| Sažetak | Fichteov je transcendentalni idealizam – ponekad nazivan i etičkim idealizmom – jedan od ključnih momenata bez kojeg bi Hegelov apsolutni idealizam bio nezamisliv. Prvi pokušaj da, kako Hegel to formulira, filozofija odbaci ime ljubavi prema spoznaji i na njeno mjesto postavi istinsku znanost danu u formi sistema, nalazimo upravo u Fichteovoj Nauci o znanosti (Wissenschaftslehre). Međutim, prema Hegelu, dva su ključna momenta u kojima transcendentalni, tj. etički idealizam ne uspijeva samoga sebe uspostaviti kao istinski i potpuni idealistički sustav čiste znanosti. Prvo, pokazuje se kako transcendentalni idealizam upada u neprilike sa kada Ja poima kao nešto što je jednako sebi (Ja = Ja) samo kao regulatorna ideja, odnosno da u zbilji Ja tek ima biti = Ja. Tako mišljeno jastvo obilježeno je vječnom težnjom (Streben) koja zbog nepremostive razlike realnog i idealnog nikada ne može biti zadovoljena. Drugi se problem tiče forme u kojoj se transcendentalni idealizam izlaže, tj. nauke o znanosti, a sastoji se u tome što je ona zasnovana na transcendentalnoj neposrednosti koja se uzima kao temelj čitave nauke o znanosti. Hegel će na tom mjestu kritizirati potrebu da se postavi temelj prije same stvari na kojemu bi ona onda počivala. Znanost, kako je u Hegela prikazana u Logici, nije transcendentalno utemeljena već proizlazi iz same stvari, odnosno jedinstva bitka i mišljenja, a što je vidljivo iz pozicije apsolutnog znanja do kojega nas vodi njegova Fenomenologija. Nakon razrade i elaboracije određenih spoznajno-teorijskih i ontoloških prednosti apsolutnog idealizma naspram transcendentalnog idealizma, u zaključku se ipak ostavlja prostor za sumnju u potpuno nadilaženje Fichteova sistema onim Hegelovim. |
| Sažetak (engleski) | Fichte's transcendental idealism – sometimes called ethical idealism – is one of the key moments without which Hegel's absolute idealism would be unthinkable. The first attempt that, as Hegel formulates it, philosophy rejects the name of love towards knowledge and replaces it with true science given in the form of a system, we find precisely in Fichte's Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). However, according to Hegel, there are two key moments in which transcendental, i.e. ethical idealism fails to establish itself as a true and complete idealistic system of pure science. First, it is shown that transcendental idealism runs into difficulties when it conceives the Self as something that is equal to itself (I = I) only as a regulatory idea, that is, that in reality I has yet to be = I. The self conceived in this way is characterized by an eternal strive (Streben) which, due to the insurmountable difference between the real and the ideal, can never be satisfied. The second problem concerns the form in which transcendental idealism is presented, i.e. the science of knowledge, and it consists in the fact that it is based on transcendental immediacy, which is taken as the basis of the entire science of knowledge. In this place, Hegel will criticize the need to lay a foundation before the thing itself, on which it would then rest. Science, as presented in Hegel's Logic, is not transcendentally based, but arises from the thing itself, that is, the unity of being and thinking, which is evident from the position of absolute knowledge to which his Phenomenology leads us. After the development and elaboration of certain epistemological and ontological advantages of absolute idealism versus transcendental idealism, in the conclusion there is still room for doubt about the complete transcendence of Fichte's system by Hegel's. |
