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Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

Nela Erdeljac

**Jazz Music in Yugoslav-American Foreign
Relations (1956-1974)**

**[Džez u vanjskopolitičkim odnosima
Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država
(1956.-1974.)]**

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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Supervisor:

Tvrtko Jakovina, PhD

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DOKTORSKI RAD

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Zagreb, 2024.

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INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUPERVISOR

Tvrtko Jakovina was born in Požega, Croatia on March 2, 1972. He obtained his PhD at the History Department of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb in 2002. Over the course of his academic career, he pursued studies at several foreign universities such as University of Kansas, Georgetown University (Fulbright scholarship), Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (MA in American Studies) and Boston College. He is a tenured professor of world history of the 20th century at the History Department at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences where he served as the Head of the Department from 2014 to 2016.

In addition to teaching at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb and several other Croatian universities, professor Jakovina spent time either as a research fellow or has taught courses at several foreign institutions of higher education such as the London School of Economics and "Istituto per l'Europa centro-orientale e balcanica" at the University of Bologna, respectively. Professor Jakovina has delivered lectures at various foreign universities over the course of his professional academic career.

Professor Jakovina is a two-time recipient of the National Science Award (2004 and 2014) and he received the literary award "Kiklop" in 2013. Chronologically, his primary research interests center on the second half of the twentieth century. Thematically, the majority of the work produced by professor Jakovina examines the foreign policy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In addition to having a rich academic career which includes five authored books, three edited volumes and many scholarly articles, professor Jakovina actively provides commentary for the Croatian media.

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ABSTRACT

The main research objective of this dissertation is to analyze the role of jazz in Yugoslav-American diplomatic relations from 1956 to 1974. By using documents from American archives and the archives of the former Yugoslav states, this dissertation approaches this specific type of diplomacy through the definition of cultural diplomacy proposed by scholar Maurits Berger (2008) and through the application of the concept of "nation branding" (Gienow-Hecht, 2019). By applying this definition and the said concept, this dissertation argues that "jazz diplomacy" which developed between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia/Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States emerged as a component of the "branding strategies" used by both states to preserve the "independent Yugoslavia" brand in the international arena. Within such strategies, which used jazz diplomacy as a branding instrument, Yugoslav jazz musicians and impresarios emerged as "brand ambassadors" who, alongside their American colleagues, used cultural activities to raise awareness and sustain the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international cultural scene in the same manner as had Yugoslav politicians in the political realm. Their assignments were made possible by several factors. In the wake of its ousting from the Cominform and in the midst of their "rebranding" campaign, Yugoslavia adopted cultural diplomacy as a branding strategy aimed at raising the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international scene and ensuring the brand's ultimate survival on that same market. Within Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government adopted "independence" and "politics of balance" as Yugoslav market forces which governed the conduct of cultural diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States and allowed the Americans to explore and navigate the vagaries of the Yugoslav cultural market. These market forces secured American presence on the Yugoslav cultural market, allowed musical interaction with the Yugoslav population and their collaboration with Yugoslav jazz musicians and impresarios in jazz diplomacy. Cultural activities undertaken by Yugoslav brand ambassadors, frequently in collaboration with American agents, ultimately led to the partial fulfilment of a goal of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy which was to obtain cultural recognition for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, the United States, cultural diplomacy, jazz, jazz diplomacy, branding, Cold War

SUMMARY IN CROATIAN

Cilj ove doktorske disertacije je analizirati ulogu jazz u diplomatskim odnosima između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije, od 1963. godine Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država od 1956. do 1974. godine. Disertacija nastoji odgovoriti na nekoliko glavnih pitanja i sugestija iz postojeće literature o kulturnoj diplomaciji. Ta literatura i dalje naglašava preveliku fokusiranost ovakvih studija na Sjedinjene Američke Države, "muči" se s pokušajima pronalaska definicije "kulturne diplomacije" te istovremeno ukazuje na manjak ovakvih studija za Jugoslaviju.

U pokušaju da odgovori na navedena pitanja i sugestije, ova disertacija pristupa "jazz diplomaciji" između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Jugoslavije u Hladnom ratu kroz "pericentrični pristup" koji predlože povjesničar Tony Smith (2000), kroz proširenu definiciju kulturne diplomacije koju predlaže Maurits Berger (2008) te koncept "nation brandinga" čiji upotrebu u studijama kulturne diplomacije trenutno predlažu vodeći povjesničari kulturne diplomacije (Gienow-Hecht, 2019). Ove postavke omogućavaju posve nov pristup kulturnoj diplomaciji između Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, odnosno sagledavanje ove vrste diplomacije preko postupka *brendiranja*. Glavni je argument ove disertacije da je jazz diplomacija koja se razvila između Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država od 1956. do 1974. godine bila jedna od *branding strategija* Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država putem koje se nastojala podići osviještenost o brendu "nezavisna Jugoslavija" u međunarodnoj areni te osigurati opstanak tog istog brenda na tom istom tržištu. Unutar tih strategija, koje su koristile jazz diplomaciju kao jedan od instrumenata brendiranja jugoslavenske države, jugoslavenski jazz glazbenici i impresariji dobili su status "ambasadora brenda" te su kroz kulturne aktivnosti, često uz suradnju s američkim predstavništvima u Jugoslaviji, radili na podizanju svijesti o brendu "nezavisna Jugoslavija" na međunarodnoj kulturnoj sceni i osiguravali opstanak brenda jednako kao i jugoslavenski političari na međunarodnom političkom tržištu.

Ova disertacija prati put jazz diplomacije kroz četiri poglavlja koji odgovaraju koracima u postupku brendiranja. Prvo poglavlje započinje s pričom o početku brenda "nezavisna Jugoslavija" koja je povezana s datumom 28. lipnja 1948. godine, odnosno izbacivanjem Jugoslavije iz Kominforma. Jugoslavenski političari potom kreću u kampanje "vanjskog" i "unutarnjeg" brendiranja kako bi osigurali unutarnju lojanost brendu te pronašli vanjske

investitore u taj isti brend. Upravo se ljuti neprijatelj Sovjetskog Saveza, Sjedinjene Američke Države, pojavljuje kao jedan od najvećih investitora u brend "nezavisna Jugoslavija".

Istovremeno s traženjem investitora, jugoslavenska država počinje koristiti kulturnu diplomaciju kao jednu od strategija brendiranja "nezavisne Jugoslavije". Ta strategija daje jugoslavenskim jazz glazbenicima, kao i jugoslavenskoj publici, status "ambasadora brenda" u glazbenoj interakciji sa strancima. Taj specifičan status dan jugoslavenskim jazz glazbenicima i impresarijima bio je i potpomognut i omogućen jugoslavenskim sustavom koji je tim istim glazbenicima dao mogućnost da "žive brend" te da surađuju s glazbenicima iz Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama. Ti su glazbenici proveli nekoliko kampanja kako bi osigurali publiku za jazz diplomaciju te pokrenuli niz kulturnih aktivnosti kako bi razvili svijest o jugoslavenskom brendu u svijetu te su djelovali u svrhu osnovnih kulturno-diplomatskih postavki jugoslavenske države.

Nakon pomirbe sa Sovjetskim Savezom sredinom pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća, u svrhu osiguravanja kulturne interakcije ne samo sa Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, već i s ostatkom svijeta, jugoslavenska vlada određuje jugoslavensku "nezavisnost" i "politiku balansa" kao dvije "tržišne sile" na jugoslavenskom kulturnom tržištu. Te dvije sile omogućavaju Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama provođenje i prilagodbu njihovih kulturnih programa, kojima pripada jazz diplomacija, jugoslavenskom tržištu, dolazak američkih jazz glazbenika, koje jugoslavenska država tretira kao potencijalne instrumente brendinga, te suradnju s jugoslavenskim jazz glazbenicima i impresarijima. Upravo te postavke jugoslavenskog tržišta i jugoslavensko okruženje omogućavaju Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama da provode brendiranje jugoslavenske države na temelju svoje vizije koja se slagala s jugoslavenskom vizijom, a u srži je značila osigurati opstanak brenda "nezavisna Jugoslavija" na međunarodnom tržištu. Kultura postaje jedna od američkih strategija za ostvarivanje te vizije s obzirom na američko shvaćanje značaja kulture za Jugoslaviju. Unutar te strategije i američki jazz glazbenici dobivaju ulogu koju trebaju odigrati u korist jugoslavenskog brenda.

U konačnici, upravo će jugoslavenski jazz glazbenici i impresariji, uz suradnju i poneku pomoć američkih jazz glazbenika, odigrati veliku ulogu u areni u kojoj se jugoslavenska država suočavala s problemima brendiranja jugoslavenske države. Preko njihovih aktivnosti, jugoslavenska će država doći do djelomičnog ostvarenja jednog od glavnih ciljeva svoje kulturne diplomacije i dobit će kulturno priznanje za državu.

Ključne riječi: jazz diplomacija, Jugoslavija, Sjedinjene Američke Države, *brendiranje*, Hladni rat, kulturna diplomacija, jazz

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter One: Setting the Independent Stage	
1.1 The “Independent Yugoslavia” brand arrives as does Dizzy	35
1.2 The transitional phase: the formation of the	54
1.3 Independence, balance and music diplomacy with the United States	72
1.4 Rules of engagement	82
Chapter Two: Culture for Independence	
2.1 “Should science and art not be the best ambassadors of peace and friendship between nations?”: Cultural Diplomacy and the International Comeback of Yugoslavia	100
2.2. It’s diplomacy: culture as “some sort of an open door even when that other door is shut”	117
2.3. Better diplomats than those paid ones: the Yugoslav agents	128
2.4 Partner no. 2: the Yugoslav audience	137
2.5 The Yugoslav performance of the independent brand.....	152
Chapter Three: The independent brand and jazz diplomacy	
3.1. A Cultural “Jigsaw-puzzle State”: Understanding the Yugoslavs	162
3.2 The launch: <i>Porgy and Bess</i> in Yugoslavia	180
3.3 “The messengers had arrived”: jazz diplomacy starts	199
3.4 The Yugoslavs take over	214
Chapter Four: The Yugoslavs Try to Take America	
4.1 Presenting Yugoslavia’s independence	244
4.2 Yugoslav cultural diplomacy calls for American aid.....	264
4.3 Pushing Yugoslav jazz into the United States	286
Conclusion	307
Bibliography	312
RESUME	331

Introduction*

Cultural Diplomacy and its definitions

"Above all, what is needed is advertisement, a smart and thoughtful one," wrote jazz musician Bojan Adamič¹ in his remarks about the cultural interaction between his country, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the rest of the world. He had been asked to do so by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries when, in 1968, this body issued a call to prominent Yugoslav cultural workers and organizations to deliver their comments on the said matter as the Committee was preparing a comprehensive analysis on the subject of Yugoslavia's cultural relations with foreign countries.² In his response Bojan Adamič further wrote how his country "needed a lot of what is today referred to as the cult of personality, only in this case, this is not about worshiping some political idol but a deliberate capital investment into a personality that would return all of this with interest rates." According to Adamič, tourism in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav gramophone industry would benefit from this investment through which, as Adamič continued, "we will try to introduce the entire world to our songs which will contribute to further political affirmation of our country which cannot live only from beautiful words but needs recognition from abroad, and, of course, money."³

These remarks by jazz musician Bojan Adamič provide a useful summary of both the topic and the concept through which this dissertation analyzes "jazz diplomacy" between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, previously known as the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and the United States of America from 1956 to 1974. Adamič's remarks on the need to advertise the country on the international scene introduce the concept applied in this

* The translation and adaptation of all quotations from Croatian to English has been done by the author.

¹ Bojan Adamič, "Neka razmišljanja o zabavnoj muzici u Jugoslaviji," 95 in Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, Elaborati o Međunarodnim vezama nekih kulturnih i prosvetnih organizacija i institucija, Maj 1968, Arhiv Jugoslavije, 559 Savezna komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom, folder 75, box 34. (hereinafter AJ-559-34-75, Adamič "Neka razmišljanja o zabavnoj muzici u Jugoslaviji")

² Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. "XIV Sednica Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom održana 4. juna 1968. godine," 7-8, Arhiv Jugoslavije, 559 Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom. Opšti materijali. Sednice Savezne komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, folder 73, box 34. Comment by Dušan Vejnović.

³ AJ-559-34-75, Adamič, "Neka razmišljanja o zabavnoj muzici u Jugoslaviji," 95.

dissertation to study one avenue of cultural internationalism⁴ developed between the said countries – "nation branding". Connected to this concept is the very idea of "brand ambassadors", that is, those extraordinary individuals Bojan Adamič called for the state to invest in, as seen from the above quoted extract. Ironically, even though Adamič described one success the state reaped from the musical failure of him and another musician at a festival in Brazil⁵, the jazz musician failed to vocalize much more directly his own role as a "brand ambassador" for Yugoslavia on the international cultural scene. It is precisely this role played by Bojan Adamič, Vojislav Simić, Boško Petrović, Davor Kajfeš and other Yugoslav jazz musicians in addition to their American colleagues such as Dizzy Gillespie, The Glenn Miller Orchestra, Louis Armstrong, Ella Fitzgerald, John Lewis, etc., that this dissertation seeks to explore within the dynamic of the Yugoslav-American "jazz diplomacy". More precisely, the main research objective of this dissertation is to analyze the role of jazz music within the diplomatic relationship between Yugoslavia and the United States from 1956 to 1974. These two years were chosen as they represent specific landmarks in this type of diplomacy which developed between the said states. Officially, "jazz diplomacy" between Yugoslavia and the United States began when the United States, through the Cultural Presentation's Program, sent American jazz musician Dizzy Gillespie on tour in 1956.⁶ The end year, 1974, also serves as a symbolic one. The first Belgrade Jazz Festival was held that year and this event marked the end of "[c]oncept ... of the Newport Jazz Festival."⁷ In essence, this dissertation looks at one element of a concept introduced by political scientist Joseph Nye in 1990, "soft power".⁸

In general, "power" means the possibility of changing the comportment of others in order to attain your goals.⁹ To use the example of Robert Dahl, power would be "a matter of A getting

⁴ As historian Akira Iriye explains, "... internationalism implies cooperation among nations, whether in political, economic or cultural affairs." *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 48.

⁵ AJ-559-34-75, Adamič, "Neka razmišljanja o zabavnoj muzici u Jugoslaviji," 96.

⁶ On the Cultural Presentations Program and the tours of Dizzy Gillespie and other jazz musicians see: Lisa E. Davenport, *Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009); Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Danielle Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2015).

⁷ *Beogradski džez festival: 1971-2020*, edited by Vojislav Pantić (Beograd: Dom Omladine Beograd, 2020), 37. (hereinafter *Beogradski džez festival*)

⁸ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), xi.

⁹ Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008), 61. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25097994>. (hereinafter "Searching for a Theory")

B to do what A wants, or of A forcing B not to do what B wants to do.¹⁰ This means that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."¹¹ In order to achieve this, one can resort to tools from the "hard power" arsenal, namely "coercion (sticks) and payments (carrots)" or a state may dip into its "soft power" pool and go with attraction.¹² As scholar Su Change explains, in the case of "hard power", power is rather reliant on the level of material resources owned by the stronger side and power is here somewhat equivalent to influence. It is the "coercive power" of one agent, continues Change, that will ultimately change both the desires and options of the other agent. In order to have more power, so Change further explains, in instances such as these, an agent needs to both acquire and expand their "material elements of power, such as territorial size, number of population, economic quality, and military technology." Simply put, according to Change, the aforementioned elements constitute the term "hard power".¹³

As scholar Louis G. Martínez Del Campo explains, before the First World War, states used resources from their military and economic arsenal to exercise power in the international arena. In the aftermath of this conflict, more appropriately in the interwar period, continues Martínez Del Campo, wartime propaganda machineries got converted into offices and departments that were to serve as frameworks for cultural diplomacy and its activities.¹⁴ It can be said that the activities that we usually associate with "modern cultural diplomacy" came to be in Europe in the interwar period.¹⁵ Scholars Elisabeth Piller and Benjamin Martin provide several explanations as to why "culture" began to be used as an element in international affairs in this particular period. The first reason Piller and Martin note is that the aftermath of the First World War brought problems for hard power. This meant, continue Piller and Martin, that countries which suffered military defeat had little option to use hard power. If such states now wanted to reclaim the territories they've lost, they needed to use cultural means to attract the population that resided near the borders. That hard power had its limits, continued Piller and Martin,

¹⁰ Su Changhe, "Soft Power," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 545.

¹¹ Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in *Behavioral Science* 2: 3 (July 1957), 201-3 quoted in Changhe, "Soft power," 545.

¹² Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 61; For a definition of "hard power" see also: Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Hard, Soft and Smart Power," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, 565.

¹³ Changhe, "Soft Power," 545.

¹⁴ Louis G. Martínez Del Campo, "Weak State, Powerful Culture: The Emergence of Spanish Cultural Diplomacy, 1914-1936," *Contemporary European History* 30, no. 2 (2021), 1. doi: 10.1017/S0960777320000636 (hereinafter: "Weak State, Powerful Culture")

¹⁵ Martin, Benjamin G. and Elisabeth Piller, "Cultural Diplomacy and Europe's Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: Introduction," *Contemporary European History* (2021), 150. (hereinafter, "Cultural Diplomacy...")

became evident even to those countries, such as France, that still had access to their hard power resources. When they, in the new context, used hard power to obtain their objectives, so Piller and Martin further explain, they were soon faced with not just with the bitterness of the civilian population, but they also had to deal with a lack of sympathies for their country in the international arena.¹⁶

It was not just that hard power that faced problems during the interwar period. As Piller and Martin note, diplomacy did too. As they further explain, while there were factors that put pressure on this type of diplomacy before the war's commencement, the catastrophe of the First World War was generally seen as the tipping point that brought shame to the old-style nineteenth century way of doing diplomacy, that is, diplomacy done in confined spaces by the elite. To adapt better to new conditions, according to Piller and Martin, European foreign ministries began reconsidering their conventional approaches and assumptions.¹⁷ Piller and Martin also write how changes occurred in the target audience of diplomacy and how the First World War and the resentment associated with it led many scholars, officials and industrialists "to see international networks of intellectual and cultural exchange as crucial levers of power in the modern world".¹⁸ Put in other words by Martínez Del Campo, states had an expanded arsenal of means through which they tried to obtain worldwide influence in the aftermath of the First World War. Military and economic factors, continues Martínez Del Campo, were no longer the only power assets of countries. Language, education and culture, as Martínez Del Campo concludes, joined them too.¹⁹

As a policy field, so writes scholar David Clarke, cultural diplomacy emerged in the last half of the nineteenth century.²⁰ In academia, studies of international relations, first described by Jeremy Bentham in 1789 as "the relations between state actors within a plural system of militarized great powers"²¹, and long dominated by studies of economic, military and political

¹⁶ Ibid., 152.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 153.

¹⁹ Martínez Del Campo, "Weak State, Powerful Culture," 1.

²⁰ David Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 19 November 2020, <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-543> (accessed 17 January 2022). (hereinafter, "Cultural Diplomacy")

²¹ Jürgen Osterhammel, "A 'Transnational History of Society: Continuity or New Departure?'" in *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, Incorporated, 2010), 44-45. ProQuest Ebook Central

themes, began incorporating culture in the mid-twentieth century.²² The term "cultural diplomacy", however, started its academic circulation in the 1990s with scholars up until then applying terms such as "'cultural action', 'public diplomacy,' 'propaganda', 'external cultural relations' or 'external cultural policies'."²³ Political scientist Joseph Nye and his coinage of the term "soft power" in 1990 provided substantial help to scholars to depart from the term "propaganda" in their studies on culture and international relations.²⁴

"Soft power", according to Nye, is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments". Soft power, continues Nye, results from "the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies."²⁵ Soft power is, according to Nye, "the second aspect of power", meaning that soft power is at work "when one country gets other countries to *want* what it wants". Soft power, so Nye further writes, equals "co-optive" power and is substantially different from "hard power", also known as "command power" where you literally command "others to do what it [the country] wants."²⁶ "Hard power is push; soft power is pull", wrote Joseph Nye.²⁷ In the same way as cultural diplomacy had been at work long before the term came to be, scholars emphasize that this was the case with soft power too.²⁸ For instance, the power of France had been increased much due to the dissemination of their language and culture in Europe during the eighteenth century.²⁹ Spain was culturally appealing to the French during the seventeenth century with the French elites reading Cervantes and following Spanish fashion.³⁰ The United States decided to side with Britain instead of Germany before the First World War as in 1914 the American public knew little about Germany to think twice over their natural allegiance to Great Britain.³¹

In an academic setting, so scholar Eytan Gilboa writes, Joseph Nye's term "soft power" had come under rigorous academic scrutiny as some scholars had seen the term to be a perplexing

²² Charlotte Faucher, "Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations in Twentieth-Century Europe," *Contemporary European History* 25, no 2 (2016), 374. (hereinafter, "Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations")

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 375.

²⁵ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, x.

²⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990), 166. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580>. On "co-optive" and "command power" see also, Nye, *Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics*, 7.

²⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Hard, Soft and Smart Power," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, 565. (hereinafter, "Hard, Soft and Smart Power")

²⁸ Changhe, "Soft power," 545; Nye, "Hard, Soft and Smart Power," 566.

²⁹ Nye, "Hard, Soft and Smart Power," 566.

³⁰ Changhe, "Soft power," 545.

³¹ Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1977-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 264 quoted in Nye, "Hard, Soft and Smart Power," 566.

one and lacking theoretical background. Others claim, continues Gilboa, that soft power cannot be synonym with power as any resource, even one that comes from a military spectrum, can be used as a soft power one. Soft power audience, the people and the media, as further explained by Gilboa, equate power with hard power, often being oblivious to the contrasts between soft and hard power. Great powers which possess military, economic and technical might are attractive. Put in other words by Gilboa, soft power relies on hard power. Additionally, writes Gilboa, soft power may be salient for one society and completely irrelevant to another. Gilboa acknowledges how Nye and some other scholars tried to remedy the situation by offering the term "smart power" which entails "learning better to combine or balance hard and soft power." On the other hand, states Gilboa, some scholars called for a complete disregard of both terms and instead proposed the term "integrated power", a term that ended up being a perplexing one as well.³²

It does not get any easier with definitions of cultural and public diplomacy which are, so scholars Martina Topić and Cassandra Scortino write, "examples of soft power".³³ The term "public diplomacy" was first utilized in 1965 to describe "the process by which international actors seek to accomplish the goals of their foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics".³⁴ As scholar Nicholas Cull writes, the then dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University Edmund Gullion is seen as the man who came up with the term in 1965. However, as Cull clarifies, by the time Gullion used the phrase, the term had not been an exactly new one. Cull notes how the term had previously been used by *Times* (London) in January 1856 to criticize the attitude of American President Franklin Pierce. The first documented usage of the term in American newspapers, continues Cull, is found in the January 1871 edition of *The New York Times* in the context of a debate in Congress.³⁵ The term denoted "new diplomatic practices" during the First World War, took on a rather internationalist meaning during the interwar period, was rarely employed during the second world conflict and reappeared again

³² Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 62.

³³ Martina Topić and Cassandra Scortino, "Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism: A Framework for the Analysis," in *Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism* (Berlin, Germany: Peter Lang Verlag, 2012), 16. (Hereinafter, "Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism")

³⁴ Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 616 (2008), 31. doi: 10/1177/0002716207311952 (Hereinafter, "Public Diplomacy"); See also Irina Gordeeva, "'Fighting for Peace is Everyone's Job': The Independent Peace Movement in the USSR and the Soviet View of Public Diplomacy in the 1980s," in *Machineries of Persuasion: European Soft Power and Public Diplomacy during the Cold War*, edited by Óscar J. Martín and Rósa Magnúsdóttir (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), 121.

³⁵ Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, edited by Nancy Snow & Nicholas J. Cull, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 13.

with the end of the Second World War.³⁶ Cull notes how this demonstrates that Edmund Gullion may have pioneered the usage of the term "public diplomacy" "in its modern meaning" but the phrase was not completely new by 1965. It was actually, continues Cull, "a fresh use of an established phrase".³⁷

While public diplomacy may not have been known as a term, an academic field or a Foreign Service "job", it had been in existence for a considerable period of time.³⁸ As scholars emphasize, it is also a term that is not so easily defined³⁹ and has frequently been equated with terms such as "soft power", then also "propaganda, public relations (PR), international public relations (IPR), psychological warfare, and public affairs."⁴⁰ What differentiates public and traditional diplomacy is that the latter occurs between governments, most notably their foreign ministries, and it is a procedure that demands "confidentiality and privacy."⁴¹ Traditional diplomacy goes hand in hand with agents who are implicated "in largely invisible processes of international relations" while public diplomacy, on the other hand, is concerned with establishing a diplomatic dialogue with the people.⁴² Public diplomacy is "an open process", meaning that the essential purpose of public diplomacy is "[p]ublicity ... the appeal is to the public: we want people to know and understand."⁴³ In general, public diplomacy entails "the cultivation of public opinion to achieve the desired geopolitical aims of the sponsor"⁴⁴ and can be defined as "'an instrument used by states, association of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values'".⁴⁵

While the usage of arts and culture in the name of politics had been a long standing practice⁴⁶, as scholars emphasize, defining cultural diplomacy is still a problem.⁴⁷ Cultural

³⁶ Ibid., 15.

³⁷ Ibid., 13.

³⁸ Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 3. (hereinafter, "Communicating with the World")

³⁹ Osgood & Etheridge, "Introduction," 12.

⁴⁰ Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 56; See also Osgood & Etheridge, "Introduction," 12.

⁴¹ Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, 3.

⁴² Jan Melissen, "Public Diplomacy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 436.

⁴³ Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, 4.

⁴⁴ Osgood & Etheridge, "Introduction," 12.

⁴⁵ B. Gregory, "American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 6:3/4 (2011), 353 quoted in Melissen, "Public Diplomacy," 436.

⁴⁶ Faucher, "Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations," 374.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 375; On the definition of cultural diplomacy being a problem see also, David Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy".

diplomacy, write historians Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried, has been used almost as a synonym for "public diplomacy, 'cultural exchange,' and 'propaganda.'" These two scholars emphasize that cultural diplomacy is rather different from other forms of diplomatic interplay and this is what constitutes the essence of the term's problem. Cultural diplomacy, so they further write, does not entail communication between two governments but a government communicating with a foreign population.⁴⁸ The problem, writes historian Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, which does not allow us to give a precise definition of cultural diplomacy is "the fact that unlike in other areas of diplomacy, the state cannot do much without the support of nongovernmental actors". The latter, continues Gienow-Hecht, are to be found among artists, teachers, students and so forth and their entry onto the stage means that "the desires, the lines of policy, the targets, and the very definition of state interests become blurred and multiply." Notwithstanding the objectives of the program or organizations they are representing, so Gienow-Hecht further writes, these agents bring their own objectives to the process.⁴⁹

As scholars further emphasize, a definition of cultural diplomacy is a problem because there is no universal usage of the term,⁵⁰ meaning that different countries use the term differently.⁵¹ To demonstrate, the examined archive materials reveal how Yugoslav cultural bodies used the term "cultural propaganda" or "propaganda of culture" to refer to cultural diplomatic activities.⁵² Scholars further note how we are not able to provide a definition of cultural diplomacy due to the inability to clearly define terms "culture" and "diplomacy", words which constitute the term.⁵³ Cultural diplomacy, or its definition, so write scholars Ang, Isar and Mar, also gets frequently fused with the term "cultural relations". As these authors explain, the former is seen as "an interest-driven governmental practice" while the latter is seen as "driven by ideals rather than interests and is practiced by non-state actors." The present day issue with cultural

⁴⁸ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, "The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, Distance, and the Promise of Civil Society," in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 13. (hereinafter, "The Model of Cultural Diplomacy")

⁴⁹ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "What are we searching for? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents, and the State," in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 10. See also, Faucher "Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations," 375-376.

⁵⁰ Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy".

⁵¹ Topić and Scortino, "Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism," 10; Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy,"

⁵² See, for instance, "Stenografske beleške, Plenarni sastanak Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, Beograd, 16. i 17. januara 1956. g.," folder 37, box 18, 559 Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom. Arhiv Jugoslavije, Belgrade, Serbia. (hereinafter, AJ-559-18-37); AJ-559-34-73, Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. "XIV Sednica Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom održana 4. juna 1958. godine"; AJ-559-36-80, "Izveštaj Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1968. godinu," Beograd, Maja 1968.

⁵³ Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy"; Topić and Scortino, "Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism," 9-10.

diplomacy, so Ang, Isar and Mar continue to write, is that "cultural diplomacy" as a term figures prominently in both foreign policy ventures and cultural vernacular of contemporary states, even though we are not really clear on "the way the notion is used, on exactly what its practice involves, on why it is important, or on how it works."⁵⁴

Scholars note how it is the definition of cultural diplomacy provided by political scientist Milton Cummings that scholars commonly cite.⁵⁵ Cummings sees cultural diplomacy to be "the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding." Cultural diplomacy can, as Cummings writes, take a one-side approach which occurs when a country focuses all of "its efforts on promoting the national language, explaining its policies and point of view, or "telling its story" to the rest of the world."⁵⁶ Scholars Piller and Martin⁵⁷, Patricia Goff⁵⁸, Jessica Gienow-Hecht⁵⁹, Cynthia Schneider⁶⁰ all provide their thinking and definition of cultural diplomacy.

Finally, scholarship on cultural diplomacy emphasizes the impact of the Cold War on the definition of cultural diplomacy. As historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht writes, the majority of research on cultural diplomacy had the Cold War United States at its center. She further writes how the US focused research saw cultural diplomacy as a salient feature of American foreign policy in their "battle" with the other superpower, the Soviet Union. Consequently, as Gienow-Hecht continues, cultural diplomacy took on a rather "one-dimensional meaning linked to political manipulation and subordination, and it has also been relegated to the backseat of diplomatic interaction."⁶¹ Such focus on the cultural diplomatic endeavours of the United and the Soviet Union, presents a double-edged sword as, so write historians Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried, through it, we learned much about cultural diplomacy but at the same time, it

⁵⁴ Ien Ang, Yudhishtir Raj Isar & Phillip Mar, "Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National Interest?" *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 21, issue 4 (2015), 365. (hereinafter, "Cultural Diplomacy...")

⁵⁵ Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy,"; Patricia M. Goff, "Cultural Diplomacy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 421.

⁵⁶ Milton Cummings, "Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey," *Americans for the Arts* (2009), 1. americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/MCCpaper.pdf (accessed September 19, 2019); Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy,"; Goff's, "Cultural Diplomacy" also partially cites this definition.

⁵⁷ Piller, Martin, "Cultural diplomacy...," 7.

⁵⁸ Goff, "Cultural Diplomacy," 419-420.

⁵⁹ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "The anomaly of the Cold War: Cultural Diplomacy and Civil Society since 1850," in *The United States and Public Diplomacy*, 32.

⁶⁰ Schneider, "The Unrealized Potential of Cultural Diplomacy," 261.

⁶¹ Gienow-Hecht, "What are we searching for?" 3. In his article "Die antideutsche Welle: The Anti-German Wave, Public Diplomacy, and Intercultural Relations in Cold War America," (*Decentering America*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007): 98) scholar Brian C. Etheridge provides a brief explanation for such a focus of academic studies on the United States.

restricted our knowledge on the general characteristics of cultural diplomacy.⁶² Some scholars, such as German historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht, who herself focused much attention on Germany's cultural diplomacy⁶³, had advocated for moving away from the Cold War studies on cultural diplomacy to better grasp what cultural diplomacy actually is and how it works.⁶⁴ As clear from the introduction section of her book, German historian Elisabeth Piller took that advice and focused on the efforts of Weimar Republic's public diplomacy to win over the United States.⁶⁵ In their introductory essay of the special issue of the journal *Contemporary European History* which was dedicated to cultural diplomacy, Piller, alongside historian Benjamin G. Martin, also stressed that the Cold War is still championed as the period in which cultural diplomacy occurred as a politically salient affair despite the expansion of studies on cultural diplomacy to other countries and even other continents during the twentieth century.⁶⁶ Similarly, scholars Óscar J. Martín García and Rósa Magnúsdóttir also recently stressed that the United States' way of looking at cultural diplomacy and its adventures in the field have still not lost its privilege in scholarship even though numerous studies have appeared that focus on cultural policies enacted by European governments during the Cold War.⁶⁷ To give a few examples, scholar Aniko Macher has, for instance, examined the cultural diplomatic efforts of Hungary from 1956, the Revolution's violent end, to 1963 where the Hungarian state tried to improve the country's position in the international arena.⁶⁸ General Franco's Spain used festivals as a soft power, "nation branding" tool to impact both Spanish people and foreigners to gain benefits for the country.⁶⁹ Polish actors, for instance, collaborated with British actors in 1970 to stage their exhibition in that country with the aim of showcasing "a multi-faceted, hybrid

⁶² Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, "The Model of Cultural Diplomacy," 15-16.

⁶³ Jessica Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Art is Democracy and Democracy is Art: Culture, Propaganda and *The Neue Zeitung* in Germany, 1944-1947," *Diplomatic History* 23, Vol. 2 (Winter 1999), pp. 21-43. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24913689> (hereinafter, "Art is Democracy and Democracy is Art")

⁶⁴ Gienow-Hecht, "The Anomaly of the Cold War," 31-32.

⁶⁵ Elisabeth Piller, *Selling Weimar: German Public Diplomacy and the United States, 1918-1933* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2021), 25. <https://doi.org/10.25162/9783515128513> (hereinafter, *Selling Weimar*)

⁶⁶ Piller, Martin. "Cultural Diplomacy ...," 155.

⁶⁷ Óscar J. Martín García and Rósa Magnúsdóttir, "Machineries of Persuasion: European Soft Power and Public Diplomacy during the Cold War," in *Machineries of Persuasion: European Soft Power and Public Diplomacy during the Cold War*, edited by Óscar J. Martín and Rósa Magnúsdóttir (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), 1-2.

⁶⁸ Anikó Macher, "Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy 1957-1963: Echoes of Western Cultural Activity in a Communist Country." in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, 75-108.

⁶⁹ Carlos Sanz Díaz, José Manuel Morales Tamaral, "Selling a Dictatorship on the Stage: 'Festivales de España' as a Tool of Spanish Public Diplomacy during the 1960s and 1970s." in *Machineries of Persuasion*, pp. 39-60. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560510-003>

identity."⁷⁰ Historian Brian Etheridge focused on German public diplomacy during the Cold War to show how Germans tried to battle the anti-German sentiment that developed in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.⁷¹ Other scholars, such as Campo-Martinez, took a different approach and examined how a specific international context "pushed" Spanish culture to the center of attention of other international players, most notably Germany, Great Britain and France, that then spread the Spanish culture within their borders at a time when Spain itself had no cultural diplomatic machinery in place in the first part of the twentieth century.⁷² These examples suggest that scholars have attempted to "decenter America" in recent years.⁷³ By placing the primary focus on Yugoslavia in the process of the cultural interaction with the Americans through jazz diplomacy, this dissertation aims to do so as well.

Literature overview

In addition to responding to the problem of defining cultural diplomacy (discussed later) and its attempt to contribute to the field by "decentering America", this dissertation also responds to a lack of studies on Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy on the European and global level. With a few notable exceptions in the aforementioned volumes, which studied American, European or Soviet cultural diplomacy, such as the study of Tea Sindbæk Andersen who analyzed Yugoslav youth brigades from a cultural diplomatic lense to argue that they were a rather successful example of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy if examined from "the individual and grass-root level"⁷⁴ or articles by scholars Sabina Mihelj and Dean Vuletic⁷⁵, Yugoslavia

⁷⁰ Verity Clarkson, "A 'Many-Coloured Prism': Exhibiting Polish National Identities in Cold War Britain." in *Machineries of Persuasion*, pp. 17-38. Quote is found on page 18.

⁷¹ Brian C. Etheridge, "Die antideutsche Welle: The Anti-German Wave, Public Diplomacy, and Intercultural Relations in Cold War America." in *Decentering America*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007) pp. 73-106.

⁷² Martínez del Campo, Luis G. "Weak State, Powerful Culture: The Emergence of Spanish Cultural Diplomacy, 1914-1936." *Contemporary European History* 30, no. 2 (2021), pp. 198-213.

⁷³ I take this phrase and the general idea of "decentering America" from Jessica Gienow-Hecht. In the introductory section of the volume *Decentering America* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007: 1), she writes how the said volume "... addresses the attempt to decenter the United States in the history of culture and international relations both in times when the United States has been assumed to take center place." She continues how the aim of the volume is to provide "... a variety of examples of how one can look at the role of culture in international history without assigning the central role to the United States."

⁷⁴ Tea Sindbæk Andersen, "Youth Brigadiers at the Railway – Personal Perspectives on Tito's Yugoslavia in the Making." in *Machineries of Persuasion*, 105-120. Quote on page 106.

⁷⁵ Sabina Mihelj, "The Dreamworld of New Yugoslav Culture and the Logic of Cold War Binaries", 97-114;

received little to no mention in these volumes.⁷⁶ The same can be said about works published by foreign scholars on music diplomacy.⁷⁷ It is as Giles Scott-Smith and Joes Segal put it, "post-World War II Yugoslavia sits uneasily with the implicit East-West divide that underpins traditional Cold War historiography."⁷⁸

American scholars who studied American "jazz diplomacy", such as Penny Von Eschen⁷⁹, Lisa E. Davenport⁸⁰ or scholars such as Ellen Noonan⁸¹, David Monod⁸² who focused on the tours of *Porgy and Bess*, only briefly mention Yugoslavia as one of the countries on the itinerary of these tours. The primary focus of these scholars lied on the American context which was concerned with American race relations which were heavily attacked by the American ideological *arch nemesis*, the Soviet Union, worldwide. As these scholars demonstrated, sending American jazz musicians abroad was an American attempt to remedy the said

Dean Vuletic, "Sounds like America: Yugoslavia's Soft Power in Eastern Europe," 115-132 in *Divided Dreamworlds?: The Cultural Cold War in East and West*, edited by Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012)

⁷⁶ Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2003); Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013);, *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History*, edited by Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010); *Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold War*, edited by Simo Mikkonen and Peka Suutari (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2016); already aforementioned *Machineries of Persuasion: European Soft Power and Public Diplomacy during the Cold War*. Yugoslavia is only briefly mentioned within the American context by Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War: 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). Frederick Charles Barghoorn also gives Yugoslavia an honorary mention in his *Soviet Cultural Offensive* (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1960). Yugoslavia is not mentioned in the aforementioned issue of *Contemporary European History* 30, Issue 2 (May 2021) that dealt with cultural diplomacy of the interwar era.

⁷⁷ I am referring to works published in the American journal *Diplomatic History* 36, No. 1 (January 2012) as part of its "Special Forum: Music Diplomacy, Strategies, Agendas, Relationship"; *Music and Diplomacy from the Early Modern Era to the Present*, edited by Rebekah Ahrendt, Mark Ferraguto, Damien Mahiet (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014); *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, First edition (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015); *International Relations, Music and Diplomacy: Sounds and Voices on the International Stage*, edited by Ramel, Frédéric, Prévost-Thomas, Cécile, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Notable exception in this volume is again Vuletic who analyzed the participation of Yugoslavia in the Eurovision Song Contest. See Vuletic, "The Eurovision Song Contest in the Musical Diplomacy of Authoritarian States," in *International Relations, Music and Diplomacy*, 213-234.

⁷⁸ Scott-Smith, Giles and Joes Segal, "Introduction: Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West," in *Divided Dreamworlds*, 6-7.

⁷⁹ Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).

⁸⁰ Lisa E. Davenport, *Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009).

⁸¹ Ellen Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess: Race, Culture, and America's Most Famous Opera* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).

⁸² See David Monod, "Disguise, Containment and the 'Porgy and Bess' Revival of 1952-1956," *Journal of American Studies* 35, no. 2 (2001), 275-312; David Monod. "'He is a Cripple an' Needs My Love': Porgy and Bess as Cold War Propaganda," in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-60*, edited by Krabbendam, Hans and Scott-Smith, Giles. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2004, pp. 300-312.

situation.⁸³ In her book *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, American musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier also mentions Yugoslavia as one of the countries visited by American musicians on State Department tours.⁸⁴

Yugoslavia's post- World War II music diplomacy has also recently captured the attention of scholars with residence in countries that constituted the former Yugoslavia. These studies complement those on American-Yugoslav political and economic relations.⁸⁵ In his study on American-Yugoslav political relations, historian Tvrtko Jakovina briefly touched on the visit of the *Porgy and Bess* troupe.⁸⁶ In her doctoral dissertation, combining both American and local archival documents, Croatian historian Carla Konta addressed American music diplomacy as part of the overall American public diplomacy towards Yugoslavia through the agents involved, the role of United States Information Service (USIS) and *Voice of America* in these tours, the messages the Americans tried to disseminate through such tours, the target audiences of American efforts and why the Yugoslavs accepted these tours. She structured her doctoral dissertation in the manner of the United States being the sender and Yugoslavia the receiver.⁸⁷ Serbian historian Radina Vučetić, whose book *Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslovenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka* preceded that of Konta, looked at the spread of American culture in Yugoslavia from the receptive lense, focusing mostly on Yugoslav archive materials. She also addressed the arrival and reception of American jazz musicians and accepted the view of jazz representing the American system.⁸⁸ Scholars Radina

⁸³ See the previous reference.

⁸⁴ Danielle Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2015)

⁸⁵ Lorraine M. Lees, "The American Decision to Assist Tito, 1948-1949," *Diplomatic History* 2, No. 4 (Fall 1978), 407-422. ; Dragica Mugoša, "SAD i jugoslovenska 1948. godina." *Istorija 20. veka*, Year 1, Issue 2, (1983), 59-89; Henry W. Brands Jr., "Redefining the Cold War: American Policy toward Yugoslavia, 1948-60." *Diplomatic History* 11, No. 1, (Winter 1987), 41-53; Robert M. Blum, "Surprised by Tito: The Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure," *Diplomatic History* 12, No.1 (Winter 1988), 39-57; Tvrtko Jakovina, "Američki komunistički saveznik? Vanjskopolitički odnosi Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Jugoslavija (1955.-1963.)," *Radovi-Zavod za hrvatsku povijest* 31 (1) (1998), 81-108; Jakovina, Tvrtko, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici (1948-1963)* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2002); Tvrtko Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik: Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene američke države: 1945.-1955.* (Zagreb: Profil International: Srednja Europa, 2003); Coleman Mehta, "The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948-1951." in *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, No.1 (Winter 2011), 101-145; Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi:1961-1971* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012), Tvrtko Jakovina, "It's Either Tito or the Soviet Aparatchik: Tito's Yugoslavia and the United States of America (1945-1991)," *Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition. Volume One, Tito's Yugoslavia, stories untold*, edited by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić (New York: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 99-137.

⁸⁶ Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, 476-477.

⁸⁷ Carla Konta. "Waging Public Diplomacy: The United States and the Yugoslav Experiment (1950-1972)" PhD diss., University of Trieste, 2016.

<https://arts.units.it/retrieve/handle/11368/2908046/187219/Waging%20Public%20Diplomacy%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2018)

⁸⁸ Radina Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, Second edition, Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2012. See page 165.

Vučetić, Dean Vuletic and Zoran Janjetović all showed how Yugoslavia employed Western style music, jazz especially, to the Eastern bloc to showcase its specificity.⁸⁹ Historians Zoran Janjetović and Dean Vuletic examined the incorporation of Western style music into Yugoslavia's domestic context and popular music⁹⁰, a topic also addressed by American historian Carol S. Lilly within her study of the domestic persuasion attempts by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1953.⁹¹ Ivan Hofman has examined the usage of folklore in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia⁹², Biljana Milanović has examined how Yugoslavia employed music diplomacy in its reorientation to the West following the 1948 events⁹³, Aleksandra Kolaković has examined the role of music in post-World War II Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy towards France⁹⁴ while Maja Vasiljević analyzed and advocated for the "pericentric approach" while studying cultural diplomacy between post- World War II Yugoslavia and Finland.⁹⁵ Vasiljević took an approach advocated by political scientist Tony Smith. He proposed the so-called "pericentrism" to argue for the need to expand research on the Cold War by exploring "the role of the periphery in the Cold War".⁹⁶ As he asserted, sole focus on the workings of the superpowers gives us an incomplete picture of the globality of the Cold War.⁹⁷ As he further argues, pericentrism, on the other hand, with its focus on smaller nations as actors demonstrates that the two global powers "were at least as much pulled as they themselves pushed into the globalization of their contest."⁹⁸ Similarly, this notion of "push" and "pull"

⁸⁹ Zoran Janjetović, *Od Internacionalne do komercijale. Popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991* (Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije: Beograd, 2011); 46; Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 181; Vuletic, "Sounds like America," 116.

⁹⁰ Zoran Janjetović, *Od Internacionalne do komercijale. Popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991* (Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije: Beograd, 2011); Dean Vuletic, "The Making of a Yugoslav Popular Music Industry," *Popular Music History* 6, No. 3 (November 12, 2012), 269-285.

⁹¹ Carol S. Lilly, *Power and Persuasion: Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist Yugoslavia, 1944-1953* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001). On the persuasion efforts of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia see also Lilly's article, Lilly, Carol S., "Problems of Persuasion: Communist Agitation and Propaganda in Post-war Yugoslavia, 1944-1948." *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2, (Summer 1994): 395-413.

⁹² Ivan Hofman, "Uloga muzičkog folkloru u spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Jugoslavije 1950-1952." u *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961.*, zbornik radova (Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd, 2008.), 437- 456; Ivan Hofman. "'Folklore diplomacy' – the role of musical folklore in Yugoslavia's foreign policy 1949-1971." in *The Tunes of Diplomatic Notes: Music and Diplomacy in Southeast Europe* (Belgrade: Institute of Musicology SASA; Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Faculty of social sciences, 2020), 203-227. (hereinafter, *The Tunes of Diplomatic Notes*)

⁹³ Biljana Milanović. "Sounding the turn to the West: Music and diplomacy of Yugoslavia after the split with the USSR and the countries of 'people's democracy' (1949-1952)." in *The Tunes of Diplomatic Notes*, pp. 185-202.

⁹⁴ Aleksandra Kolaković. "Music and cultural diplomacy: Presentation of the 'new Yugoslavia' in France after 1945." in *The Tunes of Diplomatic Notes*, 167-183.

⁹⁵ Maja Vasiljević. "Cultural cooperation between the non-aligned Yugoslavia and the neutral Finland from the 1960s to the 1980s." in *The Tunes of Diplomatic Notes*, 241-256.

⁹⁶ Tony Smith, "New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War." *Diplomatic History* 24, No.4 (Fall 2000), 569.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 581.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 581-582.

which Smith notes⁹⁹ was also used by musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier to question the idea of cultural diplomacy as "cultural imperialism" and she further writes how, during the Cold War, "[m]usic was not only pushed across borders by nation-states seeking to impose their influence: music was also pulled across borders by people who actively wanted it."¹⁰⁰ The latter, as she writes, is harder to analyze than the former as "the questions of agency that are already present when people accept or reject tours that come to them become even more acute when the recipients invite or demand the music themselves."¹⁰¹ The work of Maja Vasiljević thus joins scholars such as Elaine Kelly who examined music diplomacy between the German Federal Republic and the countries of the Middle East¹⁰², Mario Dunkel who examined West German attempts at jazz diplomacy¹⁰³, Jonathan L. Yaeger who studied the music diplomacy of the German Democratic Republic¹⁰⁴, Carlos Sanz Díaz and José Manuel Morales Tamaral who examined Spain's usage of "flamenco" in their cultural diplomacy¹⁰⁵, Corinne A. Pernet's focus on Latin American actors in their music diplomacy with the United States¹⁰⁶ and historians Tvrtko Jakovina¹⁰⁷ and Dean Vuletic¹⁰⁸ who also applied the pericentric approach in their

⁹⁹ Ibid., 572.

¹⁰⁰ Danielle Fosler-Lussier, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled: Cultural Diplomacy, Globalization, and Imperialism," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (January 2012), 60. (hereinafter, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled")

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 62.

¹⁰² Elaine Kelly, "Performing Diplomatic Relations: Music and East German Foreign Policy in the Middle East during the Late 1960s," *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, Vol. 72, No.2 (2019), pp. 493-540.

¹⁰³ Dunkel, Mario. "Jazz-Made in Germany" and the Transatlantic Beginnings of Jazz Diplomacy." in *Music and Diplomacy from the early modern era to the present*, edited by Rebekah Ahrendt, Mark Ferraguto, and Damien Mahiet (New York: Palgrave Macmillian), 2014, pp. 147-168.

¹⁰⁴ Yaeger, Jonathan L. "The Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra and the Wages of Diplomatic Service," in: *Music and diplomacy from the early modern era to the present*. Edited by Rebekah Ahrendt, Mark Ferraguto and Damien Mahiet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 69-82.

¹⁰⁵ Carlos Sanz Díaz and José Manuel Morales Tamaral, "National Flamencoism: Flamenco as an Instrument of Spanish Public Diplomacy in Franco's Regime (1939-1975)," in *Popular Music and Public Diplomacy: transnational and transdisciplinary perspectives*, edited by Mario Dunkel, Sina A. Nitzsche, (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2018), pp. 209-230.

¹⁰⁶ Corinne A. Pernet, "'For the Genuine Culture of the Americas': Musical Folklore, Popular Arts, and the Cultural Politics of Pan Americanism, 1933-50," in *Decentering America*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp.132-168.

¹⁰⁷ Tvrtko Jakovina, "It's Either Tito or the Soviet Aparatchik: Tito's Yugoslavia and the United States of America (1945-1991)," in *Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition. Volume One, Tito's Yugoslavia, stories untold*, edited by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić (New York: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 99-137.

¹⁰⁸ Although Vuletic does not specifically use the words "pericentric approach", he writes in his doctoral dissertation that his research "tempers an analytical dependence on the role of the superpowers that has overwhelmed studies of international relations of culture in the Cold War era" (17) and that he considers Yugoslavia an important cultural actor (18). Furthermore, he views Yugoslavia's cultural actors in the international arena in the 1950s and 1960s "as gatekeepers and merchants of cultural trends between East and West at a time when cultural exchange between the two blocs was still relatively restricted..." (18). Dean Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music* (doctoral dissertation, Order No. 3400600), Columbia University, 2010 in PROQUESTMS ProQuest Dissertation & Theses A&I, 84.

studies of political and cultural elements of Yugoslavia's international behavior. By focusing on Yugoslavia's cultural and jazz diplomacy, this dissertation will also employ the pericentric approach advocated by Tony Smith.

Why study Yugoslavia's international behavior through music diplomacy? Musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier argued that "[m]usic is not an 'extra' as we write history: rather it is part of the fabric we seek to describe, a site of interaction where people meet, work together, and learn from one another. In some cases, they leave this interaction with power relations among them altered or a new definition of self."¹⁰⁹ Fosler-Lussier argued for a much more serious analysis of music "as a factor of diplomacy".¹¹⁰ Historian David Suisman wrote about the same issue. As he noted, works on music are rarely published in history journals and this subject matter is still perceived to be "as peripheral to the 'real' work of historians, despite its far-reaching social, cultural, political, and economic power." Suisman then paraphrased two problems identified by historian James Millward for the occurrence of such a stance. The first problem relates to the belief of historians that they are not trained to perform an analysis of "musical forms and structures" while the second set of problems identified by Millward and paraphrased by Suisman is that historians do not always have the sources to do so, "especially for music from before the age of mechanical reproduction, and the shortcomings of even the best musical transcriptions." However, as Suisman continues, these are not obstacles that historians cannot overcome.¹¹¹ Indeed, as Suisman further recognized, by focusing on issues crucial to historians, such as, among others, diplomacy, several trained historians have demonstrated "the historical significance of music for subjects whose importance historians have long recognized".¹¹² As historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht writes, it is music that can "reflect a relation when other ties are severed, it can help us to understand the nature of relation operating on different levels, and it can introduce us to an entirely new dimension of what we deem an 'international relation.'"¹¹³ Times have changed and, as noted by scholar Giles Scott-Smith, research on international relations no longer incorporates just policies while diplomatic

<https://search.proquest.com/docview/205405912?accountid=14524> (hereinafter, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*)

¹⁰⁹ Danielle Fosler-Lussier, "Instruments of Diplomacy: Writing Music into the History of Cold War International Relations," in *Music and International History*, 118.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹¹¹ David Suisman, "Afterword: Music, Sound, History," *Journal of Social History* 52, Issue 2 (Winter 2018), 383.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 384.

¹¹³ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Introduction: Sonic History, or Why Music Matters in International History," in *Music and International History*, 2.

history is no longer so state-focused and is also incorporating studies on informal contacts in the cultural and social sphere between people and nations.¹¹⁴

When it comes to music, as Suisman writes, several scholars have started to analyze music "as social practice", their focus being not only on "systems of sound" but on the so-called term "musicking", proposed by musicologist Christopher Small who asserted that we should not look at music solely "as a *thing*, self-contained and autonomous, but as an activity – something that "happens" – dependent on a wide range of actors, conditions, and relations."¹¹⁵ Danielle Fosler-Lussier, relying on Small's term, argued that State Department funded music diplomacy during the Cold War did not just entail performances but it was instead "made real in the negotiations about priorities that surrounded these performances and in the symbolic value the performances held for all participants."¹¹⁶ In her aforementioned book *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, Fosler-Lussier argued that "human connections constitute the essence of 'soft power.'"¹¹⁷ In his study on the the tours of American symphonic orchestras during the Cold War, historian Jonathan Rosenberg also asserted "that the history of international relations cannot be disentangled from the subject of human emotions" and he indicated "that the emotions of a people are central to the way nations perceive and, ultimately interact with one another."¹¹⁸ Similarly, in her study on music diplomacy between Germany and the United States from 1850-1914, historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht also asserted that "[c]ultural and emotional relations ... fashion their own form of power in the international arena".¹¹⁹ Indeed, as David Suisman writes in his review, "music is a constitutive element of who we are as historical subjects and important not just on the level of individual pleasure ... but as part of the social and cultural relations that bind us together."¹²⁰ This dissertation joins these scholars in exploring the emotional dimension of music diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States as emotions constitute an essential component of "nation branding", to be clarified later in the text.

Despite the emphasis of this dissertation on Yugoslavia's music diplomacy, this dissertation recognizes that music was by no means the only product Yugoslavia used to presented itself

¹¹⁴ Scott-Smith, Giles. "Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programs within International Relations Theory." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008), 173.

¹¹⁵ Suisman, "Afterword," 384.

¹¹⁶ Fosler-Lussier, "Instruments of Diplomacy," 119.

¹¹⁷ Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 21.

¹¹⁸ Jonathan Rosenberg, "'To Reach ... into the Hearts and Minds of Our Friends': The United States' Symphonic Tours and the Cold War," in *Music and International History*, 159.

¹¹⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy*, 5.

¹²⁰ Suisman, "Afterword," 386.

abroad as shown by studies of scholars such as Srđan Radović and Tanja Zimmerman. Radović analyzed a soft power tool of the country, the magazine *Jugoslavija (Yugoslavia)*, founded by Oto Bihalji-Merin in 1949, that ran for ten years.¹²¹ Tanja Zimmerman also touched on the same magazine in her research¹²² while Lovorka Magaš Bilandžić analyzed an exhibition sent by the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Affairs with Foreign Countries to Europe and Latin America.¹²³ Bojana Videkanić studied Yugoslavia's cultural diplomatic ventures in the Nonaligned Movement¹²⁴ while historians Tatjana Šarić and Vesna Đikanović studied the attention and politics of the Yugoslav state towards Yugoslav immigrants.¹²⁵

This literature review on Yugoslavia's public and cultural diplomacy corroborates the previously made statement how studies on this segment of Yugoslavia's behavior are lagging behind available studies for other European countries. In general, scholars such as Eytan Gilboa, have already stated that we need more "movement" in the research on public diplomacy given the new central position this type of diplomacy is given in foreign policy and diplomacy.¹²⁶ It was already in 1990 that Joseph Nye wrote how "the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force and conquest" while "[t]he factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power".¹²⁷ Compared to previous centuries, it has become much more expensive for superpowers to resort to force even though this element still "remains the ultimate form of power in a self-help system".¹²⁸ However, different elements "such as communications, organizational and institutional skills, and manipulation of interdependence have become important"¹²⁹ and states are now much more

¹²¹ Radović, Srđan. "Channeling the Country's Image: Illustrated Magazine Yugoslavia (1949-1959)." *AM Journal of Art and Media Studies* 13 (2017), 18. doi: 10.25038/am.v0i13.180

¹²² Zimmermann, Tanja. "The Visualization of the Third Way in Tito's Yugoslavia." in *Art beyond Borders: Artistic Exchange in Communist Europe (1945-1989)*, edited by Jérôme Bazin, Pascal Dubourg Glatigny, and Piotr Piotrowski, NEW-New edition, 1, (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2016), 473-484.

¹²³ Magaš Bilandžić, Lovorka, "Izložba Sto listova jugoslovenske moderne grafike Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom i njezina uloga u razvijanju kulturnih veza Jugoslavije s inozemstvom u prvoj polovini 1950-ih." *Peristil* 62, No. 1 (2019): 139-157.

¹²⁴ Bojana Videkanić. "Nonaligned Modernism: Yugoslav Culture, Nonaligned Cultural Diplomacy, and Transnational Solidarity," *Nationalities Papers*, 2021, pp. 1-19. Similarly to this dissertation, Bojana Videkanić also emphasizes and makes the same argument about the importance cultural diplomacy played "in Yugoslavia's new international nonaligned strategy" for its survival following the country's ousting from the Cominform. (3).

¹²⁵ Vesna Đikanović, "Jugoslovenska država i iseljenici: propagandni rad među Jugoslovenskim iseljenicima u SAD od 1945. do 1948," *Tokovi istorije* 1-2 (2005), 145-159; Tatjana Šarić, "Iseljenička služba Hrvatske u Jugoslaviji i kulturno djelovanje prema iseljeništvu - 1960-e i 1970-e: hrvatski glazbenici u inozemstvu," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 53, no. 1 (April 1, 2021), 69- 99.

¹²⁶ Gilboa, "Searching for a theory of public diplomacy," 75; On the importance of public diplomacy see also García, Magnúsdóttir, "Machineries of Persuasion," 7.

¹²⁷ Nye, "Soft power," 154.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 157.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 157-158.

conscious of their *brand* due to globalization and the media revolution.¹³⁰ What has been at work is "a shift in political paradigms, a move from the modern world of geopolitics and power to the postmodern world of images and influence."¹³¹ What is peculiar about this "postmodern power is that it exercises power ... without using coercion and/or payments."¹³² Another reason why public diplomacy is becoming increasingly important today is, as Nicholas Cull stated, because the world needs to "acknowledge its interdependence and use the mechanism of public diplomacy to see that can be learned across national boundaries to address our collective challenges."¹³³ However, to go back and reiterate the assertion of Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried, what we actually know about cultural diplomacy is the Cold War American version of it and not really its exact character.¹³⁴ These two authors, who propose their own model of cultural diplomacy, pose questions on the nature of cultural diplomacy if it is positioned in a different place and different time. If we shift our analysis on a different agent, place or time, as they ask, which "mechanisms, strategies, messages, and agents" would we find? Secondly, if our attention shifts to a different transmitter or a different target, as Gienow-Hecht and Donfried continue to ask, which components of what we already know about cultural diplomacy would still work?¹³⁵ To reiterate, through the application of the "pericentric approach" in the study on the role of jazz in Yugoslav-American diplomatic relations, this dissertation responds to the said call broaden the field by looking at experiences and practices of other countries.

Theoretical Foundations

Now that we have outlined both the definitional problem of the term "cultural diplomacy" and the literature review that demonstrates how studies such as this one are necessary in the broader context of the cultural diplomatic field, it is time to move on to the theoretical foundations of this dissertation in line with the stated research gaps. In her book chapter on

¹³⁰ Ham, Peter van. "The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation." *Foreign Affairs* 80, no.5 (2001), 3. (hereinafter, "The Rise of the Brand State")

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³² Ham, Peter van. "Place Branding: the State of the Art." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008), 132. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25097998> (hereinafter, "Place Branding")

¹³³ Cull, Reputational Security, 4.

¹³⁴ Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, "The Model of Cultural Diplomacy," 15-16.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

"Nation Branding", historian Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht summarized the main "lenses" through which scholars examine international cultural relations. As she writes, some scholars focus on the characteristics and role played by agents who carried out the objectives of the great powers by creating programs through which to seduce foreigners. Here, the emphasis, as she explains, is namely on the process of reaching decisions and developing specific cultural policies. Another set of scholars who usually study "client states", continues Gienow-Hecht, see cultural diplomacy as a foreign policy substitute. This set of scholars emphasizes how "host countries" or neutral countries questioned these programs of the great powers and frequently did things their way, most notably when there were no diplomatic relations or when such relations were curtailed. A third set of researchers, so Gienow-Hecht further clarifies, study "cross-border relations" namely by private agents and usually done informally.¹³⁶ Lastly, some scholars study cultural relations and their function prior to or after the end of the Cold War, as Gienow Hecht details. Such works, continues Gienow-Hecht, aim to demonstrate how different agents may establish a rather specific international relation in which the state may not be present or such a relation can occur adjacent to the government or beyond it.¹³⁷

Some scholars have also addressed some of the important questions of cultural diplomacy through the concept of "cultural transfer". German historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht, as evident from her article "Art is Democracy and Democracy is Art: Culture, Propaganda and The *Neue Zeitung* in Germany, 1944-1947", was among the first scholars to argue for the inclusion of agents into the study of "the U.S. cultural transfer abroad", alongside the then dominant studies on objectives, motives and effects of American cultural diplomacy. As she advocated in this article, the focus needed to be "on exactly what was done and who did it."¹³⁸ Her work hinged on the concept of "transfer" introduced by Michael Espagne in 1994 that described "the process through which the norms, images and representations of one culture appear in another by the transmission of concepts."¹³⁹ More precisely, in the stated article, Jessica Gienow-Hecht demonstrated how it were the actors who formed messages and made them more

¹³⁶ Gienow-Hecht, "Nation Branding," 234.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 235.

¹³⁸ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Art is Democracy and Democracy is Art: Culture, Propaganda and *The Neue Zeitung* in Germany, 1944-1947," *Diplomatic History* 23, Vol. 2 (Winter 1999), 43. "U.S. cultural transfer abroad" is found on page 22. (hereinafter, "Art is Democracy")

¹³⁹ Hartmut Kaelble, "Between Comparison and Transfers – and What Now? A French-German Debate," in *Comparative and Transnational History*, 33. On "transfers" see also: Matthias Middell, "European History and Cultural Transfer," *Diogenes* 48, No. 189 (March 2000), 26-27; Phillip Ther, "Comparison, Cultural Transfer, and the Study of Networks: Toward a Transnational History of Europe," in *Comparative and Transnational History*, 207-208.

appealing to receivers. In this process, as she demonstrated, what the message was to convey changed as well.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, German historian Rüdiger Ritter looked at the transmission of American jazz into Eastern Europe through the same concept to argue that jazz meant a completely different thing in Eastern Europe than it had in the United States as "jazz was situated within a different cultural framework that defined the meanings of jazz." The end results were, as Ritter continues, "specific mutual misunderstandings, especially on the field what constituted individual freedom and of the black-and-white discourse in jazz."¹⁴¹ As he noted, Eastern Europeans approached jazz through discussions on whether jazz was an American product or whether it was theirs.¹⁴² Since Yugoslavia was not part of Eastern Europe, it was not included in a volume edited by Pickhan and Ritter that focused on jazz in the Eastern bloc that addressed such issues.¹⁴³ However, in one of his works, historian Dean Vuletic demonstrated how Yugoslavia underwent the same process of making Western popular music all the more Yugoslav, the by-product being the state backing up the establishment of a Yugoslav popular music industry.¹⁴⁴ Debates on jazz in Yugoslavia, as shown by Vuletic, also included proposals to develop a domestic version of jazz which meant to strip the music of its American elements.¹⁴⁵ Making jazz more Yugoslav and removing it from the American label was not just a specificity of Yugoslavia. This was a process, as shown by scholars Yoshiomi Saito and Rüdiger Ritter, that occurred in other countries too.¹⁴⁶

Scholars such as Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried identify the question of agency as one of the crucial ones that remains to be solved in cultural diplomacy.¹⁴⁷ In addition to the state and its foreign policy, scholars Simo Mikkonen and Peka Suutari also advocated for the inclusion of agents who were engaged in cultural diplomatic activities during the Cold War into

¹⁴⁰ Gienow-Hecht, "Art is Democracy," 22.

¹⁴¹ Rüdiger Ritter, "Broadcasting Jazz into the Eastern Bloc- Cold War Weapon or Cultural Exchange? The Example of Willis Conover," *Jazz Perspectives* 7, No. 2 (2013), 113.

¹⁴² Ritter, "Broadcasting Jazz into the Eastern Bloc," 112; See also Rüdiger Ritter, "The Radio – a Jazz Instrument of its Own," in *Jazz Behind the Iron Curtain*, edited by Gertrud Pickhan and Rüdiger Ritter, Berlin: Peter Lang, 2010, pp. 35-56. In his examination of jazz scenes in Poland and the GDR, Schmidt-Rost also used the concept of "cultural transfer" to examine the structure through which jazz spread in these two countries. His research further demonstrated how American elements were removed from jazz and the music was seen as European in the Polish jazz discourse. Christian Schmidt-Rost, "Freedom Within Limitations – Getting Access to Jazz in the GDR and PRP between 1945 and 1961," in *Jazz Behind the Iron Curtain*, edited by Gertrud Pickhan and Rüdiger Ritter (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 223-238. The interpretation of jazz within the Polish discourse can be found on page 234.

¹⁴³ See *Jazz Behind the Iron Curtain*.

¹⁴⁴ Dean Vuletic, "Sounds like America", 117.

¹⁴⁵ Dean Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*.

¹⁴⁶ Yoshiomi Saito. *The Global Politics of Jazz in the Twentieth Century: Cultural Diplomacy and "American music"* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020); Ritter, "Broadcasting Jazz into the Eastern bloc," 128.

¹⁴⁷ Gienow-Hecht, Donfried, "The Model of Cultural Diplomacy," 14.

studies of cultural diplomacy. These two scholars further wrote how we need to see why such agents got involved in such practices and to what result.¹⁴⁸ Again, similarly to what Jessica Gienow-Hecht had already stated regarding definitional problems which occur when we incorporate agents and their goals into the cultural diplomatic process¹⁴⁹, Mikkonen and Suutari also note that the state's view of the objective of cultural diplomacy does not always coincide with the view of participating agents.¹⁵⁰ Jonathan Rosenberg had also demonstrated this in his research on the tour of American conductor Leonard Bernstein in Latin America¹⁵¹ and Berlin.¹⁵²

However, in her review of the books edited by both Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried and Martina Topic and Sinisa Rodin, historian Charlotte Faucher warned that in our sole focus on actors and policies we "run the risk of losing sight of the principle objective of cultural diplomacy: impacting on a more or less defined audience which is conspicuously absent from many contributions."¹⁵³ According to Faucher, cultural diplomacy would gain much from "a sociological approach to cultural diplomacy".¹⁵⁴ After all, as Joseph Nye wrote, power is dependable on context. And it is in this segment, so Nye further wrote, that soft power even more so than hard power is dependent "upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers."¹⁵⁵ "Soft power", as Nye put it, "is a dance that requires partners."¹⁵⁶ Similarly, political scientist Janice Bially Mattern also writes how soft power is "a 'social relationship'" and she sees it as successful only if the target audience "are attracted to the aspiring power holder."¹⁵⁷

Scholars such as Ang, Isar and Mar noted the absence of critical studies of cultural and public diplomacy from the point of view of Cultural Studies, Cultural Policy or Cultural

¹⁴⁸ Simo Mikkonen and Peka Suutari, "Introduction to the Logic of East-West Artistic Interactions," in *Music, Art and Diplomacy*, 2.

¹⁴⁹ Gienow-Hecht, "What are we searching for?," 10.

¹⁵⁰ Mikkonen, Suutari, "Introduction," 2.

¹⁵¹ Rosenberg, "'To Reach...into the Hearts and Minds of Our Friends'," *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*, 140-165. See pp. 157-158.

¹⁵² Jonathan Rosenberg, "'The Best Diplomats Are Often the Great Musicians': Leonard Bernstein and the New York Philharmonic Play Berlin." *New Global Studies* 8, No.1, (2014), pp. 65-86. See pp. 73.
doi 10.1515/ngs-2014-006

¹⁵³ Faucher, "Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations," 378.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 383.

¹⁵⁵ Nye, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, 16.

¹⁵⁶ Nye, "Hard, Soft, and Smart Power," 567.

¹⁵⁷ Janice Bially Mattern, "Why 'Soft power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 3 (2005), 590-91 quoted in Kelly, "Performing diplomatic relations," 500.

Sociology.¹⁵⁸ Taking up the suggestion of Eytan Gilboa who proposed that scholars turn to Cultural Studies to establish a conceptual framework for public diplomacy, David Clarke tried to do so for cultural diplomacy, namely to see how cultural goods operate within cultural diplomacy.¹⁵⁹ Within his research, he identified four agents which produced and used culture. He advised us to move away from the notion "that the lines between producers and consumers of cultural diplomacy can be clearly drawn". Clarke also wrote how our analysis of cultural diplomacy, its decision-making process and performance, should concentrate on what people, within the cultural diplomatic framework, actually "do with those products, that is to say how they make meaning with them [the products], and how that meaning-making relates to the original policy goals of cultural diplomacy."¹⁶⁰ Taking a cue from Giles-Scott-Smith who stated that public diplomacy needs to be comprehended from the point of view of international relations, Clarke wrote how, to gain a better understanding of cultural diplomacy "in the context of international relations, it would be preferable for that understanding to develop in relation to existing international relations theory."¹⁶¹ Jessica Gienow-Hecht also noted how cultural diplomacy does not lean to any side of the political spectrum nor does it have political value.¹⁶² As she further writes, cultural diplomacy can be directed by people who have little connection to both the affairs of the government or the interest of their state. Nonetheless, as Gienow-Hecht concludes, "cultural diplomacy is an action and an instrument quite like classical political diplomacy – a tool and a way of interacting with the outside world."¹⁶³ While culture has started to make a stir as a subject of international relations theory ever since the late 1980s, according to Giles Scott-Smith, whom Clarke referenced in the aforementioned article, the emphasis needs to be put "on how 'culture' is a tool of diplomacy, which can be instrumentalized to achieve a state's goals in the foreign policy process".¹⁶⁴ In particular, he analyzed government initiated exchange programs through the lenses of the international relations theories so that we could better comprehend "the value of such exchanges as a political tool within foreign policy."¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁸ Ang, Isar and Mar, "Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National Interest?," 365-366.

¹⁵⁹ David Clarke, "Theorising the role of cultural products in cultural diplomacy from a Cultural Studies perspective," *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 22, No. 2 (2016), 148. (hereinafter, "Theorising the role")

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 154.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 149.

¹⁶² Gienow-Hecht, "What Are We Searching For?," 10-11.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁶⁴ Giles Scott-Smith, "Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programs within International Relations Theory," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008), 174; Quote within the quote is from Depkat, V., "Cultural Approaches to international relations: A challenge?" in *Culture and International History*, edited by Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 177.

¹⁶⁵ Giles Scott-Smith, "Mapping the Undefinable," 173.

Giles Scott-Smith, Eytan Gilboa and David Clarke are all scholars who advocate a look at both public and cultural diplomacy through the international relations theory and all three scholars point out the constructivist theory as a particularly useful one.¹⁶⁶

International relations theory is mostly materialist.¹⁶⁷ The way materialists perceive international politics, so explain scholars Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, is that it is driven by power and national interests. Power entails, as the duo continues to write, "military capability, supported by economic and other resources." National interests, according to Jackson and Sørensen, entail a selfish yearning of countries "for power, security, or wealth". Since these two are "material factors", continue Jackson and Sørensen, to materialists ideas don't matter much. Constructivists, write Jackson and Sørensen, hold an opposing point of view and to them "ideas always matter."¹⁶⁸ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen further note how constructivists point not to the material but the social as the most salient element of international relations. It is their understanding, as the aforementioned authors continue to write, that this "social and political world", which international relations constitute, "is not a physical entity or material object that is outside human consciousness." As a result, state Jackson and Sørensen, in international relations studies must be placed "on the ideas and beliefs that inform actors on the international scene as well as the shared understanding between them".¹⁶⁹ Constructivists see human relations, which incorporate international relations, as comprised "of thoughts and ideas and not essentially of material conditions or forces."¹⁷⁰ Men and women create everything that exist in the social world and, since they are its creator, they understand this world which is "a world of human consciousness: of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages and discourses, of signs, signals, and understandings among human beings, especially groups of human beings, such as states and nations."¹⁷¹ Constructivists, alongside postmodernists, neo-Marxists, feminists and others, deal "with how world politics is 'socially constructed'" and their view rests on two assertions: the basic international politics structures "are social rather than strictly material ... and that these structures shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just their behavior".¹⁷² It is the social relationships, according to scholar Alexandar Wendt, that

¹⁶⁶ Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy,"; Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 74-75; Scott-Smith, "Mapping the Undefinable," 185.

¹⁶⁷ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Fifth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 209. (hereinafter, *Introduction to International Relations*)

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 213.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 209.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 212.

¹⁷² Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995), 71-72.

make structures and these structures consist of three components: "shared understanding, material resources, and practice." Social structures, so Wendt continues, rely on ideas and they are "social" due to "their intersubjective quality". Wendt writes how material resources are seen as a part of social structures as they only gain "meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded."¹⁷³ As scholar Eric Ringmar notes, in world politics socialization can work on different planes. Imitating the doings of others, as Ringmar writes, does not just occur for security reasons as the "survival of the fittest" also entails social, not just physical survival. What this means, so Ringmar continues, is that "states not only pursue their 'national interest' but also – before anything else – they seek to establish identities for themselves." The essential question which should precede that of the interest of the country, as stated by Ringmar, is the question of the country's identity.¹⁷⁴ As Ringmar notes, "[i]t is only once we know who we are that we can know what we want."¹⁷⁵ The suggestion to approach cultural diplomacy through the constructivist theory represents the first theoretical foundation of this dissertation.

The second theoretical foundation of this dissertation rests on the argument of scholar Petar Van Ham who argues that constructivism can provide us with a theoretical base for "location branding" given that "it offers brand states (as well as other location brands) the option of constructing their own image, role, and identity."¹⁷⁶ Establishing relations with foreigners, both in person and through institutions, through emphasizing "*values*" is a common feature of both public diplomacy and place branding which distinguishes them from classical diplomacy that is focused on "*issues*."¹⁷⁷ It is precisely this reason, namely emphasis on "values and ideas as driving factors" of international relations, argues Peter Van Ham, why constructivism can help us comprehend and clarify place branding. The ability to form identities, continues Van Ham, adds to an important and special segment of place branding. Soft power is concerned with control and impact, writes Van Ham, while place branding, on the other hand, is crucial precisely because it helps create identities.¹⁷⁸ This plays a role in cultural diplomacy too, especially if we take up the suggestion of David Clarke. He, drawing on the arguments of scholars who assert "that an actor's attempt to communicate a particular image of itself to others

¹⁷³ Ibid., 73.

¹⁷⁴ Erik Ringmar, "The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West," *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 2 (June 2002), 116. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836702037002973> (hereinafter, "The Recognition Game")

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 118.

¹⁷⁶ Ham, Peter van. "Branding Territory: Inside the Wonderful Worlds of PR and IR Theory." *Millennium* 31, no. 2, (March 2002), 261. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298020310020101> (hereinafter, "Branding Territory")

¹⁷⁷ Van Ham, "Place Branding," 135.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 131.

will bear the traces of its own socially constructed identity", affirms "that policy tells us about the kind of identity and actor seeks recognition for, even if outcomes are hard to assess".¹⁷⁹

Historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht recently suggested the concept of "nation branding" as an avenue to study international history.¹⁸⁰ As a term, "nation brand" came to life in 1996 when Simon Anholt coined it to explain his idea that "the reputations of countries (and, by extension, of cities and regions too) behave rather like the brand images of companies and products, and are equally critical to the progress, prosperity, and good management of those places."¹⁸¹ We can most easily define "nation branding" as "the phenomenon by which governments engage in self-conscious activities aimed at producing a certain image of the nation state".¹⁸² A "brand" is seen by agencies involved in the branding business as pretty much "anything for which one can construct a mental inventory".¹⁸³ As Van Ham writes, "the location brand is a form of intellectual property"¹⁸⁴, i.e., 'the totality of the thoughts, feelings, associations and expectations that come to mind when a prospect or consumer is exposed to an entity's name, logo, products, services, events, or any design or symbol representing them'.¹⁸⁵ We can interpret nation branding to be a sort of a soft power display given that it showcases the yearnings of countries to get others to notice them, to notice their achievements and to believe "in their qualities".¹⁸⁶ Those engaged in nation branding attempt to add credibility and gain political impact for their country, they attempt to get foreigners to invest, seduce tourists, amplify nation building, lure and keep talented people and "change negative connotations in regard to, for example, environmental or human rights concerns."¹⁸⁷ Cultural relations also play a key role in nation branding, according to Simon Anholt, who asserted "that cultural relations is the only

¹⁷⁹ Clarke, "Cultural Diplomacy."

¹⁸⁰ Jessica Gienow-Hecht, "Nation Branding: A Useful Category for International History." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 30, No. 4 (2019), 755-779.

¹⁸¹ Simon Anholt, "Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations." *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy* 2, Iss.1 (2011), 6.

¹⁸² Bolin G., and P. Stahlberg, "Between Community and Commodity. Nationalism and Nation Branding," in *Communicating the Nation. National Topographies of Global Media Landscapes*, edited by Anna Roosvall and Inka Solivara Moring (Goteborg: Nordicom, 2010), 82 quoted in Jordan, Paul. "NATION BRANDING: A TOOL FOR NATIONALISM?" *Journal of Baltic Studies* 45, no. 3 (2014), 283.

¹⁸³ Van Ham, "Place Branding," 129.

¹⁸⁴ Van Ham, "Branding Territory," 253.

¹⁸⁵ Marsha Lindsay, "The Brand Called Wisconsin™: Can We Make It Relevant and Different for Competitive Advantage?" [<http://www.wisconsin.edu/summit/archive/2000/papers/pdf/lindsay.pdf>] quoted in Van Ham, "Branding Territory," 253.

¹⁸⁶ Jordan, "NATION BRANDING," 284.

¹⁸⁷ Viktorin, Carolin, Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C.E., Estner, Anika, Will, Marcel K., "Introduction: Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy: Exploring the Historical Origins of Nation Branding." in *Nation Branding in Modern History*, edited by Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, Anika Estner, Marcel K. Will (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018), 2.

demonstrably effective form of nation branding I have ever encountered."¹⁸⁸ Countries that exercised cultural relations for a significant period of time, according to Anholt, provide us with evidence "that consistent, imaginative cultural exchange does eventually create an environment where respect and tolerance flourish, and this undoubtedly also favours increased trade in skills, knowledge, products, capital, and people." Better rapport, continues Anholt, is established by people who comprehend one another. Subsequently, as Anholt further writes, a freer, mutually beneficial and more consistent trade tends to occur between people that have a good rapport.¹⁸⁹

Nation branding can also have considerable benefits for the study of cultural diplomacy, according to historian Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht. As she writes, the problem that frequently occurs with the Cold War studies on the cultural and informational battle undertaken by both the United States and the Soviet Union is the inability of scholars to connect these specific efforts with those that occurred in previous eras.¹⁹⁰ She then proposes that we use "nation branding" to understand "this complexity and compose a history of place-and-people identity management".¹⁹¹ Furthermore, as Gienow-Hecht et. al. note, through the concept of nation branding we can focus on the actors engaged in this process and the target audience of such practices¹⁹², in addition to "rebranding" efforts and "branding strategies".¹⁹³

This dissertation heeds the advice of Jessica Gienow-Hecht and applies this concept to its study on jazz diplomacy between post-World War Two Yugoslavia and the United States for several reasons.¹⁹⁴ To begin with, in line with constructivism and nation branding which are concerned with identities¹⁹⁵, I treat independence as a crucial, "core" identity of the citizens and the leadership of Yugoslavia. To briefly provide a theoretical foundation for my thinking, I turn to one of the most prominent advocates of constructivism Alexander Wendt and his clarification of the so-called "corporate identity" which relates to the internal, self-regulated characteristics that make an individual which would, technically, be our consciousness. This is slightly different for organizations/structures as their "corporate identity", continues Wendt,

¹⁸⁸ Anholt, "Beyond the Nation Brand," 11-12.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁹⁰ Gienow-Hecht, J., "Nation Branding: A Useful Category for International History," 760.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 761.

¹⁹² Gienow-Hecht et. al. "Introduction: Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy," 17-18.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

¹⁹⁴ Yugoslavia has, so far, not been thoroughly examined from this perspective. Carla Konta mentions this phenomenon in her doctoral dissertation but does not subject it to further scrutiny. (See *Waging Public Diplomacy*, 267). Historian Dean Vuletic also mentions some elements that constitute "nation branding" (Yugoslavia's desired image) but also does not analyze them further. See *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*.

¹⁹⁵ Ham, "Place Branding," 135.

entails "their constituent individuals, physical resources, and the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which individuals function as a 'we'". Wendt states that there are four interests that are of concern for this type of identity. The first one is "physical security" which makes a state different from other states. The second is concerned with the "ontological security or predictability in relationship to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities". The third interest, as Wendt continues, is concerned with being recognized "by others above and beyond survival through brute force". The final interest entails "development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level." The motivation to engage in action arises from these corporate interests, as Wendt further asserts, and interests are usually set in place before the interaction occurs. Wendt argues that the self-interest, which these interests do not incorporate, "is an inherently social phenomenon." The satisfaction of the states' corporate identity, so Wendt continues, rests on the articulation of "the self" relative to others, a role played by "social identities at both domestic and systematic levels of analysis." Wendt describes "social identities" as "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object". Unlike corporate identities, Wendt clarifies, agents have a variety of social identities that differ in importance.¹⁹⁶ Taking into perspective the research of historians Anita Buhin and Dean Vuletic which demonstrated the musical presentation of Yugoslavia through festivals and the Eurovision as a Mediterranean country¹⁹⁷, we can conclude how Yugoslavia had several such identities it sported abroad. Furthermore, as Vuletic demonstrated in his study on Yugoslavia's use of jazz as its soft power, Yugoslavia showcased several images to the East and the West.¹⁹⁸ However, unlike Buhin and Vuletic, the latter looking at how "Western popular music trends were used to shape cultural and political identities in Yugoslavia"¹⁹⁹, I am much more interested in the functioning of what I deemed to be "the core" Yugoslav identity, the independent one. As Alexander Wendt stated, "[s]overeignty is a social identity, and as such, both a property of states and of international society." The essence of sovereignty, continues Wendt, "is a notion of political authority as lying exclusively in the hands of spatially differentiated states, in which

¹⁹⁶ Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994), 385.

¹⁹⁷ Anita Buhin, "'Melodies From the Adriatic': Mediterranean Influence in Zabavna Music Festivals of the 1950s and 1960s." in *Made in Yugoslavia: studies in popular music*, edited by Danijela Š. Beard and Ljerka V. Rasmussen (New York; London: Routledge, 2020), 25-35; Dean Vuletic, ". 'Yugoslavia in the Eurovision Song Contest.'" in *Made in Yugoslavia*, 165-174; Vuletic, Dean. "The Eurovision Song Contest in the Musical Diplomacy of Authoritarian States." in *International Relations, Music and Diplomacy*, 218; Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 315.

¹⁹⁸ Vuletic, "Sounds like America," 116.

¹⁹⁹ Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 15.

sense it is an attribute of the state implying territorial property rights". As Wendt further writes, to have control over a territory comes into existence solely if other countries give recognition to it. It is the job of sovereignty, according to Wendt, to satisfy the needs of the corporate identity to be both secure and to be recognized by others which is done "by defining borders between the rights of self and other." Wendt further asserts that rights and corporate identities are linked and sometimes states can equate the danger to their capacity to achieve such rights as a danger to their "corporate individuality". This means, so Wendt writes, that that there occurs a "merge" of the social identity and the corporate one²⁰⁰ which this dissertation believes occurred in the aftermath of the 1948 rift between Yugoslavia and the United States.

In addition, as we can grasp from the research of scholars who examined the political and economic aspect of the relations between Yugoslavia and the United States²⁰¹, Yugoslavia's independence constituted an important part of this relationship. This specific element, frequently mentioned in consulted archive materials, is often overlooked in studies on the cultural dimension of the Yugoslav-American relations. It is also this particular element that provides us with the ability to apply a much wider definition of cultural diplomacy from the one currently employed in the majority of historical studies. As Jessica Gienow-Hecht writes, historians most often employ the term "cultural diplomacy" to mean a policy of a single state designed to assist the exportation of their representative cultural examples in pursuit of the goals of their foreign policy.²⁰² We have outlined in the first section of the introduction the definitional problems of cultural diplomacy as a term. Scholar Patricia Goff stresses that this "defiance" of cultural diplomacy to be put under just one category might be its biggest advantage. Exchanges, artistic tours or language teaching, continues Goff, may be seen as characteristic of cultural diplomacy but "an effective cultural diplomacy need not be constrained by these traditional parameters."²⁰³ I agree with Goff's assessment that the general nature of cultural diplomacy is "contingent and ad hoc".²⁰⁴ The general character of cultural diplomacy is not the only factor that requires us to apply a wider definition of the practice in the context of cultural interaction between Yugoslavia and the United States. The concept of Yugoslavia's independence, so prevalent in the relationship between the two states, as stressed by

²⁰⁰ Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," 388.

²⁰¹ See reference number 85.

²⁰² Gienow-Hecht, Donfried, "The Model of Cultural Diplomacy," 13. A notable exception is an article by Verity Clarkson, "A 'Many-Coloured Prism': Exhibiting Polish National Identities in Cold War Britain," in *Machineries of Persuasion*, 17-38.

²⁰³ Goff, "Cultural Diplomacy," 420.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 419.

political and economic historians²⁰⁵ and by the examined archive materials, demands a wider definition of cultural diplomacy too. As scholar Maurits Berger notes, public diplomacy is one with clarifying the policies' of a country to other people. Cultural diplomacy, on the other hand, continues Berger, "takes a bi-or multilateral approach with an emphasis on mutual recognition" which means that cultural diplomacy does not specifically mean "the promotion of a national culture." As Berger further clarifies, "[c]ultural diplomacy focuses on common ground, and the condition thereto is that one needs to know what makes the other tick."²⁰⁶ This also slightly hinges upon what Nicholas Cull has called the "listening" aspect of public diplomacy. This segment, clarifies Cull, involves "an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly."²⁰⁷ As Cull further notes, another possibility is "enhanced listening on one's own side with enhanced speaking on the part of one's target: building the public diplomacy capacity of other nations."²⁰⁸

Berger's definition of cultural diplomacy helps us to analyze the relationship between Yugoslavia and the United States through nation branding in two ways. By using the comparative method²⁰⁹, it allows us to find what Berger calls "common ground[s]" in the cultural policies of both Yugoslavia and the United States, the first and the most important being the use of culture to preserve Yugoslavia's independence. This then subsequently allows us to interpret these "common ground[s]" as nation branding strategies and visions for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand held by both by the United States and Yugoslavia. This, in turn, allows us, to again use economic terms, to see how and through which means they used specific campaigns to preserve this specific "independent Yugoslavia" brand, both within and

²⁰⁵ See reference number 85.

²⁰⁶ Maurits Berger, "Introduction", *Bridge the Gap, or Mind the Gap? Culture in Western-Arab Relations* (January 2008), Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 3-4; Goff also quotes Berger in "Cultural Diplomacy," 422.

²⁰⁷ Cull, "Public Diplomacy," 32.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*; 48.

²⁰⁹ As Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka write in the "preface" edition of the book *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, Incorporated, 2010), "Comparative history deals with similarities and differences between historical units, e.g., regions, economies, cultures, and nation states." (vii). On the comparative method and comparative history see also Conrad, Sebastian. *What is Global History?* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 38-44.

Hartmut Kaelble, "Between Comparison and Transfers- and What Now? A French-German Debate," in *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, edited by Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, and Kocka Jürgen (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, Incorporated, 2010), pp. 33-38.

Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History," in *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, edited by Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, and Kocka Jürgen (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, Incorporated, 2010), pp.1-30.

outside of Yugoslavia, and the role assigned to Yugoslav and American jazz musicians and impresarios. I am aware that the adoption of such a perspective puts this dissertation at slight odds with that of Carla Konta who examined American public and cultural diplomacy for much of the same period. While I do not question Konta's research that focused on the United States selling specific images of itself to a specific Yugoslav audience for their own specific gains as examined materials for this dissertation do confirm her postulates. After all, Yugoslavia was not an exception to the rule and the United States did this in other countries too as Mikel Nilssen demonstrated this for Sweden.²¹⁰ Still, the identification of Yugoslavia's independence as a common goal of both states in their cultural practice allows us to study jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States in the context of, as Ang, Isar and Mar put it, "more dialogic, collaboration approaches to cultural diplomacy" currently being suggested.²¹¹

Following the writing of Simon Anholt on the connection between nation branding and forming a stimulating environment for relationship development²¹², Berger's cultural diplomatic definition and the concept of nation branding allows us to better understand the environment, both local and global, in which the American and Yugoslav agents branded the Yugoslav state through jazz diplomacy. This is what transnational history is about. As historian Patricia Clavin writes, while transnationalism was initially associated with "the transfer or movement of money and goods, is first and foremost about people: the social space that they inhabit, the networks they form and the ideas they exchange."²¹³ With notable exceptions, such as the work of historian John Fousek on nationalism that drove the American Cold War²¹⁴, Finnish musicologist Heli Reimann's piece on Estonian jazz musician Lembit Saarsalu²¹⁵, Bulgarian musicologist's Julijana Papazova's use of constructivism as a base to examine the music diplomacy of Yugoslavia during the 1960s and 1970s²¹⁶ we do not have a lot of studies on the actual context in which the agents of cultural diplomacy "lived the brand", to use a

²¹⁰ See Nilsson, Mikael. *The Battle for Hearts and Minds in the High North: the USIA and American Cold War propaganda in Sweden, 1952-1969* (Leiden; Brill, 2016).

²¹¹ Ang, Isar & Mar, "Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National Interest?", 377.

²¹² Anholt, "Beyond the Nation Brand," 12.

²¹³ Patricia Clavin, "Defining Transnationalism," *Contemporary European History* 14, 4 (2006), 422.

²¹⁴ John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000) (accessed June 22, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central) (hereinafter: *To Lead the Free World*)

²¹⁵ Heli Reimann, "Lembit Saarsalu: 'Music Saved Me.' The Study of a Jazz Musician's Early Musical Development," in *Jazz Behind the Iron Curtain*, edited by Gertrud Pickhan and Rüdiger Ritter, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010, pp.165-181.

²¹⁶ Julijana Papazova. "Yugoslav music diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s – the cases of Esmā Redžepova and the band Magnifico," in *The Tunes of Diplomatic Notes: Music and Diplomacy in Southeast Europe*. Belgrade: Institute of Musicology SASA; Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Faculty of social sciences, 2020, pp. 229-239.

branding term. This element is crucial for the analysis of jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States as it reveals not only the specificities of the local market in which American and Yugoslav agents built the "independent Yugoslavia" brand but also how both American and Yugoslav agents utilized various networks to keep the branding instrument, jazz diplomacy operational, as seen in Chapters Three and Four.

Nation branding also allows us, so writes historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht, to respond to the global dimension of the story, that is, to see "to what extent has nation branding emerged – historically – in response to the challenge of the global, helping people and places to situate and identify themselves in an increasingly complex world?"²¹⁷ The global element also makes the concept of nation branding a perfect avenue to explore jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States as, to summarize the writings of scholars, the Cold War was nothing more than just one big market. As historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht notes, many Cold War agents had seen "the international arena as a realm comparable to other purchased goods and, more important, a marketplace for competing ideas and visions."²¹⁸ Similarly, as musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier writes, "... Cold War pressures created the sense of a global order within which the nation's cultural and political contribution had to be defined. A 'cultural presentation' was recognized as an important intervention: a way for the nation to take its place within the global order and to reveal itself as producer of its own image."²¹⁹ Focus on Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy and taking into perspective the global dimension²²⁰ reveals how Yugoslavia behaved as the market dictated and, as evident from Chapter Two, it sometimes sent its cultural troupes to specific countries just because others were doing it and there was a need for Yugoslavia to compete with them. While the story of the local branding environment reveals all the factors which made it possible for Yugoslavia and the United States to use jazz diplomacy as a branding instrument within Yugoslavia, the global dimension reveals the practices of its export, including the United States. As historian Sebastian Conrad writes, when we deal with "different temporal and spatial levels of analysis", we can try to move past contrasts "of structure and agency, of necessity and the contingent." Macro-level causality and micro-level individual agency,

²¹⁷ Gienow-Hecht, "Nation Branding: A Useful Category for International History," 773. Dean Vuletic also emphasized the importance of "the big picture" or the global dimension for Yugoslavia's identity. *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Culture*, 14.

²¹⁸ Gienow-Hecht, "Nation Branding: A Useful Category for International History," 768-769.

²¹⁹ Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 220.

²²⁰ On *global history* see Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016). (hereinafter *What is Global History?*)

continues Conrad, are valid elements to study and we need to look at both of them to conjure up the big picture.²²¹

Applying Berger's definition of cultural diplomacy and the concept of nation branding, this dissertation argues that jazz diplomacy which developed between Yugoslavia and the United States from 1956 to 1974 emerged as a component of the "branding strategies" employed by both countries to preserve the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. Within such strategies, as this dissertation further argues, Yugoslav jazz musicians and impresarios emerged as "brand ambassadors" who, through various cultural activities in the jazz diplomatic process between their state and the United States, worked to preserve their country's specific brand in the same manner as had Yugoslav politicians in the political realm. As this dissertation demonstrates, they were able to do so because of the adoption of cultural diplomacy as one of the "brand strategies" employed by the Yugoslav government and Yugoslav cultural bodies to preserve the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, in addition to the establishment of a specific set of "market forces" which allowed American agents to conduct their cultural programs in Yugoslavia thus allowing Yugoslav agents with the means to collaborate with the Americans in the cultural space of Yugoslavia. With the status of "brand ambassadors" under their belt and the Yugoslav system allowing them to "live the brand" of the country, these agents independently pursued specific cultural activities that raised the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international cultural scene which contributed to the survival of that same brand on the global market.

Since the primary focus of this dissertation is on the branding process, this dissertation will not analyze tours by Yugoslav and American jazz musicians in the classic sense of their arrival to the country and their reception, as many studies on music diplomacy do. Instead, it will analyze them through the stages of the branding process. This dissertation also acknowledges its limitations in terms of leaving out or mentioning only sporadically many important political events which occurred and bore impact on the relationship between Yugoslavia and the United States. Leaving out many of these important events runs the risk of misleading the reader into thinking that branding bore the heaviest impact on preserving Yugoslavia's independence. To clarify, the examined archive materials (State Department, United States Information Agency, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Jugokonzert, the Council of Science and Culture of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia) and

²²¹ Conrad, *What is Global History?*, 160.

many secondary sources, do not reveal there was ever an official campaign by the United States or Yugoslavia under the slogan of "independent Yugoslavia". The author of this dissertation established this slogan for the purpose of this dissertation deeming it appropriate as scholarship and the examined archive materials all demonstrate how the main objective of both Yugoslav and American officials was to keep Yugoslavia independent during the researched time period. However, the reader must bear in mind that the author acknowledges that both Yugoslav efforts to preserve its independence, in addition to American efforts to help Yugoslavia sustain this independence following its 1948 ousting from the Cominform, included a full package which included military, economic and political aid, as demonstrated by scholars who examined the political and economic dimension of the collaboration between Yugoslavia and the United States.²²² The author thus treats jazz diplomacy as just one element of this package.

This dissertation aims to do so through four chapters which are structured to follow the rationale of American musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier who sees cultural diplomacy to entail "several simultaneous forms of engagement" and argues that we need to take into account "... the factors that suggest a more complex relationship" and "... the ways in which global networks of musical and political relationships were built from below."²²³ The first chapter, in line with the branding process, focuses on the state's perspective and details the emergence of the "brand story" of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, examines "brand visions" of both American and Yugoslav officials, defines "market forces" that were to govern cultural interaction with the Americans and the American adaptation to the specificity of the local branding environment. The second chapter moves the analysis to the second level, that just below the state and it focuses on the emergence of culture as a Yugoslav "branding strategy" and music as a "branding instrument" and moves on to identify the bodies designated to fulfill the role of "brand champions". These bodies determined the main postulates of the country's external cultural policies under which Yugoslav jazz musicians and impresarios, in addition to the Yugoslav audience, performed the role of "brand ambassadors" for the country in its cultural interaction with foreigners. The third chapter serves as the avenue to explore how jazz diplomacy between the United States and Yugoslavia served as a branding instrument in practice, that is, on the Yugoslav soil from 1956 to 1974. The last chapter deals with Yugoslavia's attempts to export the cultural background of their brand through jazz diplomacy into the United States.

²²² See reference number 85.

²²³ Fosler-Lussier, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled," 63.

CHAPTER 1

Setting the Independent Stage

1.1. The "independent Yugoslavia" brand arrives as does Dizzy

"So I was sitting there in the audience in the front row waiting for the concert to begin just like everybody else," recalled Yugoslav musician Stjepan "Jimmy" Stanić as he patiently waited for renowned bebop trumpeter Dizzy Gillespie to begin his 1956 Zagreb concert that just, according to Stanić, "wouldn't start". Stanić noted how he was then approached by the "conferencier" with a question as to whether he would be willing to step on the stage and perform. A bewildered Stanić listened as the conferencier explained that they needed him to perform "well here, now, with Dizzy", the reason being the absence of Dizzy's bass player who "probably got drunk somewhere." While Stanić offered other jazz musicians, such as Miljenko Prohaska, a reputable bass player present at the event, to take the stage, Stanić said that "nobody dared so I said "Ok, I'll go." Stanić asked Dizzy Gillespie for sheet music to help with his "last-minute" performance while the band was still backstage. The American jazz musician, so Stanić further recalled, provided him "with some cards" before brushing off Stanić's request with the words "come on, you know all of this stuff". By his own admission, Stanić was familiar with Dizzy's arrangements and he also "relied on my ear so we did a very good job." As Stanić further recalled, he then got an invitation to go on a tour with the band but was unable to do so due to problems with his passport.²²⁴ In another interview, it was revealed how Stanić's passport problems began because of a comment he made while on tour of Bulgaria in 1957 that coincided with the time of death of Yugoslav politician Moša Pijade.²²⁵ Yugoslavia declared a Day of Mourning and the general stance was that the touring orchestra should not perform. Stanić, admitting to saying it "as a joke", uttered "[a]nd who will pay us for this mourning"?²²⁶ This

²²⁴ Leskovar Denis, "Razgovor. Dizzy je otišiel," *Inkluzija: Prilog Vijenca za promicanje socijalne uključenosti*, Year II, no. 8, February 25, 2021. <https://www.matica.hr/inkluzija/8/dizzy-je-otisel-31407> (last accessed on July 17, 2023) (hereinafter, "Leskovar, "Dizzy je otišiel")

²²⁵ Zoran Stajčić, "Stjepan Jimmy Stanić: Ja stalno nisam podoban," February 25, 2019. <https://ravnododna.com/stjepan-jimmy-stanic-ja-stalno-nisam-podoban/> (last accessed on June 25, 2023) (hereinafter, "Stajčić. "Stjepan Jimmy Stanić")

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

was where problems for Stanić began. "We had a snitch in the orchestra who immediately reported it to the authorities", recalled Stanić before adding how he was then unable to leave the country for three years and missed out on the opportunity to join Dizzy Gillespie on tour.²²⁷ When Stanić got his passport back from the police authorities three years later with an apology, he responded with the following words: "... screw it now, Dizzy already left."²²⁸ Years later, when Stanić reminisced about the missed opportunity, he stated that "... it would have been completely different had I left. Because you know what it's like in America. America has fierce music. And also opportunities. You either succeed there or you don't."²²⁹ Even though things may not have gone the way Stanić wanted them to go with Dizzy Gillespie, he still did not walk away empty handed that night. According to guitarist and composer Aleksandar Bubanović, Stanić's performance with Dizzy Gillespie led to success abroad as it "[w]as enough to show a picture in which he [Stanić] performed a solo in front of the orchestra led by the great Dizzy Gillespie and everybody began looking at him differently."²³⁰

Such an opportunity to not just listen but perform with one of the biggest names on the jazz scene came to Jimmy Stanić and other protagonists of the Yugoslav jazz scene as a result of two crucial factors. Dizzy's 1956 tour of Yugoslavia had largely been made possible by Dizzy's homeland, the United States of America. In response to negative perceptions foreigners had about the country he was leading²³¹ and reacting to the increased attention the Soviet Union devoted to cultural diplomacy following the death of Joseph Stalin²³², which he and other American foreign-policy makers interpreted as an attempt by the American "arch nemesis" to win the Cold War²³³, American President Dwight D. Eisenhower got the American Congress to invest 5 million dollars into his "Emergency Fund for International Affairs" which the President envisioned both as help to increase the participation of the United States in international trade fairs as well as a nudge for more active engagement of American cultural representatives in cultural manifestations in foreign countries.²³⁴ The State Department was

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Leskovar, "Dizzy je otišiel."

²²⁹ Stajčić, "Stjepan Jimmy Stanić"

²³⁰ Aleksandar Bubanović, *Sav taj jazz: moja galerija slika i druge priče* (Zagreb: Durieux, 2005), 57. (hereinafter, *Sav taj jazz*)

²³¹ Rosenberg, "To Reach... Into the Hearts and Minds of Our Friends," 142; See also, Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 4; Rosenberg, "'The Best Diplomats are Often the Great Musicians'"; 69-70.

²³² Jonathan Rosenberg, "'To Reach...into the Hearts and Minds of Our Friends': The United States' Symphonic Tours and the Cold War," in *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 141.

²³³ Ibid., 142.

²³⁴ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 137.

named as the responsible body for the "President's Special International Program" and they collaborated with the American National Theatre and Academy (ANTA) in this endeavour.²³⁵ The main idea behind the President's Emergency Fund had been "to satisfy a long-felt need to provide the means by which other peoples could obtain an appreciation of the best in American cultural life."²³⁶ The American leader launched the said program for another reason. President Eisenhower believed that music had the potential to influence opinions in addition to the belief that such diplomacy could serve as evidence of excellence of not just American culture, but the American system as well.²³⁷ American performers sent to foreign countries through the "Cultural Presentations Program" were not only tasked with the objective of cultivating a favourable image of both the foreign policy of the United States and the United States itself, they were also assigned with the task of improving the standing of American culture and to rival tours made by performers from the Soviet Union and China.²³⁸ The administration of President Eisenhower aimed to develop a foreign policy in which culture would become a much more serious matter in the relationship between states.²³⁹

The addition of jazz into the said President's Program had a story of its own. President Eisenhower had been acutely aware that it were precisely race relations that were one of his country's greatest weaknesses in the international arena.²⁴⁰ The world witnessed African American citizens of the United States attempts to achieve equal rights in the United States, events that were happening in parallel to the struggle of African and Asian countries to end colonialism.²⁴¹ The Soviet Union was quick to capitalize on American ills, using every propaganda means they could to unmask to the world what the United States did to its own citizens. The United States responded with the same technique, using every applicable means to safe face and disseminate more positive images of African American life in the United States.²⁴² Within such a climate, as scholar Paul Devlin noted, Dizzy Gillespie and other jazz musicians became ideal candidates for the envisioned diplomatic missions of the State Department. They had the music, they had the hits, they had the charm, standing and appearance

²³⁵ Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 6.

²³⁶ Operations Coordinating Board, President's Emergency Fund for International Affairs, Position Paper, OCB File no. 69 and 69, January 4, 1955, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 1586, box 41, NARA.

²³⁷ Emily Abrams Ansari, "Music Diplomacy in an Emergency: Eisenhower's 'Secret Weapon,' Iceland, 1954-59," in *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 167.

²³⁸ Danielle, Fosler-Lussier. "Music Pushed, Music Pulled," 53.

²³⁹ Rosenberg, "To Reach... Into the Hearts and Minds of Our Friends," 142.

²⁴⁰ Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 5.

²⁴¹ Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 77.

²⁴² *Ibid.*

and, through them, the investment of the State Department, so Devlin further wrote, was in "a well-established image, a 'brand,'" as it were these "personal brands of the musicians" that made the "'brand' of the aggressive, world-policing state" a bit softer.²⁴³ The task laid out on the doorsteps of jazz, the perceived music of democracy and freedom, was that of helping the United States rid themselves of the negative label concerning race relations, an issue that caught worldwide attention.²⁴⁴ The American vernacular found one more beauty in jazz. Unlike classical music which was seen as a cultural product that belonged to Europe, jazz belonged to the United States.²⁴⁵

It was on the wings of the aforementioned President's Program that Dizzy Gillespie arrived to Yugoslavia in 1956.²⁴⁶ Assessment reports of Dizzy's performance and its impact on the Yugoslav audience, compiled by authorized American representatives stationed in Belgrade, indirectly reveal that it was not just the American factor that made Dizzy Gillespie's tour of Yugoslavia possible. The Yugoslav factor had much to do with it too. When Dizzy Gillespie arrived to Yugoslavia under the indirect patronage of his President through the President's Program, the head of the state Dizzy Gillespie was visiting, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, was Josip Broz Tito who, despite being at the helm of a country that had a social system that was anathema to the American one, had at least one thing in common with American president Dwight D. Eisenhower. Similarly to his American counterpart, Josip Broz Tito also expressed great love for music.²⁴⁷ The love Josip Broz Tito held for music was known beyond the borders of Yugoslavia as one article in *The New York Times* referred to Tito in 1953 as "the country's boss man, who has a background and interest in music".²⁴⁸ According to Tito's contemporaries, Yugoslav musicians held a strong belief that, out of all of the arts, it was music that Tito was most interested in throughout his entire life with the narrative being that the Yugoslav leader got more engaged with music while serving his five year prison sentence in Lepoglava.²⁴⁹ Tito was a frequent attendee of concerts while he was in Moscow and did not miss out on the opportunity, if allowed by his schedule, to attend operas and ballets even when

²⁴³ Paul Devlin, "Jazz Autobiography and the Cold War," *Popular Music and Society*, Vol.38: No. 2, 142.

²⁴⁴ Saito, *The Global Politics of Jazz*, 3.

²⁴⁵ Saito, *The Global Politics of Jazz*, 3; Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 6.

²⁴⁶ See Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Visit of President's Fund/ANTA-sponsored Jazz Musician Dizzy GILLESPIE and Band to Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tousey 12, August 1, 1956, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-1959, box 103, NARA.

²⁴⁷ See Zoran Janjetović, "Tito i popularna kultura." in *Tito—viđenja i tumačenja: zbornik radova*, main editor Olga Manojlović Pintar (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011), 707-717; Janjetović, *Od >>Internacionale<< do komercijale*, 276-277.

²⁴⁸ Howard Taubman, "Optimism on Order," *The New York Times*, May 24, 1953, 324.

²⁴⁹ Slavko Zlatić, "Tito i muzika," *Zvuk: jugoslovenski muzički časopis*, No. 1, 1980, no page numbers.

he was appointed to the position of the President of Yugoslavia.²⁵⁰ One instance where his schedule intervened and Tito was not able to attend a performance was that of famed American conductor Leonard Bernstein in 1959. As USIS Belgrade noted in their official report, the State Department's sponsored Zagreb concert for The New York Philharmonic led by Bernstein was completely booked, a situation contrary to the one for the concert in Belgrade. In Belgrade, continued the USIS report, there were 50 to 80 empty seats, a sight to which the conductor of The New York Philharmonic "indicated considerable displeasure in what he described as the first empty seats they'd encountered." What was not known at that time, as was further written in the official report documenting Bernstein's performance in Yugoslavia, was that this had been done so by the orders of the Yugoslav government with empty seats reserved for Tito and his entourage. The Yugoslav leader and his suite, however, as the report by USIS stated, never made it back to Belgrade in due course for Bernstein's concert.²⁵¹ There are no indications that this was a deliberate snub of the renowned musical diplomat Leonard Bernstein by the Yugoslav leader. However, given the offense taken by the American conductor, had Bernstein's reaction not remained confined to the American report, it is safe to say that Josip Broz Tito could have been a protagonist of a major musical diplomatic scandal.

Josip Broz Tito not only shared the love for the arts with Dwight D. Eisenhower, he also held a strikingly similar opinion on what music could do in diplomatic relations as that of his American counterpart Dwight D. Eisenhower. For Eisenhower, music and musicians had the ability to "contribute to the better understanding of the peoples of the world that must be the foundation of peace"²⁵² For Josip Broz Tito, "the world would be a better place if people spent more time making music."²⁵³ As evident from these statements, both of these men professed music as an instrument to get peace to reign among nations. There would be other similarities between the two leaders such as, for instance, their stance towards modern art. Part of the support extended by President Eisenhower and his administration to modern art hinged on Soviet disapproval of such art.²⁵⁴ What had separated Tito and his Communist Party from

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ Heath Bowman, "Cultural Presentations: The New York Philharmonic Orchestra in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to DOS, no. 219, November 3, 1959, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

²⁵² Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in a press release from James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, 29 June 1956, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers (NSC) Staff, Papers, 1948-61, Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) Central File Series, box 18, OCB 141.31 (5), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas, quoted in Abrams Ansari, "Music Diplomacy in an Emergency," 167.

²⁵³ Slavko Zlatić, "Tito i muzika," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzički časopis*, No. 1, 1980, no page numbers. Quoted also in Papazova, "Yugoslav music diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s...", 231. In the same article, Papazova also noted the soft spot the Yugoslav leader had for music diplomacy (230-231).

²⁵⁴ Devlin, "Jazz Autobiography and the Cold War," 143.

Joseph Stalin was the fact that, their personal preferences set aside, they extended their support to "modernism" as well.²⁵⁵ It is thus not surprising to have official American reports that reflected on the Yugoslav performance of Dizzy Gillespie, a representative of music seen as "the most original product of American modernism" by American agents who selected performers for the Cultural Presentations Program²⁵⁶, comment how jazz, ideology-wise, was not looked upon favourably in countries with Communist regimes. Much of this, as the Americans continued their contemplation in the report on Dizzy's performance in Yugoslavia, had to do with the fact that jazz was a product of western origin. "The Yugoslavs," continued the document, "have been surprisingly tolerant and even enthusiastic about U.S. artists who have appeared in the country since January of this year."²⁵⁷ Indeed, in the preceeding year, that is, in September 1955, as they witnessed Eastern bloc's attempts to sway Yugoslavia back into the Eastern fold, the Americans in Belgrade wrote of no change to one element which USIS could and should completely and utterly take advantage of and that "was Yugoslavia's open, unbashd and seemingly unquenchable hunger for the cultural fruits and products of the West – its music, its drama, its literature. Poor in dollars, the country is nevertheless rich in receptivity."²⁵⁸

Looking at the above stated facts, it is hardly imaginable that, had a specific chain of events not occurred, Dizzy Gillespie would have probably never set foot on the Yugoslav soil. In fact, had just the timing of the tour been different, if Dizzy Gillespie was set to perform in Yugoslavia just a decade earlier, it is safe to say that his tour would have hardly materialized not the least because the Americans did not have the structure of the President's Program set in place at that time. A quick examination of the state of affairs in Yugoslavia just ten years prior to Dizzy's tour reveals why. Unlike Presidents Truman and Eisenhower who inherited a post-Second World War country that was the mightiest force on the planet with absolute dominance on land, sea and in the air,²⁵⁹ Josip Broz Tito emerged from the Second World War at the helm of the

²⁵⁵ Miloradović, "Od „sovjetskog satelita“ do „ američkog klina“, 80.

²⁵⁶ Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 18.

²⁵⁷ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Visit of President's Fund/ANTA-sponsored Jazz Musician Dizzy GILLESPIE and Band to Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Touse 12, August 1, 1956, 1, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-1959, BOX 103, NARA.

²⁵⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual Report for January 1-June 30, 1955," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Touse 35, September 27, 1955, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

²⁵⁹ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 2; David Painter, *The Cold War: An International History* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1999), 5.

country that was one of the most badly damaged European countries.²⁶⁰ The war amounted to a loss of around a million Yugoslav lives while total demographic losses of the country amounted to two million people.²⁶¹ Some parts of the country were badly damaged by the bombings carried out first by the Germans then by the Allies.²⁶² In a country as devastated by the war as much as Yugoslavia had been, it is unimaginable that Yugoslavia would have had the physical means to take in a performer such as Dizzy Gillespie. In fact, as historian Dean Vuletic writes, it was Yugoslavia that had the least developed cultural facilities in Europe during the interwar period.²⁶³ During the first postwar years, as Vuletic further writes, "the modernisation of cultural life entailed the establishment of cultural organisations and the expansion of music schools and radio services", that is, "develop[ing] Yugoslavia's cultural infrastructure".²⁶⁴ This serves as evidence that the physical element would have stood in the way of a potential tour of Dizzy Gillespie. Still, important as this physical element might have been, it would not have been the most prevalent obstacle preventing Dizzy's tour. The label attached to Dizzy and his music that clearly stressed the country of its origin would have been an even greater issue.

In a recollection of the music of those years, Slovenian jazz musician Bojan Adamič recalled how jazz was seen by the leading Yugoslav structure as "so socially and politically dangerous that they persecuted it when ever they could" even though jazz was known in the world of music "as one of the most extravagant revolutionary achievements".²⁶⁵ Just a couple of days after Zagreb had been liberated, recalled jazz musician Miljenko Prohaska in an interview in 1979, performances of the orchestra of the 32nd division had been stopped in the middle of a Glenn Miller arrangement. Prohaska continued how the Dance Orchestra of Radio Zagreb was accused of "making public fun of the brotherly people" when the orchestra added a bariton-sax solo to a section of a Russian melody. Prohaska further recalled in the same interview how "[i]t was not always fun to deal with – popular music" as "... those were the years when popular

²⁶⁰ Katarina Spehnjak, "Propaganda prije svega: kulturne veze Jugoslavije i Britanije 1945-1948," *Tokovi istorije* 1-2 (2005), 130. (hereinafter, "Propaganda prije svega") See also, Kranjc, Gregor. "Collaboration, Resistance and Liberation in the Balkans, 1941-1945." in *The Cambridge History of the Second World War*, edited by Richard Bosworth and Joseph Maiolo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 484.

²⁶¹ Igor Duda, "Uhodavanje socijalizma. Hrvatska u desetljeću poslije 1945. godine," in *Refleksije vremena 1945-1955*, edited by Jasmina Bavoljak (Galerija Klovičevi dvori: Zagreb, 2012), 24. (hereinafter, "Uhodavanje socijalizma")

²⁶² Tvrtko Jakovina, "Povijesni uspjeh šizofrene države: modernizacija u Jugoslaviji 1945.-1974.," in *Socijalizam i modernost: umjetnost, kultura, politika: 1950-1974.*, edited by Ljiljana Kolešnik (Zagreb: Muzej suvremene umjetnosti: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2012), 20. (hereinafter, "Povijesni uspjeh šizofrene države")

²⁶³ Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 2.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

²⁶⁵ AJ-34-75, Bojan Adamič, "Neka razmišljanja o zabavnoj muzici u Jugoslaviji," 92.

music was not just entertainment...".²⁶⁶ While true that the new Yugoslav authorities allowed jazz and other Western cultural products to flourish in the first months of the post-Second World War period as they were still in favor of collaboration with Allied powers²⁶⁷, they also strove to build their desired society that promised a peaceful and abundant life for all people, a society that would see the end of mutual exploitation.²⁶⁸ While American jazz musicians such as Duke Ellington appeared as sponsors for events organized by the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief in 1946 in the United States²⁶⁹, the music they represented began to have problems in Yugoslavia as this music was, according to historian Zoran Janjetović, on the opposite spectrum of the envisioned role music was to play in the desired society. Music, continued Janjetović, was deemed an instrument to educate the uneducated and get the citizens in line with the objectives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia so an "unwanted" label was attached to any type of music that would entice people to relax and not work.²⁷⁰ Unsurprisingly, given the prevalent view that products from the entertainment sphere were not seen as factor that rallied people to build socialism but had instead led them the way of hedonism,²⁷¹ to *Glas*, the People's Front newspaper from Serbia, in 1947 jazz was a "'senseless, impossible combinations of sounds calculated to arouse the lowest, most atavistic and long-suppressed instinct in man'" while both jazz and jive were "'music conditioned and tied up with capitalist society linked with strife.'"²⁷²

In branding terms, such compartment was indicative of the "mental inventory" that, according to scholar Peter Van Ham, constitutes a brand²⁷³ the Yugoslav Communist Party strove to build and project. The examination of the moves made by the Yugoslav Communist Party both in their domestic²⁷⁴ and foreign policy²⁷⁵ in the early postwar period reveal Yugoslav

²⁶⁶ Zvonimir Milčec, "Dirigent vlastita života," *Večernji list*, Year XXIII, no. 6259, December 22 and 23, 1979, 7.

²⁶⁷ Aleš Gabrič, "Izganjanja jazza iz slovenske glasbene scene po drugi svetovni vojni." *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, Vol. 49, No 1 (2009), 296.

²⁶⁸ Lilly, *Power and Persuasion*, 1.

²⁶⁹ "Edward Kennedy (Duke) Ellington," FBI File for Edward Kennedy (Duke) Ellington, part 1, document no. 100-434443, April 20, 1953. *The FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation*, US Department of Justice. [https://vault.fbi.gov/EdwardKennedy\(Duke\)Ellington/EdwardKennedy\(Duke\)Ellington Part 1 of 1.pdf/view](https://vault.fbi.gov/EdwardKennedy(Duke)Ellington/EdwardKennedy(Duke)Ellington%20Part%201%20of%201.pdf/view) (accessed November 11, 2022)

²⁷⁰ Zoran Janjetović, *Od >>Internacionale<< do komercijale*, 119.

²⁷¹ Mihelj, "The Dreamworld of New Yugoslav Culture and the Logic of Cold War Binaries," 106.

²⁷² "Jazz Termed 'Senseless' By Serbian Party Paper," Special to the New York Times, *The New York Times*, April 11, 1947, p. 12.

²⁷³ Ham, "Place Branding," 129.

²⁷⁴ Ivo Banac, "Yugoslav Communism and the Yugoslav State." in *The Cambridge History of Communism*, edited by Norman Naimark, Silvio Pons, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2017, 576.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 577.

communist authorities to be the biggest zealots in Eastern Europe on their path to building socialism in Yugoslavia and establishing a "a socialist (Communist) society", a blindly followed goal even though the Yugoslavs cultivated different methods than the Soviets to obtain these objectives.²⁷⁶ So strong had been this specific Yugoslav "brand" that, when Yugoslavia got ousted from the Cominform in 1948, American magazine *Life* wrote that "[i]f the Cominform had denounced Stalin himself, the West could hardly have been more surprised."²⁷⁷

The brand the country was building, both on the inside and on the outside, inevitably impacted the relations with Dizzy's homeland, the United States of America. In the early postwar period, Yugoslav authorities allowed cultural centers of the Western Allies to function under a rather restrictive line of operations, a similarity the country shared with other Eastern European countries with the exception of the Soviet Union.²⁷⁸ A brief shutdown of USIS (United States Information Service) by the Yugoslav authorities occurred in late September 1946 as a result of publication of a series of articles by a brief employee of the American Embassy in Belgrade.²⁷⁹ The American reading room was, however, soon reopened.²⁸⁰ Still, even in such a climate, there were cracks through which culture and music could emerge as a tool to establish some type of cultural interaction between the United States and Yugoslavia. As evident from a document dating from 1947, the American Embassy's cultural attaché contacted the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a request for a meeting with members of Yugoslav cultural and educational institutions in order to develop cultural collaboration between Yugoslavia and the United States. Among other exchanges, so the said document noted, the American cultural attaché suggested an exchange of musicians between Yugoslavia and the United States.²⁸¹ In favour of improving cultural relations between Yugoslavia and the United States, the Yugoslav Committee for Culture and Art was more than willing to meet with the American cultural attaché.²⁸² Even though this short interaction demonstrated readiness by both sides to engage in musical interaction, what followed instead was a period that seemed to indicate precisely the opposite. The first six months of 1948 were marked by reports from the

²⁷⁶ Jeronim Perović, "The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol.9, No.2 (2007), 37.

²⁷⁷ "Three Weeks in Tito's Yugoslavia: Denounced by the Cominform, it still looks like a Communist state," *Life*, Vol. 25, No. 2, July 12, 1948, 25.

²⁷⁸ Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, 164.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, 168; On this particular issue see also, Milorad Lazić, "(Re)inventing Yugoslavia: American Cold War Narratives about Yugoslavia, 1945-1955," *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju*, god. XX, Vol 3., 2013, 53-57.

²⁸⁰ Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, 169.

²⁸¹ AJ 317 -99-147, Srdja Prica Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost, no. 49119/47, 26. maja 1947.

²⁸² AJ-317-99-147, Vladimir Ribnikar Ministarstvu inostranih poslova, 11. juna 1947.

American Embassy in Belgrade that detailed problems and harassments by Yugoslav officials that followed concerts organized at the American premises in Yugoslavia.²⁸³ American officials stationed in Belgrade interpreted some of these activities as a possible Yugoslav reaction to the increase in American activities as a result of the passing of the Smith-Mundt Act²⁸⁴ that envisioned the usage of various media to provide information about the United States to the outside world to improve collaboration in international affairs and foster greater awareness about the United States.²⁸⁵ From the then American perspective, this explanation seemed plausible and we surely do not have strong evidence to claim otherwise. However, scholarship has demonstrated that the Americans were also pretty much clueless of an event unfolding in the background during this period²⁸⁶ whose consequences would do more for the development of Yugoslav-American music diplomacy than the love of Josip Broz Tito for music or any other similarities he shared with President Eisenhower.

American *Variety* magazine introduced its readers to this event in an article featuring jazz musician Bojan Adamič. When *Variety* spoke to Adamič in 1957, the magazine noted how he was the leading man of Radio Ljubljana's jazz orchestra and wrote "the music for nearly all domestic films". In the introductory section of this article, Adamič confidently asserted that "[j]azz has, percentagewise, in Yugoslavia more followers than in most other European countries" and how "many experts rate already Yugoslavia next to Sweden and Holland among the European jazz nations." The article in *Variety* magazine noted how American jazz musicians such as Dizzy Gillespie, Ray McKinley, Tony Scott and West German jazz bands, frequently performed in the country thus allowing Yugoslav jazz musicians to learn from them. The capital event that made it possible for American music to earn the sympathies of Yugoslav cultural officials, so wrote *Variety* magazine, was the the 1948 split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.²⁸⁷

²⁸³ Cannon, Incoming telegram from American Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 55, January 14, 1948, file 811.42700 (M)/1-1448, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, box 4744, NARA; Cannon, Incoming telegram from American Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 143, February 1, 1948, file 811.42700 (M)/2-148, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, box 4744, NARA; Cannon, Incoming telegram from American Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 472, April 21, 1948, file 811.42700 (M)/4-2148, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, box 4744, NARA.

²⁸⁴ Cannon, Incoming Telegram from American Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 143, February 1, 1948, file 811.42700 (M)/2-148, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, box 4744, NARA.

²⁸⁵ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 11; Cummings, "Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey," 7.

²⁸⁶ Blum, "Surprised by Tito," 40.

²⁸⁷ Hoehn, Hans. "Music: Jazz, Once Branded 'Capitalistic,' Now Flipping Tooters in Titoland," *Variety*, August

It was on June 28, 1948, when Yugoslavia was ousted from the Cominform, that the world witnessed the eruption of a long-lingering, ongoing tension over a variety of issues that brewed in the relationship between the Yugoslav Communist Party and their Soviet counterparts for quite some time.²⁸⁸ What followed the "eviction" was an imposition of severe economic sanctions at a moment when half of Yugoslavia's economy depended on Eastern Europe.²⁸⁹ Difficult tasks lied in front of the Yugoslav Communists. Two of the most important were a solid economy and their own fight to remain on top of the Yugoslav political chain.²⁹⁰ Yugoslavia was further confronted with the problem of being completely isolated in the international arena and unable to forge new alliances when the split occurred.²⁹¹ The countries that were to later form the Nonaligned Movement were in the midst of their own turmoils.²⁹² Eastern neighbouring countries were part of the Soviet orbit while the country's relationship with Greece was strained due to, so the accusations of the Greek government went, Yugoslav aid to the Greek partisans in a conflict in which the British aided the Greek government. Austria, a country on the other side of Yugoslavia's border, was occupied while relations with Italy were strained due to border disputes between the two countries.²⁹³ Within their own borders, the country stood its ground and ran on the fuel of one specific feeling. As Yugoslavia's diplomat Aleš Bebler told a British Foreign Office official, there was a possibility that their Five Year

14,1957, pg.48-49.

²⁸⁸ For a much more detailed account on the 1948 split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union see: Anatolij Anikejev, "Sovjetsko-jugoslovenski sukob 1948. godine. Loša volja Staljina ili svestan izbor Josipa Broza Tita. Problem interpretacije" in *Tito - viđenja i tumačenja: zbornik radova*, main editor Olga Manojlović Pintar (Beograd: INS: AJ, 2011), 461-465; Ivo Banac, "Yugoslav Communism and the Yugoslav State." in *The Cambridge History of Communism*, edited by Norman Naimark, Silvio Pons, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 577-579; Ivo Goldstein, "The Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 as a Personal Conflict." in *The Tito-Stalin Split: 70 years after*, edited by Tvrtko Jakovina and Martin Previšić (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Filozofski fakultet; Ljubljana: University Press, Faculty of Arts, Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, 2020), 17-32; Kramer, Mark. "Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet-East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948- 1953." in *Stalin and Europe: Imitation and Domination, 1928-1953*, edited by Timothy Snyder, and Ray Brandon (Oxford University Press, 2014. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014), 295-316; Leo Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Nolit, 1976), 101-103; Pirjevec, Jože. *Tito i drugovi*, translated by Nina Sokol (Zagreb: Mozaik knjiga, 2012), 234-292; Jeronim Perović, "The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol.9, No.2 (2007), pp. 32-63; Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988*, knjiga 3: Socijalistička Jugoslavija: 1945-1988 (Beograd: Nolit, 1988), 184-238; Rajak, Svetozar, "The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 202-215; Swain, G.R., "TITO: THE FORMATION OF A DISLOYAL BOLSHEVIK," *International Review of Social History*, 34, no.2 (1989), 248-71; Zubok, Vladislav, Pleshakov, Constantine. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 125-135.

²⁸⁹ Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, 201.

²⁹⁰ Lilly, *Power and Persuasion*, 164.

²⁹¹ Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 117.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 117-118.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 119; See also Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici*, 28; Jakovina, "It's Either Tito or the Soviet Aparatchik," 100.

Plan went up in smoke and, for the life of it, there was no foreign assistance available to Yugoslavia anywhere. The country had little option, continued Bebler, other than to proceed with determination.²⁹⁴

This determination was, additionally, running on two feelings that could be interpreted as cohesive factors in Yugoslavia. These two feelings, Yugoslav pride and independence that drove the Yugoslav behavior during the Second World War, were invoked by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in order to get the citizens of Yugoslavia to back them up in their fight against the Soviet Union.²⁹⁵ The strategy and the feelings associated with it apparently worked as these feelings were and remained deeply engrained in the "hearts and minds" of the people of Yugoslavia as seen from American assessments documents. In a despatch from June 18, 1958 USIS Belgrade wrote a sentence which they believed depicted reality that not only exerted impact on the work of USIS in Yugoslavia but also impacted the work of the American government in all matters pertaining to Yugoslavia. As the June 18, 1958 despatch continued, this sentence was: "Yugoslavia is communist, though a heretic; and, Yugoslavia is a heretic, though communist." Failure to take into account either side of this equation, according to the June 18, 1958 despatch, would manifest in failure "to deal with the situation realistically and to our interests."²⁹⁶ The same despatch identified another important element that impacted the work of USIS in Yugoslavia. This factor, as reported by the June 18, 1958 despatch, was a psychological one as "the vast majority of the Yugoslav people, no matter what their political opinions [are], fiercely and vehemently wish to remain independent." By dint of their geographical location, the 1948 events and their repetition in 1958, continued the June 18, 1958 despatch, the Yugoslav desire to be independent "has been able to be translated into a realistic motivating force, and accounts for the almost daily paradoxes one encounters here." The satisfaction of the need of both the people and the government of Yugoslavia to be independent, as further reported by the June 18, 1958 despatch, becomes stronger "the more both East and West are dissatisfied". However, as the Americans further explained in the said despatch, this nature of Yugoslav independence was "often defensive, and that the pressures of the world struggle induce her to take refuge in this stance, for her very preservation." Just like all the other "peripheral" states, the Americans wrote in the June 18, 1958 despatch, Yugoslavia is able to

²⁹⁴ Pirjevec, *Tito i Drugovi*, 297.

²⁹⁵ Lilly, *Power and Persuasion*, 169.

²⁹⁶ Heath Bowman, "Country Plan," FSD from USIS BG to USIA Washington, no. 152, June 18, 1958, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, box 8, NARA.

"make a virtue and a strength out of her position vis-a-vis the two great world powers."²⁹⁷ Almost twenty years after the Americans wrote the above cited despatch, another American document revealed how both the idea of Yugoslavia being independent in the Cold War and the strategies the government employed for the purpose of sustaining that independence enjoyed immense support from the Yugoslav citizens. This "balancing act between the East and West", alongside "working to diminish the relative power of both blocs, by building its own power base through its role in the Non-Aligned Movement and by sustaining its own capacity to resist aggression" as a means of preserving the independence of the country, wrote the Americans in October 1977, enjoyed the support of the Yugoslav citizens.²⁹⁸ These American documents serve as evidence that the Yugoslav government managed to win one of the most important battles in the nation branding process. As scholar Peter Van Ham writes, a successful brand requires of politicians to find their own "thing", market it like their life depended on it, make sure that their customers are happy and that there is loyalty to the brand.²⁹⁹ Indeed, as historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht writes, if the citizens did not stand behind the brand and lived according to it, nation branding programs were doomed from the start.³⁰⁰ This is actually the most challenging part of nation branding. As public diplomatic scholar Nicholas Cull clarifies, "[s]ometimes the key battle in engaging a foreign public lies not in projecting a reputation overseas, but rather in persuading the population at home to live up to a reputation they already have."³⁰¹ The Yugoslav government appears to have been successful in this endeavour.

Common logic dictates that the only way a brand and its products will survive on the international market is through obtaining investors for the brand and eventual buyers of the product this brand offers. In international relations this represents state-to-state relations³⁰² while on a more human level, as scholar Erik Ringmar notes, human beings need to interact with others for the purpose of seeing "ourselves *as our selves*". Other are needed, so Ringmar further explains, "to describe us as persons of a certain kind; people who continuously can recognize us under a certain description." Once human beings get the desired description and recognition, Ringmar concludes, "... we will be able to keep our selves stable as we move

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ "USIA Country Plan for Yugoslavia," October 17, 1977, 2, RG 0306 U.S. Information Agency, Entry# P 328: Country Plans, Country Assessments, and Related Planning Records 1954-1985, box 35, NARA

²⁹⁹ Ham, "Place Branding: the State of the Art," 129.

³⁰⁰ Gienow-Hecht, "Nation branding: A Useful Category for International History," 768.

³⁰¹ Nicholas Cull, "The Tightrope to Tomorrow: Reputational Security, Collective Vision and the Future of Public Diplomacy," in *Debating Public Diplomacy: Now and Next*, edited by Jan Melissen and Jian Wang (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill/Nijhoff, 2019), 28.

³⁰² Iriye, *Global and Transnational History*, 15.

between different spatial and temporal contexts".³⁰³ Put differently, it was one thing that the Yugoslavs saw themselves as independent, getting the others to see them in the same way was a completely different matter.

The global political market not only played a vital part in the Yugoslav government's search for investors in their "independent Yugoslavia" brand, it also did most of the advertising for the brand. It was precisely the Cold War, as historian Tvrtko Jakovina noted, that Yugoslavia could thank for such a special political and strategic position it occupied during the aforementioned period.³⁰⁴ Indeed, as historian Odd Arne Westad writes, the Cold War had "in essence been an international order because leading world powers created their foreign policy in relation to it."³⁰⁵ In the case of Yugoslavia, as historian Dragica Mugoša noted, even before the split with the Soviet Union, the Americans approached Yugoslavia from the perspective of it being "just one element in the function of primary, American-Soviet relations and not as an independent actor in international relations."³⁰⁶ The Americans did not apply such thinking solely to Yugoslavia. As American historian Penny Von Eschen writes, American policymakers did not view any of the audience in the Middle East, Africa, and Central America they wished to vie with their public diplomatic programs "as legitimate political agents, but more often as people who might be duped by the Soviet Union ... if the United States didn't get to them first and more effectively."³⁰⁷ Within such a system in which the depiction of Soviet-American relations began to change in the American media from spring to late summer of 1946³⁰⁸ and the United States no longer appeared as an intermediary between the British and the Soviets but firmly standing against the Soviet Union on the global level³⁰⁹, Yugoslavia emerged as an instrument that challenged "the homogeneity of ideology and the discipline of the socialist part of the world."³¹⁰ When the 1948 split between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia occurred, given that history had never before recorded an instance in which of one Communist Party stood up to the Soviet one³¹¹, the Americans contemplated on the meaning of this event and the existence an independent Yugoslavia could have for the future and wellbeing of their arch nemesis, the Soviet Union, and reached the conclusion that this event could only damage their said rival so

³⁰³ Ringmar, "The Recognition Game," 118.

³⁰⁴ Tvrtko Jakovina, "It's Either Tito or the Soviet Aparatchik," 100.

³⁰⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *Povijest Hladnog rata*, translated by Vuk Perišić (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2021), 10.

³⁰⁶ Dragica Mugoša, "SAD i jugoslovenska 1948. godina," *Istorija 20. veka*, Year 1, Issue 2, 1983, 59.

³⁰⁷ Penny M. Von Eschen, "Enduring Public Diplomacy," *American Quarterly*, Vol.57, No.2 (Jun., 2005), 336.

³⁰⁸ Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 117-118.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 119.

³¹⁰ Miloradović, "Od „sovjetskog satelita" do „američkog klina", 72.

³¹¹ Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici*, 23.

they aligned themselves with Yugoslavia by providing the country with military and economic aid to help the country sustain its independence.³¹² To interpret this situation in branding terms, it is precisely this "difference, the otherness", as scholar Gyorgy Szondi notes, that makes up "the appeal factor (the soft power)" in nation branding.³¹³ This meant that, at that particular time in history, Yugoslavia's independence emerged as the country's "unique selling point".³¹⁴ The most influential political people in Yugoslavia were fully aware of this fact. In terms of strategy, Josip Broz Tito rightfully assessed the value of Yugoslavia's ousting from the Cominform and he counted on the Americans not to allow the Soviet Union access to the Mediterranean Sea.³¹⁵ As scholars have noted, the Americans bought the idea and began pouring significant investments into the Yugoslav independent product.³¹⁶ As the Cold War lurked in the background, it was quite obvious that the Americans did not come to the aid of Yugoslavia out of the purity of their heart. They had done so for the purpose of propaganda, they were doing it for strategy and they were doing it for psychological gains.³¹⁷ Still, Yugoslavia's "unique selling point" remained a seductive thought for the Americans for much of the researched period. It was in April 1958 that the Americans listed three reasons as to why Yugoslavia was important to the United States. According to the document, these three reasons were Yugoslavia's independence and its impact on "Soviet efforts to maintain the solidarity of the Communist orbit", its location and being the first to successfully rid themselves of the domination of the Soviet Union.³¹⁸ In branding terms, this demonstrates how American officials strongly believed in Yugoslavia's "unique selling points" and believed the brand's story. Indeed, as noted by American cultural attaché Edward C. McBride, who served in Yugoslavia from 1974 to 1978, the United States still had a lot of programs and ventures running in Yugoslavia at that time and a lot of those programs received more money than they should have which McBride attributed

³¹² For a much more detailed account on American responses to the split and the decision to aid Yugoslavia see Henry W. Brands Jr., "Redefining the Cold War: American Policy toward Yugoslavia, 1948-60." *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (Winter 1987), pp. 41-53; Jakovina, *Socializam na američkoj pšenici*; Lorraine M. Lees, "The American Decision to Assist Tito, 1948-1949," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 2, No. 4, Fall 1978, pp. 407-422; Coleman Mehta, "The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948-1951," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 13, No.1, Winter 2011, pp. 101-145; Dragica Mugoša, "SAD i jugoslovenska 1948. godina." *Istorija 20. veka*, Year 1, Issue 2, 1983, pp. 59-89; Charles G. Stefan, "The Emergence of the Soviet-Yugoslav Break: A Personal View from the Belgrade Embassy," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1982), pp. 387-404.

³¹³ Szondi, "Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding," 16.

³¹⁴ For further information and clarification on "Unique Selling Points" see Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 43.

³¹⁵ Pirjevec, *Tito i Drugovi*, 296.

³¹⁶ For a much more detailed account on American assistance to Yugoslavia see literature under reference number 312.

³¹⁷ Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi*, 295.

³¹⁸ "Yugoslavia, April 1958," RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

to the desire of the United States "to lavish attention and court the Belgrade government."³¹⁹ The "independent Yugoslavia" brand was still relevant to the Americans.

American investment into the brand secured Yugoslavia desired recognition from those who mattered the most for the sustenance of the country's independent brand. As historian Tvrтко Jakovina notes, France and Britain may have been important, but it was the United States that was truly in a position to create a new position for Yugoslavia, both in terms of strategy and defense.³²⁰ Indeed, with American economic and military investments came the incorporation of Yugoslavia into the United States plans. In the early stages of the Cold War and in terms of American informational plans, Yugoslavia became a "Crucial Periphery" state, a category that, in addition to Yugoslavia, included Thailand, Burma, South Korea, Greece and Turkey.³²¹ The countries that fell under this category all had, according to an American document from April 7, 1950, one thing in common: "they are or could easily become, by virtue of their geographical position, the next targets for Soviet aggression." These countries had "weak or indecisive governments, real or potential..." but, so the April 7, 1950 document continued, showed high promise in being exposed to the work of USIE (United States Information and Educational Exchange program) not just through traditional means but also through the introduction of new concepts. The main job of the United States, according to the 1950 document, was to keep these countries outside of the Soviet grip, render them with technological, military and economic assistance and use the latter "towards national goals and to stiffen resistance against Soviet pressures or blandishments, vividly warning against that advancing imperialism at the same time making clear the US adherence to free determination and the individual advancement of all nations."³²²

Within this context, the United States of America adopted their very own "brand vision"³²³ for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand which was summarized by the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1975 to 1977, Laurence H. Silberman. As Silberman noted, "... Tito had

³¹⁹ Edward C. McBride interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Initial interview date: February 9, 2001, 27; Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, adst.org (hereinafter, "McBride interview")

³²⁰ Tvrтко Jakovina, *Budimir Lončar: od Preka do vrha svijeta*, 2. dopunjeno izdanje (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2020), 62.

³²¹ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 15.

³²² Program Planning, A PRS Study. Areas of World Concern: Priority of Target Areas, Target Groups and Most Effective Media, April 7, 1950 (following documents), 3, Record Relating to International Info. 1 Activities 1938-53, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, box 1, NARA.

³²³ David Aaker describes a "brand vision" as "... an articulate description of the aspirational image for the brand; what you want the brand to stand for in the eyes of customers and other relevant groups like employees and partners." David A. Aaker, *Aaker on branding: 20 principles that drive success* (New York: Morgan James Publishing, 2014), 25.

broken with the Soviet Union in 1948, and our objective should as much as possible be to sustain the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Yugoslavia." It was, as Silberman continued, "almost a mantra, those three terms."³²⁴ Following the rationale of the above quoted "PRS Study" from April 7, 1950 to use USIS (United States Information Service) as an instrument in "Crucial Periphery" countries, USIS first needed to obtain approval from the Yugoslav government to be able to carry out their activities on Yugoslav soil. For USIS, this came in 1950 when, as was stated in a memorandum from April 28 1953, "program activities were resumed on an increasingly larger scale".³²⁵ By doing so, as the Americans emphasized on several occasions, Yugoslavia became "the only Communist country in which the United States carries on a regular USIS program".³²⁶ To a large degree, wrote the Americans in December 1952, with the minus of not having an exchange of peoples program, the program USIS was running in Yugoslavia was similar to the programs USIS was running in other, Western European countries.³²⁷ As a matter of fact, so the Americans wrote eleven years later, even though there lingered the possibility of the Yugoslav government cracking on their activities at any moment of their choosing, both USIS in Belgrade and in Zagreb were seen to be "normal 'open' posts."³²⁸ One of the most important conditions for the successful conduct of music and thus jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States, explained in more detail in subchapter 1.4, was satisfied.

The thinking of Yugoslav officials towards using culture and music as strategies and instruments in the service of the Yugoslav brand, a subject of a more detailed analysis in Chapter 2, also impacted the ability of the two countries to use jazz diplomacy in their relations. As the Yugoslavs wrote in one of their undated documents which reflected on the country's cultural interaction with the world, Yugoslavia had the abilities and opportunities to use cultural diplomacy, or as they referred to it, "cultural propaganda", in many European and non-European countries due to the interest of those countries in Yugoslavia. The same document also

³²⁴ Laurence H. Silberman interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, initial interview date: September 23, 1998, 30. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, adst.org (hereinafter, "Silberman interview")

³²⁵ Operations Memorandum to Department of State from Belgrade, "1954-1955 IIA Prospectus Call," April 28, 1953, 511.68/4-2853, RG 59 Department of State, Decimal File 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

³²⁶ *Operations Coordinating Board*, Report on Yugoslavia (NSC 5805/1), December 21, 1960, 2, RG 59 General Records of DOS, Entry A1 1586B, Executive Secretariat, box 33, NARA. The Americans made this point in 1959 as well. See IOA/I-Evans, IAE-William R. Auman, "Inspection of USIS/Yugoslavia," July 22, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

³²⁷ Bruce Buttles, "IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending November 30, 1952," FSD from Belgrade to the Department of State, no. 461, December 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, 34, RG 59 DOS, Decimal File 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

³²⁸ "Yugoslavia," March 15, 1963, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 206, container 1, NARA.

acknowledged how, in the post-1948 era, the degree and the success of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomatic endeavours rested entirely on them.³²⁹ As this document confirms, the Yugoslavs acknowledged that they had become independent actors in the planning and conduct of their cultural diplomacy. Promoting this cultural independence and the country's image, as scholar Srđan Radović notes, were one of the tasks of a state-sponsored magazine *Jugoslavija*, issued for both foreign and domestic consumption, that was established in 1949.³³⁰ The magazine was published twice a year and first went out in three languages and then in five, the languages being Serbo-Croatian, English, French, German and Russian, and foreign citizens being the magazine's primary target audience.³³¹ Likewise, in 1950 Yugoslavia also initiated musical tours, namely of folklore ensembles, which targeted Western countries.³³²

This independence in the conduct of cultural relations was coupled with a change in the attitude towards the role of culture in diplomatic relations, meaning that the Yugoslavs, as we shall see in Chapter Two, began considering what culture could do for the Yugoslav independent brand on the international scene. It was in 1956, the year Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy officially began and a year in which, as historian Tvrtko Jakovina notes, Yugoslavia increased its foreign policy activities towards the East, West and the Third World³³³, that we find the first official pronouncement in the examined archive materials that directly stated that culture was part and parcel of the country's diplomatic arsenal. The Council of Education, as was stated in one meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1956, identified cultural relations to be "one aspect of our foreign policy".³³⁴ In addition to Yugoslavia's independence, as visible through this statement, the Yugoslavs established culture as yet another "common ground" between them and the Americans as both sides aimed to use

³²⁹ AJ-559-14-31, "Kulturne veze sa inostranstvom," 2.

³³⁰ Radović, Srđan. "Channeling the Country's Image," 19.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

³³² Hofman, "Uloga muzičkog folklora u spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Jugoslavije 1950-1952," 438-439. Yugoslav ensembles toured Western countries even before Yugoslavia was ousted from the Cominform. As noted by musicologist Melita Milin, the Belgrade Ballet and the Choir and Folk section of the Yugoslav Army Ensemble performed in Western countries (France, Belgium and Switzerland) in 1946. Milin, Milin, "Cultural isolation of Yugoslavia 1944-1960 and its impact on the sphere of music: the case of Serbia," *Muzikološki Zbornik*, Vol. 51, Iss.2, 2015, 159.

³³³ Tvrtko Jakovina, "1956. godina naše ere: vrhunac jugoslavenske vanjske politike", in *Spomenica Josipa Adamčeka*, edited by Drago Roksandić, Damir Agičić (Zagreb: Filozofski fakultet, Odsjek za povijest-FF press, 2009), 476.

³³⁴ AJ-559-18-37, "Stenografske beleške. Plenarni sastanak Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, Beograd, 16. i 17. januara 1956. god," 112. Comment by Lepa Perović. AJ-559-18-37. In his article "'Folklore diplomacy' — the role of musical folklore in Yugoslavia's foreign policy 1949-1971", historian Ivan Hofman also concludes how "[a]fter 1949, culture became ... the main instrument of its [Yugoslavia's] foreign policy" (*The Tunes of Diplomatic Notes*, 2020: 224). However, he does not provide an official document to support his conclusion.

culture to communicate with others. Subsequently, as Chapter Two details, such thinking directly enabled the arrival of *Porgy and Bess*, Dizzy Gillespie, the Glenn Miller Orchestra and other American performers who played a salient part in the musical interaction between Yugoslavia and the United States.

The introduction of the Yugoslav independent brand on the international scene, the Yugoslav government's successful efforts, helped much by the global political market, to attract investors for their specific brand, the growing understanding between Yugoslav and American agents that culture could be used for diplomatic purposes are all factors that warrant us to analyze in much more detail the main tenets that marked the early collaborative era of cultural interaction between the United States and Yugoslavia. The "comeback" of the Soviet Union to the political and cultural space of Yugoslavia in mid-1950s led the Yugoslav government to create "market forces" which established another structure for interacting with the Americans. The following subchapter analyzes the said issues.

1.2 The transitional phase: the formation of the strategy

On October 3, 1955, American officials stationed in Belgrade sent a telegram to the United States Information Agency (USIA) in which they described the status of their cultural and informational programs in Yugoslavia. "We have had absolutely no indication", starts the telegram, that "Tito intends [to] reduce western cultural and informational activities in Yugoslavia." As the Americans continued writing in the said telegram, they were on the lookout for such changes following the visit of Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin to Yugoslavia in May 1955, even though no potential changes or limitations to the said activities were indicated in their conversations with Yugoslav political and cultural authorities.³³⁵ The feeling that something was about to change lingered in the minds of the Americans for quite some time. On June 30, 1953 the American chargé d'affaires penned down the details of a conversation he had with Aleš Bebler, the Yugoslav Undersecretary of State, in which the duo addressed the new Yugoslav rhetoric concerning foreign information programs in Yugoslavia. In the June 30, 1953 "Memorandum of Conversation", the American chargé d'affaires requoted, without mentioning the source, how the potential new rules to govern foreign information programs in Yugoslavia were a necessity given the comeback of the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia.³³⁶ As evident from these two cited American documents, the Soviet comeback to Yugoslavia signaled a potential change in the provisional system of collaboration established by the Yugoslavs and the Americans that governed the conduct of informational and cultural programs on the Yugoslav soil during this early collaborative phase in their cultural interaction. Some of the established principles, so the Americans wrote in a despatch from December 20, 1951, rested on the animosity of the countries of the Cominform towards Yugoslavia, a driving force behind Yugoslavia's collaboration with Western countries in their anti-Eastern European propaganda campaigns.³³⁷ Indeed, from the Yugoslav perspective, this early cultural interaction mechanism developed in the aftermath of Yugoslavia's ousting from the Cominform when the leading political structure of Yugoslavia's foreign ministry began cultivating similar ideas on

³³⁵ Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, no. Tousi 84, October 3, 1955 RG 306 United States Information Agency, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

³³⁶ "Memorandum of Conversation," participants, Dr. Aleš Bebler and Mr. Woodruff Wallner, June 24, 1953, enclosed in Woodruff Wallner, "Demarche to Foreign Office Concerning Developing Pressure Against US Information Program," Foreign Service Despatch (hereinafter, "FSD") from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, no. 1042, June 30, 1953, 511.68/6-3052, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

³³⁷ Bruce Buttles, "USIE Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending November 30, 1951," FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. 598, December 20, 1951, 1, RG 59 Department of State, Decimal File 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

the role of culture in international affairs as their American counterparts, as visible from the 1950 speech by the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edvard Kardelj. Kardelj and other members of the Yugoslav delegation at the United Nations were present at a banquet held in their honour in New York in early November 1950. It is on this occasion that Kardelj told the gathered how the "development of friendly relations between nations is one of the most important means in the fight for peace. People need to get to know one another. They need to understand why one nation developed in one way and the other in another. Then they can truly work together to strengthen peace in the world."³³⁸ This public pronouncement echoed the first, to use the words of scholar Maurits Berger, "common ground" that emerged in the relationship between the United States and Yugoslavia: both sides viewed, at least declaratively, culture as a powerful means to cultivate international friendship. While Kardelj, as evident from the above cited extract, spoke of the role of culture in universal terms, during this early collaborative era, the Yugoslavs defined their cultural diplomatic objectives to serve their own, national interest. In their 1950 plan, the Department for Scientific and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries identified three aims of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy. First, so the 1950 plan stated, the Yugoslavs were to use culture "to spread the truth" about Yugoslavia's cultural and scientific achievements and the construction of socialism, connecting them to the country's socialist base which made such achievements possible.³³⁹ In branding terms, the first aim of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy was to raise "brand awareness".³⁴⁰ The second aim of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, according to the 1950 plan, was to be engaged in the ideological fight against both capitalism and communism.³⁴¹ This meant that Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy needed to reflect the main vision of the brand. In the aftermath of the events of 1948, for its independence Yugoslavia was fighting both against the East and West.³⁴² Finally, so the 1950 plan stated, through cultural diplomacy Yugoslavia needed to gain knowledge on cultural achievements of other nations in order to break free of the isolation orchestrated by the countries of the Eastern fold. Gaining knowledge on cultural achievements of other countries were also to serve the goals of spreading precise information about the country beyond its borders, in addition to "contributing to the development of our science and culture", so the 1950 document

³³⁸ "Razvijanje prijateljskih odnosa među narodima je jedno od najvažnijih sredstava u borbi za mir," *Borba: Organ Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije*, Year XV, No. 266, November 7, 1950, 3.

³³⁹ AJ-559-19-8, "Plan rada Odeljenja za naučne i kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1950 godinu," 1.

³⁴⁰ "Brand awareness" is "[t]he ability and speed at which customers recognize a brand's name, logo and unique point of difference." Slade-Brooking, *Developing Brand Identity*, 156.

³⁴¹ AJ-559-19-8, "Plan rada Odeljenja za naučne i kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1950 godinu," 1.

³⁴² Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, 241.

concluded.³⁴³ In branding terms, this aim reflected the need of the Yugoslavs to both sustain their brand on the international scene and develop it further. To achieve the said diplomatic objectives, so the 1950 plan further revealed, the Yugoslavs needed to employ two strategies. First, so the 1950 plan wrote, Yugoslavia needed to abandon their previous practice "of narrowness regarding the number of countries with which to maintain cultural and scientific relations". The second strategy, as stated in the 1950 plan, involved Yugoslavia not limiting its cultural diplomatic activities to specific territories.³⁴⁴ These strategies, in service of ensuring the survival of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, revealed central tenets which allowed the early phase of musical interaction between Yugoslavia and the United States to begin.

Initially, so it was revealed in an American memorandum from May 23, 1951, the United States and Yugoslavia did not have an "official exchange of persons program" based on the decision made by the State Department on March 10, 1951. This decision, so the May 23, 1951 memorandum clarified, eliminated the possibility of having an official program where the Yugoslavs would be brought to the United States under federal assistance³⁴⁵ on the grounds that many Yugoslavs who worked for the government of Yugoslavia and would be the ones making the exchange journey were Peoples' Front members, an organization that had the Communist Party of Yugoslavia under its wing. The United States, so the May 23, 1951 memorandum further revealed, also had the "Internal Security Act of 1950" in place which meant that the Yugoslavs would only be able to enter the United States by the hand of the Attorney General "on a case by case basis under the Ninth Proviso to Section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917." As same memorandum continued, it was impossible, so the State Department rationalized, to run such "an official exchange of persons program" under such conditions.³⁴⁶ Despite this drawback, a degree of cultural interaction between Yugoslavia and the United States did occur during this early collaborative period.

By all means and forms, this early cultural and thus musical interaction between the two states was modest at best. On March 27, 1951, the Yugoslav side informed American Information Officer Margaret Glassford of unsuccessful visits of several American artists,

³⁴³ AJ-559-19-8, "Plan rada Odelenja za naučne i kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1950 godinu," 1-2. All three objectives of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy are also quoted in: Milanović, "Sounding the turn to the West," 189.

³⁴⁴ AJ-559-19-8, "Plan rada Odelenja za naučne i kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1950 godinu," 2.

³⁴⁵ Memorandum from OFX/D- William C. Johnstone, Jr. to P- Mr. Barrett, "Official Exchange of Persons Program Between the United States and Yugoslavia," May 23, 1951, pp. 1, Group XVI Post Reports, folder 32, box 320, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

³⁴⁶ Memorandum from OFX/D- William C. Johnstone, Jr. to P- Mr. Barrett, "Official Exchange of Persons Program Between the United States and Yugoslavia," May 23, 1951, pp. 2, Group XVI Post Reports, folder 32, box 320, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

described as "the beginnings and random visits", which left the Yugoslav audience feeling dissatisfied as they "expected to hear first class artists from the US". The March 27, 1951 document also expressed the belief that "in closer contact with a representative of the Embassy, the choice will be better."³⁴⁷ Available documents reveal the choice to have been better but the execution most certainly was not. On June 19, 1951 the then American Public Affairs Officer in Yugoslavia wrote how the United States should make sure to deliver on their musical promises to avoid "embarrassment such as that in the 'Porgy and Bess' case"³⁴⁸ when the Americans failed to bring the troupe to Yugoslavia.³⁴⁹

The Americans were not the only ones that struggled to present their cultural wares during this early collaborative era. The cultural presentation of Yugoslavia in the United States lacked success too. Yugoslav representative bodies in the United States, so it was written on November 6, 1951, succeeded in hosting the "Yugoslav Night" as part of the manifestation "Festivals around the world" at Labor Temple in New York. The speech of the president of this Festival, Reverend Richard E. Evans, so the November 6, 1951 report continued, outlined "the significant political and moral role that Yugoslavia performs today, particularly with regard to protecting the independence of all [countries], especially small countries, as well as its role in the defense of peace in the world". These words, so the November 6, 1951 report further outlined, echoed those of the Yugoslav consul. Another speaker, Monroe Stern, so stated in the same report, thanked the Americans for the past aid they provided to Yugoslavia and emphasized "the sincere desire of the Yugoslavs to further develop and make permanent the friendship between the two peoples."³⁵⁰ However, in 1953, the Yugoslavs lamented how, despite Yugoslav cultural products capturing American attention, maintaining cultural relations with the United States was rather difficult due to the geographical distance between the two countries, visa problems for the entry into the United States and a lack of financial means.³⁵¹ Despite these rather modest attempts by both sides to culturally interact with one another, these early efforts at musical and cultural interaction, nonetheless, demonstrate how the Yugoslavs and the Americans started a

³⁴⁷ AJ-559-15-32, Krista Djordjević, "Zabeleška, Poseta gospodjivce Glasford 27. III. 1951. godine pretstavnicu Amerikanske Ambasade."

³⁴⁸ Bruce Buttles, "USIE: Request for musical scores, books.", Foreign Service of the United States from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, June 19, 1951, no. 975, 511.6821/6-1951, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-43, box 2474, NARA.

³⁴⁹ Allen, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1849, June 8, 1951, 511.68/6-751, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2474, NARA.

³⁵⁰ AJ-559-15-32-33, Lujo Goranin, "Učestvovanje u američkim kulturnim priredbama u prilog FNRJ," 6.11. 1951.

³⁵¹ AJ-559-8-19-20, "Pregled rada po zemljama, 1953".

dialogue, known as one instrument of public diplomacy³⁵², to further develop their collaboration in this area.

These early attempts at cultural interaction between the Americans and the Yugoslavs also reveal another factor which emerged as the second "common ground" element of the cultural diplomatic relationship between the Americans and the Yugoslavs. As Yugoslavia's diplomat Leo Mates wrote, one attempted Yugoslav foreign policy response to the Soviet Union led, Eastern European organized isolation of the country had been to make use of contacts with individuals and social and political organizations to rectify the said situation.³⁵³ As a strategy, cultural diplomacy was to follow the same principle. One of the basic elements of the Yugoslav cultural diplomatic mechanism through which they were to achieve their envisioned set of cultural diplomatic objectives in the post-1948 era, according to the Plan of the Ministry of Science and Culture from 1950, had been to engage domestic cultural and scientific institutions "that have contacts and acquaintances abroad and operate through them".³⁵⁴ The same Plan also counted on help from abroad. The aim was, so the 1950 Plan wrote, to "further activate [foreign] progressive organizations and individuals, friends of our country", use them to "perform specific actions" and, in this way, "connect them even more to the fight that was to be led by our country."³⁵⁵ Such official thinking on the methods of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy aligned with the designated cultural diplomatic methods of the Americans. As American musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier noted in her study on American music diplomacy of the Cold War period, the American State Department encouraged the establishment of contacts between American musicians and the local audience using the Cultural Presentations Program.³⁵⁶ "Brand strategies"³⁵⁷ of the two countries were thus aligned in this respect.

Since the established Yugoslav cultural diplomatic principles worked in favour of the envisioned American model of music diplomacy, it was only natural that an alarm went off among American representatives when the Yugoslavs began allowing the Soviets to return to

³⁵² See Cowan, Geoffrey and Amelia Arsenault. "Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008), 10-30.

³⁵³ Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 120.

³⁵⁴ AJ 559-8-18-20, "Plan rada Odeljenja za naučne i kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1950 godinu," 2.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*,),

³⁵⁶ Fosler-Lussier, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled," 57-58. In her book dealing with the same topic of American music diplomacy during the aforementioned period, Fosler-Lussier also argued "that these human connections constitute the essence of 'soft power.'" *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 21.

³⁵⁷ "Brand Strategy" refers to the methods, the message, the location, the time and targets the brand wishes to convey. (Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 41). It is "a central, unifying idea around which all behavior, actions, and communications are aligned." Wheeler, *Designing Brand Identity*, 12.

Yugoslavia's cultural and political space. On September 27, 1955 the Americans wrote how a shift in the relations between Yugoslavia and the United States occurred in the summer of 1953 when the Soviet Ambassador was appointed to Yugoslavia. The climax of these good relations, continued the September 27, 1955 despatch, came with the arrival of Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev to Belgrade in May 1955 in an event during which "[t]hey took all – or nearly all – the blame for the break." The Soviets, continued the September 27, 1955 despatch, also acknowledged how Yugoslavia was entitled to pursue its own socialist road and how their relations "must be conducted on the basis of equality" which was "music to Tito's ears – even if, as all observers seemed to agree, he did not bat an eye."³⁵⁸ Their visit ended up in the signage of the "Belgrade Declaration" which recognized equality in the relations between socialist countries.³⁵⁹

What followed the improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet political relations, as the Americans wrote on June 12, 1956, was the strengthening of their cultural relations and the Soviet Union's increase in the usage of propaganda to sway Yugoslavia over to their side. In the same document, the Americans noted how, during the previous year, cultural and informational interaction between Yugoslavia and the countries of the Eastern fold significantly increased in both "swiftness and the breath of their expansion" and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had already signed a cultural agreement.³⁶⁰ The Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, also acknowledged the increase in cultural exchanges between their country and the Soviet Union that followed the arrival of the Soviet delegation to Yugoslavia. In one of their annual reports that detailed their cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries wrote how it received suggestions for performances, visits and various other types of manifestations from the Soviet Embassy while the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow was flooded with the same type of invitations from VOKS³⁶¹ (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) and the Soviet Ministry and Culture.³⁶² What worried the Americans, then hard-pressed by the Yugoslavs for more cultural

³⁵⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual Report for January 1-June 30, 1955," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tousey 35, September 27, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, box 92, NARA. On the Soviet arrival to Yugoslavia in mid-1950s and the „Belgrade Declaration" see also, Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici*, 43-45; Jakovina, "Povijesni uspjeh šizofrene države," 28.

³⁵⁹ Rajak, "The Cold War in the Balkans," 217.

³⁶⁰ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Tousey 144, June 12, 1956, 6-7, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

³⁶¹ On the role of VOKS in Soviet cultural diplomacy see Jean-François Fayet. "VOKS. The Third Dimension of Soviet Foreign Policy," in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, New York: Berghahn Books, 2010, 33-49.

³⁶² AJ-559-10-23, "Godišnji izveštaj po zemljama- SSSR," dio dokumenta "Izveštaj za 1955 godinu," 434.

presentations such as *Porgy and Bess*, was the possibility of the Yugoslavs and the Soviets signing cultural and informational agreements.³⁶³ Indeed, while during the 1960s and 1970s, American public and cultural diplomatic officers noted how the Americans were not really competing with the Soviet Union on the cultural field in Yugoslavia³⁶⁴, in mid-1950s the situation appeared to be different. On June 5, 1956 the then American Public Affairs Officer Joseph C. Kolarek described the Soviet cultural troupes that arrived to Yugoslavia as being "with one exception, immature and incompetent"³⁶⁵ and saw the arrival these troupes to Yugoslavia to have been, at least partially, influenced by the successful visits of American cultural groups to the country. As was further noted in the June 5, 1956 despatch, the Americans could only contemplate about the extent to which the Russian "cultural offensive" had been inspired by the American troupes but, as the Americans concluded, the visits of Leopold Stokowski, Dizzy Gillespie, Robert Shaw Chorale, "must have had a slightly unsettling effect on the Russians — especially since no Russian artists had appeared in Belgrade this year until the arrival of the Hudezestveni theater in May."³⁶⁶ The Soviet cultural influx apparently alarmed American officials stationed in Belgrade as they wrote in the same June 5, 1956 despatch that they did not "favor a cultural race with the Soviets, but on the other hand, it [USIS] cannot stand by and watch [the] collective culture from Moscow obliterate the memory of the fine American artists who dignified the early months of this year."³⁶⁷ Just a couple of days later, in another despatch from June 12, 1956, USIS in Belgrade requested that Washington satisfies their demand for "the appearance in Yugoslavia on a regular and continuing basis of leading American stage, concert and other cultural performers". This was one of the main conditions listed by USIS in their June 12, 1956 report to help them demonstrate to the Yugoslavs "[t]he bonds" that connected them to the Americans, "[t]he cultural growth and achievements common to both countries" and "[s]ympathy in the United States for human suffering in Yugoslavia as a consequence of natural disasters."³⁶⁸ This document demonstrates how cultural troupes were

³⁶³ Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, no. Touse 84, October 3, 1955 RG 306 United States Information Agency, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

³⁶⁴ McBride interview, 30; William P. Kiehl, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, initial interview date: September 15, 2003, 44, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, adst.org (hereinafter, "Kiehl interview")

³⁶⁵ Joseph C. Kolarek, "U.S. Cultural Attractions for Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Touse 52, November 3, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

³⁶⁶ Joseph C. Kolarek, Educational Exchange: Signing of a Cultural Convention between Yugoslavia and the USSR," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Touse 142, June 5, 1956, 5, 561-68/6-556, RG 59, General Records of DOS, 1955-1959 Central Decimal File, box 2260, NARA.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Touse 144, June 12, 1956, 7, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

also a part of the American "brand strategy" for their vision of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. For the strategy to work, a key demand had to be met. As the June 12, 1956 report wrote, "... performances by other than first-rate artists have been and will be counterproductive."³⁶⁹

The above cited examples corroborate the statement made by historian Predrag J. Marković who wrote how it was during this period that Yugoslavia found itself at the center of the game in which both the United States and the Soviet Union tried to sway Yugoslavia over to their side.³⁷⁰ The cultural field was no different. In the June 5, 1956 despatch, Joseph Kolarek wrote how both the Yugoslavs and the Soviets were determined to make their cultural exchanges work, citing the example of Yugoslav soprano Anita Mezetova. As Kolarek further wrote in the same despatch, when Mezetova was in the Soviet Union, she received so much money that she purchased "expensive items not available in Yugoslavia" and uttered complimentary words about the Soviet Union once she returned home. In addition, Mezetova had no problem with Yugoslav custom officials, so Kolarek continued in the said despatch, who admitted to knowing beforehand that she would get "many 'gifts' and did not even trouble to inspect her luggage." As Kolarek concluded, "[t]he times can probably be counted that a Yugoslav returning from a foreign country has encountered such a liberal attitude."³⁷¹ Just a couple of days later, in a despatch from June 12, 1956, Kolarek wrote of all of the "fancy" items the Soviet Union pledged to give the Yugoslavs "to impress Yugoslavia with their friendship and sacrifices for 'brother Communists' and 'brother Slavs'". As Kolarek further wrote in the same despatch, the United States had already poured a considerable sum of money into Yugoslavia and "should not be placed in the position of appearing less than generous because of its failure to provide 'impact' gifts."³⁷² These efforts demonstrate that Tito was not entirely wrong when he stated at a party meeting in 1955 that the country's "reputation was enjoying a boom in the world at large" and its "voice was 'being listened to and often sought.'"³⁷³

The grandiose cultural arrival of the Soviet Union was challenging for the bodies which administered Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy. As stated by one member of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at its meeting on January 16 and 17, the opening up

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada*, 36.

³⁷¹ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Signing of a Cultural Convention between Yugoslavia and the USSR," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousi 142, June 5, 1956, 561.68/6-556, 5, RG 59 General Records of DOS, 1955-59, box 2260, NARA.

³⁷² Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Tousi 144, June 12, 1956, December 28, 1955, 7, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

³⁷³ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1- December 31, 1954," Tousi 21, March 9, 1955, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

of channels with Eastern Europe meant problems for Yugoslavia as they could not take in so many performers without jeopardizing their cultural relations with others.³⁷⁴ This line of thinking echoed the sentiment of leading political circles in Yugoslavia. As the Americans noted in their September 27, 1955 despatch, a couple of days prior to the visit of the Soviet delegation, Josip Broz Tito immersed himself into clarifying to Western diplomats that the independent line of the Yugoslav political road was not about to change anytime soon. The same despatch then quoted the words of Tito how Yugoslavia was not changing its identity and was working towards sustaining beneficial relations with Western countries while also enhancing relations with Eastern countries and the Soviet Union.³⁷⁵ As evident from a comment made by a member of the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Yugoslavia's cultural relations followed the same strategy and the slogan of the brand: we are improving Yugoslavia's cultural relations with the Eastern fold but not jeopardizing Yugoslavia's relations with other countries.

This strategy and the slogan were then broken into smaller strategies the Yugoslav government employed in order to ensure at least a partial satisfaction of the investors in the Yugoslav independent brand. The contours of this new Yugoslav strategy, designed in the background, became visible to the Americans in mid-December 1956. When the Americans addressed the arrival of American performers (including Dizzy Gillespie) to Yugoslavia in their December 18, 1956 despatch, they noted how Yugoslavia's "eagerness to present as many western cultural attractions as it could book" helped the "expansion of USIS's penetration of the Yugoslav cultural scene." This Yugoslav desire, continued the same despatch, was motivated precisely by the restoration of the country's relations with the East. "The Yugoslavs," wrote the Americans further in the December 18, 1956 despatch, "quickly realized the Soviet Union and its satellites were ready to flood this country with the products of their stages and concert halls. To offset such a threat, they turned gladly to western offerings and gave them a welcome which was unstinting in its appreciation."³⁷⁶ This was an outline or a glimpse of a strategy being developed by the leadership of Yugoslavia to preserve their independent brand in the global

³⁷⁴ AJ-559-18-37, "Stenografske beleške. Plenarni sastanak Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Beograd, 16. i 17. januara 1956.g.," 5.

³⁷⁵ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual Report for January 1-June 30, 1955," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tosi 35, September 27, 1955, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, box 92, NARA.

³⁷⁶ Joseph C. Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tosi 66, December 18, 1956, 7, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

political arena and a strategy that was soon to be launched as part of their cultural diplomacy machinery.

This "balancing strategy", a crucial one to preserve the country's independence, as historian Đoko Tripković noted, emerged as a segment of the political comportment of Yugoslavia in mid-1950s when Josip Broz Tito moved his country closer to the East but still remained within the reach of the West thus achieving his aim of "positioning the country as a relatively independent entity between East and West".³⁷⁷ By all means, as Tripković further wrote, this was a challenging policy for the Yugoslavs to pursue. Such a policy, so Tripković clarified, demanded of them to be both knowledgeable about the prevalent global situation at all times and the relations between the the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, as Tripković continued, this policy required of Yugoslavs to be present in the foreign relations' dialogue and know when to act appropriately.³⁷⁸ Put in branding terms, the Yugoslavs needed to "feel" the movement of the global Cold War political market at all times and adapt accordingly as the survival of their independent brand depended on it. Such Yugoslav adaptation to the market for the purpose of the preservation of their independent brand was both a blessing and a curse for the two Cold War opponents. In a nutshell, these two forces made peace with such a policy pursued by the Yugoslavs.³⁷⁹ In fact, such a policy proved advantageous for American cultural presentations in Yugoslavia. As American officials stationed in Belgrade wrote in their December 18, 1956 despatch in which they referred to the successes of American performers (including Dizzy Gillespie), they "took advantage of Yugoslavia's international balancing act in the period under review to emphasize on another front the 'common heritage, institutions and traditions which link Europe and the United States'".³⁸⁰ Expressed differently, this Yugoslav strategy worked in the interest of jazz diplomacy as an instrument of branding.

Concomitantly, this Yugoslav policy was also a curse for the two superpowers. The already mentioned American Ambassador to Yugoslavia in the 1970s, Laurence Silberman, clarified why. As Silberman noted, Yugoslavia had always been seen as "a potential flashpoint" because neither side of the Cold War equation "would be comfortable or accept a Yugoslavia moving

³⁷⁷ See Đoko Tripković, "Titova politika balansa prema supersilama 60-ih godina 20. veka," *Tokovi istorije*, No. 2, 2011, pp. 123-131.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 124.

³⁷⁹ Campbell, John C., *American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead*, NEW-New edition (University of Minnesota Press, 1965), 68.

³⁸⁰ Joseph C. Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 66, December 18, 1956, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

precisely in one direction or the other."³⁸¹ This meant that the leading politicians of Yugoslavia managed to get the world, to cite the definition of "soft power" by Joseph Nye Jr, "to want the outcomes that you want".³⁸² The Yugoslav politicians got the world "accustomed to Yugoslavia's insistence on full national independence as the foundation stone of its international position."³⁸³ Yugoslavia thus secured its trademark.

There were several reasons behind the Yugoslav pursuance of this strategy of "balance" in their music diplomacy. First, as Chapter Four reveals, the Yugoslavs tried to "balance" their cultural performance in the United States with the American cultural presentation in Yugoslavia. The second mechanism of this strategy of "balance" involved a detailed look at the numbers, that is, securing the same number of Soviet and American cultural performers at Yugoslav festivals³⁸⁴ which represents the most visible and concrete element of this strategy. Recollections of cultural agents provide evidence that the strategy Yugoslav cultural agents were to employ in the organization of their festivals carried the signature stamp of official policy. As Croatian composer Milko Kelemen told Edward Alexander of RIAS (Radio in American Sector) when the latter visited the Zagreb Festival of Light Music in December 1963 at the invitation of the director of the festival Josip Stojanović, his Muzički Biennale Zagreb served as "an example of the liberty with which he can arrange these modern music festivals". Kelemen, so Alexander further wrote about his trip to Yugoslavia, then listed Igor Stravinski, Gunther Schuller and John Cage as Western artists who attended his festival. According to Alexander, Kelemen further noted how he extended the invitation to the Moscow Philharmonic to attend his Biennale. Kelemen, so Alexander further recalled, explained his move with the words: "... you understand, I have to."³⁸⁵ The list of performers for that year's edition of Muzički Biennale Zagreb reveal this comment to be true. It was Kirill Kondrashin's Moscow State Philharmonic that was granted the honor of giving the first performance after the formal

³⁸¹ Silberman interview 30, FAOHC.

³⁸² Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 5.

³⁸³ Campbell, *American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe*, 68.

³⁸⁴ This Yugoslav balancing strategy was a similarity the country shared with Poland's Warsaw Autumn Festival, a festival that was, as scholar Lisa Jakelski has shown, envisioned as a place where both the East and West could demonstrate their cultural wares (193). As Jakelski has further shown, Warsaw Autumn Festival also paid homage to equal attendance of performers from the East and the West (194). See Lisa Jakelski, "Pushing Boundaries: Mobility at the Warsaw Autumn International Festival of Contemporary Music," *East European Politics and Societies* 29, No. 2 (2015), 189-211. In the Yugoslav context, in his book on the Belgrade Jazz Festival journalist Vojislav Pantić also mentions "balance" between Soviet and American jazz performers. See Pantić, *Beogradski džez festival*, 46.

³⁸⁵ Albert E. Hemsing, "Trip by RIAS Officer to Zagreb Music Festival," FM from USIS/Berlin to USIA Washington, no. 59, February 26, 1964, 4, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA. Alexander's comment on Stojanović's invitation is on page 1.

opening of the Muzički Biennale Zagreb at the "Istra Hall".³⁸⁶ At the same festival the same year, Edward Alexander heard almost an identical story from Mladen Mazur, the director of Bled Jazz Festival. As Alexander wrote, Mazur told him how "... the problem of bringing a jazz group from the Soviet Union was almost insuperable but that he had no choice, as Director of that festival, and was 'under orders' to at least make the attempt."³⁸⁷ Dubrovnik Summer Festival had not been spared of this practice either. After the Festival had been graced by the performance of American jazz musician Duke Ellington in 1970, the newspaper *Oslobodjenje* wrote how Soviet performers would also be participating in the Festival, in accordance to an agreement the organizers concluded with "Goskoncert". As *Oslobodjenje* continued, rumours spread that a similar agreement would be negotiated with an American institution as well.³⁸⁸

Other Yugoslav cultural agents, such as the director of Jugoconcert Veljko Bijedić, followed this "balancing" strategy too. As the Americans revealed in a November 7, 1963 telegram, when Veljko Bijedić returned from a trip to Bucharest, he forwarded them the information that the Romanian Concert Agency was interested in having Duke Ellington perform in Romania pre- or post- his performances in Yugoslavia. The November 7, 1963 telegram further revealed that Bijedić laid out the financial details and the number of concerts desired. The Americans, so they continued in the November 7, 1963 telegram, were aware that Bijedić's concert agency was "probably not particularly efficient point of contact with Rumanian Concert Agency", they were nonetheless "happy [to] serve as go-between with Jugokonzert to keep negotiations for Rumanian tour in strictly commercial channels at this stage, if this will ease problems Legation Bucharest dealing with Rumanian Foreign Ministry on matter."³⁸⁹ Yugoslav cultural agents adopted the slogan used by their country on the global market.

On October 8, 1970, the Americans wrote in an airgram that, by that time, the Yugoslavs were no longer as concerned "with maintaining a strict parity between the capitalist and socialist world".³⁹⁰ However, the Yugoslav "balancing" strategy had still been in effect in mid-1970 at

³⁸⁶ Ž.B., "Otvoren drugi zagrebački Muzički Bijenale," *Borba*, Year XXVIII, no. 126, May 9, 1963, 7.

³⁸⁷ Albert E. Hemsing, "Trip by RIAS Officer to Zagreb Music Festival," FM from USIS/Berlin to USIA Washington, no. 59, February 26, 1964, 7, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA.

³⁸⁸ "Dubrovnik Summer. Promises from the USSR and USA: The Summer Festival negotiates the engagement of Soviet and American artists," *Oslobodjenje*, July 17, 1970, enclosed in Belgrade A-332, RG 306 USIA Historical Collection, Entry A1 (1061), container 6, NARA.

³⁸⁹ Kocher, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 923, November 7, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, box 1, NARA.

³⁹⁰ Leonhart, "Educational & Cultural Exchange: Annual Report for Yugoslavia for Fiscal Year July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970, Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State-CU, no. A-366, October 8, 1970, 1, Group XVI, Post Reports, folder 32, box 320, Bureau Historical Collection, Arkansas

some Yugoslav jazz festivals, such as the Belgrade Jazz Festival, as is visible from the assessment of jazz critic and promoter Vojislav Pantić. Pantić writes that the invitation of Igor Bril and his ensemble from the Soviet Union to Belgrade Jazz Festival in 1975 had been the implementation of this "balancing" practice between the two sides already adopted in the previous years of the festival.³⁹¹

It were not just Soviet and American performers that were affected by this Yugoslav strategy of sustaining balance. As evident from the examined archive materials, Yugoslav cultural agents also attempted to strike a balance between the number of performances of foreign artists and their own artists on Yugoslav soil. It was already in April 1956 that one member of the Executive Board of Yugoslavia's main booking agency, Jugokonzert, listed the increasing number of foreign artists performing in Yugoslavia as one of the problems the Agency encountered in their work in the previous seasons. Not only were there a lot of performers coming from Eastern Europe, continued the Board member on the April 1956 meeting, these foreign performers were seen to be both a financial burden to the Yugoslav audience as well as a threat to the progress and marketing of Yugoslavia's very own artists. Since, alongside planned events, there were always those unplanned ones that ended up in the schedule that was already significantly overburdened, there was a need, so the Board member continued, to decrease the number of foreign performances in Yugoslavia.³⁹² Statements made by other Yugoslav cultural agents demonstrate that the Yugoslavs were not quite successful in achieving this type of balance. In 1961, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries noted that it needed to up their coordinational ante as there were too many foreign performers on Yugoslavia's soil that performed "at the expense of artistic results, and even interests of domestic reproductive artists."³⁹³ The director of Jugokonzert, Veljko Bijedić, informed the Americans of the same issue in his "exit interview" after visiting the United States under the American "P.L. 402 Leader Grant" program. In his "exit interview", Bijedić stated his desire to have more American performers in his country, but that he was also "'caught between the Hammer and the anvil' since Yugoslav entertainers complained that he was talking 'bread out of their mouths' by importing talent from abroad." He further stated in the same interview that "[h]is position would be made much more tenable if the number of Yugoslavs brought to the

³⁹¹ Pantić, *Beogradski Džez Festival*, 46.

³⁹² AJ-559-114-248, Zapisnik sednice Izvršnog odbora Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije, održane 30. IV. 1956 godine," 2.

³⁹³ AJ-559-111-244, "Informacija u oblasti muzike i scenske umetnosti," 3. Informational material attached to the call of the first meeting of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music. Smilja Mesarić, June 20, 1961.

United States was more in line with the number of Americans appearing in the theaters of Yugoslavia."³⁹⁴

At this moment, one crucial issue needs to be addressed and it relates to the question of whether or not the Yugoslav government, in a dire need to protect the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, had seen this type of cultural interaction with the Americans as a branding instrument that contributed to the development and the sustenance of the brand. The examined materials reveal a response that resonates with the statements made by scholar Peter Van Ham who noted how, when politicians engage and play with their country's brand, they do so for two reasons, internal and external. They engage with the latter, so Peter Van Ham writes, in order "to attract more clients, charge more for their products/services, and generate overall economic/political advantage for their location".³⁹⁵ While Chapter Two analyzes in much more detail the cultural diplomacy of Yugoslavia and its objectives in the 1950s, documents from the 1960s reveal much about how the Yugoslav government sought to understand these exchanges and the connections they made between them and the country's independent brand.

For the purpose of drawing a parallel in the thinking of the Yugoslav government, to reiterate the already cited words of Yugoslavia's diplomat Leo Mates, contacts were seen by the Yugoslav government as a means to help get the country out of the international isolation following its ousting from the Cominform.³⁹⁶ In addition to revealing the reason behind the decision of the Yugoslav government to allow cultural and educational interaction with the United States, an American document from 1969 reveals that the Yugoslav government changed very little of its thinking on contacts as an instrument to help their independent brand. The government of Yugoslavia, so the Americans wrote on August 16, 1969, "gives widespread support to exchanges with the U.S.". The government was, so the airgram continued, perfectly aware that Yugoslavia's technological progress had been greatly accelerated by those scientists who received a part of their training in the United States. These scientists had also, so the August 16, 1969 despatch further wrote, returned to Yugoslavia with an added incentive for work and established contacts which were seen "as assets in speeding Yugoslavia's technological

³⁹⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: J. William Henry (OCE) and Veljko Bijedić, "Exit interview: Mr. Veljko Bijedić, Director of 'Jugokonzert' (Concert Agency) Belgrade, Yugoslavia; FY 1961 P.L. 402 Leader Grantee," November 28, 1960, RG 59 General Records of DOS, Central Decimal File 1960-63, box 1074, NARA.

³⁹⁵ Ham, "Branding Territory," 253.

³⁹⁶ See Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 120.

modernization, economic independence and consequent political influence."³⁹⁷ To summarize the branding rationale of the Yugoslav government by reciting the words of scholar Peter van Ham, external branding "... generate[s] overall economic/political advantage for their location".³⁹⁸

The "independent Yugoslavia" brand could gain one more benefit from their cultural and educational interaction with the Americans. To recite van Ham's words again, it is through external branding that politicians aim "to attract more clients".³⁹⁹ In mid-1950s, Yugoslav politicians realized that both their future political positions and the country's position on the international stage depended much on getting those countries not aligned with either blocs to collaborate with them.⁴⁰⁰ Potential buyers were found in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America when Josip Broz Tito, India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Indonesian president Sukarno and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah formed the Nonaligned Movement that held its first conference held in Belgrade in 1961 and Yugoslavia then took up the position of both defending and exporting nonalignment in international relations.⁴⁰¹ This yet another "brand strategy" the government of Yugoslavia implemented to preserve their "independent Yugoslavia" brand. The same "unique selling point" that convinced the Americans to come to their aid in the aftermath of its ousting from the Cominform, Yugoslavia's independence, also attracted these countries to the brand. As evident from a conversation between an Egyptian diplomat and the then Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yugoslavia's independence was an extremely attractive idea to some of those countries them. When an Egyptian diplomat conversed with the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Matters, the latter had been told of Egypt's attempts to morph into another Yugoslavia and, during the conversation, the Egyptian diplomat drew parallels between Yugoslavia's attempts to sustain their independence and Egypt's fight for theirs.⁴⁰² Not only had Yugoslavia's history shared the colonial element so present in the history of Asia, Africa and Latin America, so thought some Egyptian politicians and other Asian, African and Latin American leaders, through which Josip Broz Tito won the

³⁹⁷ Leonhart, "Educational & Cultural Exchange: Annual Report," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, no. A-113, August 16, 1969, 2, Group XVI, Post Reports, box 320, folder 2, MC 468, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

³⁹⁸ Ham, "Branding Territory," 253.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi*, 13.

⁴⁰¹ Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, 22. On Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned Movement see also Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (Fraktura: Zaprešić, 2011).

⁴⁰² Calic, *A History of Yugoslavia*, 188.

admiration of those leaders, but he also offered these countries a blueprint on how to get both sides of the Cold War conflict to aid you without the need to commit to either side.⁴⁰³

It was in this context that, yet again, cultural and educational interaction with the Americans, could directly aid the export of the Yugoslav brand. As scholar Su Changhe writes, for any country, it is knowledge that "is an asset and a source of power. A country's soft power is highly dependent on its ability to provide thinking and knowledge to its people and the rest of the world". As Change continues, "the attraction of soft power is based on the capacity of the country in knowledge innovation, whether in the area of political systems, social organizations, or business models." It is the country, as Change further writes, that has "strong innovative capabilities" that will perform "the role of the purposeful guide in the international society."⁴⁰⁴ When the Yugoslavs aimed to develop further the most famous element of the "Yugoslav ideological *brand*"⁴⁰⁵, the Yugoslav self-management system, so the Americans wrote in an airgram on October 8, 1970 the Yugoslav authorities soaked up "management ideas and technology" of the West to develop this element of their brand in line with market principles. The United States, continued the October 8, 1970 airgram, was treated as the number one country for the Yugoslavia to send its citizens to receive training "in every discipline and in every area of the country", a crucial staple of the country's "development program". Exchanges were seen, as further written in the October 8, 1970 airgram, as "the logical instrument toward its attainment."⁴⁰⁶ In another document, the Americans rightfully concluded that, when the considering their own issues and when the country "seeks recognition and legitimacy as an innovator of polity", the Yugoslavs resorted to much more frequent contacts with the West.⁴⁰⁷ Indeed, as the Americans further wrote in the October 8, 1970 airgram, Yugoslav intellectuals and those who reaped benefits from American exchange programs continuously stressed the leadership role of Yugoslavia, both in the Nonaligned Movement and Eastern Europe, to stimulate the expansion of such exchanges with the United States.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰³ Ibid.,

⁴⁰⁴ Changhe, "Soft power," 549.

⁴⁰⁵ Jakovina, "Povijesni uspjeh šizofrene države," 27.

⁴⁰⁶ Leonhart, "Educational & Cultural Exchange: Annual Report for Yugoslavia for Fiscal Year July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970, Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State-CU, no. A-366, October 8, 1970, 1, Group XVI, Post Reports, folder 32, box 320, Bureau Historical Collection, Arkansas

⁴⁰⁷ "Yugoslavia", 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA.

⁴⁰⁸ Leonhart, "Educational & Cultural Exchange: Annual Report for Yugoslavia for Fiscal Year July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970, Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State-CU, no. A-366, October 8, 1970, 2, Group XVI, Post Reports, folder 32, box 320, Bureau Historical Collection, Arkansas.

Yugoslav documents confirm these American assessments. As was put by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in October 1968, "[o]ur international cultural politics of Yugoslavia is a reflection of the politics of an open society ready to receive the cultural achievements of others and to give its contribution to world culture." As the same document continued, "[a] permanent component of our international cultural politics is, therefore, accepting help from advanced centres and cultures and providing help to less developed centres."⁴⁰⁹ This was not the first time administrators of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy expressed such thinking. In fact, we can trace its seeds to mid-January 1956, the year in which Yugoslavia devised its branding strategies to preserve their specific brand on the international scene. It was on the January 16 and January 17, 1956 meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries that the then Chairman of the Committee Marko Ristić noted how many Yugoslav politicians, Josip Broz Tito among them, returned from their foreign travels with remarks that Yugoslavia did not develop satisfactory cultural relations with the country they visited. This, as Marko Ristić continued, became particularly noticeable in 1955 with countries such as India, Burma and Egypt (visited by Josip Broz Tito) and Latin American, Asian and other countries. These remarks centered on, so Ristić clarified, the need to develop and expand relations with a country considered on a "high cultural level" which cultivated good relations with Yugoslavia or to offer Yugoslav services to a country considered an "underdeveloped country".⁴¹⁰ Twelve years later, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries clearly positioned the United States in the first category. As stated in their 1968 report, the United States was the postwar centre of artists, educational workers, scholars and others and collaboration with the United States was of "particular interest" for Yugoslavia.⁴¹¹

In addition to engaging with external branding, as scholar Peter van Ham notes, politicians also brand internally. They do so, as van Ham writes, "to make their citizens feel better and more confident about themselves by giving them a sense of belonging and a clear self-concept."⁴¹² The Americans identified the reason behind Yugoslavia's cultural (musical) and educational interaction with them in February 1962. As was written on February 12, 1962, not only had the Yugoslavs turned to the West for economic help and trade, they also looked to the

⁴⁰⁹ AJ-559-34-75, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 72.

⁴¹⁰ AJ-559-18-37, "Plenarni sastanak... Beograd, 16. i 17. januara 1956," 60. Comment by Marko Ristić.

⁴¹¹ AJ-559-36-80, "Izveštaj komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1968. godinu," Beograd, Maja 1968, 74.

⁴¹² Ham, "Branding Territory," 253.

West "for methods and ideas" which evoked a feeling of Yugoslavia being a "progressive" country both among some of its people and the Yugoslav government.⁴¹³

Now that we have determined the "brand strategies" the Yugoslavs employed in their cultural diplomacy, it is time to address the American side of the story for the purpose of clarifying the objectives the Americans pursued in Yugoslavia through the arrival of Dizzy Gillespie and other jazz musicians. In addition to selling the American brand to the Yugoslavs, as noted by Carla Konta in her doctoral dissertation, jazz diplomacy also constituted a part of the American diplomatic arsenal aimed towards supporting the "independent Yugoslavia" brand or the American vision for the same brand. In order to be able to do so, the Americans had to recognize and adapt to the main "market forces"⁴¹⁴ of the Yugoslav cultural market which were listed in this subchapter.

⁴¹³ Walter R. Roberts, "Country Plan: Annual Revision, FY 1962," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 51, February 12, 1962,1, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA.

⁴¹⁴ As Donald Rutherford defines "market forces" in *Routledge Dictionary of Economics* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), as "1 Demand for and supply of FACTORS OF PRODUCTION and the goods and services produced by them. 2 The determinants of prices, investment and output in competitive markets. 3 The system of allocation which is the alternative to ECONOMIC PLANNING." (371)

1.3. Independence, balance and the Americans

In late June 1959, when the Americans contemplated on expanding USIS activities in Yugoslavia in a manner suitable to the Yugoslavs, they wrote how it was the pride of the Yugoslavs, the country's adherence to international norms "and its treaties with many ideologically disparate countries [that] all point to their tolerance – and even welcoming – of a reasonable number of US cultural manifestations." The Americans continued how, in order "[t]o appease their pride and to excite their attention, these manifestations must be of top quality; to accommodate their policy of 'balance' between East and West, number of any one kind of manifestation must be strictly limited – and hence this restriction demands that top quality."⁴¹⁵ This short description provides us with all of the key elements of the Yugoslav brand that would impact music, and thus jazz diplomacy, between the United States and Yugoslavia. This subchapter focuses on two elements of the cited statement: the decision and calls by American representatives in Yugoslavia for the American state to send the best of its talents to perform in Yugoslavia and American recognition and acknowledgement of the strategies employed by the Yugoslav government to ensure appropriate cultural representation of both them and the Soviet Union in the Yugoslav cultural space.

When the American government decided to employ the President's Program to the advantage of the foreign policy of the United States, they had done so as a response to a long-standing problem the United States had. As historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht wrote in her book about music diplomacy between Germany and the United States from 1850 to 1914, the United States faced a specific issue at hand as, on the international stage, the country was growing as a political and industrial force thus catching up with other powerful European countries while, simultaneously, the country shared a similarity with other small European countries which was that their "sense of indigenous culture remained extremely fragile."⁴¹⁶ Many Americans bathed in the glory of their country being a political, industrial and military force yet many of them felt their cultural accomplishments lagged behind their representation in other fields.⁴¹⁷ In order to offset this feeling of inferiority, the United States imported and became culturally open.⁴¹⁸ It

⁴¹⁵ Heath Bowman, "USIS/Yugoslavia Country Plan," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 123, June 26, 1959, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry #P 328: Country Plans, Country Assessments, and Related Planning Records 1954-1985, container 9, NARA.

⁴¹⁶ Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy*, 153.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 154.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 153-154.

was the First World War that bestowed upon the Americans a new source of pride that translated into a specific agitation towards European claims that they were culturally superior to the Americans.⁴¹⁹ Such cultural arrogance on the part of Europeans irked the Americans as many had seen the crucial role their country played during the First World War and they were also immensely proud of the resources of their cultural institutions.⁴²⁰ The Europeans, on the other hand, grasped the situation differently. Unlike the United States, as scholar Rebecca Boehling writes, the Europeans exited the two world wars with weak economies and a loss of political credibility in the international arena. It was in culture that the Europeans, so Boehling continued, found their safety net to boost their own confidence and challenge American military and economic dominance as seen in the constant depiction of "the United States as culturally primitive, although technologically advanced, money-driven, amorphous, mass society."⁴²¹

It was precisely this long-standing cultural image of the United States that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia played on during the early existence of the second Yugoslavia. For instance, at the beginning of 1948, *Jež*, the satirical newspaper of the prewar era which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia continued to publish in 1945⁴²², brought a story about an American called Fred Smith, the president of the "Classy Club", who held a lecture about his recent trip to Europe to the members of this club. Fred begins his story with a proclamation of how proud he is of his origin "because Europe is, ladies and gentlemen – uncultured. Culture – that is America. America – that is culture!" Fred goes on how Europe has drab, lengthy book classics with no available shorter versions of those same classics and no detective novels. Its centuries old architecture, continued Fred, could not hold a candle to the American "Astoria hotel" while European churches and castles were "ruins". Fred described Eastern European newspapers as "boring as the third Beethoven symphony" and, after he provided similar descriptions of European universities, theatres and movies, Fred turned his attention to European music. He told the story of how he "[l]istened and slept" while the Europeans "played some Bach, Beethoven, Tchaikovsky, Mozart, Shostakovich" justifying himself as "[h]ow could I not have fallen asleep next to their pathetic music that cannot be compared to our jazz, Paul Whiteman, swing, boogie-woogie and jitterbug?" Fred then turned to Eastern Europe and the absurdity of how literally every member of society had and should have access to culture and

⁴¹⁹ Piller, *Selling Weimar*, 132.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁴²¹ Rebecca Boehling, "COMMENTARY: The Role of Culture in American Relations with Europe: The Case of the United States's Occupation of Germany," *Diplomatic History* 23, No.1 (Winter 1999), 57.

⁴²² Lilly, *Power and Persuasion*, 145-146.

how American Ambassador Harriman had told him that he had to share his front row seats with a worker. Fred then stated how the worker who might be sitting next to the American Ambassador might not even be white but could be of different race.⁴²³

Setting aside the obvious ideological element behind this story, this depiction of the United States differed little from how other European countries depicted the culture of the United States.⁴²⁴ Yugoslavia was part of Europe and it was precisely this specific dynamic of their cultural relations with Europe that, according to scholar Yoshiomi Saito, spiked the interest of the United States to use jazz in their diplomacy as the American government was eager to enhance the country's cultural image worldwide since many intellectuals had seen the US to be "a 'cultural desert'".⁴²⁵ In this context, American officials stationed in Belgrade were delighted by the reception of American artists in Yugoslavia. As they wrote on July 25, 1955 "[t]he reception given [to] American performing artists during this period was as enthusiastic as it was historically without precedence."⁴²⁶ Indeed, as demonstrated by the previous chapter, the early collaborative era of musical interaction between Yugoslavia and the United States may have been quite modest, but the American presentation of their cultural wares in Yugoslavia picked up the pace after the arrival of *Porgy and Bess* in 1954. Jubilee Singers arrived to Yugoslavia at the end of April 1955.⁴²⁷ Then there was the unexpected arrival to the country of violinist Isaac Stern who decided take up the offer of George Allen, the former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, whom he met in New Delhi, and perform in Yugoslavia⁴²⁸, a performance described by the Americans as an invaluable asset to their cultural program in Yugoslavia.⁴²⁹ Metropolitan opera singer Eleanor Steber graced Yugoslavia's opera stages in Zagreb, Osijek, Belgrade and Novi Sad from the end of May to early June 1955, fascinating, according to the official American report, "... everyone including the hairdressers, stage hands, opera stars,

⁴²³ "Fred Smit Kulturtreger," *Jež*, Januar 3 1948, Year XIV, No. 444, 5.

⁴²⁴ Historian Dean Vuletic writes how Yugoslavia's debates on jazz and the impact of popular music in the early to mid-1950s were similar to the debates held on this type of music in the United States and Western Europe. See *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 154.

⁴²⁵ Saito, *The Global Politics of Jazz*, 3.

⁴²⁶ T.J. Crockett, "USIS Zagreb Semi-Annual Activity Report," to USIA Washington through USIS, Belgrade from USIS, Zagreb, July 25, 1955, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁴²⁷ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Jubilee Singers in Belgrade and Novi Sad," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 36, April 25, 1955; Joseph C. Kolarek, "Concert in Zagreb and Ljubljana by Jubilee Singers," FSD from USIS, Zagreb to USIA Washington, Tousey 25, March 30, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁴²⁸ The Foreign Service of the United States of America, Letter from Joseph Polakoff, Acting Public Affairs Officer to Charles F. Blackman, Office of the Assistant Director for Europe, Belgrade, June 25, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁴²⁹ Joseph Polakoff, "Visit to Yugoslavia of Isaac Stern, violinist," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 48, May 25, 1955, 4, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

choruses, critics, press and public", touching her Yugoslav counterparts with "her unaffected manner, her ability and knowledge of music" and receiving glowing reviews in the Yugoslav press for both her performances and her personality.⁴³⁰ Within the Yugoslav-American cultural diplomatic relations, Eleanor Steber emerged as one of the first American artists who issued a public call to the United States to engage more in musical interaction with Yugoslavia. Penning down a rather enthusiastic review of her time in Yugoslavia in *The New York Herald Tribune*, Steber wrote how the Yugoslavs were "full of artistic creation and they expect us to help them to better understand what our country offers". Steber continued in the same review how "[i]t seems to me that it is equally important to establish with them [the Yugoslavs] artistic exchange as much as political [exchange]."⁴³¹ Steber further hoped, as she stated in *The New York Herald Tribune*, that the Americans would be able to engage more in cultural interactions with the Yugoslavs and present them with the best American art because of America's indebtedness to Yugoslavia "for giving us the incomparable Zinka Milanov". Speaking for the Americans in the same review, Steber called on the Yugoslavs "to come to our country and demonstrate the best of what they have."⁴³² Steber was not only one of the earliest musical diplomats in Yugoslav-American diplomatic relations who publicly advocated for closer musical interaction between the two countries, she was also among those American artists listed by American representatives in Yugoslavia as contributing to the realization of one of the goals of American cultural diplomacy. As the official American assessment report put it, the performances of the above mentioned artists "... successfully implemented American foreign policy, combatting the old Soviet saw that the U.S. is a country without a soul."⁴³³

When the Americans spoke about the arrival and performances of Dizzy Gillespie, the Ballet Theatre, the Robert Shaw Chorale and the likes, they also wrote how these artists helped demonstrate the bonds that connected the United States with Europe.⁴³⁴ The latter had been an important element of what the Americans called "Area Objectives".⁴³⁵ As seen from the

⁴³⁰ Joseph Polakoff, "ELEANOR STEBER Makes Triumphant Singing Tour of Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. Tousi 62, June 10, 1955, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁴³¹ "Kroz štampu i događaje. O jugoslavenskoj muzici Ivan Petrov ... i Eleanor Steber," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija* 4-5 (1955), 213.

⁴³² Ibid.

⁴³³ T.J. Crockett, "USIS Zagreb Semi-Annual Activity Report," to USIA Washington through USIS, Belgrade from USIS, Zagreb, July 25, 1955, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁴³⁴ Joseph C. Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousi 66, December 18, 1956, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁴³⁵ See Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousi 8, September 16, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 344, container 98, NARA; Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Tousi 144, June 12, 1956, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

Operations Coordinating Board's report from early May 1954, it were through various activities that the Americans worked towards their goal of Yugoslavia forming closer relations with Western Europe to serve American defense interests, in addition to making an impact on the regime led by Josip Broz Tito.⁴³⁶ Cultural and information programs, including jazz diplomacy, carried out by USIS in Yugoslavia were to fulfil several objectives, Yugoslavia's independence being one of them.⁴³⁷ As the December 18, 1956 report wrote, the idea was to have both the people of Yugoslavia and the country's political leaders "to stand firmly for the assertion of Yugoslavia's independence in its relations with the Eastern as well as the Western powers, at the same time encouraging their ties to the West."⁴³⁸

Within such a problem framing statement, one of the first questions in a dire need of clarification is to what extent, if any, USIS interpreted the task of their cultural and informational programs in Yugoslavia to contribute to the goal of sustaining the independence of Yugoslavia. This was a question USIS officials posed themselves, as evident from a March 13, 1961 assessment report. In response to the first goal of American foreign policy, which was "[t]o encourage continued Yugoslav independence from the Soviet bloc and orientation toward the West", in the March 13, 1961 assessment report USIS officials pondered "whether 'Yugoslav independence' is a proper USIS objective". In all matters pertaining to foreign policy, so the March 13, 1961 assessment report continued, the Yugoslavs acceded to positions no different from Soviet ones. Yet, so it was further written in said report, it was crystal clear that the country was not going back to the Eastern fold. The resolution of the Yugoslavs to remain independent, so bemused USIS officials in the March 13, 1961 report, was more "a matter of political action and economic assistance, rather than propaganda". As USIS concluded in the same report, "[o]nly in a very general and indirect sense could we claim to have 'encouraged continued Yugoslav independence'".⁴³⁹

⁴³⁶ "Operations Coordinating Board. Washington, DC. Progress Report on NSC 5406/1, U.S. Policy Towards Yugoslavia," May 6, 1954, 7, RG 59 General Records of DOS. Entry A1 1586B, Executive Secretariat, box 33, NARA; Nela Erdeljac, "Engleski jezik i američka hladnoratovska kulturna diplomacija u Jugoslaviji (1951-1961)", *Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu*, 52 (2), 287.

⁴³⁷ See, for instance, Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Touse 144, June 12, 1956, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA; Joseph C. Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Touse 66, December 18, 1956, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁴³⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Touse 66, December 18, 1956, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁴³⁹ "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report, USIS Yugoslavia," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 87, March 13, 1961, 11, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, box 12, NARA.

USIS restated the same position in another "Country Plan for Yugoslavia" two years later. In the January 30, 1963 "Country Plan for Yugoslavia", USIS again pondered on their exact actions through which they could aid the achievement of American diplomatic interests towards Yugoslavia, the first being to water the seeds of Yugoslavia's independence and to buttress the willingness of the Yugoslavs to sustain that independence.⁴⁴⁰ The conclusion drawn by USIS officials in Yugoslavia was that, on their part, this could only be done indirectly.⁴⁴¹ One of the principal reasons as to why the hands of USIS were tied to any element relative to the Yugoslav notion of independence, so the American wrote in their January 30 1963 "Country Plans for Yugoslavia" was that the Yugoslavs interpreted "their achievements in national independence as strictly their own accomplishment". This same rationale, continued the Americans in the said Country Plan, was applicable to Yugoslavia's interpretation of their own relationship with the Soviet Union and the Eastern fold causing USIS to only indirectly, through achievements of other tasks, contribute to these objectives.⁴⁴²

However, the March 13, 1961 assessment report indicates that USIS did not see themselves as entirely helpless in matters pertaining to strengthening and sustaining the Yugoslav independent brand. The contribution USIS could make, so American officials wrote in the March 13, 1961 report, was to align Yugoslavia more with the United States and the West and the avenues through which they could do that were precisely those that fell under the category of educational and cultural exchanges.⁴⁴³ These activities could help their country to obtain their "brand vision" for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

With such objectives in mind, the Americans needed to tackle the surroundings in which they worked. They needed to be aware and reflect on the strategies employed by the Yugoslav government to act as sort of "market forces" in order for them to be able to conduct their cultural and informational programs that were to serve the said objectives. As we had seen in the first subchapter of this chapter, the Americans recognized the importance the Yugoslavs, both the people and the regime, attached to their notion of independence and the strong emotional connection they had towards this brand. Indeed, wrote the Americans in early April 1965, it was independence, but also the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, that the Yugoslavs were "jealously

⁴⁴⁰ Walter R. Roberts, "Country Plans for Yugoslavia," FM 47, January 30, 1963, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 20, NARA.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 2.

⁴⁴³ "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report, USIS Yugoslavia," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 87, March 13, 1961, 11, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, box 12, NARA.

protective of".⁴⁴⁴ The Americans recognized the Yugoslav clutch to their independence as a valuable asset to the operation of their cultural and informational program in Yugoslavia. On June 26, 1959, American officials in Yugoslavia wrote how, in moments in which the Yugoslavs were pressed by the deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and China and amid "Yugoslav fear of uncontrolled Soviet bloc propaganda within its borders", the Public Affairs Officer received warnings "that USIS must comply in strict detail with the several laws pertaining to foreign information activities." In the name of their "'independence" as the Americans put it in the same "Country Plan", the Yugoslavs felt the need to exercise more control over foreign information programs.⁴⁴⁵ The same document revealed this Yugoslav "independence" worked to the advantage of USIS USIS and their program in Yugoslavia. As the June 26, 1959 "USIS/Yugoslavia Country Plan" revealed, at that particular moment of time, Yugoslavia had no desire to stop the Americans from pursuing their informational activities within Yugoslavia. Should the Yugoslavs do so, as USIS wrote in the same report, they would "negate their own policy of independence, which recognizes both sides of the great world conflict."⁴⁴⁶ As the Americans indentified in the same document, Yugoslav desires laid elsewhere. This desire, continued the June 26, 1959 "USIS/Yugoslavia Country Plan", was for the Americans "to be moderate, and there we can argue over definition."⁴⁴⁷ This writing serves as evidence that, as a "market force", Yugoslavia's "independence" not only allowed the Americans to conduct their cultural and informational programs in Yugoslavia, it allowed for negotiation over the said programs, even if these negotiations sometimes went in the direction described by American official Robert C. Haney. "When you went over to the Foreign Secretariat (the Yugoslav equivalent of a foreign ministry)," noted Haney, "if the American desk officer was in agreement with what you had to say – a proposal, a request or a notification – he would send for coffee and šljivovica. But if you brought a complaint of some kind, he had a drawer in his desk that he would open, pull out a neatly typed counter-complaint and lay it on."⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁴ "NSAM 304. Action Program for US Relations with East Europe," 1, attached to Richard T. Davies, "Memorandum for the Director," April 6, 1965, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 34, folder Country Plan, NARA.

⁴⁴⁵ Heath Bowman, "USIS/Yugoslavia Country Plan," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 123, June 26, 1959, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry #P 328: Country Plans, Country Assessments, and Related Planning Records 1954-1985, container 9, NARA.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ Robert C. Haney, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Initial interview date, September 21, 2001, 38, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, adst.org (hereinafter, "Haney interview")

Despite the Americans recognizing the benefits their information and cultural programs reaped from the notion of Yugoslav independence there were, nonetheless, moments when the Americans found the Yugoslav demand for independence as just plain old annoying. One such situation was described in the January 13, 1960 despatch sent to USIA. In this despatch, the Americans stationed in Belgrade wrote how they were expecting possible Yugoslav restrictions on their exhibits as this medium was generally controlled in Yugoslavia and one Yugoslav exhibit did not fare that well in the United States.⁴⁴⁹ Additionally, continued the same despatch, Yugoslav officials limited the ability of the Americans to disseminate pamphlets on specific themes to Yugoslav citizens and noted their annoyance with the Yugoslav "delays, the hesitations, the fear of accepting our material". The underlying cause for such Yugoslav behavior, as written in the January 13, 1960 despatch, was "the strong Yugoslav motivation to show itself 'independent'", the latter being the key objective of the American foreign policy towards Yugoslavia. This idea of Yugoslav independence, in practice, continued the Americans in the same despatch, "often resolves itself into a question of, independent toward whom?". The January 13, 1960 despatch then summarized the desire of the Yugoslavs to demonstrate "two things: that it is, after all, still a Communist country; and that it must use its irritant value to play off East against West."⁴⁵⁰ This Yugoslav behavior can also be interpreted in branding terms. As historian Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht writes, in addition to getting other states to desire the same objectives as you do, power also "entails the ability to appear as one wants"⁴⁵¹, which was the case with Yugoslavia as it desired to be seen as independent. The Americans noted in their March 13, 1961 "Country Assessment Report", "... the closer they approach us – through such programs as U.S. economic assistance or their own fiscal reform – the more loudly they will feel obliged to protest that they are independent of 'all blocs.'"⁴⁵² This was the Yugoslavs telling the Americans who they were.

The American ability to work within the Yugoslav system was not something the Americans attributed solely to the Yugoslav notion of independence. In fact, the Americans were fully aware that the strategy the Yugoslavs adhered to in their cultural approach, the "politics of balance", afforded them with the same ability to find cracks in the Yugoslav system, adopt their approach accordingly and use it to the advantage of their cultural program. As the Americans

⁴⁴⁹ Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 53, January 13, 1960, 1-2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁵¹ Gienow-Hecht, "Nation Branding- A Useful Category for International History," 771.

⁴⁵² "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report, USIS Yugoslavia," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 87, March 13, 1961, 11, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, box 12, NARA.

stationed in Belgrade wrote in an October 15, 1957 despatch, in the aftermath of the visits of Communist leaders Ho Chi Minh, Władysław Gomułka, Nikita Khrushchov and Georgy Zhukov to Yugoslavia and the government of Yugoslavia leaning more to the East, "... the Yugoslavs sometimes seem to begrudge our very presence." The Americans continued to lament in the same despatch how USIS activities were under surveillance by the Yugoslav government in an attempt "to see that we do not become too successful".⁴⁵³ This strategy was described by the Americans in the October 15, 1957 despatch as a result of "this balancing act between Washington and Moscow."⁴⁵⁴ Yet, as difficult as this situation may have been for the American programs, it did not mean that Yugoslavia closed its door to such programs. On the contrary, it could be said that the Yugoslav "balancing act" yet again worked in favor of the Americans. What was so special about this "balancing" strategy of the Yugoslavs, so the American analysis continued in the October 15, 1957 despatch, was that it was "made up of many intangibles, because no two people read the scale the same, because bureaucracy is imperfect and because there is a natural public defiance in our favor" and the Americans were always extremely vigilant to exploit any opportunities that might come their way. The Americans further wrote in the October 15, 1957 despatch that they were in a dire need of "a highly flexible program" and to be aware of "what the [Yugoslav] Government approves about us, and try to edge a little farther toward the controversial, without their realizing." The matter of fact remained, so the October 15, 1957 despatch revealed, "[t]he very fact that we continue to operate, ever more broadly even as we receive setbacks, denotes not increasing tolerance on the part of the Government but recognition of this necessity for balance. Every time they naughtily flirt with the East, we can be sure they may have to avert their eyes at one or another of our activities."⁴⁵⁵ Expressed differently, just like Yugoslavia's independence, the Yugoslav "balancing" strategy allowed American cultural and informational programs to remain operational.

Balance was not only employed as a market force to be used to ensure the same position for the Soviets and the Americans, it was also used by the Yugoslav government when, plainly put, they needed something, as further visible from the cited October 15, 1957 despatch. As the Americans noted in it, if USIS offered something the Yugoslav government could use or if it agreed with a particular American policy, the government of Yugoslavia was "generous in view

⁴⁵³ Heath Bowman, "Annual Assessment Report November 1956-October 1, 1957," FSD from USIS BG to USIA, no. 28, October 15, 1957, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

of their pattern of obstacles."⁴⁵⁶ As the Americans continued in the same despatch, the Yugoslav need for "balance persuades them [the Yugoslavs] occasionally to promote and sponsor our art exhibits, often under their own auspices, our President's Fund events, our radio package programs."⁴⁵⁷ Indeed, as the Americans confirmed in a despatch from September 1, 1960, the Yugoslav authorities thoroughly paid attention to their non-alliance with neither East nor West as they equally distributed "appropriate doses of editorial comment and press coverage, balances its treatment of visitors and delegations, rationalized the quota of foreign cultural events for a given period, and impartially issues reprimands for alleged violations of Yugoslav media laws."⁴⁵⁸

In addition to identifying the American "brand vision" for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand American cultural and informational programs, which included jazz diplomacy, were to help achieve and the "market forces" the Americans had to take into account, elements that warrant further scrutiny are a specific set of characteristics of the Yugoslav system/market that further marked and made possible jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States. Those included the choice of the product to use, the rules and conditions under which such diplomacy could function and the American adaptation of their brand strategy to achieve the stated objectives.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁵⁸ Walter R. Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 20, September 1, 1960, 8, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

1.4. Rules of engagement

"Above all," wrote the already cited American despatch from October 15, 1957 signed by the then American Public Affairs Officer Heath Bowman, "USIS is here in Yugoslavia on sufferance: this fact should be kept in mind, for it conditions everything that we do, and dictates not only what we say, but even how we say it, and through what media."⁴⁵⁹ As the despatch continued, "[i]n general, we go no farther in any direction, in pursuit of any policy, than the [Yugoslav] Government will allow; seldom do we call the shots."⁴⁶⁰ Bowman's slightly "doomed USIS in Yugoslavia" statement had since been rejected by some of his own colleagues such as, for instance, Robert Gerald Livingston who was stationed at the American Embassy in Belgrade from 1961 to 1964.⁴⁶¹ In an interview in 1998, Livingston described his time in Yugoslavia as "a very pleasant time, and a little bit of suffering, well not suffering but a little bit of hard conditions."⁴⁶² As deduced from Livingston's recollections, much of Bowman's position on the "working conditions" for USIS in Yugoslavia originated from the American self-attributed feeling of suffering. As Livingston noted in his 1998 interview, "I generally think we had this feeling, which was misplaced probably misplaced, you know, 'We're on the forefront, brave band of brothers in this almost Iron Curtain country, almost Iron Curtain. We aren't suffering as much as those in Sofia, you know, but we're really suffering, and its really tough here.'" As Livingston continued in the same interview "... it was great but it wasn't really hardship, but you had the feeling it was hardship."⁴⁶³ However, Bowman was entirely correct in his assessment of the nonexistence of a free market in Yugoslavia and how it was the Yugoslav government that determined the main "market forces" of the Yugoslav market in which the Americans functioned. As evident from previous subchapters, the main branding strategies through which the Yugoslav government aimed to preserve the independent brand on the global political market, the so-called "politics of balance" and the Yugoslav "independence", found their equivalents in the country's cultural policy which allowed the Americans to culturally interact with the Yugoslavs. However, as several American documents point out, the

⁴⁵⁹ Heath Bowman, "Annual Assessment Report November 1956-October 1, 1957," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, no. 28, October 15, 1957, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁶¹ Robert Gerald Livingston interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, February 6, 1998, (initial interview date), 2, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA. (hereinafter, "Livingston interview") www.adst.org

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

Yugoslav government was also the agent that determined the product through which the two countries would interact. As the Americans wrote in an "Inspection Report" from November 20, 1959, they did not choose to work in Yugoslavia through the cultural dimension. Instead, as the Americans continued in the said report, such an approach was "imposed by the situation".⁴⁶⁴

The Americans had made this observation, albeit perhaps less directly, already in the early 1950s. On December 17, 1952, Americans stationed in Belgrade wrote how the Yugoslav government showed "relatively little resistance" to the cultural activities of the Americans which made the American Embassy much more inclined to pursue such activities.⁴⁶⁵ Another American despatch from December 20, 1951 clearly indicated that the American Embassy favoured cultural over informational activities in Yugoslavia. As the December 20, 1951 despatch wrote, "[a]lthough the information phase of the USIE program should continue to meet an urgent need in Yugoslavia, the Embassy is inclined to the view that in the long run the cultural exchange activities will prove to be the most productive and permanent in their beneficial effect." Providing that Washington secures both trained personnel and adequate materials, the despatch continued how "it is hoped that the cultural relations program can be given further emphasis."⁴⁶⁶

Several reasons shaped this American thinking. To begin with, that is, to restate from above, during 1952 and 1953, the American Embassy noted the leniency of Yugoslav authorities towards American cultural activities.⁴⁶⁷ In addition, there was the issue of the consumers and their preferences. The Yugoslavs, as recognized in one American despatch from July 1953, had a "natural bent ... for the arts, literature and music".⁴⁶⁸ Furthermore, there was the product

⁴⁶⁴ Lawrence S. Morris, "Inspection Report USIS/Yugoslavia," November 20, 1959, Report No. 46, Copy no. 4, 10, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 11, NARA.

⁴⁶⁵ Bruce Buttles, "IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending November 30, 1952," FSD from Belgrade to DOS, no. 461, December 17, 1952, 30, RG 59 Department of State, Decimal File 1950-54, box 2472, NARA. (hereinafter "Decimal File" as "DF")

⁴⁶⁶ Buttles, "USIE Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending November 30, 1951," FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Desp. No.598, December 20, 1951, 24, RG 59 Department of State, DF 1950-1954, box 2472, NARA.

⁴⁶⁷ FSD from Belgrade to the DOS, Desp.No.461, December 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Subject: IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period ending November 30. 1952; Operations Memorandum to Department of State from Belgrade, April 28, 1953, Subject: 1954-1955 IIA Prospectus Call, 511.68/4-2853; FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to the Department of State, July 13, 1953, Desp. No.44, Subject: IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period ending May 31, 1953, 511.68/7-1353. All documents were found in: RG 59 Department of State, Decimal file 1950-1954, Entry: Cultural affairs E. Europe I, from 511.68/2-750-568/12-2354, b 2472, NARA.

⁴⁶⁸ John E. McGowan, "IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period ending May 31, 1953," FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to the DOS, desp. no 44, July 13, 1953, 14, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-1954, box 2472, NARA.

itself. Music was valuable, so the American Embassy wrote in a despatch from December 17, 1952, because "even during the period of most severe restrictions upon USIS activities", the Americans were able "to maintain some type of cultural program" that was followed by "a corresponding increase in the demand for such materials" when the Yugoslav government eased their restrictions. Indeed, as the Americans further wrote in the same despatch, not only were their music library and "loan collection" in Belgrade "one of the busiest sections of the USIS establishment" but "American music is enormously important in Yugoslavia, and has shown itself an avenue for the introduction of other program materials, such as radio scripts, among institutional users."⁴⁶⁹

To draw a parallel with previous subchapters, a rather modest cultural interaction was occurring in the background, or at the forefront depending on the perspective, during this early phase of "negotiating" the rules for engaging with the independent brand of Yugoslavia and its customers. The development of such a modest cultural interaction during this period was, according to American documents, planned to a degree. It was in a document from June 23, 1951 that American officials in Yugoslavia wrote how, up until that moment, they were adopting a rather measured cultural approach. This meant, as the same report continued, that USIE hadn't "aggressively sought out new customers." The approach they pursued, as the Americans continued to write in the same report, was an effective one "and the Embassy believes that its policy of not unduly pressing the pace and building up confidence had good results."⁴⁷⁰ The Americans reiterated the pursuance of a "cautious, conservative approach to cultural relations" in a despatch from December 17, 1952. This approach, so it was further detailed in the December 17, 1952 despatch, entailed the Americans building a rapport with Yugoslav institutions "quietly on a basis of confidence, leading to the expectation that further extension of cultural relationships can be profitably exploited."⁴⁷¹ In branding terms, the Americans were building the blocs of their branding strategy, which constituted jazz diplomacy, slowly and cautiously.

In order for the Americans to be able to pursue such an approach, it was important that the Yugoslav market provides them with an important ingredient. As we had seen in previous

⁴⁶⁹ Bruce Buttles, "IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending November 30, 1952," FSD from Belgrade to DOS, no. 461, December 17, 1952, 30-31, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

⁴⁷⁰ Bruce Buttles, "USIS Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending May 31, 1951," Foreign Service of the United States of America from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. 1005, June 23, 1951, 511.68/6-2351, 18, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

⁴⁷¹ Bruce Buttles, "IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending November 30, 1952," FSD from Belgrade to DOS, no. 461, December 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, 31, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

subchapters, establishing contacts was one of the "common grounds" shared by cultural diplomacies of the United States and Yugoslavia. From the American vantage point, the entire base of operations of the American President's Fund rested on the Americans having access to those people from host countries with whom they could collaborate with in their musical interaction. As musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier noted of the organizational structure of the tours under the sponsorship of the State Department, local agents were not only engaged in the organizational aspect of the tour, they also collaborated with the Americans in the preparatory phase of the tours by American musicians.⁴⁷² Expressed differently, access to local people was crucial as, otherwise, the Americans would not have been able to accomplish their mission.

Recollections of stationed American public and cultural affairs officers in Yugoslavia, whose job was, as written by Danielle Fosler-Lussier, making sure these tours run smoothly in foreign countries⁴⁷³, reveal how the main determiner of the Yugoslav "market flows", the Yugoslav government, never really drastically diminished the American prospect to establish contacts with those Yugoslavs with whom they desired to collaborate in the cultural field. Russell O. Prickett, who served in Yugoslavia as the economic/commercial officer from 1964 to 1968⁴⁷⁴, came to Yugoslavia in the summer of 1953⁴⁷⁵ and noted how the Americans "traveled the full extent of the country, from Lake Ohrid in the south to Lake Bled in the north and all along the coast". The Americans moved via public transportation which meant, according to Prickett, that they never stumbled upon any military sights they later saw when they travelled through Yugoslavia in their personal vehicles. "But the freedom of movement was just as great, really, as when we were there in the '60s", concluded Prickett.⁴⁷⁶ Robert C. Haney, an American officer who served in Yugoslavia from 1958 to 1963⁴⁷⁷, also noted that the Americans could travel freely through Yugoslavia⁴⁷⁸ as did Dell Pendergrast, who served in Yugoslavia from 1966 to 1969.⁴⁷⁹ Pendergrast recalled how the Americans had the

⁴⁷² Fosler-Lussier, "Instruments of Diplomacy: Writing Music into the History of Cold War International Relations," in *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 121-122.

⁴⁷³ Fosler-Lussier, "Instruments of Diplomacy," 121; Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 2, 4-5, 7.

⁴⁷⁴ Russell O. Prickett interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy & Lewis Hoffacker, initial interview date March 24, 1999, 1, FAOHC, ADST (hereinafter "Prickett interview")

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴⁷⁷ Robert C. Haney interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Initial interview date, September 21, 2001, 1, FAOHC, ADST. (hereinafter, "Haney interview")

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁴⁷⁹ Dell Pendergrast interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Initial interview date: June 24, 1999, 1, FAOHC, ADST. (hereinafter, "Pendergrast interview")

opportunity to really get to know Croatian and Slovenian people and "developed very good friends in the Zagreb community, primarily in the educational and cultural fields, which is where USIA did a large part of its work."⁴⁸⁰ Terrence Catherman assumed the post of the Country's Public Affairs Officer in 1974⁴⁸¹ and he described his experience in the country as being "different than any other one I had in that we were in a society overwhelmingly pro-American and overwhelmingly open to people who were interested in the arts and intellectual activities." Catherman then added how he and his wife "established life-long friendships with the best writers, the artists, the poets and some of the journalists", all in "a few weeks".⁴⁸² When, in an interview conducted in 1990, American official Isabel Cumming, serving in Belgrade in 1976⁴⁸³, was asked whether or not USIS could establish contact with the Yugoslav people⁴⁸⁴, her response differed very little from the responses given by her predecessors. As she stated, "Absolutely. No problem. No problem at all".⁴⁸⁵

In the long run, having access to such contacts carried considerable implications for musical interaction between the two states. It was on November 24, 1967 that the Americans reported that exchanges "provide the Embassy with high level contacts for furthering future cultural and educational activities". Through these individuals, as the November 24, 1967 airgram continued, the Americans managed to organize various cultural activities in a rather short time span.⁴⁸⁶ This was indeed a valuable asset for music diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States. As noted by Wallace W. Littell, the American Public Affairs Officer in Yugoslavia from 1970 to 1974⁴⁸⁷, the majority of the funding for music diplomacy at that time went into the exchanges with the Soviet Union due to an existing cultural agreement. As Littell continued, this meant that "... we didn't have that much money to use elsewhere. So we had to do a lot of scratching around on the independent contacts to bring groups into Yugoslavia." They succeeded, concluded Littell, as "[w]e had a particularly successful jazz festival there

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., 18.

⁴⁸¹ Terrence Catherman interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt, initial interview date: January 25, 1991, 1, FAOHC, ADST. (hereinafter "Catherman interview")

⁴⁸² Ibid, 24.

⁴⁸³ Isabel Cumming, interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt, Initial interview date: January 15, 1990, FAOHC, ADST, 1. (hereinafter, "Cumming interview")

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., 33.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ Tobin, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report," AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-359, November 24, 1967, 2, Post Reports, box 320, folder 32, MC 468, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

⁴⁸⁷ Wallace W. Littell, interviewed by Robert Martens, Initial Interview Date: October 1, 1992, 2; Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, adst.org (hereinafter "Littell interview")

which was sponsored by the Yugoslavs, but we brought the leading American jazz performers ... " ⁴⁸⁸

Within Yugoslavia, contacts were important for another reason. It was on January 27, 1967 that the Americans reported how they could not really promote their lectures, held at the American Library, within Yugoslavia due to the existence of the Press Law.⁴⁸⁹ The latter had been brought by the Yugoslav Government at the beginning of 1961 and, under it, American reading rooms and other informational activities were no longer seen as part and parcel of the American Embassy whose members enjoyed diplomatic immunity, but were held accountable to the Yugoslav law.⁴⁹⁰ Within such a climate, so American officials in Belgrade wrote on January 27, 1967, American lectures in Yugoslavia "relied increasingly on local sponsors to announce such events and provide the location for them." ⁴⁹¹ This, paradoxically, depended on contacts which the Yugoslav government, in most cases, allowed.

However, everything was not ideal in the land of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and that same brand had its limits. Sometimes, at least in the early 1950s, the government's noose on Western influences in the country impacted music diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States. Amid an anti-Western campaign initiated by the leadership of Yugoslavia, namely Tito, so the Americans wrote in a despatch from March 19, 1952, the leadership in Ljubljana suddenly became disinterested "in the production of American music, which had been actively sought only recently for presentation in Slovenia." Concomitantly, the Yugoslav Council for Science and Culture refused to grant permission for a Belgrade performance of an American artist "seemingly well received by his Yugoslav colleagues on the technical level", so the Americans further wrote in their March 19, 1952 despatch. The same despatch noted how this was a change in the standard "practice of grabbing eagerly almost any foreign artist who happens to stray into Yugoslavia, and is willing to accept soft currency for his work".⁴⁹²

Sometimes even the allowed contacts between the Americans and some Yugoslav jazz agents turned out to be slightly problematic, as demonstrated by the case of Mladen Mazur, the

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 26.

⁴⁸⁹ Henry F. Arnold, "Country Assessment Report - Yugoslavia January 1966 - January 1967," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 72, January 27, 1967, 5, RG 306 USIA, Bureau of Management/Office of Administration and Technology, Entry P: 328, box 25, NARA.

⁴⁹⁰ Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi: 1961-1917*, 21.

⁴⁹¹ Henry F. Arnold, "Country Assessment Report - Yugoslavia January 1966 - January 1967," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 72, January 27, 1967, 5, RG 306 USIA, Bureau of Management/Office of Administration and Technology, Entry P: 328, box 25, NARA.

⁴⁹² Bruce Buttles, "Yugoslav Resistance to Western Cultural Presentation," FSD from Belgrade to DOS, no. 885, March 19, 1952, 2, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

director of Bled Jazz Festival. According to an American airgram from March 31, 1964 which detailed an informal chat between an American official, his wife and Mladen Mazur in Zagreb, the trio spoke about "the possibility of another illustrated jazz lecture in our [American] auditorium". Mazur then informed the duo that he was asked to clarify his role in the organization of jazz concerts held at USIS premises on one meeting of the Jazz Union of Croatia, which he did. According to the March 31, 1964 airgram, the Jazz Union of Croatia responded to Mazur by stating "that he had done nothing wrong, but that, in the future, he should not make any similar arrangement with us." The Jazz Union of Croatia, according to the same airgram, did not explain the reasons why Mazur should not collaborate with the Americans on the stated jazz project. As further detailed in the March 31, 1964 airgram, Mazur told the American official and his wife how "he was not afraid to continue", but he drew the attention of the Americans that some Yugoslav jazz bands might be reluctant to perform on American premises out of fear "that if they do not follow the advice not to perform for us, they will be unable to get passports when they wish to go abroad." According to the same airgram, the Mazur case was "the first negative effect to appear in our dealings with Yugoslavs since Mr. Mistic's (Federal Ministry for Information) visit to USIS Zagreb."⁴⁹³ These were all instances that reminded the Americans that the "independent Yugoslavia" brand had its own rules and, most importantly, limitations.

While the Party's bureaucracy, as noted by the American Public Affairs Officer Wallace W. Littell, sometimes hampered their operations, "it was not a thing that bothered us a lot."⁴⁹⁴ Heath Bowman, however, provided a different description in mid-1958 after the Yugoslav government opted for a much tougher approach towards foreign information activities in Yugoslavia, leaving his staff pretty much demoralized and him putting in the effort to raise their spirits.⁴⁹⁵ At that moment, the situation may have been uncomfortable for the Americans but Bowman still noted one element of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand through which the Americans could still work on their mission in Yugoslavia. As Bowman noted, it were cultural attractions, which he called on Washington to send to Yugoslavia, that were "[s]till open to us".⁴⁹⁶ Sometimes USIS encountered obstacles in their work in Yugoslavia due to, as they

⁴⁹³ "On Premises Jazz Concert-Lectures," USIS Zagreb to USIS Belgrade, A-135, 1, encl. in Joseph Godson, "Croatian Restrictions on USIS Operations," Airgram from Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A-135, March 31, 1964, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 40, container 91, NARA.

⁴⁹⁴ Littell interview, 25.

⁴⁹⁵ Heath Bowman to Gerard M. Gert, Belgrade, November 17, 1958, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 344, container 107, NARA.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

admitted in a despatch from September 1, 1960, them trying to do more in Yugoslavia thus discovering what they could and could not do in the country.⁴⁹⁷ There were boundaries to the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and the Americans were testing them.

Still, even these attempted impositions of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand by the Yugoslav government worked in favour of the two countries developing such interaction. As a despatch from June 26, 1959 wrote, there was no blueprint on how to act in the country. The Yugoslav authorities frequently changed their minds and USIS was rarely aware of "how far it can go" in Yugoslavia. If they were too careful or too direct in their activities, so it was further written in the said despatch, they were in danger of the Yugoslavs placing limitations on those activities. However, as the June 26, 1959 despatch continued, the Yugoslavs did not know where to draw the line between permissible activities. The Americans thus concluded how the two sides will continue to test each other.⁴⁹⁸

American official Robert C. Haney revealed another characteristic of the Yugoslav system that worked in favour of the Yugoslav-American musical interaction. In the period that followed Yugoslavia's ousting from the Cominform, as writer Marin Franičević wrote in 1950, for the revolution's sake, it was salient that there existed a country that was a rather small one, but that had demonstrated how it was indeed possible to gain independence and build up socialism "with consistent revolutionary fight" on its own at a time when those who saw themselves as Marxist-Leninist "gurus" attempted to crush the revolution. The fight Yugoslavia had undertaken, continued Franičević, namely the fight for relations between socialist states to be set on equal footing, was not just a fight Yugoslavia was leading for Yugoslavia but it was a "fight for the basic tenets of Marxism worldwide."⁴⁹⁹ Yet, regardless of such declarations of love towards Marxism-Leninism, as Haney noted, "... the official Yugoslav ideology really didn't weigh that heavily on people who were living there as we were."⁵⁰⁰ Much of this had to do with the fact that Josip Broz Tito, as noted by journalist Dusko Doder, while identifying as a Marxist "was bored by abstractions, never taking ideology very seriously, at least not as a means of interpreting the actions of others or his own reactions to problems."⁵⁰¹ The personal opinion of

⁴⁹⁷ Walter R. Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 20, September 1, 1960, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, folder Country Plan- 1960, container 10, NARA.

⁴⁹⁸ Heath Bowman, "USIS/Yugoslavia Country Plan," FSD from USIS BG to USIA Washington, no. 123, June 26, 1959, 1-2, RG 306 USIA, Entry #P 328, container 9, NARA.

⁴⁹⁹ Marin Franičević, "Put našeg kulturnog preobražaja," *Republika*, Year VI, No. 2-3, February, March 1950, 67.

⁵⁰⁰ Robert C. Haney interview, 43.

⁵⁰¹ Doder, *The Yugoslavs*, 117.

Tito, that is, his rather traditional taste in the arts, according to the opinion of an American official stationed in Yugoslavia, bore very little imprint on the manner in which "the institution and the country were run."⁵⁰² Indeed, in 1966, when American *Time* magazine described all of the changes the country went through in order to obtain foreign hard currency, the magazine used economic terms to describe the rule of Josip Broz Tito over his country writing that the economic policy of the Yugoslav leading man could be described as "hardheaded business – before – dogma".⁵⁰³ According to American officials, official Yugoslav ideology did not really bother those Yugoslav agents who collaborated with the Americans in music diplomacy. Referring to *Dom Omladine* (the House of Youth) and *Studentski kulturni centar* as two Yugoslav institutions that collaborated with the Americans, William P. Kiehl, in Belgrade in June 1971⁵⁰⁴ stated how their members were "all young Communists, or members of the League of Youth but frankly there wasn't an ideological thought in their heads."⁵⁰⁵

Almost at the end of November 1955, the Americans wrote how little ideology impacted the musical life of Yugoslavia. In a November 22, 1955 despatch, American officials wrote how a review of theatre programs and music in Zagreb showed how "Croatian theater art and music is still virile", that Marxism was nowhere to be seen nor were the arts used to advertise socialist realism or political and economic goals. Despite numerous problems, continued the said despatch, that ranged from organizational aspects to meager salaries and the desire of Yugoslav artists to either permanently leave the country or spend some time abroad, the programs revealed "a high quality, variety and keen internationalism." No longer were the translations of Soviet works given preferences over the works of Western composers and there was "vivid interest in American, English, French and Italian works." Occasionally, more as an exception rather than the rule, wrote the Americans in the same report, "these works are slightly altered to prove a communist point."⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰² McBride interview, 38.

⁵⁰³ "Yugoslavia: Socialism of Sorts," *Time*, June 10, 1966
content.time.com/subscriber/article/0,33009,942012,00.html

⁵⁰⁴ Kiehl interview, 33.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁵⁰⁶ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Lack of Communist Party Propaganda in Most Croatian Theatrical and Musical Events," FSD from USIS Zagreb to USIA, Tosi 82, November 22, 1955, 1, container 91, NARA. On "socialist realism" in Croatia, see, for instance, Snježana Banović, "Socijalistički realizam u hrvatskom kazalištu 1945.-1949." in *Od mobilnosti do interakcije. Dramsko pismo i kazalište u Bosni i Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori, Hrvatskoj, na Kosovu, u Makedoniji, Sloveniji i Srbiji*, edited by Leszek Malczak and Gabriela Abrasowicz, Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 2020, pp. 45-64.

As branding experts write, the story behind the brand is what "gives the meaning to a brand and defines what it is and what it does" and, in order to make it successful, it is of utmost importance to clarify "the core truth about the product or service concerned, as this will become the heart of the message."⁵⁰⁷ The story on which the brand "independent Yugoslavia" rested on was more than clear to the Americans. "Everybody still has a clear recollection", wrote Sergije Visich from the Yugoslav Service of IBS who was temporarily assigned to USIS Yugoslavia in August 1960, "not only of the period 1944-1948, but also of the occupation, or 'liberation', of Belgrade by the Russians."⁵⁰⁸ Visich wrote how, during his stay in Yugoslavia, he did not encounter a Yugoslav, be they a member of the Communist Party, a regime's devotee or adversary, "who did not share in the general hatred of the Russians."⁵⁰⁹ The Yugoslavs whom he conversed made it clear to Visich that their aim was "to live better or, as they expressed it, 'everybody wants to live like Americans'". To achieve this aim, as the Yugoslavs told Visich, the wife worked too which was pointed out as an example how the Yugoslavs lived the same way as Visich had in the United States.⁵¹⁰ As Visich further added, nobody, for any reason whatsoever, saw the Soviet Union as a desirable model.⁵¹¹ Put differently by the already mentioned William Kiehl, the Americans "had the advantages that we were the country that most Yugoslavs admired. They didn't admire the Russians, they were afraid of them."⁵¹² The "independent Yugoslavia" brand story worked for the benefit of the United States.

Since the Americans were buying what Yugoslavia was selling, namely its independence as a political entity and independence as an idea, the American investors adapted their methods and strategies accordingly. Referring to the decisions of both the "Operations Coordinating Board", and thus the US government, on November 3, 1958 USIS Belgrade wrote how they were completely and utterly aware "that our goals [in Yugoslavia] ... are limited" as the United States had neither the power nor was it was to its own benefit to inhibit and annihilate

⁵⁰⁷ Catharine Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity: a Guide for Designers* (London: Laurence King Publishing, 2016), 39.

⁵⁰⁸ "Appendix to Report by Sergije Visich, Yugoslav Service IBS, on his Temporary Duty Assignment with USIS/Yugoslavia, August, 1960," 3, attached to IBS/RE Charles A. Bergerson to Joseph Phillips (IAE) (US Information Agency Routing Slip), December 12, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA. Another American document from 1958 also noted the "distrust of the Russians" in Yugoslavia. See "Yugoslavia, April 1958," RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 2. Journalist Dusko Doder also noted the animosity of the Yugoslavs towards the Russians. See *The Yugoslavs*, xi.

⁵¹⁰ "Appendix to Report by Sergije Visich, Yugoslav Service IBS, on his Temporary Duty Assignment with USIS/Yugoslavia, August, 1960," 3, attached to IBS/RE Charles A. Bergerson to Joseph Phillips (IAE) (US Information Agency Routing Slip), December 12, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵¹² Kiehl interview, 45.

Communism in Yugoslavia.⁵¹³ What the Americans did want, so they wrote on March 5, 1963, was to impact "the development of Yugoslav Communism in a direction favorable to the West."⁵¹⁴ Put in branding terms, a slightly different packaging of the original Yugoslav product was in the interest of the Americans. As not to harm and damage the original Yugoslav product too much, the Americans had to be careful. As the Americans noted in the March 5, 1963 document, it was important that materials with information about the United States contain limited "political content" and, even though the Yugoslav citizens were to be shown elements of American life "and the benefits of living under a system of free choice and competing ideas", it was also important that such materials "make no explicit contrast between the respective merits of the American and the Yugoslav systems."⁵¹⁵ While the main aim of such materials was to stimulate "growing aspirations for freedom and a better life on the part of the Yugoslav people", as it was stressed in the March 1963 document, the program was not directed at subverting the Communist system in place in Yugoslavia "but rather for influencing its evolution."⁵¹⁶ That is, same product, different packaging.

There are several reports written by USIS staff in Yugoslavia that emphasized how they self-censored their materials⁵¹⁷, all in the course of not damaging the original product or insulting its originator. As was written in a despatch from February 5, 1959, USIS carefully screened their wireless file while the released bulletin was "much shorter than [a] full transmitted file". As continued in the same despatch, "a conscious effort has always been made not to be offensive, nor indulge in politics".⁵¹⁸ Indeed, in July of the same year, the Americans yet again emphasized how they, when preparing their materials, "exercised extreme care so as not to offend the sensibilities of the Communist regime to such an extent that they will object and limit our activities".⁵¹⁹ In some of the cases, the purpose had been to avoid the customary ban by the

⁵¹³ Heath Bowman, "Annual USIS Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 30, November 3, 1958, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P40, container 44, NARA.

⁵¹⁴ IAE Morrill Cody, IAE Edwin C. Pencoast, "IMG-Yugoslavia," March 5, 1963, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, box 1, NARA.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵¹⁷ Heath Bowman, "Annual USIS Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 30, November 3, 1958, 3, RG 306 USIA, Entry P40, container 44, NARA; Incoming telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 745, February 5, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA; IOA/I-Evans, IAE-William R. Auman, "Inspection of USIS/Yugoslavia. Your memo of July 10," July 22, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵¹⁸ Incoming telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 745, February 5, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵¹⁹ IOA/I-Evans, IAE-William R. Auman, "Inspection of USIS/Yugoslavia. Your memo of July 10," July 22, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

authorities.⁵²⁰ The Yugoslavs thus retained "all rights reserved" regarding their independent brand.

However, sometimes even the best USIS efforts had been in vain and the Yugoslavs found the Americans guilty of damaging the rules of their original trademark. This was, for instance, visible in the case of a pamphlet USIS distributed for the performances in Yugoslavia of the American jazz band the Modern Jazz Quartet in 1960. In a despatch from September 1, 1960, USIS Belgrade noted how they printed the program notes for the Modern Jazz Quartet's performances at the behest of Jugokonzert, the patron of the Modern Jazz Quartet's performances in Yugoslavia, which were also co-financed by USIS. The Yugoslavs, according to the same despatch, claimed that the publication of such materials did not gain approval of the Secretariat of the Interior, as demanded by the Yugoslav Press Law.⁵²¹ Indeed, the Yugoslav Press Law could, in economic terms, be interpreted as the Yugoslav government protecting the specificities of their market and their independent brand. As American official Robert C. Haney commented, the Press Law, albeit not directly stated, had been a Yugoslav move against the Soviet Union. That is, according to Haney, the Yugoslavs attempted to put a leash on the Soviet expansion of their information services in Yugoslavia as the Soviets were opening up their centers in places where the United States had none.⁵²² In order to prevent the Soviets from engulfing even more space, the Yugoslavs, continued Haney, issued the Press Law that targeted cultural and informational activities of all foreign countries in Yugoslavia.⁵²³ The background story to Haney's visa approval lends credibility to his interpretation. As the already cited September 1, 1960 despatch from USIS Belgrade to USIA reveals, Haney had initially, in the spring of 1958, been denied a visa by the Yugoslav authorities with the explanation that this decision had nothing to do with Haney per se nor with the ability of the other side to name a person of their own choosing to their diplomatic post. Instead, continued the September 1, 1960 despatch, the Yugoslavs explained that an addition of a new person would result in an increase of American "propaganda activities" in the country. The visa request, continued the same despatch, coincided with the League of Communist's Seventh Congress that took off in the spirit of Eastern absence and a fall out between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union over Yugoslavia's new party program, followed by an "anti-Yugoslav campaign" in the press of Eastern countries

⁵²⁰ Heath Bowman, "Annual USIS Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 30, November 3, 1958, 3, RG 306 USIA, Entry #P 40, container 44, NARA.

⁵²¹ Walter R. Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 20, September 1, 1960, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

⁵²² Robert C. Haney interview, 39.

⁵²³ Robert C. Haney interview, 39.

and the Soviet Union suspending loans and wheat shipments to Yugoslavia. Should the Yugoslavs conform to Haney's visa request, so the Americans entertained this thought in the September 1, 1960 despatch, then the Soviet Union would require the same treatment. As concluded in the same despatch, it was this chain of events the Yugoslavs wanted to prevent.⁵²⁴ In a rather short-time span, Haney did get his visa approved⁵²⁵ and the Americans contemplated how a satisfactory time period had passed that gave the Yugoslavs the ability to grant Haney the visa without jeopardizing "their 'principled position.'"⁵²⁶ As the Americans commented on the issue of the program notes for the Modern Jazz Quartet in their September 1, 1960 despatch, what made this situation so specific was that the materials in question were those placed "in stacks in our printing shop". This meant, continued the Americans, that "someone, probably one of our own Yugoslav employees, had simply collected Interior's 'evidence' the easy way, and a zealot in the Secretariat had instructed the Foreign Secretariat to rap our knuckles before even a cursory investigation was made."⁵²⁷ This was the Yugoslav version of a corporate espionage at its finest.

It was not just the Yugoslav government that tried to establish some sort of order on the Yugoslav cultural market. Other Yugoslav actors, such as the Veljko Bijedić, the director of the main booking agency of Yugoslavia, Jugokonzert, did too. At a December 7, 1956 meeting of the Executive Board of the Jugokonzert, speaking about performances of Yugoslav artists abroad, Bijedić noted how the Yugoslav method of accepting foreign performers to Yugoslavia had been based on the principle "we take yours, you take ours".⁵²⁸ The Yugoslavs had not been particularly successful in booking performances of Yugoslav artists in foreign lands, according to Bijedić, because the Eastern market had too many performers while the Western market asked only for high quality names and ensembles. As Veljko Bijedić continued at the same meeting, an additional performance meant nothing for such a large country as the Soviet Union while this presented a significant problem for Yugoslavia. The Eastern "package", as further stated by Veljko Bijedić on the December 7, 1956 meeting, included all countries of Eastern Europe that wanted to present their cultural troupes in Yugoslavia which he described as a "great

⁵²⁴ Walter R. Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 20, September 1, 1960, 9, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

⁵²⁵ Haney interview, 36; Walter R. Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 20, September 1, 1960, 9, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

⁵²⁶ Walter R. Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 20, September 1, 1960, 9, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵²⁸ AJ-559-114-248, "Zapisnik sednice Izvršnog odbora Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije, održane 7. XII. 1956 godine," 2-3.

burden" for the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav solution, accepted by Czechoslovakia, so Bijedić continued, was the principle "they take in our artists, and we will take in theirs according to our opportunities."⁵²⁹

However, the Americans knew how to navigate the vagaries of the Yugoslav market and package their messages differently to the Yugoslav audience. Many of the themes developed by USIA, as written in an October 23, 1959 despatch from USIS Belgrade to USIA, were left unsaid due to "the peculiarities of the operation here". The reason, continued the same despatch, was the need address these themes apolitically and "to cloathe our themes in the less disturbing aspects of strictly cultural subjects". For instance, as was further written in the October 23, 1959 despatch, when the Americans spoke about the dissemination of their culture, they could also include economy in the picture. "For example," continued the same despatch, "when we display long-playing phonograph records, we make the extra points that these are not only numerous and widely disseminated in all walks of life in the US, but that they are relative inexpensive, thanks to our economic system and our methods of distribution."⁵³⁰ In order to help preserve and sell the Yugoslav independent brand, the Americans were also very attentative to terminology. For instance, as was noted in a April 23, 1953 document, when discussing the danger of imperialism of the Soviet Union and speaking about imperialism, it was fine to use words such as "'Cominform, Russian, Moscow, or Kremlin' imperialism". It was not fine, continued the same document, to use words such as "'Communist' imperialism."⁵³¹ The terminology went through another change in mid-1950s. When Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union made up, the Americans noted how it became impossible to "attack 'international' communism as distinguished from the 'nationalist' – or Yugoslav – brand" when addressing the Yugoslav public.⁵³² Then, in 1962, USIS again commented on one of the themes and the possibility of it being used in Yugoslavia. The theme in question, as the Americans wrote in a field message from August 31, 1962, was that of "a world of free choice" which USIS considered "not feasible" for use in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs, continued the same field message, did have the Press Law in place and the Americans did not deem fit to directly castigate "the 'world of coercion' which the Communist system entails". Furthermore, as written

⁵²⁹ AJ-559- 114-248, "Zapisnik sednice Izvršnog odbora Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije, održane 7. XII. 1956 godine," 3.

⁵³⁰ Heath Bowman, "Themes on American Life and Culture in USIS/Yugoslavia Program," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 35, October 23, 1959, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵³¹ Operations Memorandum to Department of State from Belgrade, "IIA: Country Prospectus fro Yugoslavia, 1954 and 1955," April 27, 1953, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 36, NARA.

⁵³² Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," Tousey 144, June 12, 1956, 14, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

in the August 31, 1962 field message, USIS Belgrade did not consider it very efficient "to imply that the Yugoslavs have a choice between one system and another." Instead, as USIS continued in the said field message, the Yugoslavs, both members of the government and Party and those outside of those bodies, should be urged "to move toward greater freedom of choice within their particular system, and toward closer association, in world affairs, with the 'world of free choice' outside the Soviet bloc."⁵³³ Again, the basic idea was to repackage but not to change too much the original Yugoslav product the Americans bought when they choose to help Yugoslavia following the country's ousting from the Cominform.

For the sake of Yugoslav independence, the Americans also felt that some things were better left unsaid or presented differently to the Yugoslav audience. As written in a January 13, 1960 despatch, in the name of the number one objective of USIS in Yugoslavia, namely to support Yugoslavia's independence, one USIS project was aimed at bringing to mind the scope of the American assistance and the purpose of providing aid to Yugoslavia. As the Americans further wrote in the January 13, 1960 despatch, a part of this project worried them. In particular, as continued in the same despatch, they feared that if they fully revealed the scope of the aid the United States had given to Yugoslavia, this "... would run counter to our objective: that is, it would show the great extent of Yugoslavia's dependence upon our financial crutch." What the Americans chose to run instead was the message "that the country itself has used the aid and the resulting savings in balance of payments wisely."⁵³⁴ This was the one of the American strategies of building and sustaining the Yugoslav brand.

The Americans also thread lightly around a topic that was extremely problematic for the Yugoslavs and this were the relations between different nations which constituted Yugoslavia. In a despatch from July 31, 1952, the Americans wrote that there had been, looking at it historically, animosities between different nationalities in Yugoslavia and how each national group in Yugoslavia had its own "group consciousness based on cultural and historical factors". As the Americans further wrote in the same despatch, American cultural and informational activities needed to reckon with these "group stereotypes" which could be "advantageously played upon from the U.S. point of view". However, as continued in the July 31, 1952 despatch, given that the main essence of the policy of the United States towards Yugoslavia was to keep the country both unified and independent, "[d]evelopment of minority antagonisms is

⁵³³ Walter R. Roberts, "Country Plan: Annual Revision, FY 1963," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 16, August 31, 1962, 3, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA.

⁵³⁴ Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 53, January 13, 1960, 7, RG 406 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

accordingly not desirable in any way".⁵³⁵ The examined archival documents reveal only one situation in which the Americans suggested toying with the idea of a rivalry between the Yugoslav republics. This situation involved jazz.

It was on April 15, 1959 that USIA wrote back to USIS Belgrade that the tapes submitted by Vojislav Simić of Radio-Television Belgrade Jazz Orchestra were "suitable" and they would be included "as requested" in Willis Conover's *MUSIC USA* broadcast that was to air on June 9, 1959 for which USIA would also be sending promotional materials for USIS Belgrade to use to promote the event locally.⁵³⁶ USIS Belgrade was more than open to the idea of using Radio Belgrade Jazz Orchestra's tapes in the competition between international jazz musicians⁵³⁷, a May 1959 USIA idea of a competition between various jazz bands from the countries visited by Willis Conover, the host of *MUSIC USA* and the project was underway by collecting "tape recordings of the best group to jazz musicians and critics for an appearance at a major American jazz festival in 1960."⁵³⁸ As the Americans wrote in a despatch from June 11, 1959, the usage of the tapes of Radio Belgrade Jazz Orchestra in the aforementioned "jazz competition" was also seen as an avenue to further promote *MUSIC USA* in Yugoslavia. Indeed, as continued in the same despatch, USIS Belgrade sent promo materials, which consisted of two photographs containing detailed information, to 40 publications in Yugoslavia. The June 11, 1959 despatch further wrote how the news of the competition was also published in USIS bulletin and displayed in USIS Zagreb and Belgrade window displays. As noted in the same despatch, up until the time the report had been written, there was only one newspaper in Yugoslavia, Maribor's "Večer", that actually used the photograph sent to the press. As USIS contemplated in the June 11, 1959 despatch, this was probably connected to the fact that the submitted tapes contained a composition by Slovenia's very own, Bojan Adamič, who was also the leader of Radio Ljubljana's jazz band. As USIS Belgrade wrote in the same despatch about the promotion of the event in local newspapers, "[a]lthough privately pleased, the Yugoslavs, obviously, were faced with a delicate problem in publicizing the appearance of one of their star bands on a Voice of America program". As further written in the same despatch, Vojislav Simić, who arrived to USIS premises to extend his personal gratitude to USIS, suggested that the Yugoslav promotion

⁵³⁵ Bruce Buttles, "IIA: USIS-MSA Information Plan for Yugoslavia-1952-54," FSD from Belgrade to DOS, no. 73, July 31, 1952, 2, 511.68/7-3152, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

⁵³⁶ Allen, "Ref: Foreign Service Despatch #82 of 3/26/59," Outgoing Message Sent to USIS Belgrade, April 15, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵³⁷ Heath Bowman, "IBS: Proposed international 'jazz competition'", FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 117, June 11, 1959, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵³⁸ Allen, "Ref: Agency Pouch Message of April 20," Outgoing Message to USIS Belgrade, drafted on May 20, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

of the event might occur after the event, not before.⁵³⁹ Overall, as the Americans noted in a despatch eleven days later, while the initial reaction of the Yugoslav press to the appearance of Radio Belgrade Jazz Orchestra's on the June 9, 1959 "MUSIC USA" schedule, seemed lukewarm, since then five Yugoslav periodicals circulated the story and used USIA's photographs. Out of these five, continued the June 22, 1959 despatch, three were from Slovenia which USIS again contributed to the fact that a composition by Bojan Adamič was on the tapes. In the same despatch, USIS Belgrade quoted a complaint made by Maribor's *Večer* that wrote how "Yugoslav fans of light and popular music are somewhat startled by the fact that Yugoslav orchestras are to be represented by a Belgrade group, when it is well known that the best orchestra is at Radio Ljubljana and is directed by Bojan Adamic." USIS Belgrade then proposed in the June 22, 1959 despatch that they try AND take advantage of this rivalry "by also asking for representative tapes from Ljubljana to include in the proposed international jazz competition" if that might be of interest to USIA.⁵⁴⁰ The IBS section of USIA not only complimented USIS Belgrade on their rather successful promotion of "MUSIC USA" but they also complied with the proposal of USIS Belgrade to collect tapes from Radio Ljubljana so that they too appear in the "jazz competition".⁵⁴¹ For the purpose of the international competition USIA had in mind, Radio Ljubljana's Jazz Orchestra's tapes had also been submitted by the Yugoslav side.⁵⁴² The Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries noted the appearance of Yugoslav compositions, most notably from the Dance Orchestra of Radio Belgrade, on American radio-stations and "Music in the USA".⁵⁴³ Probably completely unaware of the background and the exact path of the Yugoslav tapes on Conover's broadcasts, in their report from January 1 to June 30, 1959 the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries attributed the appearance of the Dance Orchestra Radio Belgrade's tapes on "MUSIC USA" to "the recommendation of Dizi dileksija and Tomis Skota [*sic*] who, during their visit to Belgrade heard the dance orchestra of Radio-Belgrade, managed by Borislav Simić [*sic*] and liked our compositions very much."⁵⁴⁴

⁵³⁹ Heath Bowman, "IBS: Proposed International 'jazz competition'," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 117, June 11, 1959, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵⁴⁰ Heath Bowman, "IBS: Publicity on special 'MUSIC USA' broadcast," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 121, June 22, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, box 8, NARA.

⁵⁴¹ Allen, "Publicity on special 'Music USA' broadcast," Outgoing Message to USIS Belgrade, drafted on June 30, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵⁴² Heath Bowman, "IBS: Radio Ljubljana Jazz tapes," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 28, September 28, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁵⁴³ AJ-559-54-119, "Sjedinjene Američke Države. Izveštaj od 1 januara do 30 juna 1959," no date.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Now that we have examined the changes that first needed to occur on the level of the states so that music diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States could develop, our attention now must turn to the second level of analysis, that just below the state, and focus on the agents engaged in this specific type of diplomacy. In order for us to better understanding the role of culture as a branding strategy and music diplomacy as a branding instrument within the relationship between Yugoslavia and the United States, we first must identify the crucial tenets of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, especially its treatment of domestic and foreign artists within that strategy, and identify the partners the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries designated to help preserve their country's independent brand within that strategy. These issues are futher explored in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 2

Culture for Independence

2.1. "Should science and art not be the best ambassadors of peace and friendship between nations?": Cultural Diplomacy and the International Comeback of Yugoslavia

It was in early August 1958 that Miloš Nikolić, then the President of the People's Youth of Yugoslavia, spoke at a ten day seminar held in Dubrovnik entitled "Youth and Culture Today", held from August 1 to August 10, with over 80 participants at the seminar, representatives of various youth, educational, cultural-artistic institutions from fifteen different countries, the United States included.⁵⁴⁵ Among other points in his presentation, Nikolić noted how it was "culture, with all of its main characteristics that could even today be the bridge of understanding and connecting, one of the significant steps in the direction of developing peaceful and friendly cooperation of all countries." Scientific collaboration and satellites up in orbit that gathered different nations that collected and analyzed data together were two examples Nikolić listed in his presentation as evidence that it was indeed possible to "transcend bloc borders".⁵⁴⁶ Nikolić then turned his attention to the role of what we today deem to be music diplomacy. "I have read somewhere," stated Nikolić, "that the performance of Shostakovich's Leningrad symphony had always filled the audience in concert halls with enthusiasm, and even caused tears. Here, we are witnesses of an enormous success of a young, relatively unknown American pianist in Moscow and his friendly reception in the USSR as well as his magnificent welcoming after [his] return to New York."⁵⁴⁷ Nikolić then finished this section of his presentation with a question, "Should science and art not be the best ambassadors of peace and friendship among nations?"⁵⁴⁸

Nikolić's presentation highlighted one out of several Yugoslav interpretations of how on the role of culture as a branding strategy aimed at preserving the country's independent brand. For much of the 1950s, in terms of national objectives, it could be said that Yugoslav state bodies

⁵⁴⁵ Rudi Supek, "Omladina i kultura danas," *Naše teme: časopis mladih o društvenim zbivanjima*, Year II, 4-5, Zagreb, 1958, 543.

⁵⁴⁶ Miloš Nikolić, "Međunarodna kulturna saradnja omladine," *Naše teme: časopis mladih o društvenim zbivanjima*, Year II, 4-5, Zagreb, 1958, 555.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

envisioned a rather defensive position for cultural diplomacy as a branding strategy. This is evident from the comparison between Yugoslav cultural diplomatic objectives stated in the wake of the split with the Soviet Union in 1948 and in 1958 when Yugoslavia faced a similar situation. To reiterate from Chapter One, one of the three objectives of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, achievable through introducing Yugoslavia with the cultural and scientific life of other countries, had been to break off the isolation masterminded by the Soviet Union and followed by other Eastern European countries in the wake of the 1948 split.⁵⁴⁹ Almost identical cultural diplomatic objectives were found in a letter the Director of Radio Television Belgrade Dušan Popović addressed to the then Yugoslav Minister of Education, Science and Culture Rodoljub Čolaković in 1958. As Popović wrote in the 1958 letter, cultural relations Yugoslavia developed with other countries were still in the service of "further dissemination of the truth about socialist Yugoslavia and the development of its people's creativity in a society that has already established, and continues to establish improved conditions for a truly free, humanistic, all-encompassing creativity."⁵⁵⁰ Taking up yet again such a defensive posture in cultural diplomacy was a result of events taking place the same year in which Popović drafted the said letter to Rodoljub Čolaković. In 1958, the relationship between Yugoslavia and its Eastern European socialist brothers was severed again after the Yugoslavs refused to sign a declaration in Moscow in November 1957 "that rested on the principle of monolith in the name 'of higher interests' of socialism, equating this principle with the socialist bloc."⁵⁵¹ Given the rocky position of Yugoslavia's independent brand, as a branding strategy, cultural diplomacy was employed for the achievement of national objectives and as a form of help to ensure the brand's survival on the global political market for much of the 1950s. Indeed, this is evident in an analysis done by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1968. This analysis noted how the Yugoslavs resorted to the usage of cultural and educational collaboration in their diplomatic relations during the 1950s due to the "need to remove the veil of anonymity that surrounded us"⁵⁵² and to prevent any attempts made to isolate the country.⁵⁵³ During the 1950s, so the 1968 analysis continued, the goal had been to expand the number of countries and regions Yugoslavia interacted with in the fields of culture and science and to foster conditions both for the entrance of Yugoslav art and culture on the worldwide cultural scene and to make

⁵⁴⁹ AJ-559-9-19-20, "Plan rada Odeljenja na naučne i kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1950 godinu," 1-2.

⁵⁵⁰ AJ-559-19-38, Dušan Popović, "Kabinetu druga Čolakovića," no. 3748/1, 26. XI. 1958, 1.

⁵⁵¹ Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, 364.

⁵⁵² AJ-559-75-35, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 66.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*; In his study on the use of folklore in Yugoslavia's music diplomacy, Ivan Hofman also notes that the country resorted to sending performers abroad to break the isolation of the country by the Eastern bloc. See Ivan Hofman, "Uloga muzičkog folkloru u spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Jugoslavije 1950-1952," 447, 455.

Yugoslav art and culture part and parcel of that same scene.⁵⁵⁴ Participation on the world scene, so the 1968 analysis further clarified, was achievable through cultural and educational interaction with others as this type of collaboration opened "the possibility for us to be discovered."⁵⁵⁵ This 1968 analysis further revealed another factor which made the arrival of Dizzy Gillespie, Tony Scott, the Glenn Miller Orchestra, Louis Armstrong and other jazz musicians possible during the previous decade. This factor had been cloaked in another cultural diplomatic goal of the Yugoslavs. This goal, as stated in the 1968 analysis, had been that cultural achievements of other countries should be presented in Yugoslavia.⁵⁵⁶ To summarize, as a branding strategy during the 1950s, Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy served to raise brand awareness.

Giving culture such power to help ensure the survival of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand can indirectly be linked to the comprehension of Yugoslav agents of culture as connected to their country's reputation on the worldwide scene. It was on the January 1956 meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries that one member stated, "... if some of our goods fail abroad, which happens more frequently, then it won't resonate as much as would the failure of one of our artistic troupes. If plums fail, this will damage the reputation of our country that wishes to establish itself as an industrial and agricultural country, but the resonance will not be as nearly as such as if one of our operas failed."⁵⁵⁷ Such thinking on the connection culture shared with the reputation of Yugoslavia was reiterated once more a couple of years later, in 1961, during a meeting of the Committee for Performing Arts and Music. On the November 23, 1961 meeting of the said Committee, one of its members bluntly stated that "[c]ulture is not just merchandise, it is the reputation of the country."⁵⁵⁸

Available archive materials allow us to almost establish a sort of a chronology that details the development of the idea that culture was connected to the international standing of Yugoslavia in the Yugoslav context. It was Edvard Kardelj who was quoted as saying in the early 1950s that a diplomatic role should be taken on by each member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia when they travel abroad.⁵⁵⁹ As early as December 11, 1953, one member of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries proposed that the Committee not only

⁵⁵⁴ AJ-559-75-35, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 10.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 66-67.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁵⁷ AJ-559-18-37, "Stenografske beleške. Plenarni sastanak Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, Beograd, 16. i 17. januara 1956," 86. Comment by Lepa Perović.

⁵⁵⁸ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske beleške 23. XI. 1961, 75. Comment by Vučinić.

⁵⁵⁹ Slobodan Selinić, "Lik Komuniste' u Jugoslovenskoj diplomaciji 1945-1952," *Istorija 20. veka*, No.3, 2011, 182.

be given all of the information relating to cultural relations conducted with foreign countries but that the Committee should resort to the usage of the media, the press in particular, to inform the Yugoslav public about "cases of bad behavior in foreign countries."⁵⁶⁰ Then, in 1956, similar sentiments to those echoed by Edvard Kardelj were heard at the Plenary Meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries during which one member of the said Committee stated how each Yugoslav that went "abroad represents, on one hand, the cultural representation of our country."⁵⁶¹ Expressed in branding terms, by setting foot outside of the country's borders, the Yugoslavs became "brand ambassadors", an instrument of branding to be discussed later in this chapter.

Musical interaction between Yugoslavia and the world was interpreted in the same way. For instance, in one of their reports from 1955 the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries lamented on the low quality of the troupes that went abroad on their own without providing proper information to the Committee. These troupes were, as the same report continued, of low quality and "concluded humiliating agreements, just to go abroad." As the same report further wrote, Yugoslav representative bodies in foreign countries noted how many of these troupes exhibited "unworthy behavior by selling our products to support themselves with that money."⁵⁶² In their annual report for 1964, the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries mentioned an especially bad case in which a Yugoslav troupe humiliated the country in the United States. When the American Embassy in Belgrade received information about the tour of a group from Skopje called "Orce Nikolov Choir" in March 1963, they admitted in a telegram to Washington that they had never heard of that group and requested, in addition to itinerary and background information, that the State Department inquire about the reputation of the responsible American manager and his financial capacities to manage the said tour.⁵⁶³ Without background information, it appears that the Americans sensed a potential cultural catastrophe on the horizon. As was noted by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, this group was so unsuccessful in the United States

⁵⁶⁰ AJ-559-8-19, "Zapisnik sa sastanka Komisije za kulturne veze s inostranstvom održanog 11 decembra 1953 godine," 4. Comment by dr. Bora Blagojević.

⁵⁶¹ AJ-559-18-37, "Stenografske beleške. Plenarni sastanak. 16. i 17. January 1956.," 19. Comment by Predrag Milošević.

⁵⁶² AJ-559-10-23, "Kulturne veze sa inostranstvom po zemljama za 1955 godinu. Izveštaj za 1955 godinu. Opšti deo," 353.

⁵⁶³ Kennan, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1280, March 22, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA.

that even Yugoslav diplomatic officials stationed in that country demanded an end to that tour as its poor organization "damaged our reputation, especially among our immigrants."⁵⁶⁴

The Yugoslavs did not just see culture as connected to the the reputation of Yugoslavia. In the minds of those Yugoslav cultural agents responsible for developing guidelines for Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, culture also indicated their country's importance on the international stage. It was in 1954 that the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries listed three reasons as to why opportunities opened up for Yugoslavia to develop cultural relations with other countries. Not only did the Yugoslavs, according to the Committee's 1954 report, demonstrate the high quality of their culture both at home and abroad, their country was also becoming a much more visible actor in the worldwide political arena and other countries developed significant interest in Yugoslavia.⁵⁶⁵ Some Yugoslav cultural agents were of the opinion that such a notable standing of Yugoslavia in the international area should be used to the benefit of Yugoslavia's promotion abroad. In September 1957 the Secretariat for Information of the Federal Executive Council asked to be delivered expenditure details from all Yugoslav institutions engaged in propaganda activities abroad in order to "find a way for this propaganda to be done, at least partially free, given the reputation our country has abroad."⁵⁶⁶ Expressed differently, this body had see the political reputation of Yugoslavia on the global political market as paving the way for the country's cultural diplomacy. However, the perceived reputation of the country and the actual cultural diplomacy done in practice did not always, according to the view of some of Yugoslavia's cultural agents, correspond accordingly. It was during the November 1961 meeting of the Yugoslav Committee for Performing Arts and Music that one member of that Committee lamented how, when comparing the results of their cultural activities with "the international reputation of our country in the world today, which is growing with each passing year, ... this comparison works to the disadvantage of all of us who should use the international position of our country and, if I may say so this way, more easily market

⁵⁶⁴ AJ-559-31-66, "Izveštaj o radu Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom u 1964. godini," Beograd, 1965, 144.

⁵⁶⁵ AJ-559-8-19, "Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom o planu rada za 1954/izneseno u vidu postavki i teza/," 1; A similar point is also made in "Izveštaj o radu Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije u toku 1954 godine," AJ, 559, folder 23, box 10.

⁵⁶⁶ AJ-559-18-37, Illegible signature, "Izveštaj o sastanku održanom u Sekretarijatu za informacije SIV-a 23 septembra ove godine od 10 do 12 časova," 24. IX. 1957.

these spiritual goods."⁵⁶⁷ Expressed differently, politically speaking, the country was a brand. The cultural background to the brand was lagging behind.⁵⁶⁸

This did not mean that culture was not included in the campaign launched by the leadership of Yugoslavia to present to the world their rebranded image of "independent Yugoslavia" in mid-1950s. For nation branding, as "the "father" of the term Simon Anholt noted, a country that seeks admiration, needs to have relevance. The latter, continues Anholt, arises out of the country's engagement "in the global conversations on the topics that matter to people elsewhere and everywhere."⁵⁶⁹ Put in economic terms, while the Cold War significantly helped, and in a sense, did most of the marketing for the Yugoslav independent brand to get the Americans to invest, to ensure that the brand survives the viciousness of that specific market, Yugoslavia needed to find other buyers and, as we have seen in Chapter One, it did so in a bunch of internationally leaderless countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This meant that, by mid-1950s, Yugoslavia began aligning itself with the international program of the future Nonaligned Movement that spoke from a similar platform as did the United Nations and rested on "five basic principles of peaceful cooperation – respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and co-existence".⁵⁷⁰ It were the United Nations that were used as the initial stage and the voice for the Nonaligned Movement.⁵⁷¹

As historian Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht writes, "[a]s on a stage, power has to be visible, accessible, perceptible, tangible, and ultimately, convincing in order to exist and continuously assert itself."⁵⁷² This concept is evident from at least two instances of Yugoslavia's musical presentation which served to directly reflect the new "brand identity"⁵⁷³ and "brand values"⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁶⁷ AJ-559-111-244, "Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom. Stenografske Beleške sa sednice Odbora za scensku umetnost i muziku održane 23.XI. 1961.g.," 29. Comment by Vukdragović.

⁵⁶⁸ I base this observation on the writing of historian Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht. In a book chapter entitled "Nation Branding" (*Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (3rd edition), 2016), she writes how "[n]ations may be politically weak but culturally very powerful, and vice versa." (232). As she further writes in the same book chapter, "[h]egemonic power remains incomplete unless cultural and political power converge and reinforce each other." (233)

⁵⁶⁹ Anholt, "Beyond the Nation Brand," 9.

⁵⁷⁰ Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, 22.

⁵⁷¹ Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 140.

⁵⁷² Gienow-Hecht, "Nation branding," 233.

⁵⁷³ As Alina Wheeler writes in her book *Designing Brand Identity: An Essential Guide for the Whole Branding Team* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012), "Compelling brand identity presents any company, any size, anywhere with an immediate recognizable, distinctive professional image that positions it for success. An identity helps manage the perception of the company and differentiates it from its competitors." (11)

⁵⁷⁴ As Catharine Slade-Brooking writes in her book, *Creating a Brand Identity: a Guide for Designers* (London: Laurence King Publishing, 2016), "Brand values are the core beliefs or philosophy that a brand upholds, and which differentiate it from its competitors." (14)

associated with the said identity. The first instance or the place of the performance was a direct reflection of the new "brand identity" Yugoslavia desired to project. As stated by the Yugoslav newspaper "Nin" in early June 1956, the country was to be "a triple bridge: between East and West, big and small countries, Europe and the Asian-African world".⁵⁷⁵ What better place to reflect this than the stage of the United Nations. "Zagrebački soloisti" would be given the opportunity to close the final session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1956, so wrote a Croatian journalist, "in front of the highest diplomatic representatives and reporters from 79 countries, distinguished American cultural workers and critics."⁵⁷⁶ As the Croatian journalist continued the review, "[t]he speech with which the president of the Assembly Van Vantajakon [Wan Waithayakon], the prince of Thailand, thanked our artists on a virtuously performed concert, as well as the letter of the general secretary to the main chargé of the permanent Yugoslav mission at the UN, dr. Brilej, attests to the extraordinary attention aroused by Zagreb's musicians."⁵⁷⁷ "Zagrebački Solisti" were not the only Yugoslavs to have had their United Nations moment as, through them, the same opportunity was afforded to Croatian composer Milko Kelemen. As we learn from the already cited report by RIAS' Edward Alexander, Kelemen informed Alexander how Koča Popović, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, forwarded the information to Kelemen that the General Secretary of the United Nations, U Thant, heard "Zagrebački Solisti" perform his work in New York. The General Secretary then, continued Alexander, requested Popović "to commission a cantata from Kelemen dedicated to the U.N. on the occasion of United Nations Days."⁵⁷⁸

The second instance of Yugoslavia's musical diplomatic moment that reflected the essence of its new brand identity is found in 1959. Josip Broz Tito sent his cultural diplomats, two student and youth groups from Belgrade, choirs "Branko Krsmanović" and "Ivo Lola Ribar", a youth orchestra and a group of soloists from different parts of Yugoslavia⁵⁷⁹ to the "Seventh

⁵⁷⁵ Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada*, 99-100.

⁵⁷⁶ Ostojić, *Javni dnevnik*, 63.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁷⁸ Albert E. Hemsing, "Trip by RIAS Officer to Zagreb Music Festival," FM from USIS/Berlin to USIA Washington, no. 59, February 26, 1964, 4, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA.

⁵⁷⁹ "What Yugoslav Youth Will Present at the International Festival. A rich program at the Vienna Youth Festival. The 'Branko Krsmanović' and 'Ivo Lola Ribar' Societies as well as a group of soloists from the whole of Yugoslavia will participate in the Festival – the First Youth Group Travels Tonight." *Politika*, July 22, 1959, enclosed translation, Robert B. Hill, "Yugoslav Participation in VII World Youth and Student Festival in Vienna July 25-August 4, 1959," FDS from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, no. 38, July 22, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship"⁵⁸⁰, held from July 26 to August 4, 1959 in Vienna.⁵⁸¹ The Yugoslav press, most notably *Borba*, so stated an American despatch from August 17, 1959, wrote "[w]ith evident satisfaction" how the Yugoslav representatives at the Festival won several prizes in the cultural competition of the Festival. For instance, continued the cited American document, "Branko Krsmanović" won three medals, two gold medals for folkore and jazz and a silver medal for choir music. Other Yugoslav musical representatives, as further written in the same American document, collected bronze medals and came third in the Festival's film competition.⁵⁸² As *Borba* wrote, Tito sent these musicians to Vienna with a message of how the contemporary world was in a dire need of "mutual contacts and gatherings which lead to rapprochement and better acquaintanceship." It was through "[i]nternational understanding and friendship between people, first of all between young people from all continents, of all races, nations and religions" that "a strong shield against new war sufferings" could be forged, as Tito's message continued to be transmitted by *Borba*. Tito's message, as further conveyed by *Borba*, also emphasized the importance of the youth for peace as they were attempting to achieve the "realisation of a better, more just and happier mankind, which is dreaming about human happiness and welfare." As *Borba* further wrote, Tito concluded his message with his personal conviction that the youth gathered at the festival "will know how to express the wishes of the young generation and with youthful ardour, enthusiasm and fervency in order to manifest their loyalty to the cause of peace and to show the older generations their readiness and resoluteness to persevere in their struggle for peace and international cooperation."⁵⁸³ The symbolism behind the place of the performance of "Zagrebački Solisti" and Tito's message to his cultural diplomats at the Vienna Youth Festival

⁵⁸⁰ Robert B. Hill, "Yugoslavia and the Vienna Youth Festival," FDS from Amembassy Belgrade to the Department of State, no. 60, July 31, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

⁵⁸¹ "What Yugoslav Youth Will Present at the International Festival. A rich program at the Vienna Youth Festival. The 'Branko Krsmanović' and 'Ivo Lola Ribar' Societies as well as a group of soloists from the whole of Yugoslavia will participate in the Festival – the First Youth Group Travels Tonight." *Politika*, July 22, 1959, enclosed translation, Robert B. Hill, "Yugoslav Participation in VII World Youth and Student Festival in Vienna July 25-August 4, 1959," FDS from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, no. 38, July 22, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

⁵⁸² Robert B. Hill, "Yugoslav Press Comment on Vienna Youth Festival," FDS from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, No. 98, August 17, 1959, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

⁵⁸³ "Message from President Tito to the Seventh World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship," *Borba*, July 26, 1959, enclosed translation in Robert B. Hill, "Yugoslavia and the Vienna Youth Festival," FDS from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, no. 60, July 31, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

were Yugoslavia's way of telling the world the place where it wanted to act and the slogan under which it was to act which bore a direct impact on the country's cultural diplomacy.⁵⁸⁴

To reiterate the already cited words of scholar Erik Ringmar, "[i]t is only once we know who we are that we can know what we want."⁵⁸⁵ True, once Yugoslavia got a more clearer sense of who it wanted to be on the international scene, it was much easier to move their cultural diplomatic objectives away from being strictly defensive and defined exclusively in the national interest to the more universal messages and comportment that would directly reflect and embody the values of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand the country began exerting in the political arena. A new silver lining to Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy was precisely a mutually developed interest between Yugoslavia and countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to expand contacts in the cultural, scientific and educational sphere.⁵⁸⁶ Thus, in 1961, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, reflecting on the country's cultural relations in 1960, added new principles that were to guide Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy. To begin with, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries surmised that, in order for Yugoslav culture to develop, Yugoslavia's agents, institutions and organizations needed to maintain contacts with cultural agents beyond the borders of Yugoslavia.⁵⁸⁷ This was yet another manifestation of an official blessing to a policy or a branding instrument that had brought salvation in moments when Yugoslavia's independence was hanging in the air, particularly in the period after the 1948 split. The 1961 report of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries further stated how it was not possible for the cultural life of Yugoslavia to develop solely within "national and state frameworks". What was necessary, continued the 1961 report, was "contact and mutual creative exchange with the cultures of other developed, and the so-called undeveloped nations, that frequently possess a rich cultural heritage".⁵⁸⁸ The cultural development of Yugoslavia, so the report further stated, was part and parcel "of the positive cultural movement in the world, regardless of its specific national and cultural markers, and it can be developed solely in the mutual interpenetration and contact with positive tendencies in the development of culture in the world."⁵⁸⁹ Through cultural interaction

⁵⁸⁴ Indeed, as historian Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht writes: "A state-sponsored guest concert is a way of saying *adsum* – I am present." Jessica Gienow-Hecht, "The World Is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 2012), 26.

⁵⁸⁵ Ringmar, "The Recognition Game," 118.

⁵⁸⁶ AJ-559-19-38, Dušan Popović, "Kabinetu druga Čolakovića," no. 3748/1, 26. XI. 1958, 1.

⁵⁸⁷ AJ-559-20-41, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1960 godinu," Beograd, Februar 1961, 6-7.

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

with others Yugoslavia was to demonstrate, so the 1961 report also stated, its own cultural abundance.⁵⁹⁰ As in the decade before and in the decade after, contacts were still the key instrument of this Yugoslav branding strategy.

The new, much clearer identity further aligned the main postulates of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy with the brand values the country fostered. In 1961, the report of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries listed as one of the "holy missions" of Yugoslavia's cultural and educational diplomacy, even if seemingly detrimental to the country's interests, to help "countries which were freeing themselves from the imperialist dependence and colonial slavery and which were laying the foundations of their country's independence and its freer, faster cultural development on modern foundations."⁵⁹¹ Yugoslavia was to help these countries "not just materially but with our example and experience without imposing our forms on them and without serving them recipes".⁵⁹² Finally, the report also summarized the more universal vision of Yugoslavia's values that cultural diplomacy should have reflected which corresponded to the vision presented by Miloš Nikolić at the 1958 seminar. Regardless of the political and social structure, it was precisely cultural interaction between nations, so concluded its set of cultural diplomatic aims the 1961 Committee's report, that "represents an increasingly powerful instrument for better mutual understanding, for overcoming ideological, national and other contradictions and for consolidating international relations and strengthening of peace, if based on the principles of non-interference in internal affairs and mutual respect."⁵⁹³

As these examples illustrate, Yugoslavia adopted a new brand identity and new brand values which, according to the postulates, the country's cultural diplomacy should have reflected. How did this new set of values reflected on cultural relations between Yugoslavia and the United States and thus subsequently jazz diplomacy between the two countries?

Already in 1956, one report of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries stated that the Committee continued to develop Yugoslavia's cultural relations with other countries "[i]n accordance with the general politics of our country: constructive collaboration and active coexistence in international relations."⁵⁹⁴ Those same principles were seen to guide Yugoslav cultural relations with the United States. As was noted in 1960, it was "on the principles of equality, non-interference and mutual benefit, with success primarily in the

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁹¹ AJ-559-20-41, "Izveštaj Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1960 godinu," 7-8.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁴ AJ-559-10-24, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1956 god.," 66.

economic and cultural field" that the country developed its bilateral relations with Western countries, including the United States and Canada.⁵⁹⁵ Expressed differently, while the United States may have been ideologically different from Yugoslavia, the new brand values which guided Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy as a branding strategy, worked in favour of the Yugoslavs and Americans culturally interacting with each other. The Americans recognized this factor, as seen from the introductory lines of subchapter 1.3.

While culture was envisioned to both embody and reflect the main values of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, it was also seen by the Yugoslavs engaged in crafting and administrating the country's cultural diplomacy to be nothing more than a product to be offered on the worldwide market not for financial but foreign policy gains which subsequently meant to rival others on the international market. The first time the examined documents mention this view of culture was in 1961. For instance, in 1961 one member of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music referred to folklore ensemble "Kolo" that had, among other places, performed in Canada, the United States and Australia, as "goods that is a "'Singer'-machine'".⁵⁹⁶ The same year, in the already cited 1961 report by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, we find statements that reflect the need of Yugoslavia to compete with others on the international scene. In the 1961 report, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries noted the absolute necessity to further successfully promote Yugoslav culture both with a small budget and stiff competition small countries faced on the international cultural scene by "the so-called big cultural forces". Working within the constraints of what was given to them, the 1961 report of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries further identified cultural cooperation with foreigners as an instrument to be used for further assertion of their country in the international arena. Furthermore, as the Committee stated in the 1961 report, cultural relations between Yugoslavia and the rest of the world presented "a unique possibility to test our own results in the light of the results achieved by others."⁵⁹⁷ This was a call for Yugoslavia to compete on, what it recognized to be, a cultural market. The Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries issued another direct statement in support of this claim in its 1968 analysis of Yugoslavia's cultural relations. This analysis stated that shared interests of all Yugoslav cultures and people should be taken into consideration "[i]n the practical policy of the development of cultural relations with foreign countries" so that the

⁵⁹⁵ AJ-559-20-40, "Bilateralni odnosi na kulturnom planu" (handwritten title), 1.

⁵⁹⁶ AJ-559-111-244, Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom. "Stenografske Beleške sa sednice Odbora za scensku umetnost i muziku održane 23. XI. 1961. g.," 75. Comment by S. Mesarić.

⁵⁹⁷ AJ-559-20-41, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1960 godinu," 7.

country "occupies a rightful place in the international game of values".⁵⁹⁸ Such Yugoslav thinking about cultural, and thus by default music diplomacy, is indicative of the perception of music diplomacy by scholar Klaus Nathaus who argued that music diplomacy is nothing more than "a form of participation in an international prestige competition, comparable to sending a soccer team to the World Cup competition."⁵⁹⁹

Specific examples support this assertion. On the aforementioned November 1961 meeting of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music, it was candidly stated that there were no high stakes involved in sending the Zagreb Chamber Orchestra to Lebanon.⁶⁰⁰ To the question of another member of the same Committee on whether it would be more prudent to send that orchestra to a much closer location of greater interest to the country and where the country could earn more money,⁶⁰¹ the response of another member of the same Committee was that, in addition to the call for participation by organizers, it was the Yugoslav Embassy in that country that claimed that this represented "the highest level- the presentation on the Middle East: Siria and Lebanon. Renowned European ensembles participated here and it would not hurt if we showed up there too."⁶⁰² Indeed, as another member of the Committee for Performing Arts and Music noted on the same meeting, politics, namely the foreign policy of the country, required of Yugoslavia to be present, in a preorientation era, in areas such as Latin America, the Middle East as well as Eastern Europe.⁶⁰³ Expressed differently by paraphrasing Simon Anholt's words, if Yugoslavia wanted to be seen as a serious actor that drew admiration, it needed to be relevant to the countries it was vying into their sphere and this relevance, in Yugoslav eyes, was to be achieved through Yugoslav presence on those markets.

In this context, what differentiated Yugoslavia and its brand from the two power leaders of the Cold War blocs, it was stated on the June 4, 1968 meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries by one of its members, was that "Yugoslavia cannot act like a great power abroad. It cannot compete for its impact with the United States and the Soviet

⁵⁹⁸ AJ-559-34-75, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije s inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 72.

⁵⁹⁹ Klaus Nathaus, "Music in Transnational Transfers and International Competitions: Germany, Britain, and the US in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in *Popular Music and public diplomacy: transnational and transdisciplinary perspectives*, edited by Mario Dunkel, Sina A. Nietzsche (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2018), 30-31.

⁶⁰⁰ AJ-559-111-244, Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom. Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za scensku umetnost i muziku održane 23. XI. 1961. god., 95. Comment by Vučinić. (hereinafter, "Stenografske beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961")

⁶⁰¹ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske Beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961., 95. Comment by Vuljević.

⁶⁰² Ibid., Comment by Nikolajević.

⁶⁰³ Ibid., 46. Comment by Dinulović.

Union", a practice Yugoslavia was not adopting.⁶⁰⁴ Such a presentation would, after all, be in direct opposition to the Yugoslav brand and its main values. As the Americans wrote in their September 1, 1960 despatch, the international position of Yugoslavia entailed professing socialism, castigating "'bloc policies'" and staying true to their "outside-blocs position". "In a sense," as the Americans further wrote in the same despatch, "the regime has made a virtue out of being kicked out of the club." The September 1, 1960 despatch further wrote how Yugoslavia adopted this position not just because ideology demanded it, but how such a stance was beneficial to the country's relations with an increasing "number of uncommitted nations now emerging from the colonial era." The presentation of Yugoslavia to these countries, continued the September 1, 1960 despatch, was "as identified with their interests and aspirations; as free of the taint of great-power politics; as an example of rapid and independent 'socialist' industrial development worthy of emulation; finally and hopefully, as a potential leader of the ever more significant political force of the smaller and newer nations which, if they follow this leadership, can constitute 'a decisive power for peace.'"⁶⁰⁵ It is thus not surprising, to return to the June 1968 meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, that the said member argued for revising the financial elements of their programs, especially those which related to undeveloped countries, and to use such finances for the most appropriate goals. Given that Yugoslavia was "in no position to perform as a great power", this Committee member advocated examining the means of Yugoslavia's presentation in those countries. Through such means, so continued this Committee member, Yugoslavia was to make its presence known in those countries and connect it to collaboration in the economic and political sphere.⁶⁰⁶

More Yugoslav documents confirm the statement that Yugoslav cultural leaders were cognizant of the country's need to compete. This was candidly stated in an analysis done by the Federal Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in October 1968. Cultural relations, according to the 1968 analysis, lagged behind political and economic ventures the country was pursuing, especially demonstrated in the case of "newly liberated countries". These countries, so it was written in the Analysis, were undeveloped and big power players and some capitalist countries were still trying to retain the attention of those countries through cultural and educational exchanges in order to keep some form of economic power over them. These

⁶⁰⁴ AJ-559-34-73, Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, "XIV Sednica Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom održana 4. juna 1968. godine," 27. Comment by Vlada Malevski.

⁶⁰⁵ Walter R. Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FDS from USIS BG to USIA Washington, No. 20, September 1, 1960, 8, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

⁶⁰⁶ AJ-559-34-73, Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, "XIV Sednica Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom održana 4. juna 1968. godine," 27. Comment by Vlada Malevski.

big players, so the Analysis continued, also allocated large sums of money for such cultural and educational activities. As was further written in the 1968 Analysis, Yugoslavia tried to keep up with such countries as much as it could through economic activities. Cultural exchanges, on the other hand, so the Analysis continued, lagged behind, occurring only "sporadically and isolated."⁶⁰⁷ Some members of the Federal Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries deemed this to be unforgivable. On the June 4, 1968 meeting of the Federal Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, one of its members, Marija Vilfan, commented on the rather discouraging responses from Yugoslav representative bodies abroad that stated that cultural relations of Yugoslavia lagged behind political and economic relations, especially with countries of the Asia and Africa.⁶⁰⁸ As Vilfan stated, "such responses are catastrophic for a country that plays such an active role in the undeveloped world" and whose politics went in the direction of providing funding for the development of those countries.⁶⁰⁹

Yugoslav cultural leaders differentiated between cultural markets, as evident from discussions on areas to be covered by their cultural diplomacy.⁶¹⁰ As written by the Americans on March 25, 1963, the Yugoslavs felt that they were part and parcel of "the European cultural community" and had aimed to "participate fully in the cultural movements of significance in Europe." In this context, continued the Americans in the same document, the Yugoslavs "hold cultural goals akin to ours."⁶¹¹ Indeed, as put in the October 1968 Analysis of the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Yugoslavia's cultural relations with European countries were based on the principle "that our culture is part of European culture, that it develops and has developed through mutual interpenetration and impacts with other European cultures and that there is great mutual interest for further development of this collaboration."⁶¹² The same Analysis further revealed the standing occupied by the European cultural market on Yugoslavia's cultural presentation scale. As was written in the 1968 Analysis, it was the Western-European cultural market on which Yugoslavia sought

⁶⁰⁷ AJ-559-34-75, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 67.

⁶⁰⁸ AJ-559-34-73, Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, "XIV Sednica Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom održana 4. juna 1968. godine," 22. Comment by Marija Vilfan. (hereinafter, "XIV Sednica 4. juna 1968. godine")

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., 23. Comment by Marija Vilfan.

⁶¹⁰ See AJ-559-111-244, Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom. Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za scensku umetnost i muziku održane 23. XI. 1961. god., especially pages 22-29, 38, 46.

⁶¹¹ Walter R. Roberts, "Country Assessment Report-Yugoslavia, January 1962 – January 1963," March 25, 1963, 5-6, RG 306, USIA, Entry P40, container 82, NARA.

⁶¹² AJ-559-34-75, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 33. On the Yugoslavs seeing their culture to be part and parcel of the European one see a comment by Dragoljub Vujica in "Stenografske beleške. XV Sednica, 2. oktobra 1968", 37 (AJ-59-35-76).

"affirmation and confirmation of value".⁶¹³ Despite building the image of Yugoslavia as being a different type of power, seeking primary cultural validation on the European market made Yugoslavia extremely similar to the two superpowers. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union "suffered from a sense of cultural inferiority vis-à-vis Western and Central Europe" and both countries tried "to establish themselves as this tradition's rightful inheritors and progenitors."⁶¹⁴

The American market, to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, was a much more difficult nut to crack as noted by Yugoslavs already in the early 1950s and demonstrated in Chapter One. Even though the Yugoslavs were not able to penetrate the American market in the 1950s, the Yugoslavs and the Americans developed a sort of a "substitute" market for Yugoslav cultural products. As Veljko Bijedić stated during a meeting of the Executive Board of Jugokonzert in April 1953, a representative of the American Embassy suggested an exchange of artists where Yugoslav artists would perform in Germany, that is, in the American clubs in the American zone.⁶¹⁵ Jazz trumpeter Stanko Selak and his orchestra "Jadran" had been one of those musicians that played on this specific market.⁶¹⁶

Judging by some statements made during meetings of the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the markets of the non-aligned world clearly fell under the category of "niche markets"⁶¹⁷, even though they were not specifically and denotatively referred to as such by the Yugoslav cultural leaders. During the January 1956 Plenary meeting of the said Committee, one attendee, Lepa Perović, agreed that many unexpected opportunities opened for Yugoslavia the previous year due to the country's much more active foreign policy which included Tito's trips to India and Burma and the improvement of the country's relations with Eastern Europe. At the same time, continued Perović on the same meeting, some countries such as Egypt fell under the category of predictable events as it was public knowledge at least for a year that the Yugoslav delegation would be making a trip to that country. Egypt, so further

⁶¹³ AJ-559-34-75, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 43.

⁶¹⁴ Clayton Koppes, "The Real Ambassadors? The Cleveland Orchestra Tours the Soviet Union, 1965," in *Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold War*, edited by Simo Mikkonen and Peka Suutari (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2016), 70.

⁶¹⁵ AJ-559- 113- 246-257, "Zapisnik XXIII sednice Izvršnog odbora JKA od 24. aprila 1953 godine," 2.

⁶¹⁶ Aleksandar Bubanović, "Kronika zagrebačkog jazza: Jazz trombonisti od 1935. do 1960. godine," *Cantus*, no. 139, July 2006, 17; Jazz musician Milan Stojanović also performed in an "American club" in Germany. Luković, *Bolja prošlost*, 29.

⁶¹⁷ "Niche markets", so Jon Groucutt cites Kotler (2000) in his book *Marketing: Essential Principles, New Realities* (London: Sterling, VA: Kogan Page, 2004), to be "a more narrowly defined group, typically a small market whose needs are not being well served." (300)

stated by Lepa Perović, was a unique case as Egypt "has their opera, they have a building but don't have an ensemble. They have a specific taste for grand, famous operas, that our public no longer accepts that way, but demands something new." The troupe the Yugoslavs sent failed to impress even though, so Perović noted, time was on Yugoslavia's side.⁶¹⁸ Put in other words, this was poor planning on the Yugoslav part on a market that had a need for a specific product Yugoslavia could offer. Poor planning, as will be shown in Chapter 4, will also characterize music diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States.

Different markets also meant the pursuance of different objectives as it evident from the meeting of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music in November 1961. One member of this Committee stated how Yugoslavia was to send abroad both top-notch performers as well as those not so prominent ones, namely young ensembles.⁶¹⁹ The latter were not to be sent to, for instance, Paris but to Tunis, as continued by the same Committee member, as Tunis was a country lacking sophisticated criteria and the Yugoslav objective was presence and influence in that country and not desired affirmation Yugoslavia was seeking to obtain in Paris.⁶²⁰

By mid-1950s, as this subchapter has shown, a new brand identity of Yugoslavia emerged alongside its new values reflected in Yugoslavia's musical presentation to the world. If one needed a clear, concise response as to why the Yugoslavs developed such interpretations on the role of culture in their diplomatic relations and why the Yugoslavs made it a part and parcel of both their brand strategy and brand values, the Yugoslavs provided an answer to this question at the end of the 1960s. In the already cited 1968 Analysis of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, it was stated that Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy was "a part of the general activities of one socialist country, whose basic foreign policy platform is the broadest international collaboration on the principles of mutual respect, equality and parity. It should contribute to the affirmation of our country and the preservation of its independence."⁶²¹ Expressed differently, it was all about Yugoslavia's independence.

The identification of cultural diplomacy as a Yugoslav branding strategy in the service of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand allows us to move our analysis to another level, one just below the state which included agents involved in cultural diplomacy. The next subchapter analyzes actors who acted, to put in branding terms by using Catharine Slade-Brooking's words,

⁶¹⁸ AJ-559-18-37, Stenografske Beleške, Sednica 16. i 17. januara 1956., 56. Comment by Lepa Perović.

⁶¹⁹ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske Beleške, Sednica 23. XI. 1961, 60. Comment by Vučinić.

⁶²⁰ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske Beleške, Sednica 23. XI. 1961, 60-61. Comment by Vučinić.

⁶²¹ AJ-559-75-35, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 72.

as "[b]rand champions", that is, they were the people "responsible for cultivating support for a brand, internally and externally by spreading its vision and values."⁶²² In the Yugoslav context, this role was performed by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Jugokonzert. The examination of the methods employed by these "brand champions" to muster support for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand allows us to clarify the expectations the Yugoslav cultural bodies and the state had of Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington and other American jazz musicians.

⁶²² Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 34.

2.2. It's diplomacy: culture as "some sort of an open door even when that other door is shut"

By 1953, the Yugoslavs identified the main bodies responsible for the country's cultural diplomacy. The same year in which the United States established their United States Information Agency (June 1, 1953)⁶²³, which was tasked with selling the desired image of "the United States as a nation of affluence, progress, and personal fulfillment"⁶²⁴, the Yugoslavs established their Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries a couple of months earlier, on March 18, 1953.⁶²⁵ Albeit under the supervision of the Federal Executive Council, this Committee was seen as an independent body and its task was to encourage cultural, scientific and educational cooperation of Yugoslavia with other countries.⁶²⁶ As was stated on the Committee's third meeting held on December 11, 1953, its main job was to organize and finance all of those cultural activities the Yugoslav institutions had no means to do so.⁶²⁷ The Committee had seen its role, as stated in September 1957, as a sort of a "coordinator" of all of the activities in the cultural diplomatic sector and was also to keep record of such activities.⁶²⁸ According to the 1955 report by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Yugoslav cultural diplomatic methods included direct negotiations with foreign state organs⁶²⁹ or foreign counterparts of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Cultural relations with foreign countries were also to be established through direct links between Yugoslav and foreign institutions but, as the Committee further wrote in its 1955 report, it was up to Yugoslav and foreign institutions to develop tangible plans and activities while the Committee would provide organizational and financial support to such activities. All of these efforts, continued the 1955 Committee's report, were to go "hand in hand with our political affirmation and interest; [to] give appropriate quality and content to cultural cooperation, not bring it down to political-manifestational meetings."⁶³⁰

⁶²³ Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*, 57.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁶²⁵ On the establishment and structure of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Relations see Magaš, "Izložba sto listova jugoslavenske moderne grafike...", 141.

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁶²⁷ AJ-559-8-19-10, "Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom o planu rada za 1954 /izneseno u vidu postavki i teza/", 2. According to the attached call, this meeting was held on December 11, 1953.

⁶²⁸ AJ-550-11-26, "Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Izveštaj" Skupštinskom odboru, sept. 1957 (handwritten date), 2.

⁶²⁹ AZ-559-10-24, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1955," 1.

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

For the actual booking of the tours through which the Yugoslavs and the Americans were to musically interact with one another and which were to serve as a branding instrument for the Yugoslav state, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries relied on Jugokonzert. On the first meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Jugokonzert was described as one of the Committee's collaborating partners that was responsible for artistic performances, both of Yugoslav performers in foreign countries and foreign performers in Yugoslavia.⁶³¹ Jugokonzert's existence predates that of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. As noted in the Agency's report prepared for their ten year anniversary which was forwarded by the Secretariat for Education and Council of the Federal Executive Council to the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1957, immediately after its establishment, Jugokonzert was placed under the authority of the Yugoslav Council for Science and Culture. Simultaneously, so the said report continued, similar subsidiaries were established in Ljubljana and Zagreb, then for Crna Gora, Srbija and Macedonia while Bosna and Hercegovina got its concert subsidiary in August 1948.⁶³² Jugokonzert had a rather broad purview. According to a report drafted for their tenth year anniversary, not only was Jugokonzert tasked with arranging foreign artists' activities in Yugoslavia and the activities of Yugoslav artists abroad, it was also tasked with managing the concert life of Belgrade and other Yugoslav republics. Its purview, so the said report detailed, also included artistic exchanges between the Yugoslav Republics as well as aiding and cooperating with mass organizations in organizing various concert events at "large construction sites, industrial centers and workers' resorts."⁶³³

When the Yugoslav Concert Agency (Jugokonzert) told the story of how it contributed to the general fight for the survival of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international stage in the aftermath of the 1948 event, its story bears an uncanny resemblance to the official narrative of the state. The "brand's story" was thus the Agency's story. According to the already cited report the agency prepared for its ten year anniversary, in the aftermath of the split, the Agency had to put in "substantial efforts and resources to eliminate various prejudices and establish continuous business relations with leading concert agencies and artists of all continents and to develop today's level of concert life, which is not lagging behind countries

⁶³¹ AJ-559-8-19-20, "Rezime referata sekretara na 1 sednici komisije (31-III-53)", 1.

⁶³² AJ-559-115-249, "Izvještaj o 10-godišnjem radu Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije," 1, attached to Lepa Perović, Sekretarijat za Prosvetu i kulturu Saveznog izvršnog veća Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, no. 206, January 22, 1957.

⁶³³ Ibid.

with a much greater musical tradition and opportunity."⁶³⁴ Indeed, as the Agency self-assessed their own performance in their ten year anniversary report, they wrote how the arrival of foreign performers to Yugoslavia (17 in 1950 and 78 foreign performers in a span of ten years) demonstrated how the Cominform countries failed to attain their goal when they ended their cultural interaction with the Yugoslavs as the Agency not only accomplished all of its objectives, but it also managed "to increase the number of concerts and events and enhance the quality and level of concert life to a significant degree."⁶³⁵ Expressed differently, the Agency "lived the brand" of their 1948 split on the global cultural market in the same way as the state did on the global political market. It scrambled for allies and new cultural alliances.

In his quest for alliances and in a brazen display of his own independence as a cultural agent in Yugoslavia, one of the doors Veljko Bijedić knocked on was that of the Americans. At a moment when the Yugoslav government was "cracking down" on Western cultural influences, so wrote the Americans in a telegram from April 2, 1952, Veljko Bijedić, who was in the midst of creating a tentative schedule for the next concert season, walked through the American Embassy's door and asked for their help in bringing outstanding American artists "who would satisfy the enormous public demand for American presentations" to Yugoslavia. As the April 2, 1952 telegram further wrote, American officials stationed in Belgrade wondered about his motives but nonetheless suggested that they follow-up on his initiative and inform other American Embassies that Yugoslavia was also available for booking American artists.⁶³⁶ Bijedić initiated while the Americans picked up the baton of potential partnership by making it clear to other American Embassies that Yugoslavia was willing to join the musical circuit.

It appears that American officials stationed in Belgrade repaid Bijedić's trust as they advocated for this particular agency be the one to organize the tour of The Glenn Miller Orchestra. From 1953, Yugoslavia had a Jazz Federation which many scholars interpret as an attempt by the Yugoslav regime to put jazz under its control.⁶³⁷ It was this Jazz Federation, as evident from Dizzy Gillespie's assessment report, that sponsored the arrival of Dizzy Gillespie

⁶³⁴ AJ-559-115-249, "Izveštaj o 10-godišnjem radu Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije," 7.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶³⁶ "Yugoslav Request for American Cultural Presentations," Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to DOS, no. 936, 511.68/4-252, April 2, 1952, 1, RG 59 DOS, Decimal File 1950-54, box 2472, NARA. Partial quote of this document also available in Konta, *Waging Public Diplomacy*, 211.

⁶³⁷ See Janjetović, *Od internacionale do komercijale*, 46; Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 176; Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 162-163.

to Yugoslavia in 1956.⁶³⁸ When the Jazz Federation informed them how ANTA sent them an offer for the performance of The Glenn Miller Orchestra in Yugoslavia, a February 18, 1957 telegram from the American post in Belgrade asked Washington to advise ANTA to contact them before an offer is made to the local sponsor as the choice of the post for the organization of the Glenn Miller Orchestra's Yugoslav performance would have been Jugokonzert, an "authorized and experienced booking agency". The Jazz Federation, on the other hand, according to the said telegram, "proved most difficult [to] work with before and during Gillespie visit last spring."⁶³⁹ American officials wrote about some of the problems they experienced with the Jazz Federation and its organization of Dizzy Gillespie's tour in Yugoslavia in the tour's official assessment report. In this report, the Americans wrote how ANTA and the Jazz Federation were still negotiating the fees for Gillespie's band while Dizzy and his musicians were already playing in Turkey, "their last stop before coming to Belgrade."⁶⁴⁰

Those people who served in the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and people such as Veljko Bijedić whose role was, in branding terms, that of "brand champions" have the ability, so Catharine Slade-Brooking writes, to impact the perception of the brand. The more there are people who relate to the brand, continues Slade-Brooking, "the stronger the brand equity becomes."⁶⁴¹ Indeed, as Catharine Slade-Brooking further writes, "brand value" has two definitions, the more important being "the perceived value of a brand by its consumers."⁶⁴² This raises the question of whether Yugoslav "brand champions" actually believed in the "independent Yugoslavia" brand? Discussion sections of the meetings of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, words of Yugoslav cultural and educational workers and agents who organized Yugoslavia's cultural events reveal how all of these actors cultivated a specific view of their country and its role on the international stage. To begin with, it was the feeling of being independent from the Soviet Union that represented the essence of "the Yugoslav exceptionalism".⁶⁴³ Feeling "special" and "exceptional" was not just a trait of the Yugoslavs, but of Americans too. The idea behind the "American

⁶³⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Visit of President's Fund/ANTA-sponsored Jazz Musician Dizzy Gillespie and Band to Yugoslavia," 3, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, 021 FRAENKEL, G.S./4-1559 THRU 032 GILLESPIE, DIZZY/10-3157, box 103, NARA.

⁶³⁹ Riddleberger, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1157, February 18, 1957, 511.683/2-1857, RG 69 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, box 2205, NARA.

⁶⁴⁰ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Visit of President's Fund/ANTA-sponsored Jazz Musician Dizzy GILLESPIE and Band to Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tosi 12, August 1, 1956, 3, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, 032 FRAENKEL, G.S./4-1559 THRU 032 GILLESPIE, DIZZY/10-3157, box 103, NARA.

⁶⁴¹ Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 34.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, 36.

⁶⁴³ Jakovina & Previšić, "Challenging the Cominform," 9.

exceptionalism" was the American perception of "themselves as a free and prosperous people whose nation inspires admiration throughout the world" and whose country "can spread its vision of democratic capitalism abroad without imperiling the standards of living and political liberties making America special."⁶⁴⁴ Furthermore, in the post-World War II period, Americans, so historian John Fousek writes, believed that they were simply destined to lead the world, that they had the values, the institutions and a "way of life" people around the world wanted to have. The Americans, continues Fousek, felt they were a great nation whose greatness entrusted them with a global responsibility which, after "containment" arrived on the American political scene in March 1947, translated into the American mission of defeating Communism.⁶⁴⁵

From time to time an inevitable clash between American and Yugoslav exceptionalism occurred and bore an impact on the conduct of cultural and public diplomacy between the two countries. In particular, it was in January 13, 1960 despatch that the Americans wrote of one such clash that occurred in the midst of the attempts by USIS to explain and get Yugoslavs to accept the view that American policies have "[d]emocratic [m]otivations". After listing the methods USIS used for this objective, the report noted that, while many Yugoslav officials privately gave Americans credit for having sincere motivations, this did not really "convince them [the Yugoslavs] that we are right". Instead, "...the Yugoslavs, fulfilling their self-appointed destiny, take it upon themselves to urge us toward a "more enlightened" course at every opportunity – which means voicing this in line to someone or other in the Embassy almost every day."⁶⁴⁶ Politically speaking, this example demonstrates that both sides, at least in the political arena, believed in the direction of their brand.

As evident from the already cited description of his 1963 Yugoslav trip by Edward Alexander, Yugoslav cultural agents were also connected and cared deeply about their country's independence. As Alexander wrote in this description, since he was motivated to gain information on the current and most pressing issues the Yugoslavs faced, he spoke to some Yugoslav agents about the domestic politics of Yugoslavia. As Alexander continued in the same description, the response of jazz pianist Davor Kajfeš was: "Who comes after Tito! Everything we enjoy, we artists particularly, we can thank Tito for. But the big question is, will his

⁶⁴⁴ Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*, 116.

⁶⁴⁵ Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 8, 188.

⁶⁴⁶ Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FDS from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 53, January 13, 1960, 11, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, box 10, NARA.

successor continue the same politics, and be independent of Moscow."⁶⁴⁷ Expressed differently, independence always lingered in the minds of the Yugoslavs.

Likewise, Yugoslav cultural agents, both "brand champions" and "brand ambassadors" believed in the "divine calling" of Yugoslavia's culture on the international scene, as evident from the discussion section of the conference of the Association of Composers of Yugoslavia held in Bled at the end of December 1956. What differentiated Yugoslavia's music and art from the music of countries such as Germany or Switzerland, stated Slovenian composer Vilko Ukmar on the December 1956 Bled meeting, was that their music was "alive and healthy" which he saw as a significant advantage to Yugoslavia.⁶⁴⁸ Jazz musician Vojislav Simić shared a similar view. In February 1958, as evident from a report that detailed the tour, Simić and his Jazz Orchestra of Radio-Television Belgrade toured Poland. This tour, continued the same report, lasted for a month and the orchestra performed in Lodj [Lodz], Katowice [Katowice], Krakov [Krakow], Gdanjsk, Sopot, Vroclav [Wroclaw] and Varšava [Warsaw]. As the same report further detailed, in March 1958, the Orchestra went on a tour of Czechoslovakia which lasted for ten days. In Czechoslovakia, so the same report noted, the Orchestra performed in Hradec Kralove [Hradec Králové], Moravska Ostrava [Moravská Ostrava], Prag [Prague] and Plzen [Plzeň].⁶⁴⁹ As Simić stated in an interview he gave after the Orchestra's return from the said tour, the Orchestra's repertoire included modern jazz and commercial popular music numbers. Simić continued how the best received Yugoslav arrangement had been "Minijatura" by Borivoj Roković "for which they did not believe it was a domestic composition and arrangement". The audience, as Simić further explained, reacted best to the singers, Lola Novaković and Dušan Jakšić while the critics praised trumpet players Predrag Krstić and Miša Radosavljević, tenor saxophone Eduard Savilja, Joca Lukinić and Sreten Stevanović, on the alt saxophone and trombone and vocals respectively.⁶⁵⁰ In his autobiography, Simić noted how the Orchestra's rather successful concert in Prague was attended by the members of the Karel Vlach orchestra. Simić continued writing how Vlach's orchestra had been both in awe of the performance of the Jazz Orchestra of Radio-Television Belgrade, but also "slightly envious of

⁶⁴⁷ Albert E. Hemsing, "Trip by RIAS Officer to Zagreb Music Festival," FM from USIS/Berlin to USIA Washington, no. 59, February 26, 1964, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA.

⁶⁴⁸ "Smernice posleratnog jugoslovenskog muzičkog stvaralaštva," [Materijal sa Konferencije Saveza kompozitora Jugoslavije, održane na Bledu 26-28 decembra 1956 god.], *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija*, 11-12, 1957, 89. Comment by V. Ukmar. (hereinafter, "Smernice posleratnog jugoslovenskog muzičkog stvaralaštva")

⁶⁴⁹ AJ 559-112-245, "Umetničke turneje Jazz-orkestra RTB," undated document. Dean Vuletic (*Sounds like America*, 124) and Radina Vučetić (*Koka-kola socijalizam*, 181-182) also mention this tour.

⁶⁵⁰ "Par reči sa Vojislavom Simićem," *Savremeni akordi*, (Mart) 1958, 94.

our success, because they [Karel Vlach's orchestra] were technically better than us, and famous even before the war." However, as Simić further noted, "[o]ur trump card, however, was youthful enthusiasm, modern jazz repertoire (Basie, Ellington, Billy May, Woody Herman), our free movement on the stage and our extraordinary soloists-improvisors."⁶⁵¹ Such a view of the Yugoslav brand by its domestic "customers" exemplifies one of the characteristics of "strong brands" that, as Catharine Slade-Brooking writes, "are created by capturing the minds and emotions of a target audience with a particular product: great brands are those who are able to transcend their original category and come to represent a larger, more powerful meaning or experience."⁶⁵² Indeed, some Yugoslav cultural agents not only believed that their culture had a "divine mission" to accomplish on the international cultural scene, they also believed how the world expected them to complete this mission. As composer Vilko Ukmar stated at the 1956 Association of Composer's Bled conference, the outside world "expected a lot from the Slavic peoples, especially the Yugoslavs" as they had what the West lacked and that was "youth and freshness."⁶⁵³

This belief in their own brand was so strong that, even if the Yugoslavs found themselves in situations in which they became aware that the products of their brand were not that special, they still described them in terms of their uniqueness which fit the "exceptionalism" narrative that made-up their brand's story. Bled Jazz Festival presents a good example. The 1963 Bled Jazz Festival illustrated, wrote a critic for the Croatian newspaper *Večernji list*, how the festival was "stagnating".⁶⁵⁴ The organization of the 1965 Bled Jazz Festival was so poor that another critic for the same newspaper wrote in an ominous tone how television cameras caught scenes of "probably the last Yugoslav jazz festival".⁶⁵⁵ Irrespective of these problems, the Yugoslav Bled and Ljubljana Jazz Festivals were still interpreted as performing a unique role on the international scene. One domestic critic described Bled Jazz Festival as the manifestation which launched the international careers of jazzers such as saxophonist Klaus Doldinger, trombonist Albert Mangelsdorff and pianist Wolfgang Dauner while Lucio Dalla, the winner of the 1971 San Remo Festival, played the clarinet on one of the very first editions of Bled Jazz Festival.⁶⁵⁶ Another domestic critic added to the list of musicians who started their careers in Bled and

⁶⁵¹ Simić, *Susreti i Sećanja*, 77. Same citation in Vuletic, *Sounds like America*, 124.

⁶⁵² Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 32.

⁶⁵³ "Smernice posleratnog jugoslovenskog muzičkog stvaralaštva...", 89. Comment by Ukmar.

⁶⁵⁴ Nenad Turkalj, "Stagnacija," *Večernji list*, God. V, no. 1910, June 7, 1963, 7.

⁶⁵⁵ ZD. Marok, "Slabo i neorganizirano: Završen VI jugoslavenski festival jaza na Bledu," *Večernji list*, God VII, no. 1825, June 7, 1965, 5.

⁶⁵⁶ Nenad Hlača, "Od danas u Ljubljani: Četiri dana čudesnih nota. Je li nebo sklono jazzu?," *Večernji list*, God. XV, no. 3652, June 3, 1971, 5

Ljubljana bassist Miroslav Vitous, pianist Jan Hammer, violinist Jean-Luc Ponty, trumpeter Randy Brecker and saxophonist Zbigniew Namysłowski.⁶⁵⁷ Expressed differently, Bled Jazz Festival may have been on the descending path but its perceived value still added much to the value of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

Furthermore, as evident from discussions at meetings of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries during the 1960s, some members of this Committee accepted the most famous philosophy behind the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. This was the "the self-management" system, praised by Yugoslav politicians to be country's biggest "contribution to socialization of the means of production."⁶⁵⁸ Yugoslav element of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand was seen by some Yugoslav cultural leaders as an attractive element in the Yugoslav way of conducting cultural diplomacy. For instance, during the October 2, 1968 meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, one member stated that some factors the Yugoslavs themselves consistently saw as problems in their cultural dealings with others, such as organizational and coordinational issues, relations and so forth, were the country's greatest advantage "and something that is, by irresistible logic imposed on our partners."⁶⁵⁹ Putting politics into the equation, this committee member had seen "our self-management system, our deetatization, the socialization of culture — this is something that is fascinating to our partners and when that initial shock is passed – this is something that is attractive."⁶⁶⁰

In addition, these "brand champions" were also firm believers in the strategy and the instrument their country used to ensure the survival of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international scene. As one member of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries stated on their October 2, 1968 meeting, it were cultural relations that Yugoslavia was to press for even if political relations between them and the country in question were strained as this could lead to better political relations and, as the member of the Committee continued, this was diplomacy, it was long-term and "... culture should be some sort of an open doors even when that other door is shut."⁶⁶¹

⁶⁵⁷ Ognjen Tvrčković "Petnaestogodišnjica organiziranog jaza u Jugoslaviji," *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 4 (winter 1974), 60.

⁶⁵⁸ Murrey Marder, "Yugoslavia's Capitalist-Like Touches In Spots Infuriate Orthodox Reds," *The Washington Post and Times Herald (1954-1959)*, December 9, 1958, pp. A6. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post.

⁶⁵⁹ AJ-559-35-76, "Stenografske beleške. XV Sednica 2. oktobar 1968," 67. Comment by Vinko Vinterhalter.

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 67-68. Comment by Vinko Vinterhalter.

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 49. Comment by Aleksandar Petrović.

Within this accepted usage of cultural diplomacy as a branding strategy, music diplomacy emerged as a branding instrument through which to gain support and further promote the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. In their 1950 Plan, the Department for Scientific and Cultural Links admitted that, until then, they did not have a clear policy on booking foreign artists in Yugoslavia. As they advised in the same Plan, Yugoslavia's booking policy should aim at booking outstanding artists whose performances could contribute to the development of the musical life of the country.⁶⁶² Such a formulation of Yugoslavia's booking preferences reveals yet another "common ground" in the musical interaction between Yugoslavia and the United States: the former was interested in booking established artists while the latter was interested in sending such successful artists to Yugoslavia.

Within the Yugoslav strategy of using music diplomacy as a branding instrument, these foreign artists were also seen as potential branding instruments for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. The Department for Scientific and Cultural Links' 1950 Plan reveals why. For Yugoslavia's musical guests to be able to further disseminate the works of Yugoslav composers, so the 1950 Plan stated, they should be introduced to the country's music during their stay in their country.⁶⁶³ It was of paramount importance, so it was further written in the Department's 1950 Plan, that these foreign performers be given special attention and care "in order to feel the difference in the way socialist countries treat artists as opposed to this treatment in capitalist countries." First-hand experience of such practices, continued the 1950 Plan, demonstrated that these foreign artists then further disseminated information about Yugoslavia in other countries.⁶⁶⁴ To summarize the writings of this plan in branding terms, foreign musicians were potential advertising instruments for raising the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international cultural scene as they had the opportunity to further disseminate Yugoslavia's musical wares and could work for one of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomatic objectives which was to make Yugoslavia a part and parcel of the international cultural scene.

In addition, to reiterate from above and explain it further, the bodies responsible for Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy had also seen these foreign artists to be "masters" from which Yugoslav artists could learn. When making plans for developing cultural relations with foreign countries, the objective was, as was put by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign

⁶⁶² AJ-559-8-19-20."Plan rada Odelenja za naučne i kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1950 godinu," 5.

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

Countries in 1957, to take into account the benefits of such relations for the Yugoslav society in addition to booking attractions of interest for Yugoslav artists to "see, hear and learn". Another objective, so the Committee continued in their 1957 report on Yugoslavia's cultural relations with foreign countries, was to research cultural and artistic needs of those countries to be able to represent themselves with cultural attractions that would leave an imprint in those countries.⁶⁶⁵ Over the course of ten years, there were almost no changes in strategy or objectives for music diplomacy as a branding instrument. One untitled Yugoslav document from January 1966 reaffirmed the necessity of aligning Yugoslavia's cultural and scientific collaboration with the needs of the country so that such interaction contributes to the cultural and educational development of Yugoslavia.⁶⁶⁶

The strategy and the objectives of music diplomacy as a Yugoslav branding instrument changed very little on paper. In practice, the guidelines for Yugoslavia's booking policy changed due to uncontrollable factors. As Veljko Bijedić explained to an American Embassy official Walter Wein in the early 1950s, Jugokonzert's policy of booking only outstanding artists was aligned with the expectation of the Yugoslav audience that the Agency, given its limited budget, books only high quality artists. As Bijedić further clarified in the same conversation, he could do very little to convince republican subsidiaries to book a relatively unknown jazz orchestra as their preference lied with a ballet or the Boston Philharmonic.⁶⁶⁷ As the 1950s were coming to an end, Bijedić's booking policy mantra would change and this had little to do with the Yugoslav audience. As he stated in his November 1960 "exit interview" (FY 1961 P.L. 402 Leader Grantee), he was desirous to book American performers but not the most prominent ones as they asked for a lot of money.⁶⁶⁸ Put differently, Veljko Bijedić admitted that the Yugoslav strategy of using American and other foreign musicians as potential branding instruments for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand lacked the most important element ingredient – money.

Still, the Yugoslavs had another ace up their sleeve they could use as an instrument to promote and raise the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international

⁶⁶⁵ AJ-559-11-26, "Kulturne veze sa inostranstvom po zemljama za 1957. godinu. Opšti deo", 1.

⁶⁶⁶ AJ-559-23-47, Untitled and unsigned document that describes the basic objectives and postulates of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, Beograd, January 27, 1966, 1.

⁶⁶⁷ AJ-559-15-32, Veljko Bijedić, "Zabeleška o toku razgovora, koji sam imao 8. maja o.g. sa g. Walterom Winom, predstavnikom Američke ambasade u Beogradu, u vezi gostovanja dirigenta A. Rodžinskog i orkestra američkog vazduhoplovstva," Beograd, 9. maj 1952.

⁶⁶⁸ Memorandum of Conversation. Participants: J. William Henry (OCE), Veljko Bijedić. "Exit interview: Mr. Veljko Bijedić, Director of 'Jugokonzert' (Concert Agency) Belgrade, Yugoslavia; FY 1961 P.L. 402 Leader Grantee", 1, RG General Records of DOS, Central Decimal File 1960-63, box 1074, NARA.

cultural scene – their very own jazz musicians and impresarios who became, as the next subchapter demonstrates, "brand ambassadors".

2.3. Better diplomats than those paid ones: the Yugoslav agents

Musician Ljubiša Milić was one of the several members of the band "Sedmorica mladih" that had, in 1968, performed at a diplomatic hunt held in Karađorđevo in a year of less than warm relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union due to the events in Czechoslovakia the same year.⁶⁶⁹ Yugoslav reflections on the events in Czechoslovakia and some cultural manifestations that followed demonstrate how it was not always easy to play the role or "live the brand" the Yugoslavs envisioned for themselves in the international arena. When the Yugoslavs choose the "balancing" path, to reiterate the already cited words of historian Đoko Tripković, it meant that the Yugoslavs had to be, at all times, well informed about the state of affairs in the world.⁶⁷⁰ A cultural manifestation which occurred in the aftermath of the events in Czechoslovakia demonstrated how this was not always possible. The Department for Culture and Art of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia directly quoted the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia as an example of how Yugoslavia needed to pay attention to the reality that both Eastern and Western countries carried out specific policies in their cultural interaction with Yugoslavia. This became evident, so the Department for Culture and Art of the Socialist Alliance of the Working people of Yugoslavia continued, in the aftermath of the 1968 invasion. At that time, so the same Department continued, the Soviet Union blocked two Yugoslav exhibitions from appearing in their country while Yugoslav officials attended the opening of a Soviet exhibition in Yugoslavia. This was, as further stated by the Department for Culture and Art, the result of the Yugoslavs being poorly informed.⁶⁷¹ Still, nothing could stop musicians from performing after the diplomatic hunt held at Karađorđevo the same year. One of the performers that night was Ljubiša Milić. As he recalled, there was a specific seating arrangement that night as "[t]he table was set in the form of the Cyrillic letter P with the Soviet ambassador sitting at the very end" a situation which did not allow the musicians to "grasp whether his position was a consequence of the political situation". The band, according to Milić, always had a vast repertoire that ranged from dixieland to Russian and Greek songs that could, pretty much, satisfy the tastes of everybody in the audience. That particular night, as Milić recalled, "... we performed a musical and theatrical attractive Russian potpourri, not thinking about the political situation, but purely [from the standpoint of the] repertoire. We got a

⁶⁶⁹ Minja Subota, *Kako smo zabavljali Tita* (Zagreb: Vedis, 2020), 43.

⁶⁷⁰ Tripković, "Titova politika balansa," 124.

⁶⁷¹ AJ-559-24-51, "Mišljenje, statovi i ocene o međunarodnoj kulturnoj saradnji," 3.

rapturous applause and the Soviet ambassador came out on the stage with his eyes full of tears, kissed each one of us and said, ‚Spasibo‘.⁶⁷²

It was not just the Soviet Ambassador that experienced a rush of emotions when he heard the band perform. Yugoslav politicians did too. As Milić further recalled, while the band was on a break, they were approached by two Yugoslav politicians, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirko Tepavec and the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Mijalko Todorović.⁶⁷³ Both of these politicians accorded these musicians the recognition that they were, in fact, diplomats who were, on that stage, that night, performing a diplomatic duty by representing their state in front of foreign dignitaries who were present at Karađorđevo. To quote Ljubiša Milić directly, when Mijalko Todorović approached them, "[h]e patted us and told us that we were great diplomats. You play a little bit of American songs, a little bit of Russian, a little bit of the East, a little bit of West..."⁶⁷⁴ Mirko Tepavec was even more direct in granting diplomatic recognition to the musicians by stating, "[t]his is true diplomacy."⁶⁷⁵ Indeed, looking purely at the repertoire as Mijalko Todorović did, the band not only represented their own country that night on the stage in front of foreign diplomats. Through their repertoire, they also performed and exemplified their country's "independent Yugoslavia" brand that showed no formal alliance with anybody yet aiming to cultivate friendly relations with everybody. That night, the musicians acted as true "ambassadors" of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

In general, as one of the main authorities on the issue of nation branding Keith Dinnie wrote, for a country that does not have a lot of financial means to mount expensive promotional campaigns, the most profitable option is to select "a network of brand ambassadors whose role is to advance the nation-brand at every opportunity."⁶⁷⁶ People who serve as brand ambassadors are "highly enthusiastic individuals imbued with a deep knowledge of their company, and they also possess the ability to communicate the company's brand values effectively to target audiences."⁶⁷⁷ When choosing a brand ambassador, it is of utmost importance, continues Dinnie, to make sure that those chosen for this role "reflect the personality of the country and the positive attributes that the nation wishes to project."⁶⁷⁸ In discussions on the connection

⁶⁷² Subota, *Kako smo zabavljali Tita*, 43.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁶ Dinnie, *Nation Branding*, 72.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 228.

⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 72.

between culture and the reputation of the state, it is evident that Yugoslav cultural institutions which administered the country's cultural diplomacy had seen Yugoslav musicians to be representatives of the country when they traveled abroad.⁶⁷⁹ The Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries changed little of its thinking on the matter as the 1960s were coming to an end. In fact, the Committee actually clarified and stated even more directly how these musicians and cultural figures served as brand ambassadors. During the October 2, 1968 meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, one of its members stated how "propaganda of each one of our ensembles – this is propaganda for our country."⁶⁸⁰ It was Yugoslav culture, so wrote the 1968 Analysis of Yugoslavia's cultural relations with foreign countries, that made world stages "the stages of success of Yugoslav creators and artists" producing the result of Yugoslavia being "no longer unknown, but it is appearing in many fields with high quality achievements." As further written in this same Analysis, "[o]ur literature has gotten a Nobel Prize winner, our film an Oscar winner".⁶⁸¹ Put differently, it was culture and Yugoslav artists who were recognized as raising the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and making that same brand a part and parcel of the international cultural scene, an important objective of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, as stated in subchapter 2.1.

Brand ambassadors, so Keith Dinnie further explains, may fulfill this role even "without any official endorsement from their nation or any agreement by the individual concerned that they are in fact a type of ambassador for their nation".⁶⁸² However, what lends credibility to the analysis of jazz musicians and impresarios as representatives of Yugoslavia on the international stage was not solely the recognition given to the musicians (in this case "Sedmorica Mladih") by some Yugoslav politicians. This recognition came from the man who was on top of Yugoslavia's political pyramid, Josip Broz Tito.

When Nikita Khrushchev visited Yugoslavia in 1963, musician Predrag Cune Gojković performed for the Soviet statesman. As Predrag Cune Gojković recalled, he performed a song called "The Soldiers Sorrow" on this occasion. He further confessed how he knew the significance this song had for Nikita Khrushchev as this was the song Red Army's soldiers sang to him during the battle for Stalingrad. A visibly emotional Khrushchev, so Gojković further recalled, then invited the musician to visit the Soviet Union one more time after the musician

⁶⁷⁹ This is connected to an important issue for any nation and this is "... who decides/purpots to speak on behalf of the nation?" Jordan, "Nation Branding: A Tool for Nationalism," 283-284.

⁶⁸⁰ AJ-76-35, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 2. oktobra 1968. godine, 71. Comment by Vinko Vinterhalter.

⁶⁸¹ AJ-75-34, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 67.

⁶⁸² Dinnie, *Nation Branding*, 228.

revealed that he had already visited Khrushchev's country twice.⁶⁸³ It was not just Nikita Khrushchev that was impressed by Predrag Cune Gojković's performance that night. Yugoslavia's leader Josip Broz Tito was too. As Gojković recalled of Tito's reaction to the exchange of words between him and Nikita Khrushchev, the Yugoslav leader stated, "[s]ee how our musicians are such good diplomats. You are better diplomats in the world than those ours that we pay with expensive dollars and you don't even hear them."⁶⁸⁴ Expressed differently, as the head of the state, Josip Broz Tito considered them diplomats too.⁶⁸⁵

As recognized brand ambassadors, what were these musicians expected to do on the international scene for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand? To understand their diplomatic role, we need to mention one of the key tenets of Yugoslavia's diplomacy. As historian Tvrtko Jakovina writes, in the years following its ousting from the Cominform, Yugoslavia began developing its foreign policy in the direction of obtaining benefits from all three sides in the Cold War – the East, the West and the Third World. It was this policy, so Jakovina continues, that secured Yugoslavia's presence on the international political scene. For Yugoslavia, as Jakovina concluded, thus, diplomacy played a much more important role than it had for other countries as the country resolved many of its "internal political constraints" through "a more visible role in the world".⁶⁸⁶ Expressed differently in branding terms, Yugoslavia needed visibility, that is, it needed to raise the awareness of its brand on the international scene. This is where nation branding helps as, to reiterate the words of historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht, power needs to be seen.⁶⁸⁷ The same is with brands. As branding expert David Aaker put it, "[t]he brand, particularly when establishing or entering a new category or subcategory, needs to have visibility – it needs to come to mind when the product category or subcategory is selected."⁶⁸⁸ This was what Yugoslavia expected from its musicians and other cultural workers. As stated in an undated document, the country was "chasing" two types of recognition by sending their artists abroad. First, as the document stated, by sending its musicians abroad, Yugoslavia was allowing its most prominent artists to achieve recognition on the European cultural scene and to grow artistically. Secondly, as the same document stated, it was through these musicians that the country could obtain its cultural recognition.⁶⁸⁹ The same as Yugoslavia's politicians were

⁶⁸³ Subota, *Kako smo zabavljali Tita*, 67-68.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁵ Dean Vuletic makes the same point through a quote by Yugoslav singer Anica Zubović. See Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 2; *Sounds like America*, 116.

⁶⁸⁶ Jakovina, "Povijesni uspjeh šizofrene države," 48.

⁶⁸⁷ Gienow-Hecht, "Nation Branding," 233.

⁶⁸⁸ David A. Aaker, *Brand Relevance: Making Competitors Irrelevant* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011), 15.

⁶⁸⁹ AJ-559- 14- 31, "Kulturne veze sa inostranstvom," 6.

chasing recognition for their specific political path in the global political arena as an element of their "independent Yugoslavia" brand, the country's brand ambassadors were expected to do the same on the worldwide cultural scene.

Some of Yugoslavia's brand ambassadors were quite aware of their ambassadorial role, even if they did not explicitly referred to it as such. To return to the musings of jazz musician Bojan Adamič from May 1968 cited in the introductory section of this dissertation, Adamič knew very well the power Yugoslav musicians had in increasing the visibility of their country and raising the awareness of its brand. In May 1968, Bojan Adamič wrote about the impact he and Croatian singer Vice Vukov made through their participation at an international music festival in Rio de Janeiro. As Adamič recalled in the same account, the duo achieved no success whatsoever at this festival. However, as Adamič continued, Yugoslavia presented itself with a good song so the local (Brazilian) newspapers criticised the jury of the festival. The then Yugoslav chargé d'affaires in Brazil, Tihomir Kondev, so Adamič further recalled, declared how a Yugoslav musical failure got the country more presence in the media "than all of its other problems." The Yugoslav chargé d'affaires even stated, so Adamič continued, that he derived more pleasure from the duo's musical failure than he would have from them receiving a prize at the festival.⁶⁹⁰ Other members of the Yugoslav diplomatic service also recognized the value of these brand ambassadors. According to the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Yugoslavia's diplomatic missions evaluated the 1964 Asian and Latin American tour of the folklore ensemble "Branko Krsmanović Choir"⁶⁹¹ both as a success in promoting Yugoslavia's culture and a success "for political propaganda and it generated increased interest for our country."⁶⁹² Put differently, artistic successes of these brand ambassadors increased the visibility of the country, an important diplomatic objective.

This was also acknowledged by the Yugoslav media. One case in point had been composer Nikica Kalogjera. He, alongside Miljenko Prohaska, at one point in his career, stood at the helm of the Dance Orchestra of Radio Zagreb.⁶⁹³ Later in his career, as Croatian newspaper *Večernji list* noted in 1971, the composer, up until literally the last moment, was not certain whether or not he would be flying to Tokyo for an international popular music festival. The Festival's

⁶⁹⁰ AJ-559-34-75, Adamič, "Neka razmišljanja o zabavnoj muzici u Jugoslaviji," 96.

⁶⁹¹ AJ-559-31-66, "Izveštaj o radu Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom u 1964. godini," Beograd, 1965, 142.

⁶⁹² Ibid., 142-143.

⁶⁹³ Davor Hrvoj, "Miljenko Prohaska: „Kad je netko bio nepodoban izbrisali bi ga sa slike," January 9, 2022. <https://glazba.hr/citaj/intervju/miljenko-prohaska-invervju/> (accessed on April 21, 2022) (hereinafter, "Hrvoj, "Kad je netko bio nepodoban")

organizers, thinking in terms of finances, so *Večernji list* continued, publicly stated how the Festival would finance only the arrival of the performers. In the end, so further stated by *Večernji list*, Kalogjera was hand-picked by the organizers to have his travel expenses paid by the Festival. As *Večernji list* continued, the selection of Kalogjera over other composers was not an insignificant detail as it revealed the higher visibility of Yugoslavia "on the popular-musical map of the world."⁶⁹⁴ From the perspective of branding, this article is an interesting one, as it described Nikica Kalogjera in the exact terms of the role he was fulfilling. He was, so stated *Večernji list*, "the second »ambassador« of our popular music", alongside Alfi Kabiljo.⁶⁹⁵

Cultural bodies which administered Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy as part of the country's branding strategy also recognized the activities of these musicians and impresarios as contributing to raising the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. The 1961 edition of Kelemen's "Mužički Biennale Zagreb", praised by *Borba* as "the biggest and most significant music festival" in Yugoslavia⁶⁹⁶ had been praised by the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music as reaping "significant international success". As a member of the Committee further informed his counterparts, the Ministry of Culture discussed the results of the Biennale, examined the reviews of around fifty international publications and statements of prominent foreign experts during one of its meetings and concluded how this particular manifestation "had already affirmed itself" on its inaugural event.⁶⁹⁷ Similarly, Croatian newspaper *Večernji list* noted how Mazur's Bled Jazz Festival had affirmed itself as "one of the most significant European manifestations of jazz" immediately after its first edition as evident from "the great interest it stimulated among foreign artists".⁶⁹⁸ In 1963, another critic for the same newspaper commented how Bled Jazz Festival achieve fame beyond the borders of Yugoslavia resulting in situations in which a prominent foreign musician "gave up a lucrative job on the side, only to come to Bled, with minimal daily expenses and paid travels, to play in a rather pleasant circle of good musicians."⁶⁹⁹ Likewise, Yugoslav critics and commentators alike overinterpreted the selection of Belgrade as a host to the Newport Jazz Festival in 1971.⁷⁰⁰

The examined data, which consist of their quotes and reviewed activities, suggests that these brand ambassadors were acting in line with at least one objective of Yugoslavia's cultural

⁶⁹⁴ Z. Franjić, "Kotiramo li na svjetskoj »burzi« nota?", *Večernji list*, God. XV, no. 3808, December 7, 1971, pp. 4.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁶ Ž. B., "Otvoren drugi zagrebački Mužički Bijenale," *Borba*, May 9, 1963, Year XXVIII, no. 126, pp. 7

⁶⁹⁷ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske Beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961. g.," 12. Comment by Vuljević

⁶⁹⁸ Z. Franjić, "Iz naše zabavne muzike: »Bled 61«, " *Večernji list*, Year III, no. 588, May 31, 1961, 7.

⁶⁹⁹ N.T., "Kamo ide naš jazz?" *Večernji list*, God V, no. 1235, July 6, 1963, 9.

⁷⁰⁰ Pantić, *Beogradski džez festival*, 15.

diplomacy which was to bring the country more in line with worldwide achievements in the field of culture and make Yugoslavia a part and parcel of that same scene. Apart from Bojan Adamič whose call for investments into a proper "brand ambassador" who would bring about the affirmation of a country on the international scene clearly demonstrates his desire to further raise the awareness of the brand, when Newport Jazz Festival arrived to Belgrade, jazz impresario Aleksandar Živković, who got the idea to establish a jazz festival in Yugoslavia after attending festivals in Lugano, Prague and Vienna, stated his personal satisfaction "that jazz afforded Belgrade with one more element of a world's capital".⁷⁰¹ When theatre director Mira Trailović managed to get "Hair" staged in Belgrade without the help of the American Embassy, American official Edward C. McBride commented on her knowledge of the Western scene and how she "was determined that the Yugoslav audiences were going to see what was there, particularly in the avant garde and things that were generating controversy."⁷⁰²

Milko Kelemen directly stated his desire to make his country a part of the international cultural circuit which was a cultural diplomatic objective of his state. In 1977, during an interview with a musical magazine *Zvuk*, Milko Kelemen stated his motivation for establishing the "Muzički Biennale Zagreb". Drawing a parallel between the works composed before and after his Biennale to demonstrate the Festival's contribution to the development of Yugoslav music, Kelemen inferred how his country reached a level of musical achievement equivalent to that of countries such as Poland, Sweden and France.⁷⁰³ To say the least, this did not satisfy him. As he continued in the same interview: "And this is what hurts me the most, what bothered me the most, and this was probably one of the main reasons why I established the Biennale, the opinion that in Yugoslavia, for our circumstances, this was good, that we could never reach major world centers."⁷⁰⁴ These Kelemen's words indicate that one of his objectives, which was also an objective of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy as seen from the first subchapter of this chapter, was to heal an old Yugoslav wound which was connected to the perception the Yugoslavs had of their own culture. It was already in 1948 that the British wrote about "[t]he problems of ,cultural inferiority in Yugoslavia".⁷⁰⁵ A year before, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito attempted to challenge such a view of Yugoslav culture by asserting that the West was

⁷⁰¹ Kojić Zorica, Ambrozić Dragan. "Intervju Aleksandar Živković: Čuvar džez plamena," October 25, 2021, <https://nova.rs/kultura/beogradski-jazz-festival-aleksandar-zivkovic-razgovor/> (last accessed on February 15, 2022) (hereinafter, "Kojić, Ambrozić, "Čuvar džez plamena")

⁷⁰² McBride interview, 34.

⁷⁰³ "Savremena muzika i mi (razgovor s Milkom Kelemenom vodi Ljiljana Ivanović)," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija* 1, 1977, 52.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁵ Spehnbjak, "Propaganda prije svega," 131.

continuously portraying the Yugoslavs as "uncultured, 'undeveloped', 'that they don't have a real language'" while the Yugoslavs had "defended themselves and the Western civilization for 500 years and that is why they did not have time for literature."⁷⁰⁶ The Americans, who suffered from the same wound, mentioned this Yugoslav wound too. In a despatch from April 28, 1955, American officials wrote how the United States was still seen by the Yugoslavs as an affluent country with no culture. The Yugoslavs, continued the Americans in the same despatch, were prone to such beliefs as they "are suffering from an acute inferiority complex".⁷⁰⁷ In his 1977 interview Milko Kelemen challenged this view, which was still widely held in some parts of Yugoslavia, and posed a question as to why it would not be possible to present something staged in Paris or London in Yugoslav cities such as Zagreb, Belgrade and Ljubljana in an era "when Yugoslavia has a musical culture that is developing in parallel with other great cultures." This was one of the aims of his Biennale, as the composer further stated in his 1977 interview. In the same interview, Kelemen issued a call to all Yugoslav composers to develop better awareness, become more confident, overcome the feelings of inferiority and "frustration" and become "cockier, more arrogant. Because the world arena is very bloody. It implies an unfair battle in which we must get engaged."⁷⁰⁸

Working in line with another objective of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, Milko Kelemen had seen his "Muzički Biennale Zagreb" as a branding instrument that further promoted Yugoslavia's music abroad. As evident from his 1977 interview, Kelemen was of the opinion that the Yugoslavs did fairly little to promote their music abroad and noted how his Biennale served as a means to promote Yugoslavia's music in foreign countries as some of the compositions performed on the Biennale were later broadcast on numerous foreign radio stations. Foreign agents, most notably representatives of record companies and radio stations and publishing house directors, as Kelemen continued in the same interview, attended his festival and gained insight into Yugoslav music. He further advocated for other measures to promote Yugoslavia's music abroad because "... now is the time when [we] can fight more in the cultural arena than before" as "Yugoslavia has considerable international reputation and is being talked about everywhere".⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁶ "Cultural Policy of Yugoslavia," prilog izvještaju od 13.IV. 1949, 23 quoted in Spehnjak, "Propaganda prije svega," 131.

⁷⁰⁷ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, no. Tousi 35, April 28, 1955, 7, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁷⁰⁸ "Savremena muzika i mi (razgovor s Milkom Kelemenom vodi Ljiljana Ivanović)," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija* 1, 1977, 52.

⁷⁰⁹ "Savremena muzika i mi (razgovor s Milkom Kelemenom vodi Ljiljana Ivanović)." *Zvuk: jugoslovenska*

As demonstrated by this subchapter, through their activities and cultural manifestations, these agents acted on behalf of the Yugoslav state in the international cultural arena. As the next subchapter reveals, they were also active agents in Yugoslavia's branding strategy as they employed strategies designed to maintain and grow the audience for jazz diplomacy between their state and the United States. They were, in a sense, active "creators" in building the second brand ambassador of Yugoslavia – the Yugoslav audience.

2.4. Partner no. 2: the Yugoslav audience

At the Plenary Meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries held on January 16 and January 17, 1956, its vice chairman Ivo Frol stated the importance the Yugoslav audience had in Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy. As Frol commented on the aforementioned meeting, the previous year several significant, high quality foreign presentations appeared in Yugoslavia. The news of the appearances of such attractions in Yugoslavia, continued Frol, spread beyond the country's borders and "whet the appetite" of other countries for cultural performances in Yugoslavia. As Frol put it, "one pulls the other". The success of these performances in Yugoslavia and their reception by the Yugoslav audience, stated Frol, signalled to the world "that the Yugoslav public was mature enough for such a reception and for such high quality manifestations."⁷¹⁰ Put in other words, the Yugoslav cultural diplomatic package that was to serve the "independent Yugoslavia" brand included an "outstanding" audience as the second "brand ambassador".

It was because of a "warm welcome, understanding and recognition" that, wrote a document signed by Krista Djordjević in 1957, even the most prominent foreign artists liked to visit and perform in Yugoslavia.⁷¹¹ On the first hand, this assessment may seem slightly far-fetched. This notion is amplified by archive materials that provide examples of more sober-minded voices in the Yugoslav cultural arena that gave a much more realistic assessment of the status of Yugoslav culture. For instance, on the Plenary meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in January 1956, Lepa Perović commented on the desire of numerous Yugoslav artists to go abroad and noted the low quality of some Yugoslav theaters that still thought rather highly of themselves. She gave credit to such institutions for putting in the hard work but, nonetheless, stated how "[a] person has to feel appaled when one hears how members of specific theaters feel about their shows."⁷¹² In 1968, another member of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Breda Cajhen, also commented on a rather too grandiose assessment of Yugoslav cultural performance in Western Europe.⁷¹³ If someone asked, continued Cajhen, a person from France, Belgium or West Germany a question on the

⁷¹⁰ AJ-559-18-37, "Stenografske beleške. Plenarni sastanak... 16. i 17. januara 1956. g.," 8. Comment by Ivo Frol.

⁷¹¹ AJ-559-12-27, Krista Djordjević, "Godišnji izveštaj Muzičko-pozornišnog sektora za 1957 godinu- Opšti deo," 1.

⁷¹² AJ-559-18-37, "Stenografske Beleške. Plenarni sastanak ... 16. i 17. januara 1956, 87. Comment by Lepa Perović.

⁷¹³ AJ-559- 34-75, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 4. juna 1968, 67-68. Comment by Breda Cajhen.

presence of Yugoslavia on that market, their response would greatly differ from the Yugoslav one. She further noted how she kept abreast of West German cultural news and noted how these news mentioned a Yugoslav artist or an ensemble maybe two or three times a year. Yugoslav logical correctness on their cultural performance abroad was fine, so continued Cajhen, but she simply felt that it would not hurt the Yugoslavs to be a little less optimistic when assessing their performances abroad.⁷¹⁴

However, archival documents suggest that we cannot completely discard the view stated in the 1957 report signed by Krista Djordjević as simply a Yugoslav daydream on the self-imposed value attached to their audience. Metropolitan opera singer Eleanor Steber described the audience in Yugoslavia as having "extremely advanced" taste which made it much easier for "[m]odern works" to be "easily received here". It were regular people, according to Steber, that attended these concerts and there were plenty of music aficionados in the country. The Yugoslav audience, continued Steber, "was able to differentiate and, for them, enjoying music was a precious expression of freedom."⁷¹⁵ One Yugoslav newspaper shared the thoughts on the Yugoslav audience by a member of the *Porgy and Bess* cast, James Murray, who portrayed the fisherman. When asked about the Yugoslav audience, according to *Globus*, "[i]nstead of answering he [Murray] kissed the tips of his fingers."⁷¹⁶

These couple of examples demonstrate that the Yugoslavs were not entirely wrong when they described their country in 1957 as a magnet that attracted the arrival of foreign artists. The Yugoslavs considered this high quality of the Yugoslav audience a result of their own activities in this field.⁷¹⁷ As was stated in an article in the musical magazine *Savremeni akordi* that detailed Belgrade's concert life in 1954, the activities undertaken by the concert subsidiary of Serbia, the Belgrade Philharmonic, its subscription services and other activities, in addition to the activities of other organizations all "expanded the circle of the existing musical audience and brought in new visitors into concert halls."⁷¹⁸ The main concert agency of Yugoslavia, Jugokonzert, was also honor-bound to build "a new concert audience", as evident from a comment made by a member of the Executive Board of this Agency on a meeting held on April

⁷¹⁴ AJ-559- 34-75, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 4. juna 1968, 68. Comment by Breda Cajhen.

⁷¹⁵ "O jugoslovenskoj muzici Ivan Petrov... i Eleanor Steber," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija*, 4-5, 1955, pp.213.

⁷¹⁶ *Globus*, December 18, 1954 quoted in Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tosi 35, April 28, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁷¹⁷ This Yugoslav behavior is indicative of a process which occurred in other European countries as written by Klaus Nathaus who noted how the audience was taught how to behave during concerts from the nineteenth century. See, "Music in Transnational Transfers and International Competitions," 37.

⁷¹⁸ B. Stančić, "O koncertnom životu Beograda u 1954," *Savremeni akordi*, Godina II, broj 2-3, 1955, 48.

30, 1956.⁷¹⁹ According to the assessment of Yugoslav bodies, it appears that the time and efforts spent in this endeavour had not been in vain. It was stated in 1957 that a much more common sight in concert halls had been the presence of a younger audience which was the result of musical education of this specific segment of the audience through numerous activities, organized by both Jugokonzert and other Yugoslav organizations, in addition to festivals and seminars. It was this audience, according to the 1957 report, "that follows the performance with understanding and enthusiasm". Therefore, as the report signed by Krista Djordjević briefly summarized, "foreign musicians rightfully point out that the Yugoslav audience is one of the best and that each musician is honored to perform for it."⁷²⁰

The same stance was adopted for popular music. During the April 30, 1956 meeting of the Executive Board of Jugokonzert, one board member stated that the Agency, in addition to the general audience, should focus "on the audience that attended concerts of popular music". This Board member proposed that the concert agency uses programs and events with "quality popular music" to educate the Yugoslav public and "secure the new concert public."⁷²¹ The results seem to have been delivered. When Dizzy Gillespie performed in Yugoslavia, one local review praised the exemplary behaviour of the Yugoslav audience. As stated in *Republika*: "Even though the interest was great... we can say that the Belgrade public passed the test. There was none of the wildness nor the incidents which occurred in some parts of the world on similar occasions. Our public proved that as attractive as this type of music was, an uncultured occurrence was not necessary..."⁷²² Put differently, Yugoslav cultural bodies had seen their audience, which displayed civilized behavior even when the music in question was jazz, as another "unique selling point" of the country. A March 1, 1957 exchange between the Yugoslav Information Center in New York and the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries suggests that even the American ANTA recognized the high quality of the Yugoslav audience. In connection to the proposed visit of The Glenn Miller Orchestra to Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Information Center passed on ANTA's expressed grievances on the rather meager

⁷¹⁹ AJ-559-114-248, "Zapisnik sednice Izvršnog odbora Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije, održane 30. IV. 1956 godine," 1. Comment by V. Marković.

⁷²⁰ AJ-559-12-27, Krista Djordjević, "Godišnji izveštaj Muzičko-pozorišnog sektora za 1957 godinu- Opšti deo," 2.

⁷²¹ AJ-559-114-248, "Zapisnik sednice Izvršnog odbora Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije, održane 30. IV. 1956 godine," 1. Comment by V. Marković.

⁷²² *Nedeljne Informativne Novine*, translated excerpt in Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Visit of President's Fund/ANTA-sponsored Jazz Musician Dizzy Gillespie and Band to Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, no. Tousi 12, August 1, 1956, 2-3, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, 032 Fraenkel, G.S./4-1559 THRU Gillespie, Dizzy/10-3157, box 103, NARA.

earnings by American artists in Yugoslavia and their expressed desire for the Yugoslavs to improve this element of the Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy.⁷²³ The Yugoslav Information Center, not in any way engaged in the organization of the proposed visit of The Glenn Miller Orchestra, responded to ANTA's requests by making it clear that such attractions were also a "financial loss" for the Yugoslavs.⁷²⁴ Still, this document contained complimentary words about the Yugoslav audience. It was stated how "[a]rtists love to go to Yugoslavia because the audience is first-class and the reception always the best".⁷²⁵

The audience was not just another "unique selling point" of the overall Yugoslav branding strategy. It was also a vital ingredient of the Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy as a collaborative branding strategy. American musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier makes clear the importance of the foreign audience for the Americans and their Cultural Presentations Program. As she writes, American music diplomacy during the Cold War was heavily dependent on foreign citizens' cooperation.⁷²⁶ Fosler-Lussier's observations echo the explanation of political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. who noted how soft power, to reiterate from previous chapters, even more so than hard power, was reliant "upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers."⁷²⁷ Applying this observation in practice, the Americans needed the Yugoslav audience both as customers for their individual cultural product (jazz) and as customers for jazz diplomacy as a branding instrument. This is evident from an airgram sent from the American Embassy in Belgrade to the State Department on March 10, 1966 in which they explained the importance of investing into Bled Jazz Festival. First, in branding terms, investment into this festival provided the Americans with the ability to retain existing jazz customers. In the March 10, 1966 airgram, the Americans wrote how not a lot of American jazz musicians toured Yugoslavia and, in order not to have the number of jazz fans plummet further, the airgram wrote how "it will surely be necessary to find some way to correct this lack of stimulating first-hand exposure to what is best in contemporary American jazz scene."⁷²⁸ Secondly, this festival allowed them to provide a solution to the problems of jazz diplomacy as

⁷²³ AJ-559-133-284, Vilko Vinterhalter, "Gostovanje američkih umetnika," Yugoslav Information Center Komisiji za kulturne veze s inostranstvom, March 1, 1957, 2.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

⁷²⁵ Ibid.

⁷²⁶ Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 6.

⁷²⁷ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 16.

⁷²⁸ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Bled Jazz Festival," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-711, 10 March 1966, 2, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library.

a branding instrument. The March 10, 1966 aigram continued how it was up to both the State Department and the American Embassy to confront the reality that the best American performers "are priced out of the market for commercial appearances in Yugoslavia". Bled Jazz Festival, so it was continued in the same aigram, provided them with "an excellent point of departure, where a relatively modest expenditure can yield significant returns."⁷²⁹ Third, Bled Jazz Festival clarified the targets of their branding instrument. Bled Jazz Festival, as the March 10, 1966 aigram explained, was not really attractive to foreign tourists but it was to Yugoslav jazz fans. This category, so the same aigram continued, included a substantial number "of young professional men and women and the importance of contact established with this element is obviously great."⁷³⁰ Lastly, Bled Jazz Festival was important for the branding instrument itself. The March 10, 1966 aigram further suggested that the Americans improve "the quality of American participation" at Bled Jazz Festival "in order to give impetus to the survival of jazz as a main cultural influence in Yugoslavia".⁷³¹

Unfortunately, from a market research perspective, the examined materials do not provide us with enough information to outline the key features of a basic jazz consumer targeted by both Yugoslav and American agents in their jazz diplomacy. In the early 1950s, both sides situated a typical jazz consumer in the "youth" category. In a June 23, 1951 despatch, the American post in Belgrade wrote to Washington that those most interested in jazz in Yugoslavia were the youth.⁷³² Discussions on the worrisome impact of Western music, led by Yugoslav party leaders from 1952 to 1956, revolved around its influence on the Yugoslav youth.⁷³³ A survey on the musical preferences of a selected sample of the Yugoslav audience published in a musical magazine *Savremeni Akordi* in 1955 is perhaps the closest thing to a Yugoslav market research analysis on jazz. Whether or not Yugoslav students at universities took any interest in music and the extent of that interest was the subject of a survey conducted by a Yugoslav music magazine *Savremeni akordi* via an interview on the subject group of 250 students at Belgrade's universities.⁷³⁴ The age of the participants in this survey corresponds to American projections of the age range of typical Yugoslav listeners of jazz made in an 1965 analysis of the radio in Yugoslavia and its audience which was conducted by the Research and Reference Service of

⁷²⁹ Ibid.

⁷³⁰ Ibid, 3.

⁷³¹ Ibid.

⁷³² Bruce Buttles, "USIS Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending May 31, 1951," Foreign Service of the United States of America from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. 1005, June 23, 1951, 511.68/6-2351, 7, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-1954, b 2472, NARA.

⁷³³ Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 17.

⁷³⁴ Zoran Karanikolić, "Anketa: Naši studenti i muzika." *Savremeni akordi*, Godina II, broj 4-5, 1955, 84.

USIA. This analysis wrote how the most frequent listeners to jazz belonged to the age range from 17 to 19 and from 20 to 27 while those above the age of 27 showed little interest in jazz.⁷³⁵ The results of the Yugoslav survey in 1955, among other responses, demonstrated that the majority of the survey participants attended concerts at least three times a year with the majority of them attending concerts of foreign artists. The students gave no straightforward responses as to what exactly attracted them to a specific type of music which the author of the article in *Savremeni akordi* attributed to the inability to identify "... appropriate musical terms and problems with describing the thing [the effect] a specific type of music produces on the listener." Many students, continued the *Savremeni akordi* article, could not determinately state whether their preference lied with serious, popular or folk music. Others, as further stated in the same article, choose jazz, serious or folk music. Students stated, as continued in *Savremeni Akordi*, that they listened to jazz music because they "think they feel nice when listening to it."⁷³⁶ The Yugoslav students thus connected an emotion to jazz which provides a positive base for branding given that branding, as we have already seen, relies on having an emotional connection to a specific product.

Jazz critic Svetolik Jakovljević and American jazz musician Tony Scott provide further information about a shared and important market segment for American-Yugoslav musical interaction. In the May 1960 edition of Yugoslav magazine *Duga*, Svetolik Jakovljević tried to provide an account of a typical Yugoslav jazz fan. Jakovljević noted how a similar analysis had been done by "Jazz Magazine" which generated a representation of a typical jazz fan in France. He then noted the limits of his analysis by writing how it was based on observation as statistical data, present in the French case, was not available for the Yugoslav case.⁷³⁷ Jakovljević's analysis focused a lot more on the Yugoslav environment that was, due to a lack of jazz concerts, jazz records and bars where jazz music could be listened to live alongside rare visits of foreign jazz musicians, not a particularly fruitful one for jazz.⁷³⁸ American jazz musician Tony Scott provided a similar portrayal of the conditions for jazz on the Yugoslav cultural market. Scott wrote to readers of American jazz magazine *Down Beat* how he spent three weeks

⁷³⁵ Research and Reference Service, "Radio in Yugoslavia and its audience," R-13-65, February 1965, 17, RG 306 United States Information Service, Entry UD-WW 144, box 34, NARA.

⁷³⁶ Zoran Karanikolić, "Anketa: Naši studenti i muzika." *Savremeni akordi*, Godina II, broj 4-5, 1955, 84.

⁷³⁷ Svetolik Jakovljević, "O našem ljubitelju džez," *Duga*, Year XVI, no. 752, May 1, 1960, 36, Series 1: Voice of America, 1954-1996, Sub-Series 5: Travel; jazz festivals and concerts, folder 3, box 1, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*

on tour of Yugoslavia in 1957 which was not sponsored by the State Department.⁷³⁹ It was on this tour that Parker spontaneously composed his most in-demand piece, "Blues for Charlie Parker".⁷⁴⁰ In a recap of his visit to Yugoslavia, Scott noted the lack of contacts between Yugoslav and American jazz musicians, even though Yugoslav musicians stated their deepest desire to hear American jazz musicians perform live. He further wrote how Yugoslav musicians informed him that they listened to Voice of America's jazz broadcasts and were able to receive jazz records from other countries, even though record companies had no subsidiaries in Yugoslavia. Many of Yugoslavia's fans of jazz came from the ranks of engineers, doctors and the likes who played jazz in their spare time due to, as Scott clarified, Yugoslavia experiencing great losses in the war which required these jazz fans to enter universities to obtain necessary vocations to help rebuild their country. However, Scott noted that there was great love and desire for jazz among these fans and they gave their support for this type of music in numerous ways. Scott then called on the readers of *Down Beat* magazine to send jazz records to the Croatian Jazz Music Composers Society.⁷⁴¹ The information provided by these three sources demonstrated that jazz, as a product, could work as a branding instrument on the Yugoslav market.

As a branding instrument, jazz could also work internally as the Yugoslav political leadership opened up this segment of the Yugoslav market for reception of this specific product. As scholars Marta Rendla and Aleš Gabrič noted, in the early 1950s, Edvard Kardelj publicly acknowledged that the socialist system was not anathema to having fun nor should the Yugoslav audience be deprived of products such as jazz.⁷⁴² Externally, as historian Dean Vuletic noted, the Yugoslav Communist Party was acutely aware of the fact that the acceptance of popular music as one element of their "soft power" did good for the Yugoslav brand as it not only satisfied domestic customers,⁷⁴³ it also distinguished their brand from other Eastern European brands.⁷⁴⁴ However, this acceptance of jazz did not mean that there weren't here and there attacks on jazz in the Yugoslav public arena. One such instance was the already widely documented Tito's 1953 attack on jazz that historian Radina Vučetić interprets as not so much

⁷³⁹ Tony Scott, "An Open Letter to 13 People," *Down Beat*, Vol. 25, No. 15, July 24, 1958, 45. [hereinafter, "An Open Letter to 13 People"]

⁷⁴⁰ Margalit Fox, "Tony Scott, Jazz Clarinetist Who Mastered Bebop, Dies at 85," *The New York Times*, March 31, 2007. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/obituaries/31scott.html> (last accessed on February 28, 2023)

⁷⁴¹ Scott, "An Open Letter to 13 People," 45.

⁷⁴² Gabrič, "Izganjanje jazza iz slovenske glasbene scene po drugi svetovni vojni," 298-299; Rendla, "Džez v Slovenij kot subkultura," 166.

⁷⁴³ Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 19.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

connected to music but more a result of Tito showing off, for Kremlin' sake, his allegiance to Communism.⁷⁴⁵ The Americans, on the other hand, interpreted the same anti-Western attack as being demonstrative of "Yugoslavia's anomalous position as a Communist country, economically and military dependent on the West, and therefore unable to isolate itself from western ideas."⁷⁴⁶ Another documented attack on jazz by Josip Broz Tito occurred in 1963 and it was at that time that, as the Americans reported, "Sarajevo radio was warned to stop playing jazz versions of Bach and other masters".⁷⁴⁷ In a nutshell, these instances demonstrated how the Yugoslav market functioned. Yugoslav-American political collaboration, so wrote Yugoslavia's diplomat Leo Mates detailing one such instance, functioned in a manner in which the United States was not always on board with the prevalent situation in Yugoslavia while Yugoslavia could not pass on the opportunity to critique the comportment of the United States on the world stage.⁷⁴⁸ The "demand and supply" of the Yugoslav cultural market functioned in a similar way. As the Americans rightfully predicted in March 1952: "acceptance of Western cultural projects carried on within the country may be expected to follow a cyclical pattern, in which IIA activities will come up against varying degrees of official or political opposition."⁷⁴⁹ However, the Yugoslav market also allowed the Americans to run counter-campaigns, as evident from the American reaction to Tito's 1963 campaign. This reaction was a request for Washington to send to the country "specialists", namely "several outstanding creative personalities to obtain maximum impact among Yugoslav artists, cultural leaders and students by means of lectures, informal discussions, demonstrations, and other personal contact."⁷⁵⁰ This was a de facto counter-campaign of the Americans that was to, as the document put it, "demonstrate the virtues of freedom of artistic expression under our form of government and help dispel any lingering remnants of the abortive, short-lived campaign, following Tito's return from Moscow in January 1963, which criticized the 'decadent influence from the west' and urged greater Yugoslav emphasis on socialist cultural forms."⁷⁵¹

⁷⁴⁵ Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 175-176.

⁷⁴⁶ Turner C. Cameron, Jr., "Yugoslav Drive Against Western Ideas," FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, no. 8, July 20, 1953, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 41, NARA.

⁷⁴⁷ Alexander C. Johnpoll, "The Campaign for Ideological Conformity in the Cultural Field," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, A-998, March 30, 1963, 3, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, box 1, NARA.

⁷⁴⁸ Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 206.

⁷⁴⁹ Bruce Buttles, "Yugoslav Resistance to Western Cultural Penetration," FSD from Belgrade to DOS, no. 885, March 19, 1952, 511.68/3-1952, 1, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-53, box 2472, NARA.

⁷⁵⁰ Walter R. Roberts, "USIS Yugoslavia Country Plan- Fiscal Year 1965," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 26, September 23, 1964, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 34, NARA.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*

The Yugoslav market or its consumers had little power over a change in the attitude of one of the stakeholders of jazz diplomacy. As the 1950s were coming to an end, the United States of America began changing its policy on jazz diplomacy.⁷⁵² Rock 'n' roll sidelined jazz and took its place in American cultural diplomacy in their attempts to reach the youth.⁷⁵³ The Yugoslav audience followed these trends and, as evident from the visit of The Glenn Miller Orchestra to Yugoslavia in 1957. As the Americans noted in their June 6, 1957 despatch, one of the factors that impacted the reception of this jazz orchestra in Yugoslavia had been the program that, "while basically balanced, did not include one really good 'rock 'n roll' number, which the Yugoslav jazz enthusiasts, like all others, are fantastically eager to hear." The program, continued the Americans, "did not include any of the top hits of the day."⁷⁵⁴

In theory, to reiterate from this subchapter's beginning, the Yugoslav audience was a factor in Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, it had its part to play in the country's cultural diplomacy and Yugoslav institutions and agents had a task of growing the audience that would attend concerts of foreign performers, act as an attractive force for other foreign performers and raise the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international cultural scene. This audience, to reiterate from the earlier sections of this subchapter, also included the audience for jazz. In practice, however, jazz was left to fend for itself on the Yugoslav market. First, there were attempts to prevent jazz from gaining access to the Yugoslav market by performers and composers of classical music, actors who not only had more abilities to gain financial and material means but who also held significant political leverage.⁷⁵⁵ It was only in 1961 that the Federation of Composers of Yugoslavia finally extended its membership to artists of the popular music genre⁷⁵⁶ making it appear that the status of jazz in Yugoslavia was resolved. However, in 1974 Croatian jazz musician Boško Petrović was still publicly calling out the Association of Croatian Composers for not publishing arrangements and releasing records of jazzers such as Miljenko Prohaska, Tomica Simović, Davor Kajfeš, Silvije Glojnarčić and others, even though they enjoyed international reputation and fame.⁷⁵⁷ Indeed, the examined stenographic transcripts of meetings by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries rarely mention jazz as is the case with stenographic transcripts of the Committee for

⁷⁵² Ritter, "Between Propaganda and Public Diplomacy: Jazz in the Cold War," 99.

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁷⁵⁴ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: President's Fund- ANTA TOUR- Glenn Miller Orchestra," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 121, June 6, 1957, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁷⁵⁵ Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 158.

⁷⁵⁶ Vuletic, "The Making of Yugoslav Popular Music," 278.

⁷⁵⁷ Boško Petrović, "Jazz naš svakidašnji," *Večernji list*, no. 4655, September 21 and 22, 1974, pp. 10.

the Performing Arts and Music. The latter mentioned jazz in the context of a disapproval of one member of the said Committee to send a jazz orchestra to perform in the United States.⁷⁵⁸ As evident from the review of the first Bled Jazz Festival, a formal jazz education was not available to jazz musicians in Yugoslavia. This review, published in the musical magazine *Zvuk*, noted how the performance of students of music academies at this particular festival opened "the question of specialized education of jazz musicians". As the review continued, there were no schools in Yugoslavia where musicians could learn how to play jazz and they were "more or less, left to listen to records" which resulted in "copying well-known role models".⁷⁵⁹ Expressed differently, as brand ambassadors jazz musicians were on their own.

As a branding instrument, jazz was on its own when it came to finances too. German historian Rüdiger Ritter noted how it was the Cold War that secured finances for jazz festivals in Eastern Europe that are now, when the funding is gone, barely surviving.⁷⁶⁰ It appears that the opposite situation unfolded in Yugoslavia as state bodies gave very little financial stimulation to Yugoslavia's jazz festivals. American artists such as Eleanor Steber⁷⁶¹ and musicologist Everett Helm⁷⁶² were thrilled that the Yugoslav state offered subsidies to theaters and opera houses, news of which they brought to American readers, recollections of Yugoslav jazz musicians and jazz impresarios, as we shall see below, tell a different story. Bled Jazz Festival, even before its fifth edition, wrote jazz impresario Aleksandar Živković, demonstrated how Yugoslav jazz had been faced with a specific type of crisis which could not be remedied even by the experiments of Miljenko Prohaska, Janez Gregorc and Tomica Simović.⁷⁶³ A rather difficult year for the festival was 1966 when, according to Mladen Mazur, the festival managed to keep its head above water solely because of the hard work and motivation of its organizers. The problems that engulfed Bled Jazz Festival over the years, as Mazur noted, had been "financial problems and a lack of understanding."⁷⁶⁴ Indeed, the American Embassy in Belgrade also acknowledged the increasingly difficult situation of the Festival in 1965 when, according to the March 10, 1966 airgram, it was "not know[n] until the

⁷⁵⁸ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske Beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961, 3. Comment by Pustišek.

⁷⁵⁹ Ivo Petrić, "Prvi Jugoslavenski Jazz Festival," *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija*, 41-42, 1960, 62.

⁷⁶⁰ Ritter, "Between Propaganda and Public Diplomacy: Jazz in the Cold War," 110.

⁷⁶¹ See "Kroz štampu i događaje. O jugoslavenskoj muzici Ivan Petrov ... i Eleanor Steber," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija* 4-5 (1955), 213.

⁷⁶² Everett Helm, "Visitor to Yugoslavia Finds Thriving Musical Activity," *Musical America*, Vol. LXXIX, no. 10, September 1959, 7-8.

⁷⁶³ Aleksandar Živković, "Svež i poletan džez," *Borba*, June 9, 1964, Year XXIX, no. 156, 7.

⁷⁶⁴ Mladen Mazur, "Osvrt na X jubilarni festival jazza „Ljubljana 69’," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija*, 95, 1969, 228.

last moment whether they would be able to hold the event or not." The problem was, so the Americans wrote in the same airgram, the lack of support from tourist agencies in Ljubljana and Bled "which would normally stand to gain from such an event, were niggardly in their support, and failed to take advantage of the opportunity to organize special excursions to Bled from Ljubljana."⁷⁶⁵ Still, regardless of the obvious lack of financial means, American assessment reports on jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States, addressed in more detail in the next chapter, note that Yugoslavia had the audience for jazz. It may not have always been the numbers they had hoped for but the audience did show up for the attractions. These assessment reports, as further detailed in the next chapter, also noted the satisfaction of American jazz musicians with the Yugoslav audience which meant that the Yugoslav audience attracted and managed to fulfill the role assigned to them by the main cultural bodies of Yugoslavia. New musical products may have pushed jazz to the sidelines⁷⁶⁶ but the main suppliers, in this context Yugoslav jazz musicians and impresarios, were working hard to maintain existing customers for this specific product on the turbulent Yugoslav market.

There were several campaigns these agents undertook for this purpose. Sometimes the musicians and impresarios got down on their knees and did the dirty work. This was frankly stated by an exasperated Boško Petrović in mid-1960s when *Večernji List* noted that his Zagreb Jazz Quartet called it quits. As Petrović told *Večernji List* in 1967, around 2 million dinars were necessary to keep Bled Jazz Festival alive. Petrović stated how it was "mission impossible" to actually obtain that sum even though large sums of money were granted to "insignificant events". Petrović continued how "for our concerts we had to put up posters around the city on our own, we rented pianos on our own and so on."⁷⁶⁷ On other occasions, jazz impresarios and festival organizers reacted to the "supply and demand" of the market and went sightseeing in hope of finding a better location for their festival. The case in point had been the organizers of Bled Jazz Festival organizers. As the Americans wrote in their March 10, 1966 despatch, after an especially bad situation in 1965, these organizers began looking for other places to stage the festival where they would gain more support from local bodies. This act, continued the same airgram, secured more support from the Bled Tourist Association. As the Americans further wrote in the March 10, 1966 airgram The organizers also managed to shore up support

⁷⁶⁵ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Bled Jazz Festival," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-711, 10 March 1966, 2, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library.

⁷⁶⁶ Janjetović, *Od internacionale do komercijale*, 131; Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 186.

⁷⁶⁷ M.M., "»Kvartet« se rastaje... Tko u Njemačku, tko u Švedsku," *Večernji list*, God. IX, no. 2340, February 13, 1967, 5.

from the Slovenian Secretariat for Culture.⁷⁶⁸ Indeed, shoring up new alliances was yet another means through which Yugoslavia's "brand ambassadors" attempted to preserve the market and retain the audience for jazz. When Bled Jazz Festival, after running "smoothly" for several years, yet again faced organizational and financial problems in 1972, the festival still managed to pull through, thanks to the help of "Slovenija-Koncert", with only 50 percent of the necessary financial means.⁷⁶⁹ Journalist Vojislav Pantić also wrote how Aleksandar Živković battled local cultural authorities and politicians for funding and recognition of his Newport jazz festival (later Belgrade Jazz Festival) as a cultural manifestation of equal significance to other events held in Belgrade such as BITEF and BEMUS. Pantić further penned down Živković's comment how there was always some sort of an "ideological problem" with jazz and it was only ever afforded secondary treatment by the local authorities.⁷⁷⁰ A similar observation was made by Mladen Mazur in 1969 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Bled Jazz Festival. According to Mazur, jazz in Yugoslavia was not given "necessary attention. Even though we possess a couple of worldwide achievements in this area and, on the European [scale] we are on a solid level, jazz music is in our cultural life a foster-child, only occasionally given small chances and good advice."⁷⁷¹ A lack of financial means, wrote one Yugoslav critic, did not allow Bled Jazz Festival to advance, its audience further shrunk and, in 1974, the festival was "a mediocre international" stage of European performers. Better funding, as the same critic continued, gave other festivals (Newport Jazz Festival/House of Youth (*Dom Omladine*)) better opportunities to book American performers. It was largely thanks to Newport/Belgrade jazz festival scheme that, according to the same critic, Yugoslavia managed to hear "the most prominent names of world jazz."⁷⁷²

In order to keep the branding instrument, jazz diplomacy between their country and the United States, alive, Yugoslav jazz musicians and impresarios also turned to a bit of networking, made possible by the Yugoslav cultural market which encouraged cultural contacts between Yugoslav musicians and their foreign counterparts, as evident from previous subchapters. As Yugoslav newspaper *Borba* noted in March 1966, Yugoslav jazz musicians

⁷⁶⁸ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Bled Jazz Festival," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-711, 10 March 1966, 2, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library.

⁷⁶⁹ Mladen Mazur, "Trinaesti međunarodni jazz-festival „Ljubljana '72", *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija*, 124-125, 1972, 172.

⁷⁷⁰ Pantić, *Beogradski džez festival*, 23.

⁷⁷¹ Mladen Mazur, "Osvrt na X jubilarni festival jazza „Ljubljana 69", *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 95 (1969), 228.

⁷⁷² Ognjen Tvrčković, "Petnaestogodišnjica organiziranog jazza u Jugoslaviji," *Zvuk*, 60.

applied for participation at the the Jazz Festival in Vienna that year, as had other candidates from 18 other countries. Bled Jazz Festival, so continued *Borba*, then sent an invite to future winners of the Festival to perform at Bled Jazz Festival, as had the Jazz Festival in Bologna.⁷⁷³ Bled Jazz Festival's leading man, Mladen Mazur, then forwarded the information on potential American musicians coming to Bled from Vienna to USIS Zagreb believing that it, "might be useful in our [USIS] planning [of] American participation in the Bled Jazz Festival."⁷⁷⁴ The Yugoslavs also had connections to the Graz Jazz Institute whose director, so the Americans wrote in a telegram from April 12, 1966, informed the organizing body of the Bled Jazz Festival of American jazz musicians performing in Graz "and has offered [to] bring them to Bled Festival which opens the following day."⁷⁷⁵ There was a Yugoslav connection to the Graz Jazz Institute. Slovenian jazz musician Janez Gregorc taught there and, for the 1966 Bled Jazz Festival, the ensemble of that institute made up "from high quality musicians" and joined by American trumpet player Randy Brecker performed three Gregorc's arrangements.⁷⁷⁶ Impresarios such as Živković also relied on Yugoslav jazz expatriates to obtain desired performers. It was Yugoslav jazz musician Duško Gojković who served as a link to the performance of American jazz musician Lee Konitz in Yugoslavia⁷⁷⁷ and the Woody Herman Orchestra in 1966 when Gojković called and informed Živković on the availability of the band for booking while the band was on a State Department sponsored tour of Africa.⁷⁷⁸ When Živković managed to secure the performance of Lee Konitz in Yugoslavia through *Dom omladine*⁷⁷⁹, which was an attempt to surmount "Belgrade's dearth of jazz experience", there were only a hundred people in attendance and it was Živković himself who "had to make up the deficit – amounting to half of his monthly salary – out of his pocket."⁷⁸⁰ These were the sacrifices jazz impresarios were making to ensure the product survives on the Yugoslav cultural market. In that direction, they were also no strangers to writing invitations to prominent jazz names to attend their events. Aleksandar Živković wrote to Willis Conover in September

⁷⁷³ "Četrdeset ansambala na festivalu modernog džez u Beču," *Borba*, March 26, 1966, Year XXXI, no. 83, pp. 7

⁷⁷⁴ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Yugoslav Jazz Festival, June 2-5, 1966," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to DOS, no. A-734, 18 March 1966, 1, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

⁷⁷⁵ Elbrick, Incoming Telegram from Amembassy Belgrade to SecState WashDC, no. 1425, April 12, 1966, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

⁷⁷⁶ N. Turkalj, "Završetak bledskog jazz festivala: Svečanost jaza," *Večernji list*, Year VIII, no. 2134, June 10, 1966, 7.

⁷⁷⁷ Pantić, *Beogradski Džez Festival*, 9.

⁷⁷⁸ Kojić, Ambrozić, "Čuvar džez plamena," October 25, 2021.

⁷⁷⁹ Pantić, *Beogradski džez festival*, 9.

⁷⁸⁰ Dan Morgan, "In Europe. A jazz Upswing: Overtures to A Jazz Revival," *The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973)*, November 21, 1971, K1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post.

1972 reminding him of his (Živković's) visit to the studios of Voice of America in February 1971 and their discussion about "jazz in general, as well as the jazz situation in Yugoslavia and Belgrade in particular". In the letter, Živković invited him to take part in the Newport Jazz Festival, noted how the Festival was unable to pay his travel expenses but promised that, once Conover was in Belgrade, the Yugoslavs would "be good hosts and take care of your [local] expenses."⁷⁸¹ This was an attempt to compensate their financial "flaw" by good old hospitality.

In order to retain customers for jazz, Yugoslav jazz musicians and impresarios teamed up with other media in Yugoslavia. Boško Petrović had a show on Zagreb Television.⁷⁸² He also partnered up with the American Consulates' Department for Culture and Press in Zagreb and the city then hosted performances of his BP Convention with jazzers Dexter Gordon and Leo Wright while Radio-Zagreb sponsored the making of a record between these musicians and Prohaska's Dance Orchestra of Radio Zagreb and Petrović's BP Convention.⁷⁸³ In a 1972 interview for Yugoslav media, Aleksandar Živković emphasized the importance of television for his Newport Jazz Festival as this media not only popularized jazz but it also contributed to the visits of these prominent jazz artists to Belgrade. In the same interview, Živković heaped praise on Belgrade's TV I's program and people such as Dušan Mitević, Slobodan Habić, Boško Vučinić and others at Belgrade TV. As he put it in the same interview, "[i]t is their merit that jazz got its public and now we do not have to be afraid of empty halls at jazz concerts."⁷⁸⁴

There were probably many other activities these "brand ambassadors" had undertaken that directly and indirectly benefitted the jazz diplomatic process between the United States and Yugoslavia, recollections of many of them probably fading with the death of many of these musicians. In an interview in 1967, just before he departed Yugoslavia for performances in the United States, Miljenko Prohaska stated that many similar undertakings were simply not written about in the Yugoslav media. Prohaska agreed with the interviewer's statement that his US success was a remarkable one as, to cite the interviewer's words, "America is the homeland of jazz". As Prohaska further stated in the same interview, he was not against the Yugoslav media devoting more attention to some Yugoslav manifestations, but he also believed that the media

⁷⁸¹ Letter from Alexander Živković to Willis Conover, September 1st, 1972, Willis Conover Collection, University North Texas Music Library

⁷⁸² M.M., "»Kvartet« se rastaje... Tko u Njemačku, tko u Švedsku," *Večernji list*, God. IX, no. 2340, February 13, 1967, pp. 5

⁷⁸³ "U četvrtak u Istri: Noć bluesa," *Večernji list*, God. XV, November 22, 1971, no. 3797, pp. 5.

⁷⁸⁴ Dejan Pataković, "The 'Newport '72' Festival from November 7-10," *Politika Ekspres*, February 14, 1972, Transmittal Slip from USIS Belgrade to DOS CU/CP, February 18, 1972, Group II. Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2. Performing Arts, 1950-1980, folder 2, box 73, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

should direct some attention to foreign performances of popular musicians.⁷⁸⁵ This was a public call by Miljenko Prohaska for the Yugoslav media to support the work of these "brand ambassadors".

There was one more element that allowed Prohaska, Živković and other Yugoslav agents to actively pursue their desired cultural activities and engage the Yugoslav audience in the jazz diplomatic process between their country and the United States. As the Yugoslav system worked to the advantage of the American model of music diplomacy, as shown in Chapter One, the "independent Yugoslavia" brand worked in favour of Yugoslav agents too as it allowed them relative independence in the pursuit of their cultural activities. As the next subchapter reveals, it allowed them to "live the brand" of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

⁷⁸⁵ I.J., "Miljenko Prohaska na američkom jazz-festivalu. Ne jedino priznanje!", *Večernji list*, God. IX, no. 2521, 15.IX. 1967., 7.

2.5 The Yugoslav performance of the independent brand

In an interview later in his life, the already mentioned American official Robert C. Haney, commented how the capital city of Yugoslavia "had a very active opera". When the American Secretary of Treasury C. Douglas Dillon was to visit Yugoslavia⁷⁸⁶, the American Embassy, according to Haney, went into preparatory mode. As Haney recalled, the American Secretary of Treasury indicated his desire to get a taste of Belgrade's cultural life. Haney was on his way to the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat to get a basic sense on what would be staged at the time of the Secretary's visit as Haney believed the American Secretary of Treasury could be in the mood for an opera. The available opera on the day of the Secretary of Treasury's visit, according to Haney, was so bland that, years later, Haney could not even remember its title.⁷⁸⁷ As Haney further recalled, the official at the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat "told us, 'It's such a shame. In the old days, you could just tell the opera to cancel the scheduled program and throw in 'Boris Godunov.' But we can't do that anymore."⁷⁸⁸ A discussion on a similar matter took place at a meeting of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music around the same time Haney was running around Belgrade to find a cultural attraction that would satisfy his Secretary of Treasury. The November 23, 1961 meeting of the said Committee revealed the struggle it and other similar Yugoslav bodies went through in the decision-making process on the works to be performed on their stage due to the relative independence of Yugoslav cultural agents. More precisely, as one member put it on the November 23, 1961 meeting, the Committee successfully concludes the cultural exchange process, reaches an agreement with foreign partners, signs cultural conventions only to fail in honoring the said agreement. The specific issue at hand, so continued the same member, were the Yugoslav agents who were not honoring their obligations from the cultural agreement which warranted the performance of pieces (in this case) by Soviet composers, even though the Soviet Union accepted performances of Yugoslav compositions. In fact, so it was further stated by the same Committee member, Yugoslav cultural institutions did not even reply to the Committee's proposal for the performances of such works.⁷⁸⁹ As another member of the Committee stated on the same meeting, this course of action pursued by

⁷⁸⁶ The American Secretary of Treasury arrived to Yugoslavia on July 17, 1960. See Paul Underwood, "Dillon to Begin Yugoslav talks: Arrives in Belgrade Today for 3 Days of Meetings – Tito to Ask Aid Rise," *The New York Times*, July 17, 1960, pp. 9.

⁷⁸⁷ Haney interview, 41.

⁷⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 41-42.

⁷⁸⁹ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961. g., "Comment by Vuljević, 13.; The same problem was addressed by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1963. See AJ-559-21-44, "Izveštaj komisije za kulturne veze za inostranstvom za 1963. godinu," Beograd, decembar 1963, 92.

the Committee had the purpose of ensuring performances of Yugoslav works on Eastern European stages. The Committee, so the same member continued, failed to anticipate that it would be the Yugoslav side that would cause problems.⁷⁹⁰ One member of this Committee identified the main problem. As he stated on the same meeting, the problem was "that cultural-artistic institutions are becoming all the more independent" and are focusing on performances of works that ensure profit.⁷⁹¹ Some members of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music recognized the same issue Haney indirectly recognized too. It was a shift into a new era in the conduct of Yugoslavia's cultural relations where official cultural bodies of Yugoslavia could not force Yugoslav cultural institutions and agents to accept specific performers or compositions. As was bluntly stated by a member of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music, the Committee was now searching for solutions "in a new situation" while simultaneously recognizing how "it was different in the old situation. Today, in this situation, it is harder to command something"⁷⁹² to which another member replied that it was also possible to reach an agreement with Yugoslav cultural institutions.⁷⁹³ Both Haney and the discussion that occurred at the November 1961 meeting of the Committee for Performing Arts and Music recognized how the Yugoslav system "institutionalized" the era of Yugoslav agents "living the brand".

Such behavior had its roots. As some scholars noted, by mid-1950s Yugoslav non-state agents were already heavily engaged in establishing direct cultural contacts with foreign bodies, a practice that caused significant problems for the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries to keep track of all these established contacts as decentralization of cultural relations was already in full swing by then.⁷⁹⁴ Decentralization was both a blessing and a curse, according to the chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries Marko Ristić who noted at a Committee's meeting in December 1953 that decentralization played a huge role in Yugoslavia's cultural relations with foreign countries. A blessing was, as Ristić continued on the same meeting, the independence of Yugoslav agents and institutions to directly establish contacts with foreigners and go abroad on their own while the negative side was that the Committee was utterly clueless about such broad cultural relations and was in no

⁷⁹⁰ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961. g., "Comment by Vučinić, 15.

⁷⁹¹ Ibid., 14. Comment by Vuljević.

⁷⁹² Ibid., Comment by Vuljević.

⁷⁹³ Ibid., Comment by Vučinić.

⁷⁹⁴ Bilandžić Magaš, "Izložba *Sto listova jugoslovenske moderne grafike*," 141.

position to offer suggestions or advice.⁷⁹⁵ On the same meeting, one member of the Committee advocated for "the prevention of activities and trips abroad that are not useful" to which another member replied how this proposition would simply circle back to "centralization". The first member clarified how his proposal was not, in any case, "limiting democratic freedom" but simply asking Yugoslav cultural workers to inform their institutions about their trips abroad.⁷⁹⁶ As this example demonstrates, by December 1953, the Yugoslav system recognized the independence of Yugoslav agents in their cultural interaction with others.

This feature of the Yugoslav system became even more prominent as time passed. From 1961, the "higher" cultural bodies of Yugoslavia would push Yugoslav cultural agents even more in the direction of them pursuing direct contacts and collaboration with their foreign counterparts.⁷⁹⁷ Such thinking on cultural relations was indicative of the Yugoslavs "living the brand" of the most famous element of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand – "self-management". It was Yugoslavia's self-management system that afforded Yugoslav institutions the freedom to make their own choice about establishing contact with foreign countries, according to Dušan Vejnović, then the president of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. As Vejnović continued, this decision, adopted by the Cultural Educational Council of the Federal Assembly in 1966, allowed Yugoslavia to have "in general one of the most liberal systems in the world in terms of cultural politics of collaborating with foreign countries." This meant, so Vejnović continued, that not a single Yugoslav institution was obligated to inform the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries about negotiations "it intended to have with another country."⁷⁹⁸ This technically meant that jazz impresarios such as Aleksandar Živković, Mladen Mazur, Milko Kelemen and other Yugoslav non-state agents were granted the right to "live the brand" of their country to independently pursue and establish a network of connections both within and outside of Yugoslavia that allowed them to organize a number of events that would retain the audience and interest for jazz.

In general, the Yugoslav government stayed on the sidelines in the selection process of jazz performers for Yugoslav festivals and in the decision-making process of American jazz diplomacy in Yugoslavia. Apart from the already mentioned and documented refusal of an

⁷⁹⁵ AJ-559-8-19-20, "Zapisnik sa sastanka Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom održanog 11 decembra 1953 godine," 2.

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁹⁷ AJ-559-34-75, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 5.

⁷⁹⁸ AJ-559-35-76, Stenografske beleške, XV Sednica 2. oktobar 1968., 4, 91. Comment by Dušan Vejnović.

unnamed American artist to perform in Slovenia mentioned in Chapter One, the examined American and Yugoslav archive materials do not suggest hamperings or any type of interferences by the Yugoslav authorities in the Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy in the strictest definition of this process as the arrival of American jazz musicians in Yugoslavia. The only supposed case was found in 1957. American magazine *The Cash Box* brought news in their May 11, 1957 edition that The Glenn Miller Orchestra, on a State Department's sponsored tour that lasted for a month, performed concerts in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland and East Germany but not Yugoslavia. According to the same *The Cash Box* article, Yugoslav officials not only prevented the band from performing in Belgrade, they also did not allow the band to perform at the house of the American Ambassador, U. Alexis Thompson. The article further detailed that "[n]o reasons were given for the shunting of the band's special railway care onto a siding and leaving it there locked for 36 hours minus food, interpreter and heat."⁷⁹⁹ This was clearly an error as Thompson was not an American Ambassador to Belgrade and, in their special June 1957 edition following the tour of the Glenn Miller Orchestra to the aforementioned countries, *Down Beat* identified Czechoslovakia as the country in question.⁸⁰⁰ Problems that followed jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States were of different nature and will be discussed in the upcoming chapters.

Yugoslav cultural bodies responsible for Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy also did not interfere in the stages of the selection process of artists who were to perform at Yugoslav festivals. As noted at the aforementioned November 23, 1961 meeting of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music, the basic concept was that it was not the said Committee that was to set the program of the festival and invite its guests, but that this was a individual decision of the festival. If the Committee had a particular interest in something, so it was continued at the meeting, they would approach the leading people of the festival in question and converse with them about this specific matter. The basic idea, as further stated at the November 23, 1961 meeting, was that the Committee works on "the diplomatic and political sector, to create the atmosphere and the conditions" while the organization of the festival was up to the festival

⁷⁹⁹ "Back from Behind the Curtain," *The Cash Box*, Vol. XVIII, number 34, May 11, 1957, 38, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution.

⁸⁰⁰ Dom Cerulli, "Curtain Parts, Lets McKinley Through," *Down Beat*, Special: Ray McKinley and Band, June 13, 1957, pp. 13-14, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Washington D.C.

itself.⁸⁰¹ Technically, the Committee worked on the larger scale while the festivals were seen as independent agents on the lower scale.

The organizational and selection process politics of Muzički Biennale Zagreb corroborates this theory. Addressing the performance of the American avant-garde composer John Cage at the second Muzički Biennale Zagreb, Croatian musicologist dr. Krešimir Kovačević wrote how the American performer demonstrated "[e]xtreme radicalism in the application of musical expression" and his performance "evoked boisterous mood". The Croatian musicologist then noted how "the seriousness with which this musician performs this pointless ritual is still some sort of documentation of our time", before adding how this was something experts commented on at a discussion on contemporary music trends.⁸⁰² Both Milko Kelemen and American reports confirm that it was precisely Kelemen who invited John Cage. In addition to the tapes to be used to publicize American participants at this event, in mid-April 1963 USIA wrote to the American Embassy in Belgrade that they were also working on providing interviews with American participants at Muzički Biennale Zagreb.⁸⁰³ A month later, the Assistant Information Officer at the American Embassy in Belgrade James D. Conley wrote back to Charles Bergerson, the Chief of the VOA's Yugoslav Service, that the Embassy was opting against submitting the said tapes to Radio Zagreb. As Conley wrote, the Embassy "did not believe it would have been good tactics for us to appear to be pushing the more extreme moderns at this particular time in Yugoslavia", as there was a possibility that the Muzički Biennale Zagreb be cancelled.⁸⁰⁴ The examined materials provide no indication of the reason for the potential cancellation of this manifestation so, at this point, we are only left with the ability to speculate by taking into account available background information. Given the nature of Muzički Biennale Zagreb, its timing and location, one plausible explanation could be that the manifestation found itself in the middle of the crossfire of Tito's 1963 campaign. This campaign called for the cleansing of the arts from all Western influences, targeting republics such as Croatia and Slovenia where such influences "have been widely accepted and imitated" and bringing them back in line with socialism and realism.⁸⁰⁵ While the examined materials do not allow us to get to the root of the said situation, we are able to clarify the role Yugoslav agents had in inviting

⁸⁰¹ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961. g., " 56. Comment by Vuljević.

⁸⁰² Dr. Krešimir Kovačević, "Posle drugog zagrebačkog muzičkog bijenala. Smotra savremenog muzičkog stvaralaštva," *Borba*, Year XXVIII, no. 136, May 19, 1963, 11.

⁸⁰³ Murrow, U.S. Information Agency Outgoing message sent to USIS/Belgrade, April 18, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA.

⁸⁰⁴ James D. Conley to Charles Bergerson, May 17, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA.

⁸⁰⁵ Joseph Godson, "Press Campaign for New Cultural Orientation," Airgram to Department of State from Amconsul Zagreb, no. A-92, March 5, 1963, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA.

performers for the Muzički Biennale Zagreb. As Conley continued in the cited letter, Kelemen and some other Yugoslav actors had been rather successful in arguing "that invitations had gone out, publicity materials had been released, and that the only graceful and face-saving way to deal with the affair was to go on with the show." It was for this reason that the American Embassy in Belgrade was not that keen on getting "too closely identified with people like Cage, Tudor, and, for that matter, Schuller." The Embassy, so Conley continued, decided not to generate publicity "since the Biennale had invited these people".⁸⁰⁶

Milko Kelemen, supported and described by his fellow composers "as a combination *Wunderkind* and *enfant terrible*"⁸⁰⁷ described the performance of John Cage at Muzički Biennale Zagreb as "a minor revolution which, because of its extreme nature, aroused the anger, he said, not only of the Zagreb Communist Party but of the U.S. Consulate as well." According to Milko Kelemen, he had sent the invitation to John Cage as he was "a symbol of the most radical type of freedom in the arts, and not as a representative of contemporary American music." In the end, the Central Committee of the Communist Party opted against taking measures while Kelemen revelled in the fact that "I had given the avant-gardists in Yugoslavia a big boost."⁸⁰⁸ Kelemen's words add credibility to the theory presented above that politics was a potential driving force behind the idea to cancel the Biennale.

It was not just that Muzički Biennale Zagreb, to recite Kelemen, gave "the avantgardists in Yugoslavia a big boost", it also impacted some Yugoslav jazzers too. In the aftermath of the first Biennale, rumour had it that the second edition of the festival might include jazz⁸⁰⁹ and musicologist Krešimir Kovačević listed Zagrebački Jazz Quartet as one of the performers at the 1963 Biennale.⁸¹⁰ The official report of the second Muzički Biennale Zagreb makes no mention of jazz whatsoever.⁸¹¹ Nonetheless, a member of Zagrebački Jazz Quartet Boško Petrović revealed in his autobiography how he attempted to incorporate what he heard at Muzički Biennale Zagreb into some of his arrangements.⁸¹² The same musician later made Biennale's

⁸⁰⁶ James D. Conley to Charles Bergerson, May 17, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA.

⁸⁰⁷ Helm, "Few Fireworks," *Musical America*, Vol. LXXV, no. 11, October 1960, 30.

⁸⁰⁸ Albert E. Hemsing, "Trip by RIAS Officer to Zagreb Music Festival," FM from USIS/Berlin to USIA Washington, no. 59, February 26, 1964, 4, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA.

⁸⁰⁹ F. Pašić, "Posle I muzičkog bijenala grada Zagreba. Uspela panorama savremene muzike. Predloženo da se II bijenale održi u maju 1963. godine," *Borba*, June 14, 1961, Year XXVI, no. 146, 7.

⁸¹⁰ Dr. Krešimir Kovačević, "Posle drugog zagrebačkog muzičkog bijenala. Smotra savremenog muzičkog stvaralaštva," *Borba*, Year XXVIII, no. 136, May 19, 1963, 11.

⁸¹¹ AJ-559-121-258, "Muzički Biennale Zagreb. Internacionalni festival suvremene muzike. Zagreb, 8.-16.5. 1963.," attached to Josip Stojanović Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, no. 2989, Zagreb, 4.VI. 1963.

⁸¹² Boško Petrović with Davor Hrvoj, *Život kao jam session: Boško Petrović – autobiografija* (Zagreb: Menart, 2012), 78.

history when jazz finally made an appearance on this festival. The second Biennale, as noted by a Croatian critic in 1963, demonstrated "the rapprochement between jazz and modern music"⁸¹³, according to the Yugoslav music magazine *Zvuk*, jazz, alongside chanson, made its debut on Muzički Biennale Zagreb in 1973 with the performance of Petrović's band and performances of American jazz pianist Cecil Taylor and French jazz saxophonist and clarinetist Michel Portal.⁸¹⁴

American documents also show how Mladen Mazur and the organizational board of the Bled Jazz Festival also had significant leeway in the selection of performers for this festival. To reiterate, Mladen Mazur forwarded information on performances of American jazz musicians at the Vienna Jazz Festival to USIS Zagreb in order to have them perform at Bled Jazz Festival in 1966.⁸¹⁵ Out of the seven names listed in the American report from March 18, 1966, the Yugoslavs managed to get all but two names to visit and perform at Bled Jazz Festival in 1966. Those American jazz musicians who performed at the 1966 Bled Jazz Festival were Julian "Cannonball" Adderley, J.J. Johnson, Art Farmer and Ron Carter, described by *Borba* as some of the most prominent names in the jazz world.⁸¹⁶ Mazur also managed to get Ted Curson⁸¹⁷, also proposed by the Bled Organizing Committee to perform at Bled in 1966.⁸¹⁸ At this particular festival Curson performed with the Dance Orchestra of RTV Zagreb, led by Miljenko Prohaska and, as one Croatian critic put it, "with four of its own arrangements manifested interesting paths of contemporary jazz, inspired by the heritage of serious contemporary music."⁸¹⁹

Even though it was George Wein who established the Newport Jazz Festival⁸²⁰ and it was through the collaboration of his "Festival Productions" and local sponsorship that the State

⁸¹³ N.T., "Kamo ide naš jazz?" *Večernji list*, God V, no. 1235, July 6, 1963, 9.

⁸¹⁴ Eva Sedak, "VII muzički bijennale – Zagreb, svibnja 14 – 20. 1973.," *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija*, No. 4 (winter 1973), 449.

⁸¹⁵ See Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Yugoslav Jazz Festival, June 2-5, 1966," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to DOS, no. A-734, 18 March 1966, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

⁸¹⁶ "Bledski džez-festival od 2. do 5. juna," *Borba*, Year XXXI, May 28, 1966, 7.

⁸¹⁷ Hugh B. Sutherland, USIS-assisted cultural events: Seventh Yugoslav Jazz Festival," from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 86, June 27, 1966, 1, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, box 347, NARA.

⁸¹⁸ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Bled Jazz Festival," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-711, 10 March 1966, 3, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

⁸¹⁹ Nenad Turkalj, "I pored uspjeha – pod upitnikom," *Večernji list*, God. VIII, no. 2130, 6. lipnj 1966, 5.

⁸²⁰ Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 187.

Department sent Newport Jazz Festival's attractions to Belgrade⁸²¹, Aleksandar Živković firmly considered Newport Jazz Festival, the predecessor of the Belgrade Jazz Festival, to be a Yugoslav product. As Živković clarified in a recent interview, Belgrade Jazz Festival arose out of a series of manifestations organized by the Belgrade Hall of Youth or the Association of Jazz Musicians and the first festival was called "Newport Jazz Festival" due to collaboration "with one of the then most prominent festivals of this kind in the world."⁸²² While the Americans, that is, the State Department, as historian Penny Von Eschen writes, stayed clear of the sponsorship of Miles Davis for Newport⁸²³, had it not been for the Yugoslav agents, the performance of Miles Davies at the 1971 Newport Jazz Festival probably would have not happened. It were Živković and jazz musician Duško Gojković that embarked on a trip to Munich and managed to convince the musician to perform in Belgrade.⁸²⁴ In the upcoming years, Živković would receive payment for sponsorship of their jazz performers by the Goethe Institute and the American Embassy.⁸²⁵ Even though Belgrade Jazz Festival got a Program Committee which oversaw Živković's program when the city of Belgrade became more involved with the Festival⁸²⁶, the above quoted examples still demonstrate how the Festivals were given the right to choose performers.⁸²⁷

Indeed, as the already mentioned American official Edward C. McBride noted, members of the artistic scene in Yugoslavia "asserted, and usually got away with, a fair degree of independence".⁸²⁸ McBride cited the example of Mira Trailović, the leading lady of BITEF, and her desire to stage "Hair" in Yugoslavia. When Trailović decided to stage that musical in Yugoslavia, as McBride commented, she turned to the obvious source that could help her obtain what she wanted. As McBride noted, she approached the American Embassy. Having considered the musical to be "very controversial" and the Embassy wasn't really sold on this "controversy", so McBride continued, the lack of financial means became a good excuse for the Embassy to turn down Trailović's request.⁸²⁹ Mira Trailović was, however, not really discouraged by this setback. As McBride recalled, she managed to stage the play in Yugoslavia. As McBride further commented, "[t]he fact that this woman could not only decide that she

⁸²¹ Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 189.

⁸²² Kojić, Ambrozić, "Čuvar džez plamena."

⁸²³ Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 197.

⁸²⁴ Pantić, *Beogradski Džez Festival*, 19.

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁷ Bojana Videkanić makes the same point for Ljubljana Biennale. See, "Nonaligned Modernism", 10.

⁸²⁸ McBride interview, 29.

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

wanted to do it, but pull it off without worrying about the consequences that the government might sort of close her theater or slam her or do something. She did it, and it was fine." McBride even noted how her "complimented her" for this endeavour.⁸³⁰

In general, McBride noted the impact of intellectuals and artists in Yugoslav society, albeit he saw them as having less influence in the Yugoslav society than had artists in France or Great Britain. Still, continued McBride, the Yugoslav government was aware that such groups existed while these groups, in turn, knew that their academic freedom had limits. This meant, observed McBride, that these artists and intellectuals could not escape punishment if they castigated the Yugoslav system.⁸³¹ McBride's recollections allow us to draw a parallel with the same issue faced by both USIS and Yugoslavia's cultural agents in Yugoslavia. As McBride noted, Yugoslav artists and intellectuals would be in trouble if they crossed the line. However, as McBride continued, "too far was a very murky line."⁸³² Indeed, as we could see from Chapter One in the case of USIS work in Yugoslavia, the definition of "too far" was often stretchable in the Yugoslav context.

The independent behaviour allowed by the Yugoslav system worked in favour of Yugoslav-American jazz interaction as the people who were assigned the roles of "brand ambassadors" by the Yugoslav state were simultaneously the target audience of American cultural efforts in Yugoslavia. From mid-1956, cultural leaders of the country, alongside educators and university students, emerged as the second most important target audience of USIS efforts in Yugoslavia, following Yugoslavia's political leaders and economic experts. Performers, managers, scientists and engineers were the third most important target audience while the youth, workers and peasants came in last.⁸³³ In November 1959, the Americans described those Yugoslavs that came from the artistic world as being "best prepared to listen".⁸³⁴ These cultural leaders of Yugoslavia remain the target audience of American cultural and public diplomatic efforts in the sixties too.⁸³⁵ In general, as the Americans noted themselves, the target audience for American

⁸³⁰ Ibid.

⁸³¹ Ibid.

⁸³² Ibid.

⁸³³ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade/USIA, Tousi 144, June 12, 1956, 8, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁸³⁴ Lawrence S. Morris, "Inspection Report USIS/Yugoslavia," November 20, 1959, Report No. 46, Copy No. 4, 11, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 11, NARA. Carla Konta also recognized the target audience of American public diplomacy and cites this document. See Konta, *Waging Public Diplomacy*, 56.

⁸³⁵ See Walter R. Roberts, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," Field Message 47, January 30, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 20, NARA; Walter R. Roberts, "United States Information Agency. Country Plan for Yugoslavia," FM 89, January 28, 1966, RG 306 USIA, Entry #P 328, container 26, NARA.

informational and cultural programs in Yugoslavia was not a very big one. The Americans were, according to the words of one American official, targeting in Yugoslavia "a small, but extraordinarily significant minority."⁸³⁶ This was nothing out of the ordinary. According to Hand Tuch, a former American public diplomat and USIS official, the United States does not have the financial means to conduct communication with all segment's of the population of a specific country. As Tuch continues, only a part of that population is "interest[ed] in, and have influence over, their government's policies, including its relationship with the United States."⁸³⁷ As American official Edward C. McBride put it, the concept was "to influence people who were in a position of influence and to reach out to those people".⁸³⁸ Put in other words, those that were "somebodies" in Yugoslavia were the targets. And these "somebodies", as we have seen in this subchapter, were afforded a lot of leeway by the Yugoslav system to conduct and engage in cultural relations with foreign countries, the United States included.

This subchapter concludes the section on the Yugoslav part of the story as it revealed the branding strategies, instruments, champions and ambassadors the Yugoslavs set in place to culturally interact with others. Now it is time to move to the actual analysis of jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States.

⁸³⁶ McBride interview, 39.

⁸³⁷ Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, 44.

⁸³⁸ McBride interview, 39.

CHAPTER 3

The independent brand and jazz diplomacy

3.1 A Cultural "Jigsaw-puzzle State": Understanding the Yugoslavs

In mid-1958, Heath Bowman, then a Public Affairs Officer in Yugoslavia, wrote a letter to Gerard M. Gert, an American officer then working in USIA's IAE division⁸³⁹ who arrived to Belgrade in 1960 to assume the post of the Information Officer.⁸⁴⁰ In that letter, Bowman explained the difficulties USIS encountered while trying to conduct an American informational program in Yugoslavia. Upon listing the difficulties and the Yugoslav comportment, Bowman wrote of one specificity of the Yugoslavs "which defy normal reason and logic: [when] their pride is greatly involved, and whenever they get themselves into a trap, they are likely to bull ahead stubbornly, and end up with more than they bargained for."⁸⁴¹ Bowman's colleague Wallace W. Littell confirmed Bowman's observation. Littell served as the Public Affairs Officer in Yugoslavia from 1970 to 1974 and noted how the people of Yugoslavia "have survived occupation of one sort or another and they are very tough, stubborn people."⁸⁴² Observations such as these provided by Heath Bowman and Wallace W. Littell represent an important element in the branding process as these observations demonstrate how American officials tried to make sense of the environment in which they worked and the customers they were to target in this branding process. One of the first steps in branding, so writes Anita Wheeler, is "to understand the organization: its mission, vision, target markets, corporate culture, competitive advantage, strengths and weaknesses, marketing strategies, and challenges for the future."⁸⁴³ Expressed differently, in order for the Americans to launch their program of musical interaction with the Yugoslavs, they first needed to actually understand the Yugoslavs. Put in branding terms, as Catharine Slade-Brooking writes, in order to have an effective brand, one needs to

⁸³⁹ Heath Bowman to Gerard M. Gert, Belgrade, November 17, 1958, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 344, container 107, NARA.

⁸⁴⁰ Gerard M. Gert Oral History interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt, Initial interview date: December 30, 1988, 1, 7, FAOHC, ADST.

⁸⁴¹ Heath Bowman to Gerard M. Gert, Belgrade, November 17, 1958, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 344, container 107, NARA.

⁸⁴² Wallace W. Littell Oral History interviewed by Robert Martens, Initial Interview Date: October 1, 1992, 24-25, FAOHC, ADST.

⁸⁴³ Wheeler, *Designing Brand Identity*, 116.

ensure that the brand "'speaks' to its audience". That is, so Slade-Brooking continues, "[a] designer must understand the consumer in detail – their lifestyle, needs and desires before starting on the creative process".⁸⁴⁴ Such information is obtained through research, that is, as Wheeler writes, "[c]ustomer behavior is observed in everyday life in either a work or home environment."⁸⁴⁵ This is how Bowman, Littell and numerous other American public and cultural affairs officers stationed in Yugoslavia gained information needed to design their cultural and informational programs to fit Yugoslavia and they had done so through the usual method used at that time. As scholar Nicholas Cull wrote, the standard way of doing public diplomacy saw data collection as the job of a public diplomat, namely the press attaché or a public affairs officer, who was stationed in a foreign country, fostered good relations with the intellectual and journalistic elite and got a basic sense of how a nation functioned.⁸⁴⁶ This meant that the observation of the Yugoslavs in their "natural habitat" gave American officials all of the necessary information to decide which products to launch on the Yugoslav market.

Neither Bowman nor Wallace or, as a matter of fact, any other American public and cultural affairs officer in Yugoslavia had an easy job to do, not the least because of the nature of the Yugoslav system. Branding in itself is a difficult process and the Americans were not just branding the United States in Yugoslavia, they were actually working for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand too. This was an extremely difficult task. As Catharine Slade-Brooking writes "... designing for other cultures can be like learning a foreign language; it is not just a matter of grammar – you have to understand the nuances and the etiquette."⁸⁴⁷ Put differently in cultural diplomatic terms, to reiterate the words of Maurits Berger, cultural diplomacy is all about seeing "what makes the other tick".⁸⁴⁸ As demonstrated in Chapter One, the Americans stationed in Belgrade were fully aware of the emotional connection the Yugoslav people had with their independence. While working in the Yugoslav environment, the Americans also became aware of the impact and sway of another emotion on Yugoslavia's independence. When running one of their projects listed under the objective "[to] encourage Yugoslav Independence by U.S. Examples", as the Americans stated in a despatch from Belgrade dated June 26, 1959 wrote, the idea the Americans tried to sell to the Yugoslavs was that the United States especially valued "their distinctive cultural customs (as differentiated from their political practices)". This

⁸⁴⁴ Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 54.

⁸⁴⁵ Wheeler, *Designing Brand Identity*, 120.

⁸⁴⁶ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," 47-48.

⁸⁴⁷ Slade-Brooking, *Designing a Brand Identity*, 60.

⁸⁴⁸ Berger, "Introduction," 3-4.

project, as the same despatch continued, was strongly tied to the issue of reciprocity, namely "to encourage Yugoslav art and musical manifestations in the US, and to play back good comments and increase coverage for them."⁸⁴⁹ It was Yugoslav pride that inspired such American thinking. As the June 26, 1959 despatch continued, Yugoslavia, "[t]his relatively small and new country has ancient pride that dotes on recognition, such pride fosters independence."⁸⁵⁰

Discussions by Yugoslav cultural agents responsible for the country's cultural diplomacy confirm that the Americans were indeed right in their assessments of the driving forces of Yugoslav behavior. As evident from their discussions on Yugoslavia's cultural affairs, these agents made no bones about the fact that pride was the shining star that guided them in their cultural relations with others. For instance, during a meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in January 1956, the then Chairman Marko Ristić stated how the Yugoslav side kept telling the Chinese and Eastern European delegations that Yugoslavia was simply not able to receive all of their offered cultural goods because "we cannot plan such broad relations, because we need to pay attention to our relations as a whole." At the same meeting Ristić also noted that he, "with significant pride", kept saying "no" to the offers of both the Chinese and the Russians that they finance the appearances of their cultural attractions in Yugoslavia. When the Chinese Ambassador insisted that Yugoslavia and his country exchange cultural delegations, Ristić continued the conversation by stating the desire of Yugoslavia not to focus solely on one type of exchanges but instead preferred to add "specific content" to cultural interaction and preventing such interaction from having "a manifestational, almost tourist-banquet-toasting character".⁸⁵¹ In addition, as Ristić continued, he informed the Chinese Ambassador that a significant geographical distance separated their countries and that the Yugoslavs needed to devote particular attention on which activities they were to spend their limited budget.⁸⁵² When the Chinese Ambassador deployed a counter-argument by stating how his country had the financial resources to bear the costs of their cultural attractions, Ristić noted at the said January 1956 meeting how he raised an objection to his argument with the following words: "... just because you are a representative of one big nation, you can understand the pride

⁸⁴⁹ Heath Bowman, "USIS/Yugoslavia Country Plan," FSD from USIS Belgrade to DOS, No. 123, June 26, 1959, 13, RG 0306 USIA, Entry #P 328, container 9, NARA.

⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵¹ AJ-559-18-37, "Stenografske Beleške. Plenarni sastanak ... 16. i 17. January 1956," 62. Comment by Marko Ristić.

⁸⁵² *Ibid.*, 62-63. Comment by Marko Ristić .

of a smaller nation, we cannot accept charity /[I] haven't really told him in these words/, but that it can be reciprocity."⁸⁵³

Twelve years later, the Yugoslavs exhibited similar thinking regarding their cultural interaction with the United States. It was during a meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in February 1968 that one Committee member claimed that programs Yugoslavia had in place with the United States demonstrated "that we did not set things right". There was significant geographical distance between Yugoslavia and the United States and sending promotional materials to that country was a heavy burden to the Yugoslavs, so continued the same member at the same meeting. The Committee member agreed on the necessity to send more materials to the United States compared to other countries but he questioned whether some of those activities took resources away from other ventures.⁸⁵⁴ A portion of the comments made by the above quoted committee member, most notably the part of the need to redistribute a portion of resources to other areas, engendered support from the chairman of the said Committee on the same meeting. The Chairman then commented on the need to establish a specific policy towards the United States before turning his attention to another crucial element in the Yugoslav interaction with that country. When establishing a policy for and with the United States, the chairman noted how it was important that the Yugoslavs do not put themselves in a position in which the Americans are the ones picking up all the costs, even if the matter involved high Yugoslav dignitaries.⁸⁵⁵ In fostering bilateral relations with a country as large as the United States, the idea was, continued the Chairman, that "this country [Yugoslavia] still needs to have some [financial] means to ensure the satisfaction of at least a minimum pride in all of that."⁸⁵⁶

It was not just that the Americans got it right regarding the importance pride had for the Yugoslavs and their independence, the Yugoslav behavior in musical interaction between them and the Americans served as evidence that the Americans were also right in their assessment that Yugoslav pride mixed with Yugoslav stubbornness. For instance, as one Yugoslav document from 1957 revealed, a representative of the world renowned American impresario Sol Hurok arrived to Yugoslavia that year. He arrived, so continued the document, for educational

⁸⁵³ Ibid., 63. Comment by Marko Ristić.

⁸⁵⁴ AJ 559, box 24, folder 50 (hereinafter AJ-559-24-50), Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom. "Stenografske beleške: sa sastanka Predsednika Republičkih Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom održanog 29. februara 1968. godine," 138. Comment by Mičković. (hereinafter, "Stenografske Beleške. Sednica 29. Februara 1968")

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid., 147. Comment by the Chairman.

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid., 147-148. Comment by the Chairman.

purposes to discuss American and European performances of a Yugoslav ballet under Hurok's arrangement with the members of the same ballet and members of the Yugoslav agency "Turist-Express". As the 1957 document further stated, the decision of the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations "[a]fter careful deliberations, discussions with experts and responsible factors" was that, if necessary, it would be the Yugoslavs and their institutions who would be preparing their ballet as such a task "cannot be left to some foreign manager or individual."⁸⁵⁷ This was a classic example how of Yugoslav pride got connected to Yugoslav stubbornness as identified by Heath Bowman in the introductory lines of this subchapter.

Observing the Yugoslavs in their natural state also provided the Americans with information on which product to use in order to impact the Yugoslav people to work with them for their mutual goal which was the preservation of the country's independent brand. The Americans did not just choose culture as a branding strategy because of the leniency shown towards it by Yugoslav authorities as demonstrated in the first chapter. Culture was chosen, to refer back to Chapter One once again, because of the customers too as the Americans realized that the Yugoslavs had an innate affinity for music. Indeed, American musicologist Everett Helm told a portion of the American public the same thing in 1960. Helm wrote to readers of *Musical America* in 1960 how "[t]he Yugoslavs are, I observed, an eminently musical nation with a strong, innate gift for melody".⁸⁵⁸ There was also another emotional ingredient that made culture an ideal product through which the United States could interact with the Yugoslavs and use it as a strategy to fulfill their main objective of maintaining the independence of the country. As the Americans noted in April 1958, non-Communists and Communists in Yugoslavia disagreed on many matters that ranged from the perception of their country and its political authorities to the perception of their way of life. Still, as the 1958 document stressed, there were several elements the two sides agreed upon, one being that the Yugoslavs "can be rightly proud of their cultural achievements."⁸⁵⁹ Culture was thus connected to the feelings that served as the driving forces of Yugoslav behavior. This is precisely what a branding strategy does – it looks at the emotions and the needs of its customers.⁸⁶⁰ This is, to reiterate the statement of scholar Maurits Berger, the function of cultural diplomacy too as the key is to find "what makes the other

⁸⁵⁷ AJ-559-12-27, Krista Djordjević, "Godišnji izveštaj Muzičko-pozorišnost sektora za 1957- Opšti deo," 3.

⁸⁵⁸ Everett Helm, "Yugoslavia: a new musical world," *Musical America*, Vol. LXXX, no. 3, February 1960, 172.

⁸⁵⁹ "Yugoslavia, April 1958," 9, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

⁸⁶⁰ Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 42.

tick."⁸⁶¹ As evidence demonstrated by the above listed examples, culture could most definitely get the Yugoslavs to "tick".

A brand strategy does look at its customers⁸⁶², but the branding team also pays attention to the competition present on the specific market.⁸⁶³ It was the competition present on the Yugoslav musical market that also nudged American officials stationed in Belgrade to think in terms of investing in music diplomacy as an instrument to interact with the Yugoslavs. As the Americans stationed in Belgrade wrote in January 1951, American competitors, namely the British, had already been heavily engaged in this type of collaboration when the document in question was drafted. The same document then cited the British model of music diplomacy the State Department could use as a blueprint when considering the idea of funding American attractions to Yugoslavia.⁸⁶⁴ The competition on the Yugoslav cultural market was yet again quoted by the Americans stationed in Belgrade on August 26, 1954 as a reason behind the necessity of USIA to step up the American cultural game in the area as the British and the French, so wrote the aforementioned document, had "consistently been stealing cultural spotlight with top ranking performers and where "normalization" relations with [the] Soviet bloc presents [a] possibility [to] review USSR offensive on artistic front." The British and the French, continued the report, notched up successes with their cultural attractions while the United States lagged behind due to limited resources.⁸⁶⁵ As the Americans wrote in an April 28, 1955 despatch, the issue the United States faced in Yugoslavia was the need to send only the best of their performers to Yugoslavia because if they didn't, and this was a problem that didn't bother the British and the French on the account of their long tradition of sending their performers to Yugoslavia unlike the relatively unknown American culture, the Yugoslavs would perceive the unsuccessful American artist as a representative of American culture. In return, the Americans continued to muse in the April 1955 document, this would only support the assertion that the United States "has money and no culture". Unlike the British and French whose long tradition of performances in Yugoslavia afforded them the luxury of Yugoslavs seeing one of their unsuccessful artists as the exemption rather than the rule, the United States

⁸⁶¹ Berger, "Introduction," 3-4.

⁸⁶² Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 42.

⁸⁶³ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁸⁶⁴ Margaret Glassford, "Musical Activities in Yugoslavia," Foreign Service of the United States of America from Belgrade to DOS, no. 521, January 13, 1951, 511.68/1-1351, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA. Konta also noted that the Americans used the British example to advocate for music diplomacy with the Yugoslavs. See Konta, *Waging Public Diplomacy*, 211-212.

⁸⁶⁵ Kolarek, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to USIA, Tousey 23, August 26, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

had no such luxury, continued the April 28, 1955 despatch. The Americans heaped partial blame for the desire of the Yugoslavs to see the Americans as uncultured on the Yugoslavs themselves, but still wrote in the same April 28, 1955 despatch how such sentiments would disappear if the Americans sent an excellent performer on the account of a rather general "pro-American" sentiment of the Yugoslav population.⁸⁶⁶

In the entire cultural diplomatic process and the use of culture as a branding strategy, American agents noted the high cultural level of Josip Broz Tito's country and its brand ambassadors – the Yugoslav audience. American officials stationed in Belgrade noted the high quality of the Yugoslav audience before the advent of the Cultural Presentations Program. As Americans stationed in Belgrade wrote to the State Department in mid-December 1952, "the cultural standards in much of Yugoslavia, particularly in the metropolitan areas of Croatia and Slovenia, are far more sophisticated than might be expected." The document continued with a caution that "... it would be unwise for the United States, especially in the field of music, to send to Yugoslavia anything less than its best examples of cultural achievement."⁸⁶⁷ When "Bess" from "Porgy and Bess", that is Gloria Davy, performed in Zagreb in the role of "Aida" at the Croatian National Theatre on June 12, 1957, a performance that earned considerable praise from the Yugoslav press, USIS Zagreb wrote back to USIA to suggest that she, at that time performing in Yugoslavia on a private tour, be considered for state sponsorship under the Cultural Presentations Program given her success "in this city [Zagreb] of sophisticated musical taste".⁸⁶⁸ Additionally, the assessment report of the successful performances of the Modern Jazz Quartet in Yugoslavia also noted that this group was Cultural Presentations' Program material.⁸⁶⁹ Perhaps the best testament of the high quality of the culture of Yugoslavia and what it meant for the Americans to succeed here was provided by American humorist Art Buchwald who, according to the *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, told Robert Breen, the producer of *Porgy and Bess*, that "[t]hey loved you in Zagreb and that means they'll love you anywhere."⁸⁷⁰ These examples

⁸⁶⁶ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tousey 35, April 28, 1955, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, box 91, NARA.

⁸⁶⁷ Bruce Buttles, "IIA Semi-Annual Evaluation Report: Yugoslavia Period Ending November 30, 1952," 31, FSD from Belgrade to DOS, no. 461, December 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, 31, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

⁸⁶⁸ Corrine Spencer, approved by Joseph C. Kolarek, "Performance of Gloria Davy, as Aida in Zagreb," FSD from USIS, Zagreb to U.S. Information Agency, Washington, Tousey 1, July 1, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁸⁶⁹ Robert C. Haney, "The Modern Jazz Quartet Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, no. 91, June 29, 1960, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, NARA.

⁸⁷⁰ "Porgy in Zagreb," *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, December 18, 1954, Gershwin Collection- Scrapbooks of George and Ira Gershwin, Item 23 through Item 24, Microfilm 93/20013, Reel no. 9, Feet 56, Library of Congress, Washington DC.

illustrate that the second Yugoslav "brand ambassador", the Yugoslav audience, did their duty and achieved their assigned tasks.

On the other hand, the Yugoslavs held a slightly different view of their American partners. President Eisenhower's choice to hear compositions by Brahms and Beethoven when his health slightly improved delighted the Yugoslav musical magazine *Zvuk*.⁸⁷¹ The same could not be said about the President's choice of literary works as *Zvuk* noted that the American president requested Wild West stories and police novels.⁸⁷² The country of Dwight D. Eisenhower and his successors was still seen by the Yugoslavs in 1968 as a country that presented itself through entertainment products and less by serious music.⁸⁷³

In addition to the intrinsic motivation of the Americans to use cultural diplomacy as a branding strategy worldwide as stated in the introductory section of this dissertation and Chapter One, in the Yugoslav context, the Yugoslav customers, its market and the American competitors on that same market were all factors which bore an impact on the decision of the Americans to use culture as a branding strategy in Yugoslavia. However, this did not mean that it was an easy task to organize performances of American artists and some cultural events in Yugoslavia. The tours that came under the flag of the State Department were logistic-wise, wrote an airgram sent from USIS Belgrade to USIA in April 1965, "for the Embassy something like the winters in Belgrade – sometimes harder to get through and sometimes easier, but they must be gotten through in any case."⁸⁷⁴ The April 1965 document referred to logistics but, in branding terms, it also spoke about the environment in which the Americans used jazz diplomacy as a branding instrument in support of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. This environment makes up "[t]he visual language of a country" that is impacted by elements such as the culture of the country, its history and geography, its climate and so on.⁸⁷⁵ To a degree, all of the aforementioned elements impacted music and thus jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States. Some Americans were given a glimpse into the state of affairs American officials faced on a

⁸⁷¹ "Vesti i Beleške. SAD," *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija*, no. 6, 1956, 280.

⁸⁷² *Ibid.*, 281.

⁸⁷³ Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Državni Sekretarijat za inostrane poslove. "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 65, Oktobar 1968, Beograd. Arhiv Jugoslavije, 559 Savezna komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, folder 75, box 34; "Izveštaj Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1968. godinu," Beograd, Maja 1968, 75; Arhiv Jugoslavije, 559 Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom. Opšti Materijali. Sednice Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, folder 80, box 36.

⁸⁷⁴ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational & Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Pittsburgh Symphony-Tour Management and Logistical Aspects," Airgram from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. A-942, April 10, 1965, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 34, NARA.

⁸⁷⁵ Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 60.

day-to-day basis in Yugoslavia by musicologist Everett Helm the September 1959 issue of *Musical America*. In this article, Helm noted the diversity, geographical, ethnological and cultural, of the country. Helm further wrote how, beginning with Belgrade, he visited other Yugoslav republics and their capitals, the only exception being Montenegro. According to Helm, Belgrade had a cosmopolitan feel to it and a similar musical scene while Skopje made him feel like "I was between two worlds – Europe and Asia". From Skopje, Helm wrote how he traveled to Zagreb where he felt "that in a couple of hours I had been transported to an entirely different world." Helm further noted how a bit of German was spoken in the city as Croatia was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and how Zagreb resembled an Austrian city.⁸⁷⁶ Zagreb and Skoplje were, according to Helm, culturally stark opposites "that are typical of Jugoslavia today." Helm continued how Ljubljana was similar to Zagreb as it was Austrian in tradition. Helm also noted the similarity between Sarajevo and Skoplje before writing that the former was culturally much more developed due to the Austrian rule that followed the Turkish one. On the other hand, Belgrade, so Helm concluded, "has the fullest musical life and an atmosphere all its own."⁸⁷⁷ Helm's description echoed the 1957 words of Harry R. Beard of *The New York Times* who, writing about the costumes worn by members of "Kolo", wrote how "YUGOSLAVIA is a jigsaw-puzzle state – no less so culturally than it is politically".⁸⁷⁸

When conducting cultural and informational programs in the Yugoslav environment, differences between the Yugoslav republics, according to one American public affairs official, really did show during the negotiation process and he described the dealings of Americans with the authorities of Bosna and Herzegovina as "sort of mid-eastern, Arabic Turkish."⁸⁷⁹ American attempts, for instance, to establish an American center in Sarajevo backfired as two employees "were hounded and harassed and it was quite ugly".⁸⁸⁰ On the other hand, the authorities in Macedonia were easy going and quite direct during the negotiation process.⁸⁸¹ Croatians and the Serbs, according to public affairs officer trainee William Kiehl, were quite different too as the Serbs were initially much more approachable, friendly and open to strangers, which included the Americans, but this was where they drew the line. The opposite was true for the

⁸⁷⁶ Everett Helm, "Visitor to Yugoslavia Finds Thriving Musical Activity," *Musical America*, Vol. LXXIX, no. 10, September 1959, 7

⁸⁷⁷ Helm, "Visitor to Yugoslavia," 8

⁸⁷⁸ Harry R. Beard, "Cultural Activity in Yugoslavia," *The New York Times*, May 12, 1957, 258.

⁸⁷⁹ Wallace W. Littell, interviewed by Robert Martens, Initial Interview Date: October 1, 1992, 25-26, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, adst.org

⁸⁸⁰ William P. Kiehl, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, initial interview date: September 15, 2003, 41, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, adst.org

⁸⁸¹ Littell interview, 26.

Croatians who, according to Kiehl, were initially reserved but became much more open once they got to know somebody.⁸⁸² The Croatians, as Kiehl continued, also shared similar cultural values with Western Europe.⁸⁸³ When a war-torn, not so rebuilt, post-Second World War Belgrade came into his sight, American official Robert C. Haney described how he experienced a "cultural shock".⁸⁸⁴ On the other hand, when he arrived to Zagreb for the Zagreb Fair, he "felt I was back in Europe again."⁸⁸⁵ Haney also revealed that it was neither the Communists nor inadequate housing that were the causes of his anxiety during the early period of his stay in Belgrade. The cause was, as Haney revealed, "that damned music". Yugoslav radio stations played Eastern type music described by Haney as "fit for kola dances, or wailing songs accompanied by unidentifiable strings and insistent percussion."⁸⁸⁶ USIA's Dell Pendergrast shared Haney's view of Zagreb. To Pendergrast, "Zagreb was a beautiful city with a distinctly Central European, Mitteleuropa atmosphere", was not war damaged like some other Yugoslav cities "and retained a lot of the old European charm."⁸⁸⁷ Slovenia was, according to Dell Pendergrast, culturally even more Western and Central European than Croatia. English was widely spoken there, the towns and cities of Slovenia, alongside the people, looked and smelled Western, a feeling that the people of Slovenia nourished, according to Pendergrast. They were quite different from the rest of the people of Yugoslavia, noted Pendergrast, even though they did see Slovenia as belonging in Yugoslavia "and they paid appropriate homage to the political reality of Yugoslav unity".⁸⁸⁸

The republics even differed in their jazz preferences. As a critic wrote in a review of the first edition of Bled Jazz Festival, Belgrade gave the highest while Ljubljana the lowest number of jazz musicians for the festival. Belgrade's forte were the pianists and trumpet players, continued the critic, Ljubljana was, completely on-point technique-wise while Zagreb "gave more of an intellectual, refined, chamber type of jazz".⁸⁸⁹

⁸⁸² William P. Kiehl, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, initial interview date: September 15, 2003, 46; FAOHC, ADST.

⁸⁸³ Kiehl interview, 47.

⁸⁸⁴ Haney interview, 43.

⁸⁸⁵ Haney interview, 44.

⁸⁸⁶ Haney interview, 43.

⁸⁸⁷ Dell Pendergrast interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Initial interview date: June 24, 1999, 17, FAOHC, ADST.

⁸⁸⁸ Pendergrast interview, 22.

⁸⁸⁹ Petrić, "Prvi Jugoslavenski Jazz Festival," *Zvuk*, 41-42, 1960, 63.

The problems stated above also belonged to the category of "where" to brand in the overall "brand strategy"⁸⁹⁰ The American choice of the cities in which to brand was resolved by the Yugoslav customers who were the targets of their campaigns. The peasants, as seen from the recollections of official Edward C. McBride, that pretty much made up the majority of the Yugoslav population were not really the target audience of the Americans.⁸⁹¹ Indeed, this was bluntly stated in the American "Country Plan for Yugoslavia" from June 12, 1956. As American officials wrote in that Plan, neither the workers nor the peasants were seen to be that important "to USIS objectives related to Yugoslav national policy." The same Plan continued how the peasants were pro-American while many workers had just entered "the ranks of the industrial proletariat" and were not so ideologically hard-headed. In fact, so the Plan clarified, many of them had actually been peasants who were still connected to the land and they possessed the same political opinions as those who stayed behind to work on the land.⁸⁹² The same document revealed one other specificity of an important target audience for American music diplomacy. As the June 12, 1956 Plan revealed, there was a significant difference between the youth in Yugoslavia and their counterparts in the Eastern bloc. The former, so the Americans commented in the plan, were not insulated from the outside world as were their Eastern counterparts.⁸⁹³ To reiterate from Chapter Two, this was technically one of the cultural objectives of Yugoslavia in the 1950s, as the country aimed to break its anonymity and become part and parcel of the world cultural scene through educational and cultural collaboration. The youth of Yugoslavia, so the June 12, 1956 Plan wrote, albeit not free of ideological indoctrination of the leading political structure, was still receptive to influences that came outside of their educational and work circles. Furthermore, as the same Plan continued, they were exposed to American films and books, desirous to learn English and captivated by modern American music.⁸⁹⁴ As time passed, this trend only intensified. The already mentioned American official William Kiehl who was in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s, noted that members of *Studentski Kulturni Centar* (Student's Center of Culture) and *Dom Omladine* (Hall of Youth) that collaborated with the American Embassy had the knowledge of the "it" items on the worldwide market "and they were trying to adopt the dress, the look, the lingo, the music, the

⁸⁹⁰ Slade-Brooking, *Creating a Brand Identity*, 41.

⁸⁹¹ McBride interview, 39.

⁸⁹² Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Tousey 144, June 12, 1956, December 28, 1955, 10, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁸⁹³ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Tousey 144, June 12, 1956, December 28, 1955, 10, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

⁸⁹⁴ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Tousey 144, June 12, 1956, December 28, 1955, 10, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

culture, to the point where with a lot of the Yugoslav kids, you couldn't tell the difference between Americans, western Europeans or Yugoslavv [*sic*] young people.. And if they spoke English, you couldn't tell they were from the Eastern bloc, as you might say, or the Eastern part of Europe." As Kiehl further noted, they were keen on being in contact with the American Embassy as well as obtaining stuff from the Americans.⁸⁹⁵ Other potential customers for American culture cultivated similar tastes. For instance, Everett Helm who visited the country in 1959, wrote that one of the most pleasing aspects of his visit to Yugoslavia had been "the amount of interest I encountered in the music and musical life of America and other Western countries, an interest that was genuine and not satisfied by generalities." As Helm continued in the conclusion of this article, the conversations he held with numerous Yugoslav musicians revealed to him "that Jugoslav musicians are remarkably well informed about what is going on in the outside musical world and are determined to keep abreast of new developments."⁸⁹⁶ The renowned American jazz broadcaster Willis Conover saw Yugoslav jazz musicians to be similar to Americans in some instances. When he visited the jazz festival in Prague in 1965, he noted the friendliness of jazz musicians from Eastern Europe and wrote how the Yugoslavs were "[I]ess old-world courtesy, more outspoken (in this sense, more like Americans)." The Yugoslavs had, according to Conover, the "[w]ildest variety of personal characteristics: sophisticated, naïve, jolly, stubborn, abrupt, warm, chich, generous, confident."⁸⁹⁷

The Americans kept their operations running in places where they could find their designated target audience. As an American despatch from mid-September 1954 noted, cities and regions in which USIS could find Yugoslav leaders, both of the government and the Communist Party, were Zagreb, Ljubljana and Belgrade, that is, the republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia.⁸⁹⁸ In the 1956 Country Plan for Yugoslavia, Belgrade was listed as important due to the presence of key officials, Zagreb was seen as the "cultural center" even more so than Belgrade. There were several other Yugoslav cities the 1956 Country Plan saw as significant regional hubs- Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Novi Sad, Subotica, Rijeka, Kragujevac, Niš and Mostar.⁸⁹⁹ For a long time, it were only Zagreb and Belgrade that had an American consulate and the American

⁸⁹⁵ Kiehl interview, 39.

⁸⁹⁶ Everett Helm, "Visitor to Jugoslavia Finds Thriving Musical Activity," *Musical America*, Vol. LXXIX, no. 10, September 1959, 8.

⁸⁹⁷ Willis Conover, "Conover in Europe, Part II: Jazz Today in Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest," *Down Beat*, Vol. 33, No. 2, January 27, 1966, 27.

⁸⁹⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousei 8, September 16, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 344, container 98, NARA.

⁸⁹⁹ Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," 8.

Embassy.⁹⁰⁰ Later on the Americans spread their cultural presence to other Yugoslav cities such as Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Priština and Skopje⁹⁰¹ and then came Podgorica and Kosovo.⁹⁰² It appears that the Americans adapted over time and began "living the [decentralized] brand" of the Yugoslavs. Writing about the presence of USIS offices in five out of six republics of Yugoslavia, the 1977 "USIA Country Plan for Yugoslavia" admitted that "USIS Yugoslavia, like Yugoslavia itself, decentralized its program". This move, so the Country Plan continued, showcased the American "support for an independent, multinational Yugoslavia." Such a decentralized program allowed the Americans, as further written in the said Country Plan, "better access to a broader spectrum of influential audiences than would be the case if we were located only in the capital city" as well as "good contact possibilities among middle and upper echelon academics, editors, professionals and officials on the part of all USIS officer personnel".⁹⁰³

American focus on these three cities did not mean that the Americans and the Yugoslavs didn't try to break into the Yugoslav market through other cities.⁹⁰⁴ As the Americans wrote in a despatch from April 28, 1955, during the visit of *Porgy and Bess*, they witnessed "so much competition and 'jealousy' among the [Yugoslav] republics in the cultural business". The same despatch further noted how both the capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana, and the capital of Bosna and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, "had tried desperately to be included in the tour". However, as the same despatch continued, because of their stages being too small to fit a troupe as large as the set of *Porgy and Bess*, these two cities did not make the final cut.⁹⁰⁵ We find similar attempts to include other cities on the itinerary of jazz tours in later years. Alongside complimentary words for the 1970 Newport Jazz Festival, a youth newspaper from Zagreb, *Omladinski Tjednik*, lamented how Zagreb, compared to Belgrade, heard very little jazz.⁹⁰⁶ Newport Jazz Festival

⁹⁰⁰ Kiehl interview, 41.

⁹⁰¹ McBride interview, 27.

⁹⁰² Kiehl interview, 41.

⁹⁰³ "USIA Country Plan for Yugoslavia," October 17, 1977, 1, RG 0306 U.S. Information Agency, Entry# P 328, box 35, NARA

⁹⁰⁴ Danielle Fosler-Lussier also notes that the Americans sent their performers to smaller cities in different host countries. See "Music Pushed, Music Pulled," 58.

⁹⁰⁵ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, no. Tousi 35, April 28, 1955, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁹⁰⁶ Leonhart, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations: Newport Jazz in Belgrade – Wrap-up report," Airgram from Amembassy BG to DOS, no. A-456, December 10, 1970, 1, Group II CPP, Series 2. Performing Arts, Subseries 1. Performers, box 66, folder 6, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

expanded to Zagreb and Ljubljana in 1973.⁹⁰⁷ When the American band *Blood, Sweat and Tears* arrived to Yugoslavia⁹⁰⁸, Sarajevo's *Večernje novine* proudly declared how the city's agency "Youth and Culture" realized the opportunity to snatch a band whose music was "well-known both to children and to adults." As the same article continued, after entering into negotiations with, among others, the American Embassy, members of this agency managed to secure the band's performance in Sarajevo. However, so the article further wrote, there was only one agent, the Tourist Agency, that was willing to step in and offer a portion of the much needed money to co-sponsor the event. The article concluded how it was "unbelievable that there were no businessmen in this town willing to give the 60,000 N.D. that were needed".⁹⁰⁹ Likewise, in reference to the same band, a critic from Slovenia noted how Zagreb was initially the only Yugoslav city the band scheduled for a performance. Boasting of their triumphant "presentations they [the Slovenes] organized in the recent past", the American Embassy, at that time in the planning stage of the visit of this band, detected this behavior of the people from Ljubljana and *Blood, Sweat and Tears* were on their way to Ljubljana too.⁹¹⁰ A critic for Slovenian *Dnevnik* expressed a slightly different opinion on the context of the performance of the band in Ljubljana's Hala Tivoli. As this critic wrote in the June 23, 1970 edition of *Dnevnik*, he disagreed with the announcer's words that the performance of *Blood, Sweat and Tears* in Yugoslavia brought to Slovenia "the opportunity to hear in Ljubljana a concert of really good music". As the same critic continued, in the past Ljubljana had the opportunity to hear "a number of top level interpreters of all kinds of music". Despite disagreeing with the announcer on this

⁹⁰⁷ Johnson, "Newport Jazz Festival in Belgrade," Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram No. 715, December 28, 1973, 1, Series 2, Subseries 1, box73, folder 2, MC 468, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

⁹⁰⁸ On the band's tour of Yugoslavia, sponsored by the State Department, see Littell, "USINFO on Blood, Sweat and Tears First Concert," Incoming Telegram from Amembassy Belgrade to RUEHIA/USIA Wash DC, No. 1663, June 19, 1970, folder 2; Littell, "Usinfo Blood, Sweat and Tears Tour of Yugoslavia," No. 1860, June 7, 1970, folder 5; Littell, "USINFO – Yugoslavs hail Blood, Sweat and Tears Group in Zagreb and Ljubljana," Incoming telegram from Amembassy Belgrade to USIA Wash DC, No. 1668, June 23, 1970, folder 2; "Blood, Sweat and Tears EE (Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland), June 13-June 8, 1970," folder 4; Dunlop, "Opening Concert Zagreb," Telegram from Amconsul Zagreb to SecState Wash DC, no. 870, folder 2; Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A- 311, July 30, 1970, folder 4; Littell, "Usinfo Blood Sweat and Tears," Incoming Telegram from Amembassy Belgrade to USIA WashDC, no.1839, June 20, 1970, box 57, folder 5. These documents are all stored in: MC 468, Group II CPP, Series 2 Performing arts, Subseries 1. Performers 1956-1980, box 57, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

⁹⁰⁹ "After a long period of uncertainty BST is coming to Sarajevo," *Večernje novine* (Sarajevo), June 20, 1970, enclosed translation in Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A- 311, July 30, 1970, Group II Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2 Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 57, folder 4, CU Historical Collection

⁹¹⁰ S. Niedorfer, "We were on another 'Pilgrimage'. Blood, Sweat and Tears in Tivoli," *Magazin-7dni*, June 25, 1970, pp. 15, enclosed in Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A- 311, July 30, 1970, Group II Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2 Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 57, folder 4, CU Historical Collection.

aspect, this critic agreed with the assessment of music critics who deemed the band to be "one of the best interpreters of that kind of music (rock-jazz) in the world".⁹¹¹

The presence of "the leaders" was not the sole factor that determined the places targeted by jazz diplomacy. As the above quoted example of *Porgy and Bess* demonstrated, not all Yugoslav republic had the institutional capacities to receive American performers. Even those cities which could, such as Zagreb, did not always delight American performers. This was demonstrated by the performance in Yugoslavia of The New York Philharmonic led by Leonard Bernstein. An American despatch from November 3, 1959, which detailed the visit of The New York Philharmonic, stated how halls and theatres of Yugoslavia disappointed Leonard Bernstein and Jerome Robbins while some musicians from Bernstein's The New York Philharmonic protested the quality of the hotels in both Belgrade and Zagreb, causing in the latter a "Palace Revolution" as some musicians from The New York Philharmonic decided, on their own, to stay at Esplanade even though they were assigned to hotel Palace⁹¹², causing transportational and financial problems. The same despatch continued how orchestra members protested to a lack of meals provided at hotels and told hotel employees how "[t]his is worse than Russia". The November 3, 1959 despatch continued, members of the Jerome Robbins' troupe exhibited similar bad behavior, causing a hotel in Dubrovnik to state that this was the last time they accommodate a group from the United States.⁹¹³

American officials stationed in Belgrade tried to adapt the branding instrument to the branding environment. They attempted to provide Washington with a solution to the said problem by using the example of a State Department sponsored performance in Yugoslavia of dancer Jose Limon.⁹¹⁴ Jose Limon's success was quoted in a March 2, 1960 despatch from the American Embassy in Belgrade to the Department of State in connection to a discussion that began in the aftermath of the visit of Jerome Robbins. The discussion centered on the ability of American troupes to perform in smaller cities in Yugoslavia. It was Jerome Robbins, so the

⁹¹¹ "Brilliant concert of the American orchestra Blood, Sweat and Tears in Ljubljana," *Dnevnik*, June 23, 1970, translation, enclosed in Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A- 311, July 30, 1970, Group II Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2 Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 57, folder 4, CU Historical Collection

⁹¹² Bowman, "Cultural Presentations: The New York Philharmonic Orchestra in Yugoslavia," 6-7.

⁹¹³ Heath Bowman, "Cultural Presentations: The New York Philharmonic Orchestra in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to the Department of State, Desp. No. 219, November 3, 1959, 4, RG 306, United States Information Agency, Entry UD-WW 291, Yugoslav Country Files, Box No.2, Lot No. 62 D 338 IAE 1959-1960, Yugoslav Country Files, ICA to Zagreb (BPAO) (1959), box # 9, NARA.

⁹¹⁴ Heath Bowman, "Report on USIS Exploitation of Jose LIMON Performances in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 55, December 23, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

same despatch continued, who hinted at the possibility of arranging the choreography of his regular troupe to fit smaller stages. The idea was, so the same despatch further explained the concept, that a full dance company or a ballet performs in regular theaters while the smaller section of the company (eight people) performs in smaller places.⁹¹⁵ Yugoslav cities the Americans had in mind were Opatija, Dubrovnik, Rijeka, Split, Zadar, Šibenik, Maribor, Banja Luka, Subotica, Osijek, Skoplje and Niš.⁹¹⁶ As stated further in the March 2, 1960 despatch, both the American Embassy and Yugoslav agents desired to have American artists perform in smaller cities. The main problem, however, was "in the fact that just to break even it is necessary to book such groups only in the larger cities, where seating capacities are greater and ticket prices can be a little higher."⁹¹⁷ Even before the aforementioned 1960 report, technically, jazz tours fit into this criteria. The second State Department jazz tour, that of The Glenn Miller Orchestra in 1957 included a "smaller" city such as Osijek on the band's itinerary.⁹¹⁸ Jugokonzert managed to book the Modern Jazz Quartet for performances in Skoplje and Niš, alongside Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.⁹¹⁹ Smaller cities such as Karlovac, Valjevo, Novi Sad, alongside Zagreb, Ljubljana and Belgrade, were visited by the University of Illinois Jazz Band from October 17 to October 30, 1969.⁹²⁰ Skopje was on the itinerary for the 1978 Milkin University Jazz Band Tour alongside performance in Zagreb and in Belgrade.⁹²¹ This was a tour the State Department decided to help with "a grant-in-aid" precisely because of the band's trip to Yugoslavia. The tour included France, Spain and Portugal and the State Department did not offer funding to countries of Western Europe.⁹²²

The Americans conducted research about the Yugoslavs, found out what "ticked" them, identified their target audience and choose their designated target locations. In order to be able

⁹¹⁵ Robert C. Haney, "Cultural Presentations: 'Debriefing' of Jerome Robbins," FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, no. 460, March 2, 1960, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

⁹¹⁶ Haney, "Cultural Presentations: 'Debriefing' of Jerome Robbins," 1-2.

⁹¹⁷ Haney, "Cultural Presentations: 'Debriefing' of Jerome Robbins," 2.

⁹¹⁸ "Music: Miller Orch (McKinley) Mops Up in East Europe; Lays One Egg in Yugo," *Variety*, May 15, 1957, 57.

⁹¹⁹ "MJQ Likes to be Paid in Yank Dollars," *The Billboard*, May 23, 1960, pp. 7.

⁹²⁰ Elbrick, "Educational & Cultural Exchange: University of Illinois Jazz Ban," American Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-84, February 20, 1969, Series 2, Subseries 1, box 81, folder 22, MC 468, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

⁹²¹ Eagleburger, "Millikin University Jazz Band - Evaluation Report," Incoming Telegram from Amembassy Belgrade to SecState Wash DC, no. 4734, January 30, 1978; Group II. CPP, Series 2. Performing Artists 1950-1980, box 71, folder 10, MC 468, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

⁹²² Memorandum from CU/ARTS - Paul E. Wheeler to CU -Mr. Christian Chapman, "Your Query re Cable from Madrid on the Milkin University Jazz Lab Band," February 21, 1978, Group II. Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Artists, box 71, folder 10, MC 468, CU Collection, Arkansas

to do just that, they also needed to have credible partners.⁹²³ Did Yugoslav "brand champions" and "brand ambassadors" and their American counterparts see each other as credible partners in the jazz diplomatic process? The examined documents provide us with a positive response to the posed question. When Jugokonzert managed to book three American artists, Isaac Stern, Yehudi Menuhin and Artur Rubinstein to perform in Yugoslavia⁹²⁴, the Yugoslav agency approached the American Embassy for help. When Jugokonzert, as the Americans continued to write in their 1966 Assessment report, celebrated their 20th anniversary, "special recognition was accorded [to] the American attractions in Yugoslavia this past year" and Veljko Bijedić publicly thanked the American Embassy. As the same assessment report further wrote, those present at the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the concert agency were the Federal Secretary of Education and Culture and other cultural leaders.⁹²⁵ The Yugoslavs thus granted their American partners recognition in front of the people who mattered to American cultural efforts – the cultural leaders who, as we have seen from the previous subchapter, were the designated target audience of American cultural and informational ventures. When American official Edward C. McBride recalled the negotiating efforts aimed at bringing the Los Angeles Philharmonic to Yugoslavia, he remembered how the Yugoslav agent did not have the financial means to organize such a performance and how he provided too small a plane for the Orchestra's 120 members, their instruments and luggage to transport from Rome to Zagreb. In the end, so McBride continued, the Americans ending up paying more than they envisioned. While McBride described this event as "gentle blackmail" at the hands of the Yugoslav booking agent, he also noted how this event indicated "the resources that the Yugoslav government had available." However, as McBride emphasized, "[b]ut by and large, they met their commitments."⁹²⁶ The Yugoslavs were thus also seen as credible partners and the Americans complimented the organizational skills of some of their Yugoslav partners. For instance, when the fourth Newport Jazz Festival extended to Ljubljana and Zagreb, an American airgram from December 28, 1973 noted how Yugoslav organizers handled previous organizational problems, even though Ljubljana and Zagreb's organizers faced some new problems.⁹²⁷ Belgrade's Hall of

⁹²³ As Topic and Sciortino write, "credibility" is a crucial "property of effective soft power". "Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism," 13.

⁹²⁴ Henry F. Arnold, "Country Assessment Report - Yugoslavia January 1966 - January 1967," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 72, January 27, 1967, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry P: 328, box 25, NARA.

⁹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁹²⁶ McBride interview, 29.

⁹²⁷ Johnson, "Newport Jazz Festival in Belgrade," Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram No. 715, December 28, 1973, 1, Series 2, Subseries 1, box 73, folder 2, MC 468, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

Youth (*Dom Omladine*) was praised in the same airgram as enhancing their professional service and holding their ground, both with logistical issues and the demands of the musicians. The Hall of Youth, continued the December 28, 1973 airgram, became less dependent on the American "Embassy for moral or facilitative support" which the Americans deemed "most encouraging for the programming of cultural events in the future." Indeed, according to the said airgram, the Hall of Youth came up with a rather creative idea to fully benefit from "post-concert events by staging 'jam sessions' in its own hall, within walking distance of the concert hall." The Yugoslavs set up a "base group" consisting of Kenny Drew and his Trio and Art Farmer and other musicians joined them as they finished their concert. Listeners, so the Americans further wrote in the December 28, 1973 airgram, swarmed the hall for three nights straight.⁹²⁸ There was mutual credibility in the usage of jazz diplomacy as a branding instrument.

The analysis of the identity of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and its customers allowed the Americans to identify all of the elements and factors that needed to be taken into account when organizing jazz tours of American musicians as part of the American "brand strategy" of preserving the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. Before fully addressing the role of jazz diplomacy in preserving the independent Yugoslav brand, it is important to analyze what could, in marketing, be interpreted as a "testing phase" of music diplomacy between the two countries that preceded the tours of jazz musicians. This was the tour of *Porgy and Bess* that came to Yugoslavia in December 1954 and is the subject of analysis of the next subchapter.

⁹²⁸ Ibid., 2.

3.2 The launch: *Porgy and Bess* in Yugoslavia

"With unprecedented acclaim," wrote journalist Mihailo Vukdragović in *Borba* about the appearance in the country of *Porgy and Bess*, "the public has welcomed this extraordinary artistic collective which has so significantly accomplished its cultural-artistic propaganda mission of drawing peoples closer together through musical and dramatic virtuosity."⁹²⁹ Of equal praise for "Porgy and Bess" was Yugoslav *Politika* which described it as 'a 'great presentation and unforgettable artistic experience'.⁹³⁰ *Porgy and Bess* did not just delight Yugoslav critics, it seduced regular Yugoslav people too, as we can see from the recollections of jazz guitarist Aleksandar Bubanović. In his autobiography, Bubanović expressed a rollecoaster of emotions that swept him as he witnessed the performance of the American troupe. As he wrote in his autobiography, the performance of *Porgy and Bess* in the Croatian National Theatre was nothing short of a "sensation. ... Perfect harmony and precise realization of the smallest details."⁹³¹ Bubanović was especially mesmerized by the lullaby "Summertime" and he further wrote in his autobiography how "[t]he biggest ability of a singer is when he fills the entire theatre by singing with a piano voice. This is artistry inherent in rare [performers]. Never before nor after have I listened and watched such a perfect play."⁹³²

The arrival of the praised *Porgy and Bess* had been, according to an American despatch from March 9, 1955, a culmination of negotiation efforts conducted between USIS officials and the officials of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav cultural leaders which lasted for over two years.⁹³³ The main sender of the opera had been the American state, that is, its department involved in foreign affairs, the State Department, even though this had not really been their original product. As historian Ellen Noonan writes, the 1950s version of *Porgy and Bess*, the opera composed by George Gershwin with the help of his brother Ira, and DuBose Heyward⁹³⁴ who published *Porgy* in 1925⁹³⁵, "did not originate as a State Department-sponsored cultural tour." It were actually Robert Breen and Blevins Davis that had done all of the necessary work, in terms of

⁹²⁹ Kolarek, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, Tousi 90, December 20, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁹³⁰ Ibid.

⁹³¹ Bubanović, *Sav taj jazz*, 52.

⁹³² Ibid.

⁹³³ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1-December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousi 21, March 9, 1955,3, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁹³⁴ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 124.

⁹³⁵ Ibid., 15.

obtaining the rights, finding the cast and the consultant, with Breen picking up the directorial hammer, to have the show produced in January 1952.⁹³⁶ The American state picked it up as it was yet another means in the American defense line against the attacks of the Soviet Union on American race relations⁹³⁷ and did not fund all but some of the performances on a tour that lasted for four years.⁹³⁸

According to historian Ellen Noon, there are three angles to interpret the opera. The first one, the smallest one, is it being the work of George Gershwin and DuBose Heyward that, during the tour from 1952 to 1956, performed for American, European and South American audience. The second, according to Noonan, were the offstage performances of the cast for the foreign audience while the cameras were clicking at the cast's every move. Finally came the last angle, which was the civil rights movement that the world saw by means of the Montgomery bus boycott or the funeral of Emmett Till who had been lynched.⁹³⁹ As Noonan continues, the way that the State Department, that is their USIS element, interpreted these three angles were as follows. The first angle belonged deep in the past and this is how USIS depicted the oppression, both economic and social, faced by African Americans citizens of the United States while simultaneously praising the composer, George Gershwin.⁹⁴⁰ The second angle, the offstage performance of the African American cast, was seen by the State Department as them "living the brand" of "American racial progress and equal opportunity." The third angle, the uncontrollable one, meant the application of a myriad of propaganda weapons to sell the story of how racial events, be they violence or discrimination based on race, were the exception not the rule in American society. The tour of *Porgy and Bess* was one such means.⁹⁴¹ As the context surrounding the American "test launch" of *Porgy and Bess*, singled out by President Eisenhower as evidence that a state-backed up musical diplomacy could work in the state's favour when he asked the Congress to fund his Cultural Presentations Program⁹⁴² demonstrates, the opera was not specifically sent solely to Yugoslavia nor did Yugoslavia have any say in the decision-making process that led the American state to fund the opera for performances abroad in the first place. Yet, as documents from the collection of Robert Breen reveal, the State Department made it imperative that this opera appears in Yugoslavia.

⁹³⁶ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 198.

⁹³⁷ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 187; Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 4;

⁹³⁸ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 185-187.

⁹³⁹ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 188.

⁹⁴⁰ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 188-189.

⁹⁴¹ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 189.

⁹⁴² Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 4.

Both sides, the American and the Yugoslav, had actually lobbied for this opera to perform in Yugoslavia before its official arrival to the country in December 1954. We had already seen in the first chapter how American officials lamented on the unsuccessful attempt to bring *Porgy and Bess* to Yugoslavia in 1951.⁹⁴³ While the first lobbying efforts had been in vain, the second set of such efforts provided fruitful. From the Yugoslav side, as Robert Breen retold the story in letters to ANTA's Robert C. Schnitzer and Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, it was the Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Popović, who tried to get the ball rolling for this troupe to visit Yugoslavia. As Breen writes in the letters, he and Yugoslav Ambassador Vladimir Popović met at one of the social gatherings that followed the performance of the opera in Washington DC in January 1954. Popović, who confessed to seeing the opera twice, so Breen continued, then expressed an interest in having *Porgy and Bess* staged in Yugoslavia, a desire he would restate in a phone call to Breen in late February in which he also forwarded the details to the American producer as to whom to send a letter regarding the visit of the opera to Yugoslavia which Breen did. As Breen further notes, he never received a response to his letter until June of that year when Breen was contacted via letter by the cultural attaché of the American Embassy in Belgrade, Milos O. Ptak.⁹⁴⁴ As Breen wrote to Congressman Powell, "I know that the powers that be have been working on it quietly, but we had no further word."⁹⁴⁵ Despite even the best intentions of those engaged in the lobbying process, one crucial ingredient was missing. As an American telegram from Belgrade to USIA from August 26, 1954 stressed, the Yugoslavs simply did not have the financial means to pull off such a venture. The Yugoslavs, so the Americans forwarded the information they received from their talks with Yugoslav officials in the August 1954 telegram, were "willing [to] make available Belgrade, Zagreb opera houses; shift schedules, provide every facility, including internal transportation." The only thing the Yugoslavs could not bring to the table, so continued the telegram, were the "dollars to bridge gap between company's price and what [the] Yugoslav Government can afford." The telegram then further provided a rough approximation of an amount of 50,000

⁹⁴³ See, Bruce Buttles, "USIE: Request for musical scores, books.", Foreign Service of the United States from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, June 19, 1951, no. 975, 511.6821/6-1951; On the failed attempt to bring *Porgy and Bess* to Yugoslavia see also Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1489, June 8, 1951, 511.68/6-751, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

⁹⁴⁴ Robert Breen to Robert C. Schnitzer, "Re: *Porgy and Bess* (Yugoslavia)," November 1, 1954, ANTA, Eyerman Opera Co. Correspondence, June-November 1954 (Copies), f4/20, box 80; Robert Breen to Adam Clayton Powell, "Porgy and Bess in Europe," November 5, 1954, same folder and box, Robert Breen S. Breen Papers, Collection #C0004, Special Collections Research Center, George Mason University Libraries (hereinafter, "Robert S. Breen Papers, GMU")

⁹⁴⁵ Breen to Clayton Power, "Porgy and Bess in Europe," November 5, 1954, f 4/20, box 80, Robert S. Breen Papers, GMU.

dollars that would be needed to pull off such a venture.⁹⁴⁶ Both Yugoslav and American foreign officials were thus lobbying for the appearance of this specific product on the Yugoslav market.

Curiously enough, the Soviet Union lobbied for the appearance of the same troupe in their country via the same means. As scholar Michael Sy Uy notes, the Soviet Union requested the performance of the opera in the Soviet Union through their own Ambassador to the United States, Andrei Vishinsky, in May 1953.⁹⁴⁷ However, regardless of Breen's enthusiasm, the State Department did not approve of such a request⁹⁴⁸ and it was only in late 1955 that Robert Breen managed to book the Soviet portion of the tour with again the State Department refusing to fund the tour and the Soviet Union picking up all of its costs.⁹⁴⁹ Put in other words, the Soviet 1953 pitch was unsuccessful, the Yugoslav-American 1954 pitch was a success. Indeed, as we shall see in the lines below, where the Yugoslav side failed, namely in financial terms, their American partners did not. This is all the more relevant, especially if we take into account, to reiterate the words of historian Ellen Noonan stated above, that the State Department did not give financial aid to performances in all countries on the tour as money was available only to selected ones. And Yugoslavia was one of them. That the State Department ready to disburse the money necessary for Yugoslavia was seen from a memo that Robert Breen sent to his wife Wilva. As Breen informed his wife, the State Department was offering the company 50,000 dollars to perform in Yugoslavia without any requirements regarding duration. The company was free to use the finances offered by the State Department, as Breen continued, as their hearts desired.⁹⁵⁰ There was only one condition the State Department attached to the above listed offer. As Breen noted, the stated amount of money would become available to the company "... provided we play Yugoslavia."⁹⁵¹ Indeed, Robert Breen provides us with another set of evidence that the State Department really pushed for the tour to occur in Yugoslavia in the same memo to his wife Wilva. As Breen contemplated in the letter on the issue of the layoff week, that is, the possibility of having the company in Yugoslavia at that time and working out some sort of an

⁹⁴⁶ Kolarek, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, No. Tousi 23, August 26, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁹⁴⁷ Michael Sy Uy, "Performing Catfish Row in the Soviet Union: The Everyman Opera Company and Porgy and Bess, 1955-56," *Journal of the Society for American Music* 11, No.4 (2017), 470.

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 470-471.

⁹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 471.

⁹⁵⁰ Memorandum from Robert Breen to Wilva Breen, "RE: Booking and the State Department," November 1, 1954, folder 4/20, Robert S. Breen Papers, box 80. See also in the same collection Cable Bobreen to Mrs. Robert Breen, Othenapol Paris, November 1, 1954, f 4/20, box 80.

⁹⁵¹ Memorandum from Robert Breen to Wilva Breen, "RE: Booking and the State Department," November 1, 1954, folder 4/20, Robert S. Breen Papers, box 80. See also in the same collection Cable Bobreen to Mrs. Robert Breen, Othenapol Paris, November 1, 1954, f 4/20, box 80. Underlined part in the original text.

agreement through which the American government would pay for their accommodation during that week "as a condition of our accepting the Yugoslavian deal."⁹⁵² Put in other words, Yugoslavia was probably not in the initial itinerary of Breen's company's 1954 tour, the State Department put it there.

The time of the launch of music diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States through the specific product of *Porgy and Bess* had been, at least according to the assessment of American officials stationed in Yugoslavia, more than appropriate. Looking at it from a purely political perspective, the above quoted August 26, 1954 document, drafted while still in the lobbying phase for the product launch, noted how the Yugoslav market was more than ready to take in this musical product. As the Americans wrote in the stated document, the political atmosphere prevailing in Yugoslavia at that time, which included the signing of the Balkan Pact. Yugoslavia taking steps towards the European Defence Community and the anticipation of the Trieste settlement, all worked in favour of presenting *Porgy and Bess* in Yugoslavia.⁹⁵³ It was precisely the latter, the settlement of the Trieste question, so the Americans wrote on March 9, 1955 that represented "probably the most significant as well as most dramatic single factor contributing to harmonious relations and reduction of tensions." The Americans then, in the same document, directly credited the settlement of this issue and its "afterglow" that was "marked by exchanges of messages of goodwill and congratulations among Yugoslavia, Italy, and the United States and Great Britain" as the event that "unquestionably helped make possible the biggest USIS project ever undertaken in this country, the presentation of the American folk opera *Porgy and Bess*."⁹⁵⁴ Put in other words, the market was ready for such a product and, as we could see from the above lines that were confirmed in the August 26, 1954 American report, the target audience was also eager for this American product to appear in Yugoslavia. Indeed, as the August 26, 1954 report noted, the Yugoslavs were eager for *Porgy and Bess* to appear in Yugoslavia after hearing the news that Robert Breen was bringing the opera to Europe for performances in Italy, France, Belgium and Germany.⁹⁵⁵

⁹⁵² Memo from Robert Breen to Wilva Breen, "Re: Booking and State Department," (handwritten title), November 1, 1954, 4, folder 4/20, Robert S. Breen Papers, box 80, GMU.

⁹⁵³ Kolarek, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, No. Tousi 23, August 26, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁹⁵⁴ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1-December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousi 21, March 9, 1955, 3, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁹⁵⁵ Kolarek, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, No. Tousi 23, August 26, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

The global geopolitical picture also played a part in the successful pitch of the project. As Cole Blasier, a consular/political officer of the United States in Belgrade from 1951 to 1954, put it, in terms of strategy, in early 1952 Yugoslavia was one of the most salient European countries and a country that stood at the center of the Cold War bickering between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁹⁵⁶ The climate that was prevalent at a time when the Yugoslavs and the Americans went into the negotiation phase is revealed by Robert Breen's November 1, 1954 memo to his wife Wilva. After Robert Breen informed his wife about the State Department giving the company the money necessary to perform in Yugoslavia, he then reiterated the words of ANTA's Robert C. Schnitzer "that the only thing they [the State Department] would loosen up on at the moment was the money for Yugoslavia." The State Department, as Breen continued to quote Robert Schnitzer, was "not at all interested in the other European or Northern European countries insofar as this program is concerned." The way Schnitzer clarified the situation to Breen, as detailed by Breen himself, was that the State Department held the view of Germany already being aligned with the United States so there was no need for them to fund the tour there.⁹⁵⁷ Given that the State Department wished to sponsor the performances to Yugoslavia, it is evident that an opposite situation was at hand in Yugoslavia. Within the dynamic of Yugoslav-American relations and in economic terms, the tour of *Porgy and Bess* to Yugoslavia was thus a worthy investment, as it could demonstrate, in line with the grand American plans, as was put in the March 9, 1955 USIS report, stated under the "Area Directive" section to showcase the connections between the United States and Europe based on "the common heritage, institutions and traditions" and to push for, through *Porgy and Bess*, "the progressive introduction of more democratic processes in Yugoslavia."⁹⁵⁸

As its own product, and through its own relations to the state, *Porgy and Bess* had its own message to deliver and it had been largely connected, as American scholars such as Noonan, Von Eschen, Monod⁹⁵⁹ and others have demonstrated, to the issue of American race relations. In the Yugoslav context, there were documented attacks on American race in the Yugoslav

⁹⁵⁶ Cole Blasier interviewed by Peter Moffat, January 28, 2002 (initial interview date), 3, FAOHP. ADST.

⁹⁵⁷ Memo from Robert Breen to Wilva Breen, "Re: Booking and the State Department," (handwritten title), November 1, 1954, ANTA, Everyman Opera Co. Correspondence, June-November 1954 (copies, original to OHS), f 4/20, box 80, Robert S. Breen Papers, GMU.

⁹⁵⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1-December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 21, March 9, 1955, 10, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁹⁵⁹ See references 79-82 for the suggested literature.

media in August 1952⁹⁶⁰ that the American side tried to remedy with appropriate materials.⁹⁶¹ Referring to those summer attacks and noting how the Yugoslav press had not attacked the United States since 1950, in a despatch from December 1952 Americans stationed in Belgrade wrote how a certain level of misunderstanding about the United States had been noted amongst the Yugoslavs, the most common one being American race relations which were "used to illustrate the injustices of the capitalist system". The Embassy further noted in the said despatch how such "false beliefs" were a serious impediment to accepting positive facts about America, "the permanence and strength of its society and its ability as a nation to cooperate in international affairs without unjust pressure upon smaller members of the community of nations." The Americans attempted to remedy the said situation with appropriate materials and a lecturer.⁹⁶² As noted by American official William Kiehl, at the time of his service in Yugoslavia (1971-1975), American race relations were not a topic of terrible interest to the general Yugoslav population, notwithstanding several Yugoslav intellectuals at a university level who considered race relations the topic of their research interest. Nonetheless, race relations were, as Kiehl noted, "an important part of the country plan" as instructed by USIA.⁹⁶³ While the basic idea the Americans were pressing for was that the United States was trying to make reparations for past mistakes, that everyone had the same opportunities and so forth,⁹⁶⁴ the Yugoslavs still had no interest as they felt that "what we were trying to do was change the way they thought of each other."⁹⁶⁵ Indeed, as Kiehl noted, the Yugoslavs did not comprehend race relations in terms of "black-white relations". Instead, continued Kiehl, the word "race" was connected to ethnic relations.⁹⁶⁶ The end result was that, as Kiehl put it, American race relations mattered rather little to the Yugoslavs "because they weren't hung up on it like Americans were."⁹⁶⁷ As historian Dean Vuletic notes, "for Yugoslavia this racial dimension was not a domestic issue but a foreign policy one, and its political leaders were developing closer ties with African states through the Non-aligned Movement, the development of jazz in Yugoslavia

⁹⁶⁰ Allen, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 154, August 8, 1952, 511.6841/8-852, RG 59 Department of State, DF 1950-54, box 2474.

⁹⁶¹ Acheson, Outgoing Airgram from DOS to Amembassy Belgrade, no. A-58, September 11, 1952, 511.6841/8-852, RG 59, DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2474.

⁹⁶² Bruce Buttles, "IIA: Countering Anti-American Propaganda in Yugoslavia," FDS from BG to DOS, no. 482, December 22, 1952, 511.68/12-2252, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2472.

⁹⁶³ "Kiehl interview", 42.

⁹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 42-43.

⁹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 44. Indeed, in another survey in 1961, a sample of thirty Yugoslav refugees in Germany did not list race relations as the element that hurt American image in Yugoslavia. See Konta, *Waging Public Diplomacy*, 124.

paralleled this and reflected a new interest for African and African American cultures."⁹⁶⁸ Still, jazz musicians Miljenko Prohaska and Boško Petrović used race to defend jazz against attacks on this type of music in Yugoslavia.⁹⁶⁹ Yugoslav jazz critic Svetolik Jakovljević "rebelled" against the portrayal of the Modern Jazz Quartet and the African American contribution to jazz music by American music critic Allen Hughes in a review of his lecture in *Savremeni akordi* by noting how Allen Hughes "is not the first American author who, from afar, disputes the contribution of blacks to the development of jazz. So instead of the formulation »blacks are changing jazz« ... we would like to hear that they are developing it."⁹⁷⁰ Sometimes American race relations also reflected back to Yugoslav musicians. For instance, Yugoslav jazz musician Mihailo Blam, a white musician, recalled in his autobiography how he was sometimes subjected to the wrath of some African American jazz musicians such as Curtis Fueller, Alvin Queen and Jimmy Wood due to race. He usually handled such arguments that revolved around whites enslaving African Americans and which frequently occurred after concerts when everybody drank one too many⁹⁷¹, by counterpointing the difference of pay between even a lousy, mediocre African American performer and a white one in the 1970s.⁹⁷² Put in such a context, Blam would claim that it was him who was the actual victim on the stage.⁹⁷³ Still, Blam was not the type of musician who was shy in using his country's political position as a part of his argument. As he stated in his his autobiography, his counterpoints included the acknowledgement that Yugoslavia had no African Americans in their country until 1961 when the Nonaligned Movement was formed and how, starting from that point, "half of Africa studied here" under Yugoslav scholarships!⁹⁷⁴

Likewise, some American jazz musicians also ended up in tricky situations that could be, base on the interpretation of the person involved, labelled as racism, even if it was pure disagreement. For instance, William Kiehl recalls one such incident when jazz trumpeter Freddie Hubbard visited and performed in Zagreb. As Kiehl recalls, in Serbo-Croatian, which

⁹⁶⁸ Vuletic, *Sounds like America*, 120.

⁹⁶⁹ Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 36; Hrvoj Davor, "Razgovor s Miljenkom Prohaskom, dobitnikom nagrade Miroslav Sedak Benčić za životno djelo koje mu je dodijelilo hrvatsko društvo skladatelja. "Dobili smo »nogu« jer smo svirali jazz," interview by Davor Hrvoj, *Cantus*, no. 179 (March) 2013, 7; Hrvoj, "Miljenko Prohaska: „Kad je netko bio nepodoban izbrisali bi ga sa slike," <https://glazba.hr/citaj/intervju/miljenko-prohaska-invervju/> (accessed on April 21, 2022)

⁹⁷⁰ Svetolik Jakovljević, "Alen Hjuž, muzički kritičar Njujork Herald Tribjuna: Džez nije oblik umjetnosti već stil izvođenja," *Savremeni akordi*, broj 1, Januar 1958, 19.

⁹⁷¹ Blam, *Jazz u Srbiji*, 8.

⁹⁷² *Ibid.*, 9.

⁹⁷³ Blam, *Jazz u Srbiji*, 8.

⁹⁷⁴ Blam, *Jazz u Srbiji*, 8.

was the official language of Yugoslavia, the word "'negro' ... it comes out as that other n-word, very close in sound, and some of the black artists who performed in Yugoslavia heard this and were highly offended." Freddie Hubbard, according to Kiehl, felt insulted when he heard a local Yugoslav jazz organizer attempting to utter the word "'negro' and it came out quite wrong". Hubbard then declined to play the second part of the concert until Kiehl managed to clarify the situation.⁹⁷⁵ However, while on stage, Hubbard took a swing at the Yugoslavs by saying

... something at the beginning about, 'If any of you people out here are racists,' that kind of thing, something quite nasty, actually, before he performed. Of course, the language works both ways, they thought he was saying something really nice about them and they all applauded, which sort of took him aback, it sort of deflated the whole thing and he performed.⁹⁷⁶

Notwithstanding such minor incidents, as Kiehl recalled, "the jazz people were treated like kings and queens" in Yugoslavia.⁹⁷⁷

To return to the opera *Porgy and Bess*, as we have stated, the pitch was successful, the capital acquired, the message developed, the market was ready for the product. The next stage of the product launch meant moving into the negotiation phase as to the actual launch of the product in Yugoslavia. Negotiations between the two sides started in November 1954 with Veljko Bijedić from Jugokonzert leading the Yugoslav "delegation" while the American side was led by Anatole Heller⁹⁷⁸, an impresario from Europe who, in booking negotiations regarding performances of American attractions in foreign countries, worked as a representative of the United States and helped American Embassies with contract negotiations⁹⁷⁹, with the presence of the American Cultural Affairs Officer at negotiation meetings.⁹⁸⁰ As could be seen from the American despatch from April 28, 1955, problems amounted during the negotiation phase which frustrated the American side. As the despatch continued, there was a lack of a basic understanding by the Yugoslav side for American principles of booking and performances, Veljko Bijedić did not speak English which meant that he and Heller conversed in the language

⁹⁷⁵ Kiehl interview, 43.

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁹⁷⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tousey 35, April 28, 1955, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁹⁷⁹ Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations. *Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives Eighty-ninth Congress first session* (US Government Printing Office, Washington: 1965), 1018.

⁹⁸⁰ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tousey 35, April 28, 1955, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

spoken by a translator on site that day, meaning either French or German. An additional problem, as was continued in the April 28, 1955 despatch, occurred when Bijedić could not offer a definite response as to whether or not he would be able to deliver on transportational requirements for the company and the cast to go to Greece.⁹⁸¹ However, sides that sat opposite of each other at the negotiating table had higher forces urging them to resume negotiations despite encountered difficulties. As the April 28, 1955 report continued, it was Ambassador Riddleberger who urged Anatole Heller to persist in negotiations while the Americans contemplated that it was Josip Broz Tito who handled the transportational problems as Veljko Bijedić, at one point during the negotiations process, requested a time slot of a couple of hours after which "he was in a position to say 'yes' and, what is more, sign anything. It is believed that he went as high as Tito himself for this OK because in a conversation with Mrs. Bijedic late that same afternoon, the CAO was told that at that very moment Mr. Bijedic was "in audience" and Mrs. Bijedic was sure her husband would get complete authority to sign the contract with all its clauses."⁹⁸² Indeed, American newspapers also brought news that the Yugoslav leader was more than willing to help out so that the staging of the opera went as smoothly as it could in Yugoslavia. As the newspapers reiterated the story of how Heller, when called to attend a meeting with Josip Broz Tito, "quaked in his boots, borrowed the American Ambassador's dress clothes to wear what he expected would be a troublesome interview" only to have Josip Broz Tito say, "Is everything going as it should?... and if it isn't, will you please let me know so I can help?"⁹⁸³ These interventions brought the negotiation phase to its successful end and Porgy and Bess was on its way to Yugoslavia.

The launch dates set had been December 11 to December 14 in Zagreb while the opera and its cast were to be in Belgrade from December 16 to December 19.⁹⁸⁴ As was noted by Yugoslav *Borba* a couple of days before the cast arrived to Yugoslavia, it was Jugokonzert that organized these performances that were to represent "one of the biggest artistic events of our postwar cultural life". *Borba* further added that the performances would be given in collaboration with

⁹⁸¹ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Touse 35, April 28, 1955, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

⁹⁸² Foreign Service Despatch from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Desp. No. Touse 35, April 28, 1955, 2, Subject: Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia, RG 306, USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, Yugoslav Country Files 1951-1957, Lot No. 60 D17 IAE, NARA

⁹⁸³ Untitled article, *The Washington Post, Times Herald*, December 16, 1954, Gershwin collection, Scrapbooks of George and Ira Gershwin, Item 23 through Item 24, Microfilm 93/20013, Reel no. 9, Feet 56, Music Division, Library of Congress.

⁹⁸⁴ "President's Emergency Fund for Participation in International Fairs. Second Quarterly Report. November 15, 1954 – December 31, 1954." RG 59 General Records of DOS, Entry A1 1586C, box 41, NARA. "Uoči velikog gostovanja. Osam predstava muzičke drame „Porgy i Bes" u izvođenju američke crnačke trupe," *Borba*, Year XIX, no. 294, December 8, 1954, 4.

Zagreb and Belgrade's opera orchestras.⁹⁸⁵ Judging by the reviews, the product launch was more than a successful venture for both sides. The official American report on the Cultural Presentations Program stressed that the first performance of the troupe in Zagreb drew fourteen curtain calls while the final performance earned a half an hour ovation.⁹⁸⁶ A review in the *Boston Herald* praised *Porgy and Bess* for showing the Yugoslavs who exactly the Americans were and how the United States managed things. In an article entitled "Ambassador Gershwin," an unknown author begins by stating how staging *Porgy and Bess* in Yugoslavia was indeed a rare sight as "[h]ow could the stolid Slavs possibly appreciate Gershwin's 'Porgy and Bess'? What could they ever make of 'I've Got Plenty of Nuttin'," "Summer Time," and all those other intensely American melodies?" The author of the article then summarized all of the successes the opera achieved in Yugoslavia, ranging from curtain calls to the melodies from still being performed in Yugoslavia, before referring to George Gershwin and the performers as "our best ambassadors". This was, as the article continued, the way things should be set as "[s]tuffed shirt, double talk diplomacy is not part of the American character (at least we like to think it isn't.) Show 'em how we do it; show 'em what we've made; show 'em how we sing- this is how to win friends and preclude battles."⁹⁸⁷ *The New York Times* reported how the cast of the opera mingled with local residents and "to watch the members of the cast striking up friendships everywhere is something to report home."⁹⁸⁸

From the official, American perspective, as American Ambassador James Riddleberger wrote to Washington, the performances of *Porgy and Bess* were a huge success, "reaction here is one of enthusiastic approval and I have heard nothing but praise of this production from all people of Yugoslav life." Tickets had been sold out for all of the performances, continued Riddleberger, with "still tremendous demand for tickets."⁹⁸⁹ Indeed, another American telegram sent from Belgrade to USIA just a couple of days later reiterated this information noting how even after *Porgy and Bess* had performed five times in the capital, "the box office demand

⁹⁸⁵ "Uoči velikog gostovanja. Osam predstava muzičke drame „Porgi i Bes" u izvođenju američke crnačke trupe," *Borba*, Year XIX, no. 294, December 8, 1954, 4.

⁹⁸⁶ "Third Quarterly Report, President's Emergency Fund for Participation in International Fairs. January 1, 1955 – March 31, 1955," 4, attachment to Memorandum from P-Carl W. McCardlen to The Under Secretary, "Third Quarterly Report on the President's Emergency Fund for Participation in International Affairs (January 1, 1955 through March 31, 1955)," April 26, 1955, RG 59 General Records of DOS, Entry A1 1586C, box 41, NARA.

⁹⁸⁷ "Ambassador Gershwin," *Boston Herald*, December 23, 1954, Gershwin collection, Scrapbooks of George and Ira Gershwin, Item 23 through Item 24, Microfilm 93/20013, Reel no. 9, Feet 56, Music Division, Library of Congress.

⁹⁸⁸ Jack Raymonds, "'Porgy' Delights Belgrade Crowd: Residents of Catfish Row are Seen as Goodwill Envoys – Opening is Festive," *The New York Times*, December 17, 1954, 36. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

⁹⁸⁹ Riddleberger, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 473, December 17, 1954, 511.68/12-1754, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2473, NARA.

remained far from satisfied." As this telegram from December 20, 1954 further noted, Jugokonzert's official proudly professed, "[t]hey could play here for months!"⁹⁹⁰ Indeed, Yugoslav *Borba* echoed similar sentiment stating how *Porgy and Bess* had not only been "a first-class event for Belgrade's musical audience" that achieved in "Belgrade as in many other cities ... complete success" but that "the Belgrade audience will feel sorry that this talented ensemble is not staying longer in our country. It [the Belgrade audience] will undoubtedly wish for more frequent visits of such performers."⁹⁹¹ Radio Belgrade hosted two children actors from *Porgy and Bess*, Gail Barnes and George Royston Jr. These two actors taped two songs for a children's musical program of the same radio station for future broadcast. Gail Barnes and George Royston greeted their Yugoslav peers with "Kako ste" and left with saying „Doviđenja". These two child actors were also given presents by Radio Belgrade, the instrument "dvojnice" (double whistle) and a big box of candy.⁹⁹²

Equally satisfied with their Yugoslav stay was Robert Breen who, in a letter to American president Dwight D. Eisenhower, especially praised "very highly the gracious, co-operative, and most efficient manner in which Ambassador James W. Riddleberger engineered all arrangements for the Yugoslavian engagements" with all of those engaged in the company being "most appreciative of his expert and warm assistance."⁹⁹³ In terms of target audience, *Porgy and Bess* was most definitely a hit given that, as James Riddleberger wrote home, the highest echelons of the Yugoslav power pyramid, led by Edvard Kardelj, attended the Belgrade premiere of *Porgy and Bess*. Also present in attendance was, wrote Riddleberger, Josip Broz Tito's wife.⁹⁹⁴ The leader of Yugoslavia himself, Josip Broz Tito, and another powerful man in the country at that time, vice-president Aleksandar Ranković, wrote the April 28, 1955 American despatch, were unable to attend the performances as they were off on official business to India. However, Ranković's wife was in attendance.⁹⁹⁵ Apart from Kardelj, those Yugoslav

⁹⁹⁰ Kolarek, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, Touse 90, December 20, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.; The quote by a Jugokonzert official also in Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1- December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Touse 21, March 9, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁹⁹¹ A. Stefanović, "Veliki uspeh opere „Porgi i Bess" u Beogradu. Kad crnačka četvrt oživi na pozorišnoj sceni," *Borba*, Year XIX, no. 302, December 18, 1954, 4.

⁹⁹² "Najmlađi članovi crnačkog umetničkog ansambla u poseti Radio Beogradu," *Borba*, Year XIX, no. 302, December 18, 1954, 5.

⁹⁹³ Letter from Robert Breen to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, December 23, 1954, ANTA STATE Duplicate (Original to OHS), Nov. 54-April 55, f 2 4/20, Robert S. Breen Papers, GMU.

⁹⁹⁴ Riddleberger, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 473, December 17, 1954, 511.68/12-1754, RG 59 DOS, DF 1950-54, box 2473, NARA.

⁹⁹⁵ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Touse 35, April 28, 1955, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

officials who came to the performance of *Porgy and Bess* were Moša Pijade, the president of the Federal Assembly, Rodoljub Čolaković and Svetozar Vukmanović, vice-presidents of the Federal Executive Council and Petar Stambolić, the president of the People's Assembly of Serbia. *Porgy and Bess* also drew in a high number of representatives of foreign embassies and posts.⁹⁹⁶ *Porgy and Bess* was also credited, the source being a Foreign Office aid, on making "quite an impression on some of the more dogmatic people in our Government" with the implication made that this person was Edvard Kardelj.⁹⁹⁷ Indeed, as the March 9, 1955 despatch wrote, *Porgy and Bess* was "evidence of USIS's scoring a bully's eye smack in the middle of its primary and most difficult target group, namely, the government leaders."⁹⁹⁸ USIS and the United States had also earned credit from Yugoslav officials and journalists for bringing *Porgy and Bess* to Yugoslavia.⁹⁹⁹ Put in other words, those that mattered to American cultural diplomatic efforts noted. When the ban on the distribution of American films was lifted after a three month period in Croatia and when Croatian political officials expressed interest in further cooperation with the Americans both in cultural matters and usage of USIA films, the Americans contemplated that "[p]ossibly the good-will created by the '*Porgy and Bess*' performances supplied incentive to these friendly overtures."¹⁰⁰⁰

On a musical level, *Porgy and Bess* was further praised in the April 28, 1955 American despatch for raising the popularity of not just George Gershwin but American music in general on Yugoslav radio stations with the Yugoslavs especially developing a sweet spot for spirituals that bore a similarity to their folk music. As the April 28, 1955 despatch from Belgrade continued, USIS received a request for spirituals from the Academic Chorus of the University Belgrade's director, Bogdan Babić to incorporate into their program.¹⁰⁰¹ Indeed, as was noted in a separate despatch from March 18, 1955 sent from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Belgrade University Academic Chorus held a concert in which they sang American spirituals

⁹⁹⁶ A. Stefanović, "Veliki uspeh opere „Porgi i Bess" u Beogradu. Kad crnačka četvrt oživi na pozorišnoj sceni," *Borba*, Year XIX, no. 302, December 18, 1954, 4.

⁹⁹⁷ Kolarek, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, Touse 90, December 20, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA; Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1- December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Touse 21, March 9, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁹⁹⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1- December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Touse 21, March 9, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

⁹⁹⁹ Kolarek, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, Touse 90, December 20, 1954, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA

¹⁰⁰⁰ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1- December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Touse 21, March 9, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

¹⁰⁰¹ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Porgy and Bess in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Touse 35, April 28, 1955, 6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

in a program that included Italian, old English, German, Serbo-Croatian, French and Latin songs. The Americans stressed in the despatch that it was them who provided the Chorus with necessary materials for the spiritual section of their program, a venture which earned them gratefulness from the members of the Chorus, as expressed to the American Cultural Affairs Officer in the backstage area. This despatch also stressed that it was amid the massive success of "Porgy and Bess" that the Belgrade University Academic Chorus members asked for such materials. What the members of the Belgrade University Academic Chorus were desirous to discover, continued the March 18, 1955 despatch, was "how they compared with American choral groups and how they sounded in English." As the Americans wrote in their report, "[t]he singing was excellent and the English, good." Furthermore, as the March 18, 1955 despatch stressed, the American Cultural Affairs Officer also earned the admiration of other members of the diplomatic core who were present at the concert and who "congratulated the CAO on the warm reception accorded these spirituals, and a Russian Third Secretary remarked regretfully that they had sung only one Russia number."¹⁰⁰² Belgrade University Academic Chorus was not the only ensemble in Yugoslavia prompted to take up the Porgy and Bess inspired repertoire. Even before the opera was staged in Yugoslavia, the choir "Ivo Lola Ribar" had put Porgy and Bess on the repertoire of the concert which celebrated the tenth anniversary of their choir's existence.¹⁰⁰³ From the American perspective, Porgy and Bess was most definitely a success on several levels.

From the Yugoslav perspective, in their annual report for 1954, Yugoslav concert agency Jugokonzert noted how the visits of foreign artists to Yugoslavia and Yugoslav artists going abroad "maintain and expand the relations of our country with other countries". From the line of the ensembles that had visited Yugoslavia that year, continued the report, alongside Janine Charrat's ballet troupe, it was *Porgy and Bess* that had "undoubtedly achieved the greatest success."¹⁰⁰⁴ Similarly, when pianist Andrija Preger wrote an article for the "Review of International Affairs", he wrote how Porgy and Bess was "a veritable triumph" that had exceeded all expectations given that, lured by the name of the composer and "the negro cast", the Yugoslav audience "expected sensation and amusement". What the Yugoslavs got instead, continued Preger, was "real art ... deep and warm, saturated with humanity, with an

¹⁰⁰² Joseph C. Kolarek, "Concert by Belgrade University Academic Chorus," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, no. Tousi 23, March 18, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 91, NARA.

¹⁰⁰³ V.P., "Decenija plodnog rada. Omladinsko kulturno-umetničko društvo „Ivo Lola Ribar" počelo proslavu 10-godišnjice svog osnivanja," *Borba*, Year XIX, no. 292, December 6, 1954, 5.

¹⁰⁰⁴ AJ-559-10-23, "Izveštaj o radu Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije u toku 1954 godine," 1.

incomparable artistry of production and acting, full of musical feeling and spontaneity of expression, naturalness and conviction." The Yugoslavs saw, continued Preger, "a performance of real, moving drama, created with unusual artistic power" and when the Yugoslavs exhibited their venues what they brought with them were "unforgettable impressions, stirred by a great artistic experience."¹⁰⁰⁵ These reviews demonstrate that the artistic success of Porgy and Bess was undoubtedly there and was recognized and acknowledged by the Yugoslav public and critics alike. But more than that, as is visible from the 1957 report by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the arrival of Porgy and Bess was also seen to be the recognition to the state itself. When the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries wrote about the performances of foreign artists in Yugoslavia in 1957, it wrote how "Yugoslavia had become an attractive country for the performances [of foreign artists] because of its general cultural level, because of the interest of the public and hospitality and because of the significance of its political position and events and because of significant international cultural manifestations /that attract one another by force of competition/."¹⁰⁰⁶ These were all, technically, elements that made up the basic postulates of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy in accordance to the main elements of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. It was precisely the arrival of Porgy and Bess, alongside ensembles from the Soviet Union, Italy, France, Greece, China and other countries that the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries served as evidence for the claim of the attractiveness of their country for the arrival of foreign performers in 1957.¹⁰⁰⁷ The "brand strategy" was working as Porgy and Bess had, alongside other ensembles, contributed to the visibility of the country, that is, it raised the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

However, Porgy and Bess was, in the Yugoslav context, also important for one more reason in accordance to the "brand strategy" and this was further promotion of the country. As the Americans noted in their March 9, 1955 despatch, in his autumn address, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito proudly professed how "[p]eople come to visit us from all over the world". Indeed, as the Americans continued in the despatch, statistics confirmed the statement of the Yugoslav leader and the Yugoslavs themselves worked on "[a] far-flung international publicity campaign" to attract tourists for next season.¹⁰⁰⁸ It was in this context that Porgy and Bess worked in favour

¹⁰⁰⁵ Joseph Polakoff, "Educational Exchange: Evidence of Effectiveness of Cultural Program in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to DOS, no. 719, June 23, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD.WW 343, BOX 91, NARA.

¹⁰⁰⁶ AJ-559- 11-26, "Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom Skupštinskom odboru, Septembar 1957," 6-7.

¹⁰⁰⁷ AJ-559- 11-26, "Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom Skupštinskom odboru, Septembar 1957," 7.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1- December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tosi 21, March 9, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD.WW 343, container 92, NARA.

of the plans of the Yugoslav state. Why? Because, as historian Ellen Noonan demonstrated, in order to harness publicity for *Porgy and Bess* both at home and abroad and to shape its reception, Robert Breen mounted a powerful publicity campaign of his own.¹⁰⁰⁹ In order to generate publicity for *Porgy and Bess* in the United States, multiple reporters from the United States accompanied the troupe on the tour.¹⁰¹⁰ Cameras clicking and the overall presence of the media suited Yugoslavia. Publicity was the key and publicity, to again reiterate the basic postulate of Yugoslavia's cultural relations in the 1950s, was to serve the goal of acquainting the world with Yugoslavia. In such a context, *Porgy and Bess* was a promotional campaign of Yugoslavia as it was of the United States.

One of the journalists who came to Yugoslavia with *Porgy and Bess* was humourist Art Buchwald. He was first a reporter at *Variety* magazine, then a columnist of *The New York Herald Tribune* from 1949 to 1962 when he moved to *The Washington Post*.¹⁰¹¹ Buchwald covered the visit of *Porgy and Bess* in Yugoslavia and wrote an article about it in the *The New York Herald Tribune* that pretty much detailed the transformation of the country. He began his article with a statement that "many changes have taken place in Belgrade since we were here in 1950." Those changes included not only the installation of a traffic light to solve the capital city's traffic system problem, but also more beefsteak on the menus of Yugoslav restaurants, then the comeback of the chocolate cake previously seen as "a capitalist luxury", the amazing taste of "čevapčići" which Buchwald translates as "little sausages" and much better wine.¹⁰¹² It were the restaurants that had, according to Buchwald, signalled the greatest change in Yugoslavia. Indeed, continues Buchwald, on June 5, 1952 a brazen customer in Belgrade's Majestic Hotel dared to return his stake, dissatisfied with how it was grilled.¹⁰¹³ This specific event, so we can sense from Buchwald's interpretation, was a clear demarcation line between the old and new Yugoslavia. As Buchwald writes, the "old" Yugoslav way would have seen the guest being "thrown out of the restaurant bodily, or sent to jail for being a Fascist agitator."

¹⁰⁰⁹ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 201-207.

¹⁰¹⁰ Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess*, 205.

¹⁰¹¹ Buchwald, Art. *Hrvatska enciklopedija, mrežno izdanje*. Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2021.

Accessed on September 1, 2021. <https://www.enciklopedija.hr/natuknica.aspx?ID=9927>

¹⁰¹² Art Buchwald, "Europe's Lighter Side. There've Been Some Changes Made," *New York Herald Tribune*, December 30, 1954. Scrapbook 93/23, George and Ira Gershwin Collection, Music Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. The same article was also published on January 16, 1955 in *The Washington Post* under the title "Uplift Airlift Shores Up 'Liberalicia'," pp. E3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post.

¹⁰¹³ Art Buchwald, "Europe's Lighter Side. There've Been Some Changes Made," *New York Herald Tribune*, December 30, 1954. Scrapbook 93/23, George and Ira Gershwin Collection, Music Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. The same article was also published on January 16, 1955 in *The Washington Post* under the title "Uplift Airlift Shores Up 'Liberalicia'," pp. E3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post.

Instead, continued Buchwald, the chef took notice of the remark and redid the stake for the customer. The restaurants were state-ownership before 1952 while the self-management system Yugoslavia was sporting made sure that, as Buchwald wrote, "the customer is occasionally right." Buchwald also took note of the new fashion sported by the Yugoslavs, namely the wives of Yugoslav officials. As Buchwald writes, Parisian gowns were ordered by the wives of top Yugoslav officials for the visit of the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. Wives of those ranked just below the top officials had their gowns carbon copied from the Parisian ones while the wives of low ranking officials had their gowns flown in from Italy. The male population of the delegation ordered their jackets, according to Buchwald, from movie studios and the national opera while some had their suits tailor-made in Belgrade. The Yugoslav side fashioned appropriate clothing for the visit of the Ethiopian Emperor and, to prevent such problems from occurring in the near future, as Buchwald noted, each wife of Yugoslav governmental official was now a proud owner of two gowns while their husbands owned a tuxedo. Additionally, Belgrade's nightclubs improved too and, as Buchwald noted, in one of them, the members of the secret police of Yugoslavia, the so-called UDBA, "no longer get the best tables." Furthermore as Buchwald noted, it was now also possible to tell political jokes "without the regime getting mad."¹⁰¹⁴ Humour aside, Art Buchwald recognized and wrote to the Americans about Yugoslavia's rebranding efforts. As scholar Peter Van Ham notes, name and flag changes and changes in language and fashion sense are all changes that indicate rebranding and a change of the political system.¹⁰¹⁵ *Porgy and Bess*, at least in this context, served Yugoslavia's purpose.

Artistically speaking, *Porgy and Bess* also served as a demonstration of the credibility of the Yugoslavs as partners in the musical interaction between them and the United States when they, in 1971, took all the necessary steps to make sure to afford full credibility to the American opera when they staged it in Belgrade. "They wanted an American director", stated Irvin Barnes when the *The Washington Post*, *Times Herald*, brought news to American readers that the Yugoslavs were staging their version of *Porgy and Bess*. Barnes, who had been one of the three singers of *Porgy* on the 1952 to 1956 tour and who performed the role in Yugoslavia in 1954, recalled how he was in Basel when the Yugoslav call came. One of the reasons why the Yugoslavs insisted on having an American directing the opera had been, as Barnes told *The Washington*

¹⁰¹⁴ Art Buchwald, "Europe's Lighter Side. There've Been Some Changes Made," *New York Herald Tribune*, December 30, 1954. Scrapbook 93/23, George and Ira Gershwin Collection, Music Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. The same article was also published on January 16, 1955 in *The Washington Post* under the title "Uplift Airlift Shores Up 'Liberalicia'," pp. E3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post.

¹⁰¹⁵ van Ham, "Place Branding: the State of the Art," 134.

Post, Times Herald, "because they wanted a production with a soul and this is what I hope they are getting". The article continued to stress the immense popularity of this work in Europe, not so much in the United States and how a company in Budapest was also staging it but without foreign consultants. While Barnes praised the voices and the scenery of that production, as *The Washington Post, Times Herald* article continued, he "was disturbed by the characterization" which "seemed to him to burlesque Negro mannerism instead of evoking them realistically". What especially bothered Barnes, so was stated in a couple of lines below in the article, was the addition of a political element, nonexistent in the original work, that the Communist countries could not do without when staging this play. As the article noted, Barnes rejects some of the portrayals in the Budapest version of *Porgy and Bess* feeling that the essence of the production lies "in the dignity of *Porgy*".¹⁰¹⁶ The remainder of the article then noted how different the Yugoslav attempt to stage the play was. The Yugoslav version of the play, so the article stated, ensured dignity, as seen in the choice of the finest artists of the Yugoslav opera scene, such as Miroslav Čangalović, Radmila Sinjalić and Sava Javanović in the roles of *Porgy*, *Bess* and *Sportin' Life* respectively, to perform in the play. While the article noted that language caused some problems in communication between the director and the Yugoslav cast, when the Yugoslavs needed to be told that their movements did not resemble the original movements of the characters, Barnes employed the method of directly telling the Yugoslavs "a black man wouldn't do that. Coming from me, it's a little hard to dispute."¹⁰¹⁷ Expressed differently, the Yugoslavs aimed to honestly present *Porgy and Bess* in Yugoslavia, a collaborative venture between them and the American agent that served the desired image of the American brand.

The test launch of the music diplomatic program between the United States and Yugoslavia through *Porgy and Bess* was more than successful. *Porgy and Bess* had demonstrated that music diplomacy could function as an element that could work in favour of buttressing the independence of Yugoslavia, an important element for both sides, even if their objectives were different. Looking at it from the purely economic perspective, just like Yugoslavia, the United States also needed to ensure that, given that their version of Yugoslav independence depended on the citizens of Yugoslavia being satisfied and thus loyal to the Yugoslav independent brand, that they plaster appropriate products into the Yugoslav market to keep Yugoslavs satisfied

¹⁰¹⁶ Dan Morgan, "A Serbian 'Porgy and Bess'," *The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973)*, December 13, 1971, B10. Proquest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post

¹⁰¹⁷ Dan Morgan, "A Serbian 'Porgy and Bess'," *The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973)*, December 13, 1971, B10. Proquest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post

with their independent brand. Of course, this is not to dispute scholars who state that the United States had its own intrinsic motivations and was preoccupied with selling their own image of the United States to the countries on the receiving end. Yugoslavia was no different target in this regard, especially if we focus on other objectives of the United States in Yugoslavia, as we have already stated in the introductory lines of this dissertation. However, the ultimate goal of the United States and thus their ultimate investment was Yugoslavia's independence. To keep up with the demands of the market, and Chapter One had indeed showed us that there was a demand for American products on the Yugoslav market, the United States needed to keep providing the Yugoslav market with attractive musical products to ultimately preserve their own investment into the Yugoslav independence.

As the following pages will demonstrate, jazz diplomacy was part of the campaign that had the aim of preserving the Yugoslav independent brand. Even though we do not have materials that clearly state that this was a collaborative venture of the two sides, the basic postulates, as we have seen Yugoslav cultural diplomatic ones in the previous chapter and, as we shall see the American ones in this chapter, were aimed at the same goal – the Yugoslav independence. Based on these postulates, we can clearly discern that the motivation of those engaged in cultural diplomacy, namely American officials stationed in Yugoslavia as well as Yugoslav agents previously mentioned such as Živković, Mazur, Kelemen and others, the latter organizing cultural manifestations and allowing American participation in them, all worked in favour of the Yugoslav independence.

3.3. "The messengers had arrived": jazz diplomacy starts

In a recent interview, jazz musician Davor Kajfeš recalled of the efforts of John Lewis, the frontman of The Modern Jazz Quartet, to teach members of Boško Petrović's band how to play jazz. His effort was a notable one, continued Kajfeš, especially since race relations made many African American jazz musicians inclined to hide their playing techniques in fear of others stealing their ideas. This was what made John Lewis different from others, as Kajfeš further explained, as he was more than willing to share what he knew.¹⁰¹⁸ This characteristic of the frontman of the Modern Jazz Quartet brought enormous benefits to Yugoslav musicians. As Kajfeš further recalled, they learned to play jazz from records.¹⁰¹⁹ The trouble with records, so Kajfeš continued, was that they "didn't scream if you made an error."¹⁰²⁰ Only rare European jazz musicians, among them some Yugoslav jazz musicians, were given the opportunity to work directly with musicians such as John Lewis thus, as jazz musician Boško Petrović recalled in his autobiography, gaining valuable lessons "no one at that time in Europe could get just like that".¹⁰²¹ Indeed, as Kajfeš further recalled in the cited interview, when these American jazz greats began their descent on Yugoslavia, it felt "as if angels came from the sky. The messengers had arrived."¹⁰²²

The arrival of these "messengers" to Yugoslavia began in mid-1950s when Yugoslavia was included on the itinerary of the tour of Dizzy Gillespie as, so historian Dean Vuletic noted, the only Eastern European country.¹⁰²³ Looking at the "Country Plan for Yugoslavia" and American assessment reports drafted around Dizzy's visit to Yugoslavia, as part of the American foreign policy towards Yugoslavia, this tour was also to serve the primary American objective for Yugoslavia which was acceptance of the country's specific brand while, simultaneously, trying to orient that same brand more to the West.¹⁰²⁴ In branding terms, Dizzy was an instrument so

¹⁰¹⁸ Davor Hrvoj, "Davor Kajfeš - Kako sam oduševio Quincyja Jonesa," January 2, 2022, <https://glazba.hr/citaj/intervju/davor-kajfes-kako-sam-odusevio-quincyja-jonesa/> (last accessed on February 16, 2022) (hereinafter "Kajfeš. "Kako sam oduševio Quincy Jonesa")

¹⁰¹⁹ Kajfeš, "Kako sam oduševio Quincyja Jonesa."

¹⁰²⁰ Kajfeš, Davor. "Kako sam oduševio Quincyja Jonesa."

¹⁰²¹ Boško Petrović, Davor Hrvoj. *Život kao jam session: Boško Petrović- autobiografija* (Zagreb: Menart, 2012), 199.

¹⁰²² Kajfeš, Davor. "Kako sam oduševio Quincyja Jonesa."

¹⁰²³ Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 205.

¹⁰²⁴ See Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Tousey 144, June 12, 1956, field circular no. 13 (Policy Programs), December 28, 1955, 2; Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 66, December 18, 1956, 1. Both documents are located at RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

serve the brand vision of the American state for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. It is thus not surprising that Dizzy Gillespie shared the same "Area Objective" with *Porgy and Bess*. The American trumpeter also arrived to Yugoslavia in an attempt to achieve the American "Area Objective" that aimed to accentuate the "common heritage, institutions and traditions which link Europe and the United States".¹⁰²⁵

For Yugoslavia, Dizzy also came in the name of Yugoslav independence as, to reiterate from Chapter Two, it was during this time that the country experimented with various strategies to ensure the survival of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international scene and one of the strategies to raise brand awareness had been precisely the performances of top-notch foreign artists in the country. *Borba's* depiction of Dizzy Gillespie as a "top-notch American trumpeter"¹⁰²⁶ serves as evidence that the famed jazz musician was included in this category and was thus an instrument of the Yugoslav state to raise the awareness of the Yugoslav brand on the international cultural scene. As was noted in *Borba*, Dizzy's arrival to Yugoslavia came through the partnership of American ANTA and the Yugoslav Jazz Federation as the renowned American musician came under a series of events organized by the Jazz Federation, entitled „We introduce you to various styles". Under this arrangement, so *Borba* continued, the musician and his band were set to perform in Zagreb on May 8th before departing for Belgrade for performances on May 9th and May 10th.¹⁰²⁷ Yugoslav market forces made Dizzy's arrival to Yugoslavia possible as the Americans noted in their December 18, 1956 despatch how they fully exploited the Yugoslav "balancing" strategy and the prevalent climate of the Yugoslav cultural market that, amid the "normalization" of the relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, was more than willing to fill itself up with American musical products.¹⁰²⁸

While the Yugoslavs and the Americans got the timing right and the market was indeed ready for the arrival of Dizzy Gillespie, the product itself was attractive too. While there were other American performers who had arrived to Yugoslavia before Dizzy Gillespie and after *Porgy and Bess*, American officials themselves confessed how Dizzy was different. First and foremost, as the August 1, 1956 American despatch noted, other American attractions allowed the Yugoslavs to find some connection to Europe, be that connection found in American artists

¹⁰²⁵ Joseph C. Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 66, December 18, 1956, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹⁰²⁶ "Uspeo koncert džez-trubača Dizija Gilespija," *Borba*, Year XXI, no. 118, May 11, 1956, 5.

¹⁰²⁷ "Crnački džez orkestar Dizija Gilespija gostovaće u Beogradu 9 i 10 maja," *Borba*, Year XXI, no. 100, April 21, 1956, 5.

¹⁰²⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 66, December 18, 1956, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

performing European works, having European musical teachers or being born in Europe thus adopting some of the characteristics of the European environment. The connection was almost always, continued the Americans in the same despatch, made with Europe, especially Eastern Europe "which takes some of the sting out of the artist's representing the West" and this was different with Dizzy Gillespie.¹⁰²⁹ Indeed, these words are indicative of the prevalent thinking amongst American officials at that time which, to reiterate, saw classical music to be Europe's "forte" while jazz became that "forte" for America.¹⁰³⁰

For the customers, Dizzy was appropriate too as elements of the American research of the Yugoslav market revealed how jazz as an instrument could help American branding efforts. It was in a July 3, 1953 despatch that the Americans wrote how musical and exhibit programs constituted a part of the overall cultural programs of their Zagreb Information Center. When the American center in Budapest closed its door, so the same despatch continued, their records and scores went to the Information Center in Zagreb. As the Americans further reported in the July 3, 1953 despatch, Zagreb Symphony Orchestra played a concert with a program which contained American music while the people of Zagreb also enjoyed a concert featuring jazz, music that was, according to the Consulate, "immensely popular here". The Yugoslav audience reacted to the American program, so the July 3, 1953 despatch continued, with "[e]very efforts seems to indicate greater understanding and the deepening of the friendship between the Americans and Yugoslavs."¹⁰³¹ Put differently, jazz was a valuable branding instrument as it could the attention of the customers. Indeed, this was confirmed in a July 25, 1955 report from USIS Zagreb that emphasized how "[m]ore than 150 persons were turned away because of lack of space at the one jazz concert organized."¹⁰³² Additionally, as evident from the July 3, 1953 despatch, in combination with other factors, jazz was also recognized as having the power to assist in the development of amicable relations between the two countries. In this regard, Americans stationed in Belgrade changed little of their thinking over time. As the Americans noted in a December 10, 1970 airgram: "Jazz is a great leveler and a marvelous means of

¹⁰²⁹ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Visit of President's Fund/ANTA-sponsored Jazz Musician Dizzy GILLESPIE and Band to Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tosi 12, August 1, 1956, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, box 103, NARA.

¹⁰³⁰ Saito, *The Global Politics of Jazz*, 3.

¹⁰³¹ Theresa C. Mravintz, "The New USIS Headquarters in Zagreb," FSD from American Consulate, Zagreb to DOS, no. 4, July 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, RG 59 DOS Decimal File 1950-54, box 2472, NARA.

¹⁰³² T.J. Crockett, "USIS Zagreb's Semi-Annual Activity Report," from USIS, Zagreb to USIA, Washington- through USIS, Belgrade, July 25, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

communication; it does the American image no harm to be associated with such an effort to bridge the generation gap."¹⁰³³

Jazz was an appropriate product for one more reason that connected all three elements necessary for the successful launch of the product – the timing, the market and, a segment of a target customers. As we had seen from the last subchapter of Chapter Two, the targets of American cultural diplomacy and potential customers for their vision of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand were those Yugoslav agents who belonged to the Yugoslav arts community, that is, people such as Boško Petrović and Davor Kajfeš, the musicians. The era in which Dizzy, The Glenn Miller Orchestra and Louis Armstrong arrived to Yugoslavia corresponded to an era of Yugoslav jazz described by jazz musician Milivoj Koebler as the "[p]eriod of learning and mastering the craft".¹⁰³⁴ As Milivoj Koebler explained in his presentation entitled "Laka i popularna muzika u Jugoslaviji" ("Light and popular Music in Yugoslavia") at the "Yugoslav-American seminar on music", held at Sv. Stefan from July 6 to July 14, 1968¹⁰³⁵, in the postwar period, the older generation of musicians such as Bojan Adamič, Bojan Hohnjec, Ferdo Pomykalo, Marjan Marjanović and others, joined the younger generation of musicians, which was fascinated by jazz and its "new way of treating the instrument and opportunities afforded to them by improvisation", in their attempts to produce modern popular music. The products of their efforts, continued Koebler, had been the establishment of a large number of orchestras that fell under two categories: professional ones, established under the banner of radio-stations, and amateur ones established either by a conductor or cultural-artistic societies. Jazz and popular music associations, as Koebler further reported, arrived on the scene at the beginning of the 1950s.¹⁰³⁶ Koebler further noted in the same report how activities, such as concerts, publication of sheet music, the need of the film and radio industry for Yugoslav compositions and many other similar ventures, stimulated a demand for Yugoslav popular music.¹⁰³⁷ Koebler's report also made no bones about the fact that American jazz bands exercised an enormous influence over these orchestras but, at the same time, as Koebler continued,

¹⁰³³ Leonhart, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations: Newport Jazz in Belgrade – Wrap-up report," Airgram from Amembassy BG to DOS, no. A-456, December 10, 1970, Group II CPP, Series 2. Performing Arts, Subseries 1. Performers, box 66, folder 6, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

¹⁰³⁴ Milivoj Koebler, "Laka i popularna muzika u Jugoslaviji." Jugoslovensko-američki seminar o muzici, Sv. Stefan, 6-14 Juli 1968, in *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 87-88, 1968, 454. (hereinafter, "Laka i popularna muzika u Jugoslaviji")

¹⁰³⁵ For some of the papers presented at this seminar see *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija*, no. 87-88, 1968.

¹⁰³⁶ Milivoj Koebler, "Laka i popularna muzika u Jugoslaviji." Jugoslovensko-američki seminar o muzici, Sv. Stefan, 6-14 Juli 1968, in *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 87-88, 1968, 453.

¹⁰³⁷ Koebler, "Laka i popularna muzika u Jugoslaviji," 453-454.

Yugoslav musicians attempted to create their own arrangements "to get the audience accustomed to the new, contemporary sound, more complex harmonic structure and the modern comprehension of rhythm".¹⁰³⁸ All of these efforts on the micro-market, represented by the Yugoslav jazz scene, were developing in parallel to the development and use of cultural diplomacy as a brand strategy by the Yugoslav state that aimed, to reiterate, to pull all of its resources and raise the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the much larger international market. Indeed, as historian Dean Vuletic noted, the period from 1945 to 1961 was not just a period during which the contours of the Yugoslav popular music began to emerge¹⁰³⁹ but this was also the shaping period of the Yugoslav foreign policy. The changes in the two areas, continued Vuletic, were interdependent.¹⁰⁴⁰

In the same report delivered at the seminar at Sv. Stefan in 1968, Koerbler marked the 1958 arrival of Opatija Festival on the Yugoslav scene as the year that signalled the end of this "learning phase" when, officially, popular music received recognition in Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁴¹ Other Yugoslav jazz musicians and critics interpreted the time frame of this "learning phase" in Yugoslav jazz to be slightly different. Miljenko Prohaska, for instance, had still seen the early days of Bled Jazz Festival as an era in which Yugoslav musicians sat, listened and performed on "jam sessions" with foreign musicians. This was, according to Prohaska, the first phase. Collaboration between Yugoslav and foreign jazz musicians marked the second phase while the third phase, so Prohaska continued, arrived when Yugoslav music became a part of the repertoire of foreign musicians.¹⁰⁴² Similarly, a Croatian critic wrote how it was with the arrival of Bled Jazz Festival on the Yugoslav scene that a Yugoslav jazz repertoire began to emerge as this particular festival required writing new arrangements "especially those based on our folklore, which was especially interesting and something new to foreign observers."¹⁰⁴³ This music critic thus positioned this "learning phase" in a similar time frame as did Miljenko Prohaska. Notwithstanding these different interpretation of the end years of this phase, the fact

¹⁰³⁸ Milivoj Koerbler, "Laka i popularna muzika u Jugoslaviji." Jugoslovensko-američki seminar o muzici, Sv. Stefan, 6-14 Juli 1968, in *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 87-88, 1968, 453.

¹⁰³⁹ Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 6, 8.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Vuletic, *Yugoslav Communism and the Power of Popular Music*, 8.

¹⁰⁴¹ Koerbler, "Laka i popularna muzika u Jugoslaviji," 454.

¹⁰⁴² Hrvoj, "Miljenko Prohaska: „Kad je netko bio nepodoban izbrisali bi ga sa slike.”

¹⁰⁴³ Nenad Hlača, "Od danas u Ljubljani: Četiri dana čudesnih nota. Je li nebo sklono jazzu?" *Večernji list*, God. XV, no. 3652, June 3, 1971, 5.

remains that the arrival of Dizzy Gillespie, The Glenn Miller Orchestra and Louis Armstrong corresponded to an era in which the Yugoslavs were developing their branding instrument.¹⁰⁴⁴

In branding terms, the alignment of time, the climate of the market and the needs and wants of the customers meant that all of the pieces of the puzzle needed for the successful launch of jazz diplomacy fell into place. The only thing missing was the invitation to launch the product itself. This came in the final days of December 1955 when the State Department received a telegram from the American Embassy in Belgrade that stated how they and USIS were of firm belief that an "American Jazz Group [would] certain[ly] get enthusiastic reception [in] Yugoslavia", requesting both further information and promotional materials.¹⁰⁴⁵

On May 11, 1956 Yugoslav *Borba* wrote how Dizzy Gillespie had, the previous day, held two successful concerts at the Kolarac People's University Hall and the Guard House (*Dom Garde*) at Topčider. The hall of the Kolarac People's University, according to *Borba*, had been filled to capacity. The article continued how Dizzy Gillespie and his orchestra "still demonstrated the high level of today's reproductive jazz music", even though the jazz musician played "bebop", a style "which among certain listeners does not meet complete approval".¹⁰⁴⁶ To another Yugoslav critic, it was bebop that made Dizzy a complete miss for Yugoslavia, as the reviewer for *Nedjeljne Informativne Novine* wrote how, instead of bebop, a better choice would have been a performer of "'progressive' or interpreters of 'swing'" with "more harmony and melody, more virtuosity and artistry, than in be-bop." The reviewer continued how some of his friends pondered on abandoning jazz altogether while he tried to talk them out of it by stating that "Dizzy hasn't even [got] many friends in the West... With him are only the jazz fanatics."¹⁰⁴⁷ While this critic additionally found fault in Dizzy's comportment on stage, describing the musician's "method of arousing enthusiasm as 'rather cheap'" and offered a rather critical review of the band's performance in *Nedjeljne Informativne Novine*¹⁰⁴⁸, musicians' accounts tell a

¹⁰⁴⁴ Indeed, as historian Dean Vuletic noted, the Yugoslav state started to invest more in the development of Yugoslavia's music industry of Yugoslavia starting 1957 (Vuletic, "The Making of a Yugoslav popular music industry," 271-272) while in 1959 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia declared how "international meetings and cultural ties had become more important for Yugoslavia's affirmation abroad, and it accordingly urged its artists to participate more in them." (Vuletic, *Sounds like America*, 118)

¹⁰⁴⁵ Riddleberger, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 734, December 30, 1955, 511.683/12-3055, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, box 2205, NARA.

¹⁰⁴⁶ "Uspeo koncert džez-trubača Dizija Gilespija," *Borba*, Year XXI, no. 118, May 11, 1956, 5.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Extract from *Nedjeljne Informativne Novine* translated in Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Visit of President's Fund/ANTA-sponsored Jazz Musician DIZZY GILLESPIE and Band to Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tousey 12, August 1, 1956, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, box 103, NARA.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: Visit of President's Fund/ANTA-sponsored Jazz Musician Dizzy GILLESPIE and Band to Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Tousey 12, August 1, 1956, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-1959, BOX 103, NARA.

different story. For instance, a twenty-seven year old unnamed drummer, who wrote that he played in Radio Zagreb's Dance band, described the 1956 performance of Dizzy Gillespie in the American jazz magazine *Down Beat* as "[the] happiest days on our life."¹⁰⁴⁹ Dizzy's performance earned praise from the already mentioned Aleksandar Bubašević who wrote in his autobiography that "for as long as I live, I will not forget his performance of the composition »I can't get started«, with such musicality and perfect technique he performed this popular theme".¹⁰⁵⁰ Dizzy's performance apparently triggered a strong emotional reaction in the Yugoslav audience as one Yugoslav lady was quoted in the American magazine *The Saturday Review* as stating "[w]hat this country needs is fewer ambassadors and more jam sessions."¹⁰⁵¹

While Dizzy Gillespie's tour was rather successful, the same could not be said about the second Yugoslav-American attempt at jazz diplomacy. The tour of The Glenn Miller Orchestra in 1957, sponsored by the State Department, was organized by the same partners as those involved in the planning of Dizzy's tour: ANTA contacted the Jazz Federation of Yugoslavia with the offer of a tour by the said orchestra¹⁰⁵² while the Yugoslav state, that is its official representative bodies in the United States, stayed on the sidelines¹⁰⁵³, as evident from the section on the Yugoslav audience in the previous chapter. As an article in an American newspaper wrote, the tour included North Africa, France, England, Germany and Yugoslavia, territories in which "fans have accepted the American and his musical stylings with an enthusiasm that even tops their U.S. popularity". The same article then noted the reaction of Ray McKinley's mother to such news as she stated how "[p]eople just seem to like Raymond and his music".¹⁰⁵⁴ However, official American assessment reports and the Yugoslav reviews of the same performance indicate that, regardless of what his mother said, good old Raymond failed in his ambassadorial role and was not loved in Yugoslavia, even by those who were supposed to have his back, such as American officials stationed in Belgrade who represented the state that sent Ray McKinley and the Glenn Miller Orchestra on tour. The official despatch

¹⁰⁴⁹ Charles Suber, "The first chorus," *Down Beat*, Vol. 26, no. 7, April 2, 1959, 4.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Aleksandar Bubašević, *Sav taj jazz: moja galerija slika i druge priče* (Zagreb: Durieux, 2005), 56-57.

¹⁰⁵¹ Marshall W. Stearns, "Is Jazz Good Propaganda? The Dizzy Gillespie Tour," *The Saturday Review* 39, July 14, 1956, 29.

¹⁰⁵² Riddleberger, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1157, February 18, 1957, 511.683/2-1857, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-1959, box 2205, NARA.

¹⁰⁵³ AJ-559-133-284, "Gostovanje američkih umetnika," Yugoslav Information Center Komisiji za kulturne veze s inostranstvom, 1 marta 1957. godine", 1-2.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ann Jones, "Warsaw Turns Out. Ray McKinley, Drug Making Hit in Poland," *Friday Evening*, April 19, 1957, no page numbers, folder 14, Newspaper Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution.

sent from Belgrade to USIA on June 6, 1957, described McKinley, the leader of the Orchestra and the drummer, as looking "more like an advertising account executive than an orchestra leader and is inclined to handle himself with a certain reserve and subtlety which a foreign audience is likely to interpret as indifference or hauteur" and the first performances demonstrated that the Glenn Miller Orchestra did not have "a strong, colorful personality at its helm".¹⁰⁵⁵ According to a May 7, 1957 telegram from Belgrade to State, an estimated audience of more than 12,000 people had seen the performance of the band during the tour of Yugoslavia which lasted for eight days. Despite the tour making an impact on the Yugoslav audience, so the May 7, 1957 telegram continued, the Glenn Miller Orchestra simply did not live up to the success enjoyed by Dizzy Gillespie and his band. As concluded in the same telegram, problems associated with this tour were "[i]nadequate vocalists in an area where vocalists are most popular soloists, and lack of program variety."¹⁰⁵⁶ The latter being a problem for The Glenn Miller Orchestra in Yugoslavia was reiterated a couple of days later in another American despatch that drew comparison to the soloists Dizzy Gillespie brought to Yugoslavia, Dottie Saulters and Herb Lanz, who "literally brought the house down with each rendition."¹⁰⁵⁷ In branding terms, an element of jazz diplomacy as a branding instrument was not aligned to the Yugoslav musical environment.

The Glenn Miller Orchestra's performance also failed, to recite the words of Catharine Slade-Brooking, to "'speak' to its audience". As the June 6, 1957 despatch wrote, from time to time, Ray McKinley "stimulated chuckles, but was not moved to the necessary antics often enough to inject an over-all gaiety [*sic*] and spontaneity into the performances." When he did get the audience to respond, continued the June 6, 1957 despatch, he demonstrated "markedly-improved showmanship ... but unfortunately he could not sustain his enthusiasm without immediate response – and spontaneity [*sic*] and instant appreciation are not characteristic of Yugoslav audiences."¹⁰⁵⁸ Indeed, even though the article that cited the words of Ray McKinley's mother proudly professed how "[w]hen he [Ray McKinley] plays drums, even the Reds

¹⁰⁵⁵ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: President's Fund-ANTA Tour-Glenn Miller Orchestra," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 121, June 6, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Riddleberger, Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1537, May 7, 1957, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, box 113, NARA.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: President's Fund- ANTA Tour-Glenn Miller Orchestra," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 121, June 6, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: President's Fund- ANTA Tour-Glenn Miller Orchestra," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 121, June 6, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

applaud"¹⁰⁵⁹, the Yugoslav reviews demonstrate how the Yugoslavs most definitely did not applaud. That the band did not have what it takes to win the Yugoslav audience over was stated by Zagreb's weekly *Kerempuh*. This weekly stated that the Orchestra, for the price of the tickets, performed well. This was not a bad orchestra, so *Kerempuh* continued, but the Orchestra was not successful in extracting the maximum out of the audience. "We yelled a lot, but it can't be said that the yelling could not have been better", concluded *Kerempuh*.¹⁰⁶⁰ The daily newspaper from Zagreb *Vjesnik* published a caricature of the band performing with the caption: "Well, and that should be a first-class orchestra. The alto saxophonist cannot raise his foot as high as C."¹⁰⁶¹ Another reviewer for *Narodni List* described The Glenn Miller Orchestra's first concert appearance in Zagreb as "simple and leisurly, the latter, maybe emphasized a little too much. They, namely, in humorous style, linked quite typically with their climate, tried to give to the whole occasion a most serene, entertaining character."¹⁰⁶² This critic had also noted how badly the band failed to reach the Yugoslav audience. The Yugoslav public came to The Glenn Miller Orchestra's concert, so the critic for *Narodni List* wrote, with the expectation of "a good jazz-music concert, and it obviously was not impressed by the throwing of instruments up in the air, with the forcible mimicry and gestures; not even by that announced 'playing with the whole body' of the otherwise sympathetic (and excellent!) contrabassist, Jim THORPE." The leader of the Orchestra, Ray McKinley, so the reviewer for *Narodni List* continued, "was too much mislead by his temperament before the microphone, which would have impressed on as something almost repulsive but for his firm gesture in the needed moment, and very agreeable voice and fine signing interpretation." The Yugoslav audience did not really understand Ray McKinley's announcements in English and, as the critic for *Narodni List* concluded, "it did not

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ann Jones, "Warsaw Turns Out. Ray McKinley, Drug Making Hit in Poland," *Friday Evening*, April 19, 1957, no page numbers, folder 14, Newspaper Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution.

¹⁰⁶⁰ "Glenn Miller Razočarao," *Kerempuh*, May 3, 1957, p 3, enclosed translation in L.S. Briggs to Lenny Hambro, August 28, 1957, folder "News Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980," box 51, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution.

¹⁰⁶¹ *Vjesnik*, April 28, 1957, pp. 7 enclosed translation in L.S. Briggs to Lenny Hambro, August 28, 1957, folder folder "News Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980," box 51, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution.

¹⁰⁶² N.T., "The Glenn Miller Orchestra in Zagreb," *Narodni List*, April 25, 1957, pp. 6, enclosed translation in L.S. Briggs to Lenny Hambro, August 28, 1957, folder folder "News Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980," box 51, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution.

look sympathetic that in some moments the players were entertaining themselves without paying much attention to the public."¹⁰⁶³

However, there were positive reactions to the Glenn Miller Orchestra in Yugoslavia as, to reiterate from the first subchapter of this chapter, audience in different areas of Yugoslavia had different preferences for jazz. For instance, as could be gathered from a review published in *Slovenski Poročevalec* (Slovenia), tickets for the concert of the Glenn Miller Orchestra had been sold out in advance and the reviewer assessed the performance as "a great success, and our public was carried away by the 'dixieland' in the same manner as they are by the 'rock and roll'."¹⁰⁶⁴ Equally satisfied with the Yugoslav public, at least in Ljubljana, was Ray McKinley. As the review in *Slovenski Poročevalec* continued, McKinley described the Ljubljana audience as "wonderful" and expressed sadness "that some of our members had to leave. Otherwise we might have some additions."¹⁰⁶⁵

The performance of The Glenn Miller Orchestra in Yugoslavia had also been a failure of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy. As seen in Chapter Two, Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy expected the Yugoslav audience, its "brand ambassadors", to be hospitable in their interaction with foreign performers in order to generate positive reviews and then to have these musicians disseminate information on Yugoslavia further in the world. Being hospitable was thus one of the brand values of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. It appears, however, that the performance of Ray McKinley in Osijek and the subsequent behaviour of the Yugoslav audience irked some Yugoslav spirits. The already mentioned *Kerempuh* made fun of the treatment of The Glenn Miller Orchestra in one hotel in Osijek. Apparently, the problem was, according to *Kerempuh*, that the entire hotel was too focused on the members of The Glenn

¹⁰⁶³ N.T., "The Glenn Miller Orchestra in Zagreb," *Narodni List*, April 25, 1957, pp. 6, enclosed translation in L.S. Briggs to Lenny Hambro, August 28, 1957, folder folder "News Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980," box 51, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Martin Žnideršič, "After the Glenn Miller Concert." *Slovenski Poročevalec*, April 25, 1957, p. 3, enclosed translation in L.S. Briggs to Lenny Hambro, August 28, 1957, folder folder "News Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980," box 51, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Martin Žnideršič, "After the Glen Miller Concert." *Slovenski Poročevalec*, April 25, 1957, p. 3, Martin Žnideršič, "After the Glenn Miller Concert." *Slovenski Poročevalec*, April 25, 1957, p. 3, enclosed translation in L.S. Briggs to Lenny Hambro, August 28, 1957, folder folder "News Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980," box 51, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C.

Miller Orchestra at the expense of domestic visitors. *Kerempuh* then threw shade at the hotel by stating that many other tourist centers, larger ones than Osijek, could be jealous of the way Osijek treated foreign guests.¹⁰⁶⁶ Even though the Yugoslavs were supposed to be hospitable to attract foreigners, apparently there was such a thing as being too hospitable.

From the promotional aspect of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, the visit of The Glenn Miller Orchestra had been a failure too. The members of this jazz orchestra had spoken about Yugoslavia to the outside world but not in the way the Yugoslavs may have expected them too. As Lenny Hambro, the altoist and band manager, noted in *Down Beat*, "[o]ne town in Yugoslavia seemed a little cold to us. They loved the band, but they were not so avid as other towns. I guess they had a lot more Red influence there."¹⁰⁶⁷ Other members of the band expressed similar sentiments. As Ray McKinley noted to *Variety* magazine, "... various jazz clubs and Yugoslavia concert clubs went all out in making our tour a great success", but "[i]n just one city – Osijek, Yugoslavia – the band laid an egg. The audience was cold and never warmed up the group."¹⁰⁶⁸ These examples demonstrate how, from the promotional aspect and the ability of the Yugoslav audience to attract others to the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, this tour was a failure.

Despite this tour's limited success, American officials in Belgrade took effort to stress that this was not a rejection of the product. In their June 6, 1957 despatch USIS noted that it was their hope that Washington did not see their assessment of the performance of The Glenn Miller Orchestra in Yugoslavia as mirroring "a disinterest in jazz or popular music groups". It was quite the opposite, continued the same despatch, as the position of USIS was that "these groups can make a tremendous contribution to the furthering of understanding of the West and Western culture". This despatch also reiterated the request for the State Department to fund "tours of leading jazz specialists."¹⁰⁶⁹ Another American despatch from May 7, 1957 stressed that despite the modest success of The Glenn Miller Orchestra in Yugoslavia, jazz was still an avenue to

¹⁰⁶⁶ "Živjeli stranci," *Kerempuh*, May 10, 1957, 5, enclosed translation in L.S. Briggs to Lenny Hambro, August 28, 1957, folder "News Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980," box 51, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Dom Cerulli, "Curtain Parts, Lets McKinley Through," *Down Beat*, Special: Ray McKinley and Band, June 13, 1957, 14, folder "News Clippings and Magazine Articles 1956-1980," box 51, Series 2: Ephemera, Subseries 2.2.: News Clippings and Magazine Articles, 1929-1955, box 51, Ray McKinley Music and Ephemera, ca 1945-1994, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C.

¹⁰⁶⁸ "Music: Miller Orch (McKinley) Mops up in East Europe; Lays One Egg in Yugo," *Variety*, May 15, 1957, 57.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: President's Fund-ANTA Tour-Glenn Miller Orchestra," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousey 121, June 6, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

exploit in Yugoslavia. What was needed, as the same despatch continued, was a leader to be "[an] entertainer like Gillespie, Louis Armstrong or Lionel Hampton."¹⁰⁷⁰ The already cited June 6, 1957 despatch adopted the same position and stated that "[n]egro jazz musicians are particularly popular in Yugoslavia", urging the State Department to send either Louis Armstrong or Lionel Hampton to Yugoslavia in 1958.¹⁰⁷¹

The hopes of American officials stationed in Yugoslavia were answered by their Yugoslav partners who delivered the desired product in 1959. In a despatch from January 13, 1960, the Americans described the arrival of two specific individuals as one of their projects that had the aim of simply "bring[ing] them to Yugoslavia". The arrival of these two individuals, so the January 13, 1960 despatch continued, was not a matter of "convincing most of the knowledgeable people of the country: they know of their works, were conversant with their contributions, [they] simply wanted to see and speak to them, and hear from their mouths. By different types of people – but now always different – they were highly respected already." The issue at stake, so stated the January 13, 1960 despatch, was to actually "bring the Yugoslavs together with them." The despatch then identified these two specific individuals to be Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Louis Armstrong.¹⁰⁷² As evident from this paragraph, the Americans listed the arrival of these two individuals as a project designed to achieve one of the American objectives listed in the January 13, 1960 despatch as showcasing "... in Yugoslavia's 'Strategic Show Window,'" the American "political, economic and cultural dynamism".¹⁰⁷³ However, the arrival of Louis Armstrong to the country was primarily a Yugoslav undertaking. In a February 3, 1959 telegram, American officials stationed in Belgrade wrote how Jugokonzert was able to pay "most of large fee Armstrong asks". The fee amounted to 9,000 dollars and the arrangement included the musician playing five concerts and agreeing, according to the said telegram, to take half of the said fee in dinars. Still, continued the telegram, Jugokonzert reached out to the American Embassy to receive help in the sum of 1,500 dollars.¹⁰⁷⁴ The arrival of Louis Armstrong to the country was described by the then PAO Heath Bowman in a March 31, 1959

¹⁰⁷⁰ Riddleberger, Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1537, May 7, 1957, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, box 113, NARA.

¹⁰⁷¹ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Educational Exchange: President's Fund – ANTA Tour – Glenn Miller Orchestra," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tosi 121, June 6, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹⁰⁷² Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 53, January 13, 1960, 14, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹⁰⁷³ Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 53, January 13, 1960, 11, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Rankin, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 737, February 3, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

letter as "the biggest thing that ever hit Belgrade; they've got the militia out in force against the possibility of riots."¹⁰⁷⁵ American materials testify that Louis Armstrong was indeed a highly anticipated guest in Yugoslavia. As an American despatch from Belgrade to USIA from May 13, 1959 noted, tickets for five concerts, one in Ljubljana on March 31, two performances in Zagreb (April 1) and two in Belgrade (April 2), were sold out well before the concerts and stories circulated around that the tickets for the performances of Louis Armstrong were resold "at several times their price."¹⁰⁷⁶

The first concert of Louis Armstrong's Yugoslav tour, the one in Ljubljana, did not begin on time due to the plane carrying the renowned jazz musician being delayed.¹⁰⁷⁷ The American official report and the recollection of USIA's Junior Officer Trainee in Zagreb (later the Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer in Belgrade) John W. Shirley give different accounts of the city from which Louis Armstrong departed to give a performance in Yugoslavia. The official report stated Brussels and the fog as the reason for the delay of Louis Armstrong's flight¹⁰⁷⁸ while Shirley put Le Bourget (Paris).¹⁰⁷⁹ According to Shirley, the route Louis Armstrong took was from Le Bourget to Zagreb and then the musician was off to Ljubljana to perform there. As Shirley continued, the reason for the delay of Armstrong's plane were Zagreb's airport's runway lights as they apparently weren't functioning properly "and they weren't going to let the plane land. I then spent an hour or more persuading the Zagreb department of roads to provide those little smudge pots they put on roads at night. We lined the runway with the smudge pots, and Louis Armstrong landed."¹⁰⁸⁰ According to the American magazine *Variety*, Armstrong's Ljubljana concert, scheduled to start at 9 pm, had been cancelled twice. The officials of Jugokonzert, continued *Variety*, managed to come into "radio contact with Armstrong's plane over Austria, securing his agreement to go on with the program at any time up until midnight." Armstrong and his band, continued *Variety*, appeared "on stage in their traveling clothes, many carrying borrowed instruments, the group received a standing ovation."¹⁰⁸¹ According to the

¹⁰⁷⁵ Heath Bowman to Gerard M. Gert, Belgrade, March 31, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Ambassador John W. Shirley interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt, November 21, 1989, 4, FAOHC, ADST.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Shirley interview, 4.

¹⁰⁸¹ "Satchmovic Just a Slav To Fans in Hot & Hectic Flying Yugoslav Tour," *Variety*, Vol. 214, no. 7, April 15, 1959, 1.

official report, 3,500 people attended the concert in Ljubljana that began at 11.30 and finished after 2 am. Later on, as the official assessment report continued, a reception was held at the only hotel that was willing to take in the invited crowd, which included around fifty people from the Slovenian jazz circuit, radio, TV and film personalities, local officials and journalists.¹⁰⁸² During this reception Louis Armstrong, according to *Variety* magazine, summarized his feeling by writing a dedication in a book of a Slovenian jazz musician. The dedication read, so *Variety* continued, "Man, you are a living aspirin; you like music as much as me — Satchmovic."¹⁰⁸³ Armstrong's Zagreb concerts drew in a crowd of 13,000 people while 4,500 people attended his Belgrade concerts.¹⁰⁸⁴

Armstrong's concert drew praise from critics too, one of them being Dušan Plavša, who just ten years prior was one of the harshest critics of jazz.¹⁰⁸⁵ As Plavša wrote, "they have enjoyed the concert of Louis Armstrong no less than those who see the famed trumpeter as a "semi-God".¹⁰⁸⁶ *Borba* stated how, when Armstrong appeared on the Belgrade stage, "we were confronted by the entire history of jazz in the person of this musician" while *Politika* wrote how "[e]ven the strict Puritan must confess that jazz is the most popular music today and Armstrong the greatest living musician."¹⁰⁸⁷ As the official assessment report of the Americans noted, Louis Armstrong reached a large number of people in Yugoslavia that came from the ranks of "young jazz enthusiasts to government officials of Slovenia, Croatia as well as Serbia."¹⁰⁸⁸ Those in attendance in Slovenia were RTV Ljubljana's Orchestra and their leader Bojan Adamič, the band of Mojmir Sepe, members of the Avsenik quintet, singers Marijana Deržaj, Betty Jurković and Majda Sepetova and many others.¹⁰⁸⁹

¹⁰⁸² Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

¹⁰⁸³ "Satchmovic Just a Slav To Fans in Hot & Hectic Flying Yugoslav Tour," *Variety*, Vol. 214, no. 7, April 15, 1959, 1.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Yugoslav jazz musicians recalled several instances of Plavša's negative attitude towards jazz. See Luković, *Prizori iz muzičkog života Jugoslavije*, 36, 40.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Dušan Plavša, "Zabavna muzika i vaspitanje omladine," *Naše teme: časopis mladih o društvenim zbivanjima*, Year III, no 3., 132.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Igor Andrejčić, Direction de Concerts de Slovenie, to American Consulate General Zagreb, April 3, 1959, translation attached to Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA.

The arrival of these three musicians and their bands marked the first stage of the Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy. In this phase, which was still a developmental phase of the Yugoslav branding instrument, American jazz musicians were the teachers while the Yugoslav musicians were the students. With the arrival of the 1960s on the scene and the arrival of new postulates of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, jazz diplomacy branched out and began running on three tracks. The first one was the American Cultural Presentations Program, the second booking efforts of Jugokonzert while the third track were the activities of Yugoslav "brand ambassadors". With this last step, so the next subchapter reveals, the Yugoslavs became much more active branding agents whose activities contributed to building Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy, one of the branding instruments of both Yugoslavia and the United States to preserve the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

3.4 The Yugoslavs take over

Just a year after the arrival and performance in Yugoslavia of perhaps the biggest name in contemporary jazz, Louis Armstrong, and three years after the last State Department sponsored jazz tour of The Glenn Miller Orchestra, Modern Jazz Quartet performed in Yugoslavia. As a June 29, 1960 American despatch wrote, the Modern Jazz Quartet gave five performances in five Yugoslav cities (Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Skoplje and Niš) to an estimated audience of 4 000 Yugoslavs. As a result of the success of the band, so the June 29, 1960 despatch continued, USIS succeeded in making "new and renew[ed] contacts in a field dominated by young people" and some of the band's concerts were attended by officials ranking high in the Yugoslav government. According to the same despatch, not only did Modern Jazz Quartet establish contacts with jazz aficionados, they were also "able to attract and in some cases convince the regular music critics in the classical and serious approach of the compositions of Messers. Lewis and Jackson, in their top-professional interpretation and finally by their dignified and intelligent impression on and off stage."¹⁰⁹⁰ After the band's performance in Yugoslavia and in parallel with the performance in Yugoslavia of Quincy Jones' Orchestra, famous Willis Conover came to Yugoslavia for a ten day stay which included him visiting four Yugoslav cities, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Ljubljana and Zagreb under the sponsorship of various Jazz Federations.¹⁰⁹¹ It was precisely the performances by the Modern Jazz Quartet, so wrote the American Country Assessment Report from March 13, 1961, that allowed Willis Conover to harvest "an additional benefit from the excitement they had aroused."¹⁰⁹² From the American vantage point and according to their evaluation criteria, the performance was a success.

From the Yugoslav perspective, this tour revealed one of the greatest problems faced by Jugokonzert, one of Yugoslavia's "brand champions", in its attempt to secure the support for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. To reiterate from the previous chapter, when Modern Jazz Quartet arrived to Yugoslavia, a new cultural diplomatic set of objectives were formulated by another "brand champion" of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Some of the aims had been, to restated from the already cited

¹⁰⁹⁰ Robert C. Haney, "The Modern Jazz Quartet Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 91, June 29, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹⁰⁹¹ Walter R. Roberts, "IBS Yugoslav Visit: Willis Conover, VOA," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 14, August 16, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹⁰⁹² "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report, USIS Yugoslavia," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Message No. 87, March 13, 1961, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, box 12, NARA.

1960 report of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, to further promote Yugoslav culture with meager financial resources¹⁰⁹³, to ensure the development of Yugoslav culture through interaction with other cultures¹⁰⁹⁴ and to demonstrate the cultural abundance of Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁹⁵ The said report recognized that these efforts, especially the promotion of Yugoslavia's culture abroad, were to be done with insufficient funds.¹⁰⁹⁶ These branding problems became visible around the time of the Modern Jazz Quartet's tour of Yugoslavia. It was then reported in the American *Billboard* magazine that five out of the ten proposed Modern Jazz Quartet's concerts had been cancelled due to a money-related disagreement over the currency in which to pay the artist's fees.¹⁰⁹⁷ This problem, which became more evident during the negotiation process for this tour, was, by no means, a new one. Two years earlier, Veljko Bijedić submitted a report to the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in which he wrote how his Agency was forced to enter into "bargaining" negotiations on artistic fees with foreign artists and organizations due to limited budgets of republican subsidiaries and not such ideal relations between them. This process, so Bijedić further stated in the same report, had not only cast doubt about the Agency's reputation but it also allowed foreign artists to manipulate the dates and programs of their performances in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, continued Bijedić in the said report, such a process had also allowed foreign artists to not give clear and definite answers about their performances in Yugoslavia and to cancel these same performances if a better opportunity for a performance in another place becomes available to them. While in previous years, according to Bijedić's report, prominent artists were more than willing "to perform in Yugoslavia under very favourable terms", this was no longer the case as such artists were now "setting even bigger terms than they get in specific musical centers such as Paris, Vienna and Milano." As the same report continued, the Agency was burdened with the difficulties of both finding ways to satisfy the audience's interest and simultaneously not allowing a drop in the level and diversity of Yugoslavia's concert seasons.¹⁰⁹⁸

This Yugoslav lack of financial resources impacted musical interaction between them and the Americans. In a despatch from November 3, 1958, the Americans lamented on numerous

¹⁰⁹³ AJ-559-20-41, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1960 godinu," 7.

¹⁰⁹⁴ AJ-559-20-41, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1960 godinu," 6.

¹⁰⁹⁵ AJ-559-20-41, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1960 godinu," 7.

¹⁰⁹⁶ AJ-559-20-41, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1960 godinu," Beograd, februar 1961, 7.

¹⁰⁹⁷ "MJQ Likes to be Paid in Yank Dollars," *The Billboard*, May 23, 1960, 7.

¹⁰⁹⁸ AJ-559-115-249, "Izveštaj o radu Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije," Prilog, Veljko Bijedić Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, No. 1082/18, December 17, 1958, 3.

difficulties they faced while attempting to conduct their program in Yugoslavia before penning down how they were hampered even "in the realm of private enterprise". However, as the November 3, 1958 despatch further continued, these problems were caused by the "lack of dollars probably more than planned disapproval". Offers of American performers to perform in Yugoslavia, as stated in the same despatch, were rejected by the Yugoslav side "for the lack of financial guaranty in hard currency."¹⁰⁹⁹ Indeed, during the December 16, 1964 meeting of the Committee for Musical Art, Veljko Bijedić revealed the bad state of his concert agency. To remember and reiterate from Chapter Two, his Agency was to serve as a "brand champion" of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and, in this role, his Agency had to muster support for that same brand on the international cultural scene with music diplomacy as branding instrument. On the December 16, 1964 meeting of the Committee for Musical Art, Veljko Bijedić rightfully posed the question on the possibilities and the extent of their country's representation in world centers while simultaneously stating how his Agency was literally, on its own, fighting for its survival.¹¹⁰⁰ He then stated how it was only through his agency's maximum cooperation with organizers and concert subsidiaries that they managed to carry out their program.¹¹⁰¹ Expressed differently, Bijedić's words on this meeting and earlier problems with the cancellation of some concerts by the Modern Jazz Quartet revealed one of the most pressing matters in Yugoslav jazz diplomacy: lack of financial resources for the branding instrument in question.

Within the dynamic of the Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy, the first source of a steady supply of jazz on the Yugoslav market had been the Americans. To clarify, even though, with the dawn of the 1960s and during the administration of John F. Kennedy, as historian Tvrtko Jakovina wrote, "Yugoslavia ... was not in the first or the second or third plan of American foreign policy"¹¹⁰², the Americans stationed in Belgrade were still in a sense acting as "brand champions" for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand as this was still their country's vision for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. The Americans retained the same vision of Yugoslavia's independence as one of the most important American goals¹¹⁰³ and they still supported the

¹⁰⁹⁹ Heath Bowman, "Annual USIS Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 30, November 3, 1958, 4, RG 306 United States Information Agency, Entry #P 40, container 44, NARA.

¹¹⁰⁰ AJ-559- 111-244. "Sednica Odbora za muzičku umetnost održana 16. XII. 1964. g.," 38-39.

¹¹⁰¹ Ibid., 39.

¹¹⁰² Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici*, 78.

¹¹⁰³ See Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 53, January 13, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA; Walter R. Roberts, "COUNTRY PLAN: Annual Revision, FY 1961," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 11, August 10, 1960, RG 0306 USIA, Entry # P: 328, container 9, NARA; "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report, USIS Yugoslavia," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 87, March 13, 1961, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, box 12, NARA; "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report USIS Yugoslavia, August 31, 1962," FM from USIS

model of having Yugoslavia independent from the Soviet Union and more aligned with the West in the early 1960s.¹¹⁰⁴ Culture was still an instrument to achieve this vision, as evident from a Country Plan drafted in mid-January 1960,¹¹⁰⁵ the same year Modern Jazz Quartet performed in the country. Two years later, in an August 31, 1962 field message, the Americans did not question Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union and the Eastern fold. This did not mean, continued the Americans in the same field message, that Yugoslavia was aligned with the West as "[i]n many technical and cultural matters, Yugoslavia looks toward the West, as it has for centuries. In others, for equal centuries Yugoslavia has looked East." The current course Yugoslavia was pursuing, so the Americans further clarified in the August 31, 1962 field message, aimed "to establish a balance with a definite political rationale" which was Nonalignment's primary position. This position, continued the same field message, required the existence of two blocs from which they could be "nonaligned". Given this Yugoslav policy, that is, the portrayal of the Americans as leading one of those blocs, so the Americans continued their explanation in the August 31, 1962 field message, "our potential in encouraging an overriding orientation toward the West is, therefore, rather limited."¹¹⁰⁶ The American solution to achieving their objective and their brand vision of keeping Yugoslavia independent from the East and more aligned with the West was through "keep[ing] Yugoslavia open to the influences of the West as well as the East without at the same time seeming to want to make of this country a 'battleground for the cold war between the blocs.'" To prevent this, continued the Americans in the August 31, 1962 field message, the Yugoslavs used the politics of "balance" to keep them in the same position as the East.¹¹⁰⁷ This American vision for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand made American officials stationed in Belgrade "brand champions" of the same "independent Yugoslavia" brand the Yugoslavs were pursuing while American jazz musicians were branding instruments who worked for the very definition of the brand vision the Americans had for Yugoslavia and their job, in line with the stated brand vision, was to help,

Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 18, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 40, box 82, NARA; Walter R. Roberts, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," Field Message 47, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, container 20, NARA.

¹¹⁰⁴ See Walter R. Roberts, "COUNTRY PLAN: Annual Revision, FY 1961," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 11, August 10, 1960, RG 0306 USIA, Entry # P: 328, container 9, NARA; "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report, USIS Yugoslavia," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 87, March 13, 1961, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, box 12, NARA; "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report USIS Yugoslavia, August 31, 1962," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 18, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 40, box 82, NARA.

¹¹⁰⁵ Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 53, January 13, 1960, 8, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹¹⁰⁶ "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report USIS Yugoslavia, August 31, 1962," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 18, August 31, 1962, 9, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 40, box 82, NARA.

¹¹⁰⁷ "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report USIS Yugoslavia, August 31, 1962," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 18, August 31, 1962, 10, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 40, box 82, NARA

to recite from above, "keep Yugoslavia open to the influences of the West". This is one of the reasons why the Modern Jazz Quartet was evaluated as a success by American cultural diplomatic standards. To reiterate the already cited March 13, 1961 field message, they created the conditions for Conover to arrive.¹¹⁰⁸ They kept the Yugoslav cultural hatch open to American artists.

While serving as a "brand champion" for Yugoslavia and their very own vision of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, the Americans helped their fellow "brand champions", Jugokonzert, in their quest for high quality foreign performers in several ways. The issue Bijedić and Jugokonzert faced with dinars and American artists refusing payment in this currency was a problem the Americans stationed in Belgrade raised with the State Department in January 1959. In the said despatch, USIS Belgrade urged the State Department to finance the arrival to Yugoslavia of three American artists, Van Cliburn, Richard Tucker and Leonard Warren, artists possibly en route to the Soviet Union. In the case of the State Department's inability to do so, so it was continued in the same despatch, a solution was provided by USIS Belgrade in the same despatch – they would render Jugokonzert with financial assistance for the arrival of some American artists in cases they themselves evaluate as important and in cases where such artists were out of the foreign currency range of Jugokonzert.¹¹⁰⁹ The first American solution thus involved the American Embassy in Belgrade sharing the cost for the arrival of American artists with Jugokonzert.¹¹¹⁰ This is how some of American jazzers, such as Louis Armstrong¹¹¹¹ and the Modern Jazz Quartet¹¹¹², arrived to Yugoslavia.

The second request the Americans stationed in Belgrade forwarded to the State Department in the January 22, 1959 report was a more promotional one. The American Embassy in Belgrade noted in this despatch "that agents of U.S. artists do not take seriously Jugokonzert's request for terms because there is a suspicion that no payment can be made except in dinars". The same despatch emphasized that the main booking agency of Yugoslavia "has a modest amount of

¹¹⁰⁸ "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report, USIS Yugoslavia," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Message No. 87, March 13, 1961, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, box 12, NARA.

¹¹⁰⁹ Heath Bowman, "Cultural Presentations: Requests for Yugoslav Appearances by American artists Van Cliburn, Tucker and Warren," FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to the Department of State, no. 313, January 22, 1959, 032/1-2259, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, box 90, NARA.

¹¹¹⁰ In her doctoral dissertation *Waging Public Diplomacy* Carla Konta also noted that USIS helped Jugokonzert to finance the arrival of some jazz musicians to Yugoslavia. See page 207.

¹¹¹¹ Heath Bowman, "Louis Armstrong Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 107, May 13, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 9, NARA. Also noted by Konta, *Waging Public Diplomacy*, 207.

¹¹¹² Robert C. Haney, "The Modern Jazz Quartet Tour in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 91, June 29, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

foreign currency with which it often makes partial payment to visiting artists" with USIS more than willing to provide financial aid. USIS Belgrade further requested the State Department in the January 22, 1959 despatch to forward information to managers of American artists that USIS stood available to financially assist Jugokonzert.¹¹¹³ This meant that the Americans stationed in Belgrade, while working for their vision of "independent Yugoslavia" brand, were prepared to invest both financial resources in Yugoslav attempts to musically interact with the Americans and to promote that same assistance in hope of helping Yugoslavia achieve more prominence as a potential concert destination for American artists, a venture which could potentially help them achieve their task, to quote the already cited August 31, 1962 assessment report, of "keep[ing] Yugoslavia open to the influences of the West".¹¹¹⁴

Another offer of help by the Americans stationed in Belgrade revolved around another set of problems the Americans noted in the business practice of Jugokonzert and listed on two separate occasions during the 1960s. The first instance was marked in the 1964 assessment report the Americans submitted for the performance of pianist Arthur Rubinstein in Yugoslavia. This report noted how "the central booking agency for concert artists often seems incapable of providing its performers with even the simple amenities and kindnesses, let alone with efficient booking services." Through their cultural program in Yugoslavia, so the Rubinstein report continued, the Americans took it upon themselves "to bring in top-quality American performers, where possible through the State Department's Cultural Presentations Program, but otherwise through the post's own efforts locally."¹¹¹⁵ The Americans stationed in Belgrade envisioned their undertakings as help to Jugokonzert. As the Rubinstein report continued, this was the question "of enhancing the status of Jugokonzert's booking efforts through offering our 'good offices' in negotiations with particular artists", the case in point being pianist Arthur Rubinstein.¹¹¹⁶ Two years later, the Americans stationed in Belgrade wrote how all of the elements that made Yugoslavia "Yugoslavia" hampered musical interaction between the two sides. In their assessment report for the period from January 1966 to January 1967, the

¹¹¹³ Heath Bowman, "Cultural Presentations: Requests for Yugoslav Appearances by American artists Van Cliburn, Tucker and Warren," FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to the Department of State, no. 313, January 22, 1959, 032/1-2259, RG 59 General Records of DOS, CDF 1955-59, box 90, NARA.

¹¹¹⁴ "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report USIS Yugoslavia, August 31, 1962," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 18, August 31, 1962, 9, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 40, box 82, NARA.

¹¹¹⁵ Walter R. Roberts, "Arthur RUBINSTEIN and the American Festival of Music in Belgrade, September 23 - October 2, 1964," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Msg No. 44, January 8, 1964, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 34, NARA.

¹¹¹⁶ Walter R. Roberts, "Arthur RUBINSTEIN and the American Festival of Music in Belgrade, September 23 - October 2, 1964," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Msg No. 44, January 8, 1964, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 34, NARA.

Americans wrote, "[t]icket prices in Yugoslavia are extremely low, concert halls are small, travel between towns can be difficult and hotel accommodations often leave much to be desired." As the same report additionally stated, due to insufficient funds, exceptional performers very frequently not offered to Jugokonzert.¹¹¹⁷ In order to bring to Yugoslavia "high-quality examples of American achievements in science, education, culture, and political and economic development", so the Americans stationed in Belgrade wrote in the 1965 "USIS Yugoslavia Country Plan", they would persist in their efforts of lending assistance to Jugokonzert in booking American artists both for certain events and individual appearances during the season. As the same Plan further revealed, the idea was, in accordance with the desire to make their program more effective and long-term, that USIS in Yugoslavia "contact[s] American managers and artists directly to determine their availability and terms."¹¹¹⁸

The descriptions provided by the Americans may, at first glance, seem like a slight exaggeration on their part to boost their own credibility in the entire process of musical diplomacy with the Yugoslavs. However, some Yugoslav documents confirm these American claims. In fact, Veljko Bijedić was the first to admit the problems that followed his Agency in their booking efforts. A couple of years before the Americans drafted the above cited documents, Bijedić told other members of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music on their November 23, 1961 meeting how "50 percent of activities fail just because Bijedić is known as a man who bargains and some agencies won't work with Jugokonzert".¹¹¹⁹ Engaging in such a practice was not a voluntary decision made by Veljko Bijedić himself but this was something the prevalent circumstances forced him to do. As Bijedić continued on the same meeting, "... since we don't have money, I have to bargain and that's how deadlines pass and the enterprise fails."¹¹²⁰ Expressed differently, in his attempt to shore up support for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and achieve desired objectives through musical interaction, one of the methods Veljko Bijedić resorted to was pure bargaining.

The Americans used this method of helping Jugokonzert's booking efforts in parallel with, so it was stated by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1964, the

¹¹¹⁷ Henry F. Arnold, "Country Assessment Report - Yugoslavia January 1966 - January 1967," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 72, January 27, 1967, RG 306 USIA, Bureau of Management/Office of Administration and Technology, Entry P: 328, box 25, NARA.

¹¹¹⁸ Walter R. Roberts, "USIS Yugoslavia Country Plan – Fiscal Year 1965," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 26, September 23, 1964, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 34, NARA.

¹¹¹⁹ AJ-559- 111- 244, Stenografske Beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961, 122. Comment by Veljko Bijedić.

¹¹²⁰ AJ-559- 111- 244, Stenografske Beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961, 122. Comment by Veljko Bijedić.

attempts of the Yugoslavs to expand their cultural relations to "all areas".¹¹²¹ The Yugoslavs also evaluated how there "existed a real basis for deepening cooperation" with the United States.¹¹²² Indeed, documents reveal how the Yugoslavs were keen on culturally interacting with the Americans. As written by Walter R. Roberts on February 23, 1961, when the Americans sat down with the Yugoslavs, represented by Franc Primožić from the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs and the Press Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, Mirko Kalezić, among other matters, the Yugoslavs stated how they were eager to develop cooperation with the Americans in film production and they were anxious "to send some Yugoslav film people (cameraman, directors, actors) to Hollywood for a period of six months to a year to learn American movie-making methods."¹¹²³ Veljko Bijedić, the man at the helm of Jugokonzert, also went to the United States. As the Americans noted in their despatch from September 27, 1961, Veljko Bijedić first came to the United States with the Branko Krsmanović Choir and was in the country from September 24 to December 2, 1960. Upon his return to Yugoslavia, so the Americans continued in the said despatch, the director of Jugokonzert "has made several improvements in his booking operation, and has increased both the number and caliber of American artists". Some of the artists Bijedić managed to book, as was further written in the September 21, 1961 despatch, were bass-baritone George London and jazzers Ella Fitzgerald and Oscar Peterson.¹¹²⁴ As complimentary as this American description of the improvement of Bijedić's business practice was, Bijedić told a different story of his path to attract foreign artists, potential partners in Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy and branding, to Yugoslavia.

Bijedić did indeed succeed in bringing to Yugoslavia high quality artists, a recognition given to him by the Americans and reaffirmed in the Yugoslav context. When addressing the arrival of foreign artists to Yugoslavia in 1961, one Yugoslav document noted how these artists, Ella Fitzgerald included, were, quality wise, of "high artistic value and, in terms of genres, there was diversity".¹¹²⁵ To composer Konstantin Babić who wrote the reviews for the performances of

¹¹²¹ AJ-559-31-66, "Izveštaj o radu Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom u 1964. godini," Beograd, 1965, 3.

¹¹²² AJ-559-31-66, "Izveštaj o radu Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom u 1964. godini," Beograd, 1965, 4.

¹¹²³ Walter R. Roberts, "Transmittal of Memo of Conversation: Proposed Yugoslav Cultural Activities in the U.S.," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 82, February 23, 1961, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 395, folder Yugo. Activities in U.S. 1961, container 17, NARA.

¹¹²⁴ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program with Yugoslavia for Fiscal Year 1961," Foreign Service Despatch from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, No. 173, September 27, 1961, Group XVI, Post Reports, folder 32, box 320, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Historical Collection, Arkansas.

¹¹²⁵ AJ-559-111-244, "Informacija Saradnja u oblasti muzike i scenske umetnosti," 13.

both Oscar Peterson and Ella Fitzgerald in *Zvuk*, the performances of these two musicians "was without a doubt a concert of artists of the greatest international reputation" and hearing them perform was "a trully an extraordinary event". Babić continued his review by stating how listening to these artists performing on records or tapes did not allow the listener to have "that dynamic and fierceful feeling of co-participation that can be acquired at the concert during live performance so that the experience of this concert was extremely powerful and indirect." Babić further wrote in *Zvuk* how Oscar Peterson's performance "gained in immediacy during a live concert performance" while the composer felt that this was the missing factor in Ella Fitzgerald's performance. While praising Fitzgerald's vocal technique and her "precision hearing", Babić concluded his review by stating that the "tone of her voice no longer contains that freshness and glow" which would position her in the category of an "outstanding singer"¹¹²⁶ While Ella Fitzgerald delighted the Yugoslav audience and musicians who attended her performance in Belgrade¹¹²⁷, from Veljko Bijedić's vantage point, actually getting Ella Fitzgerald to come and perform in Yugoslavia was a demanding task. As Bijedić stated at the meeting of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music on November 23, 1961, the view of visits of popular music performers as "financially commercial" was a fallacy as "there is no performance in Yugoslavia that could be 100% commercial".¹¹²⁸ At the same meeting, Bijedić equated the lack of quality performances of popular musicians in Yugoslavia with the lack of financial resources, comparing the costs of the performance of Yehudi Menuhin to artists such as Elvis Presley in which the latter's costs were three times higher than the former's.¹¹²⁹ Bijedić then turned his attention to Ella Fitzgerald. As Bijedić stated on the November 23, 1961 meeting: "For ten years, I had begged Ella Fitzgerald and personally met [her] three times so she would come to us. When we first paid her 1.000 dollars, she asked for the second arrival 8,000 dollars for one performance". Bijedić continued how the price for a performance by Maria Callas was 4,000 dollars. He further stated at the same meeting how "[r]egarding our standard, our possibilities and our relations to the audience, we really do not have the means to withstand this."¹¹³⁰ This was Veljko Bijedić laying out all of the difficulties Jugokonzert as a "brand champion" experienced in their fight to ensure support for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand

¹¹²⁶ Konstantin Babić, an untitled review, *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija*, no. 47-48, 1961, 397.

¹¹²⁷ Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 183.

¹¹²⁸ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 23.11. 1961., 44-45. Comment by Veljko Bijedić.

¹¹²⁹ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske beleške. Sednica, Novembar 23, 1961, 45. Comment by Veljko Bijedić.

¹¹³⁰ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske beleške. Sednica, Novembar 23, 1961, 45. Comment by Veljko Bijedić.

by attempting to attract foreign performers to Yugoslavia. He was attempting to do so without one of the crucial instruments necessary to mount a major campaign – capital.

In their attempts to do so, Bijedić and American officials in Yugoslavia were joined by a third agent. It were those jazz impresarios and musicians, who were granted the recognition of being Yugoslavia's "brand ambassadors" in the international cultural arena, that joined the efforts of American officials and Jugokonzert in raising the awareness of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand in the international cultural arena and working towards the brand visions of both sides of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. The arrival of these agents on Yugoslavia's domestic scene marked a new era of jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States in which these agents and their products, namely Bled Jazz Festival and Muzički Biennale Zagreb, became much more active agents in the jazz diplomatic process.

There were several reasons why Bled Jazz Festival and Muzički Biennale Zagreb were important both for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and for jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States. First and foremost, these festivals served as symbolic representations of the vision and path of the Yugoslav brand, both in the domestic, Yugoslav as well as the European and world context. As branding expert Wally Olins notes, nation branding and its program often focus on the "visual symbol" which is taken up by all participating members of that specific program. This symbol is then used, so further stated by Olins, by all participating members "as an endorsing tool." However, as Olins continues, real meaning does not lie solely with the symbol. What matters more, so Olins further elaborates, is the main idea behind this symbol.¹¹³¹ Indeed, so branding expert Alina Wheeler writes, it is precisely the "symbol that conveys a big idea..."¹¹³² The brand vision of the Yugoslav political leadership for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, to reiterate from previous chapters by reciting the Americans who wrote on March 9, 1955 the idea was "to help 'bridge' differences between East and West" and reaffirmed their conviction in "the peaceful coexistence between countries of differing political, economic and social systems."¹¹³³ The Yugoslavs continued to hold this vision and direction for the brand well into the 1960s as seen from a statement made in 1967 by one Yugoslav grantee. As the Americans wrote on November 24, 1967, one highly positioned Yugoslav, a grantee of one of the American programs, told the official of the

¹¹³¹ Olins, "Making a National Brand," 178.

¹¹³² Wheeler, *Designing Brand Identity*, 49.

¹¹³³ Joseph C. Kolarek, "Semi-Annual USIS Report for July 1- December 31, 1954," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. Tousi 21, March 9, 1955, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 92, NARA.

American Embassy in Yugoslavia, "that 'Yugoslavia serves today as a decompression chamber' for visitors from other East European countries returning from the West".¹¹³⁴ This classical Cold War brand vision of Yugoslavia being a "bridge" between two blocks added, in mid-1950s, other elements that reaffirmed such a position for Yugoslavia and extended the radius of countries Yugoslavia was to connect. In mid-1950s, in addition to connecting the two blocs, Yugoslavia was to connect Europe and the Third World and big and small nations.¹¹³⁵ In terms of identity and culture this meant that Yugoslavia was "a meeting point of two cultural worlds, which presumably gave rise to a unique cultural hybrid containing elements drawn from both the East and the West."¹¹³⁶

This was seen in the interpretation and branding of festivals such as Bled Jazz Festival and Muzički Biennale Zagreb. As an idea, both of these festivals emerged in the heads of those designated to act the part of "brand ambassadors" of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. The history of Bled Jazz Festival started in 1959 when a group of jazz aficionados, Mladen Mazur, Svetolik Jakovljević, Aleksandar Skale and Branko Rustja, approached the tourist agency of the city of Bled with the idea of starting a jazz festival.¹¹³⁷ Bled Jazz Festival, the first held in 1960, had been envisioned as a place where Yugoslav jazz musicians could meet up and exchange their experiences.¹¹³⁸ After its first edition, Bled Jazz Festival was to continue to act as a host to "national festivals of Yugoslav interpreters of popular music"¹¹³⁹ with *Borba* writing how the second Bled Jazz Festival was to be held in September with "the aim of extending the tourist season".¹¹⁴⁰ A discussion at the fall 1959 meeting of the Association of Composers of Croatia led to the establishment of the Muzički Biennale Zagreb, its first edition held from May 17 to May 24, 1961.¹¹⁴¹

¹¹³⁴ Tobin, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report," AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-359, November 24, 1967, 2, Post Reports, b 320, f 32, MC 468, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. Quoted also in Konta, *Waging Public Diplomacy*, 248.

¹¹³⁵ Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada*, 99-100.

¹¹³⁶ Mihelj, "The Dreamworld of New Yugoslav Culture and the Logic of Cold War Binaries," 98.

¹¹³⁷ Nenad Hlača, "Od danas u Ljubljani: četiri dana čudesnih nota. Je li nebo sklono jazzu?," *Večernji list*, Year XV, no. 3652, June 3, 1971, 5.

¹¹³⁸ Ognjen Tvrtković, "Petnaestogodišnjica organiziranog jazz u Jugoslaviji," *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 4 (winter 1974), 60.

¹¹³⁹ "Bled – festivalski centar džez-muzike," *Borba*, February 13, 1961, Year XXVI, no. 36, 7.

¹¹⁴⁰ D.D., "Na Bledu će se održati drugi jugoslovenski festival džez-muzike," *Borba*, June 9, 1960, Year XXV, no. 161, pp. 6.

¹¹⁴¹ Josip Stojanović Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, no. 2283, June 12, 1961, 1, AJ, 559 Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, folder 258, box 121.

In the Yugoslav domestic context, the interpretation of both of these festivals supported the main brand vision of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. First, the branding focused on their location, an important element of the nation brand. The premise is, so writes historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht, that there exists a connection between the image of the country and its geographic location from which nation branding starts. The premise further implies, continues Gienow-Hecht, a mutual influence of these two elements which "can be used to promote each other."¹¹⁴² Indeed, Yugoslavia's location, as we had seen from the reactions of American and Yugoslav officials in the immediate aftermath of Yugoslavia's ousting from the Cominform, was a salient factor to both sides when they contemplated on establishing strategies for collaboration with one another.¹¹⁴³ Even some members of the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries were aware of the special geographical position occupied by Yugoslavia. In his introductory remarks at the October 2, 1968 meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the then chairman of the Committee, Dušan Vejnović emphasized how "[w]e don't live, as we see, in an airless space, we are in an extremely sensitive position in the geographic, political and strategic view and it is extremely important that we have a specific orientation, that we know what we want."¹¹⁴⁴

In branding terms, Yugoslav critics pointed out how it was Yugoslavia's location that differentiated Bled Jazz Festival from other jazz festivals. In 1963, one Yugoslav jazz critic wrote how the festival, using the words of foreign participants, gained recognition "as a unique, trully »European« festival" where musicians from both sides of Europe could perform in large numbers. It was both Yugoslavia's prestige and its "geographical location" that contributed to this.¹¹⁴⁵ It is true, as historian Radina Vučetić writes, that Yugoslavia lagged behind Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with its organization of jazz festivals.¹¹⁴⁶ Chronologically speaking, this may have been true, but the Yugoslavs interpreted Yugoslavia's location as working in Bled Jazz Festival's favour of occupying the central position in the world of European jazz festivals. As was stated by the same critic in 1963, "to the remark that the Polish already had an affirmed jazz-festival, the response was that Warsaw is too far away and the trip too expensive while Bled is precisely located in a convenient, central place."¹¹⁴⁷ Expressed

¹¹⁴² Gienow-Hecht, "Nation Branding," 237.

¹¹⁴³ See Pirjevec, *Tito i Drugovi*, 296; "Tito: ally, not friend.", editorial, *Life*, Vol. 32, No. 19, May 12, 1952, 30; "Yugoslavia, April 1958," RG 306, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

¹¹⁴⁴ AJ-559-35-76, Stenografske beleške. XV Sednica Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom održana 2. oktobra 1968. godine, 5. Comment by Dušan Vejnović.

¹¹⁴⁵ N.T., "Kamo ide naš jazz?", *Večernji list*, Year V, No. 1235, July 6, 1963, 9.

¹¹⁴⁶ Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 185.

¹¹⁴⁷ N.T., "Kamo ide naš jazz?", *Večernji list*, Year V, No. 1235, July 6, 1963, 9

differently, the location of Yugoslavia gave Bled Jazz Festival a special position on the map of European jazz festivals.

A similar interpretation of Muzički Biennale Zagreb was offered by American musicologist Everett Helm in *The New York Times*. It was "Music Biennale Zagreb" that was seen by this musicologist as not only "the biggest modern music festival in the world" but also as the festival that stood out as the most fascinating one in certain aspects. The program of no other festival, be it held in Darmstadt, Donaueschingen, Warsaw or Venice, continued Helm in *The New York Times*, offered such a diversity of styles and series of events. The American musicologist praised the appearances of both sides (East and West) at this festival and attributed such adequate representation to Yugoslavia's politics and geography.¹¹⁴⁸ The recognition of foreigners of the connection between Yugoslavia's location and the central position of its cultural events on the European scene as a result of this location was present in the context of Bled Jazz Festival too. To return back to the 1963 description of Bled Jazz Festival, the Croatian critic noted that numerous foreign jazz critics and jazz musicians "expected the development of the Bled manifestations into one authoritative international jazz-festival that could play a rather significant role in the development of European jazz given productive mutual impacts from the Eastern and Western side."¹¹⁴⁹ Foreigners thus recognized and reacted to this symbol.

Location, as part of the nation brand, technically gave these festivals the right to serve as a "brand ambassador" of the designed vision for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand outlined above. As journalist Stevo Ostojić wrote, Muzički Biennale Zagreb was a place where the East and West met and were given the not so frequent ability to exchange information about modern music.¹¹⁵⁰ In a similar manner Croatian composer Branimir Sakač wrote how this musical event was "[l]ocated at the historical intersection of two great cultures, on the meeting point of cultures of the East and West, Muzički Biennale in Zagreb considers this circumstance a very fortunate [one], because it, in its own right, historically determines the program's depth and openness to both sides."¹¹⁵¹ Indeed, the final report of the first Muzički Biennale Zagreb stated how "future festivals would seek even more to develop contact East-West."¹¹⁵² Bled Jazz Festival had been interpreted in a similar manner. Through a program that contained a diverse

¹¹⁴⁸ Everett Helm, "Modern Styles Rub Elbows in Zagreb," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1965, 15.

¹¹⁴⁹ N.T., "Kamo ide naš jazz?", *Večernji list*, Year V, No. 1235, July 6, 1963, 9

¹¹⁵⁰ Ostojić, *Javni dnevnik*, 96-97.

¹¹⁵¹ Branimir Sakač, "Muzički bijenale i njegova programska koncepcija," *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija*, 73-74, 1967, 17.

¹¹⁵² AJ-559-121-258, Josip Stojanović Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, no. 2283, June 12, 1961, 10.

selection which ranged from traditional to the most modern forms of jazz, so wrote one edition of *Matica*, the 1966 Bled Jazz Festival offered a range of possibilities for "the exchange of international practices in the field of jazz and opened doors to all quality musicians of the world." What had made this festival special, so it was further written in *Matica*, was that it was "the first jazz-festival that included in its program jazz of the East and West" and a festival in which "for the first time, Western jazz-experts discovered Eastern European talents."¹¹⁵³ Indeed, the fact that musicians from both the East and West could perform on Bled was described by *Borba*, referring to the 1966 Bled Jazz Festival, as "unique in the world".¹¹⁵⁴ Expressed in branding terms, as the country was growing into its imagined role on the international scene, the festivals were easing into their symbolic role too, that of "living the brand" of independent Yugoslavia. Indeed, that this was the case was revealed in discussions that centered on the second edition of Muzički Biennale Zagreb. This edition of the festival was to be held from May 8 to May 15, 1963 and discussions centered on the possibility of including contemporary jazz into the program and there was even talk of including performers from Asian and African countries.¹¹⁵⁵ Biennale was thus further building itself as a reflection of the brand's vision.¹¹⁵⁶

That Yugoslav festivals were successfully representing the country's brand in the musical arena was recognized by foreign artists too. It was precisely the fact that Muzički Biennale Zagreb managed to get performers from both sides to meet that dr. Vaclav Kučera, a composer and musicologist from Czechoslovakia, evaluated as one of the two successes of the festival.¹¹⁵⁷ Later editions of the Muzički Biennale Zagreb drew similar parallels. For instance, in 1967 a conductor from Frankfurt labelled the Biennale as "a strong and unique forum in the world where musical workers from the East and the West meet." This conductor also stated how it was on the Muzički Biennale Zagreb that he first listened to Soviet cellist and conductor Mstislav Rostropovich. As he continued, Biennale also provided him with the opportunity to engage with other composers from the Soviet Union. Previous editions of Muzički Biennale

¹¹⁵³ Mirjana Greblo, "Jugoslavenski jazz festival na Bledu," *Matica*, September 9, 1966, 348; For the interpretation of Bled as being the place where both musicians from the East and West could perform for the first time see also Ognjen Tvrčković, "Petnaestogodišnjica organiziranog jazzu u Jugoslaviji." *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 4 (winter 1974), 62.

¹¹⁵⁴ "Bledski džez-festival od 2. do 5. juna," *Borba*, Year XXXI, May 28, 1966, 7.

¹¹⁵⁵ F. Pašić, "Posle I muzičkog bijenala grada Zagreba. Uspela panorama savremene muzike. Predloženo da se II bijenale održi u maju 1963. godine," *Borba*, June 14, 1961, Year XXVI, no. 146, 7.

¹¹⁵⁶ Indeed, this was also evident in the practice of the Ljubljana Biennale. As Bojana Videkanić ("Nonaligned Modernism") writes: "The Ljubljana Biennale is therefore an example of the ways in which nonaligned policies and doctrines were negotiated and implemented concretely in cultural practice,..." (10)

¹¹⁵⁷ AJ-559-121-258, Josip Stojanović Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, no. 2283, June 12, 1961, "Muzički Biennale Zagreb 17.-24.5.1961. Zaključni izvještaj," 8-9.

Zagreb, so the Frankfurt conductor continued, also provided him with the ability to converse with American musician John Cage.¹¹⁵⁸

Brand ambassadors such as Mladen Mazur and Milko Kelemen and their products, Bled Jazz Festival and Muzički Biennale Zagreb, also worked in favour of designated cultural diplomatic goals as one of their state's branding strategies. As noted before in Chapter Two, one of the aims of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy was to raise the awareness of the brand on the international cultural scene and make their cultural products a part of that cultural market. That Bled was indeed successful in putting Yugoslavia on the itinerary of foreign jazz musicians was visible from the February 1962 interpretation of one Croatian critic who wrote about the third edition of the festival and how it captured the attention of both "domestic and, for the first time, renowned foreign artists". Furthermore, as the Croatian critic continued, negotiations were held with European jazz musicians so that they come to Bled for the purpose of considering "Yugoslav achievements in this field of music."¹¹⁵⁹ Indeed, foreign performers such as American singer Hellen Merrill, who was of Yugoslav descent, then the West German trio of Borislav Roković, Rome's Roman-New Orleans jazz band and Jack Diéval, accompanied by his American ensemble, already performed on the second Bled Jazz Festival.¹¹⁶⁰ The performance of, among others, the Modern Jazz Quartet's leader John Lewis on the second Bled Jazz Festival was praised by the Croatian media because "on such a festival comprised beyond the border can only benefit, especially when such prominent artists as, for instance, John Lewis, a prominent black American jazz-pianist and arranger, the head [of] »Modern Jazz Quartet« arrive."¹¹⁶¹ When the Modern Jazz Quartet performed again on the third Bled Jazz Festival, Aleksandar Živković wrote how their performance on the last day of this festival significantly raised the prestige of this event compared to its previous editions. Even if other performers, continued Živković in *Borba*, could not be judged by the Modern Jazz Quartet's standard, they still performed high quality jazz. This was the case, so Živković further wrote in *Borba*, with Prague's SH Quintet [SH/Jazz Quintet], Stockholm's Eje Telina [Eje Thelin], Warsaw's Jan Vroblevski [Jan Wróblewski], Budapest's Aladar Pegea [Aladár Pege] and others.¹¹⁶² Mentioned American jazz musicians such as Hellen Merrill and John Lewis thus served dual ambassadorial roles. Technically, their presence raised the profile of Bled Jazz Festival thus

¹¹⁵⁸ I. Tomljenović, "Protiv dogmi, za dobru muziku," *Borba*, Year XXXII, May 14, 1967, 12.

¹¹⁵⁹ Z. FR., "Iz naše zabavne muzike: »Bled 62«,," *Večernji list*, God. IV, no. 797, February 02, 1962, pp. 6.

¹¹⁶⁰ Z. Franjić, "Iz naše zabavne muzike: »Bled 61«,," *Večernji list*, God. III, no. 588, May 31, 1961, pp. 7.

¹¹⁶¹ N. Turkalj, "Danas počinje na Bledu drugi festival jazza," *Večernji list*, God. III, no. 595, June 8, 1961, pp. 10

¹¹⁶² Aleksandar Živković, "Svež i poletan džez," *Borba*, June 9, 1964, Year XXIX, no. 156, 7.

working in favour of the Yugoslav state whose cultural diplomacy was driven by the need to raise the awareness of the brand. At the same time, their ambassadorial presence on these festivals worked in favour of keeping the cultural hatch of Yugoslavia open to Western products, as demanded by the brand vision of the United States for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. Either way, just by performing, these musicians were working for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

Bringing Yugoslavia's art more in line with the European and world scene had not just been the aim of Bled Jazz Festival but of Muzički Biennale Zagreb too. The basic aim of the Muzički Biennale Zagreb, according to Milko Kelemen, was to "stimulate domestic musical production and reproduction, [to] put our domestic achievements in direct contact with the achievements of foreign countries in this area and, finally, to introduce the public to the newest works of our and foreign composers and the successes of reproductive artists." As Kelemen further clarified, Biennale offered the opportunity "to affirm Yugoslav music worldwide."¹¹⁶³ It was, according to Kelemen, "international competition" that arrived to Biennale that "forced Yugoslav composers to put in maximum efforts into adjusting their compositions, in terms of technique and content."¹¹⁶⁴

These festivals did not just serve as "brand symbols", they also served as a means to promote the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. This was seen during one meeting of one of the brand champions of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, the Committee for Performing Arts and Music, in which one member of the said Committee asked for clarification as to why one Yugoslav festival would not be inviting foreigners.¹¹⁶⁵ Another festival, continued the same Committee member, picked up a similar practice which was, in a nutshell, antithetical to the existing Yugoslav policy and its need to promote Yugoslav culture beyond its borders. As this Committee member continued, evidence showed "that foreign observers – mainly prominent experts or people who are able to do much for us and our art in their country's – they write in magazines, they put our specific pieces on the repertoire, they organize a series of events of our great interest so it would be a shame to end it...".¹¹⁶⁶ Expressed differently, foreign performers were still seen as potential advertising instruments for the Yugoslav state and its culture in the

¹¹⁶³ Milko Kelemen, "Bijenale – afirmacija jugoslavenske muzike u svjetskim razmjerima," *Zvuk: Jugoslavenska muzička revija* 73-74 (1967), 18-19.

¹¹⁶⁴ Kelemen, "Bijenale – afirmacija jugoslavenske muzike u svjetskim razmjerima," *Zvuk*, 19.

¹¹⁶⁵ AJ-559-111-244, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961, 52. Comment by Vuljević.

¹¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 53. Comment by Vuljević.

1960s as they had been in the 1950s and it was the "job" of Yugoslav festivals to bring them to Yugoslavia.

Bled Jazz Festival, both as a symbol of the brand and an "agent" of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, achieved positive results. However, in its ambassadorial role, this product of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand faced the same problems as had Jugokonzert. First and foremost, the Festival's organizers or the country's brand ambassadors, had difficulty in meeting the demands of the global market. In particular, the issue at hand was the need of the festival to be more flexible and "go with the flow" of dates of other European jazz festivals. As revealed by the examined documents, the Yugoslavs were not particularly successful in this adaptation. As was noted in the March 18, 1966 airgram from USIS Belgrade, Willis Conover offered to lend a helping hand in booking American jazz musicians for Bled Jazz Festival if the festival adjusted its dates with other jazz festival in the area.¹¹⁶⁷ American jazz musician Art Farmer offered similar advice. As he told one Yugoslav reporter at the seventh Bled Jazz Festival, this festival "enjoys a great reputation in the world" and both American and European jazz musicians were keen on performing on this festival. As Art Farmer continued, the dates, Bled included, were an especially problematic element of European jazz festivals and Bled would, according to Farmer, attract a much larger presence of American jazz musicians "for a fee not bigger than—a return round trip ticket" if its dates were more aligned with other European festivals.¹¹⁶⁸ The dates were the reason, continued the article that cited Art Farmer's words, why three American jazz musicians did not show up and play at the Festival that year.¹¹⁶⁹ However, as USIS in Belgrade noted, the dates were not really up to the organizers of the Bled Jazz Festival.¹¹⁷⁰

Bled Jazz Festival was much more successful in adapting to its own, Yugoslav, market. It was in 1966 that both the American and the Yugoslav side, for strikingly similar reasons, considered the idea of moving the Yugoslav jazz festival from Bled to some other city. Addressing organizational issues and the need to attract a larger audience, the Yugoslav media

¹¹⁶⁷ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Yugoslav Jazz Festival, June 2-5, 1966," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to DOS, no. A-734, 18 March 1966, 3, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

¹¹⁶⁸ Mirjana Greblo, "Jugoslavenski jazz festival na Bledu," *Matica*, rujan 1966, 348.

¹¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁰ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Yugoslav Jazz Festival, June 2-5, 1966," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to DOS, no. A-734, 18 March 1966, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library; Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Bled Jazz Festival," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-711, 10 March 1966, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

wrote about the issue of "moving the festival to another location".¹¹⁷¹ Indeed, as one critic from Croatia noted, the discussion surrounding the move of the jazz festival from Bled to somewhere else centered on the "fact that Bled is hospitable and picturesque and it has already, as a concept, entered world musical annals – but facts also remain that it is communicatively out of the way and it has no chance to attract a wider and larger audience." As the critic continued, many claimed how performing at Bled was an amazing experience. Still, as the article further elaborated, the same voices also claimed that there was a need to "move the festival to a more convenient place – if one does not want to have a festival just for the sake of a festival but above all a festival for the audience who should be brought closer to this valuable type of musical art."¹¹⁷² In order to brand through jazz and through this festival, the festival needed to be moved to a better location.

Americans stationed in Belgrade were of the same opinion. As the Americans wrote at the end of June 1966, their belief was that Bled should be moved to a location with a much larger population in order for the festival to have an audience. As they further wrote, the preceding jazz festival at Bled for which the Organizing Committee distributed complementary tickets to Zagreb and Ljubljana's Youth Organizations, had a full hall for only one night. Bled was, continued the Americans, "a charming tourist center" but not convenient to a large number of people. The festival was broadcast but, as the June 1966 American field message further noted, "we feel that a large live audience is necessary to create a real impact on the Yugoslav jazz scene." The same field message concluded with the advocacy that the Americans continue providing support for Bled Jazz Festival regardless of the possible move even though they felt that "a move might put the entire operation on a more professional basis than heretofore."¹¹⁷³ Apparently, the brand ambassadors of the Bled Jazz Festival heeded the call of all of the stakeholders involved. In 1967, Bled Jazz Festival moved to Ljubljana.¹¹⁷⁴

In the context of Bled Jazz Festival, in their role as "brand champions" American officials stationed in Yugoslavia acted in the same way and with similar methods to aid their co-branding partner as they had Jugokonzert.

¹¹⁷¹ Nenad Turkalj, "I pored uspjeha – pod upitnikom," *Večernji list*, God. VIII, no. 2130, 6. lipnja 1966, 5.

¹¹⁷² N. Turkalj, "Završetak bledskog jazz festivala: Svečanost jazza," *Večernji list*, God. VIII, no. 2134, June 10, 1966, pp. 7.

¹¹⁷³ Hugh B. Sutherland, USIS-assisted cultural events: Seventh Yugoslav Jazz Festival," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 86, June 27, 1966, 2, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, box 347, NARA.

¹¹⁷⁴ Rendla, "Džez u Sloveniji kot subkultura," 166; Ognjen Tvrković, "Petnaestogodišnica organiziranog jazza u Jugoslaviji," *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 4 (winter 1974), 60.

Yugoslav agents may have emerged as a much more prominent actor in the context of the branding instrument of Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy, but the Americans were still there and still acting as brand champions in the context of Bled Jazz Festival, in the same way as they had for Jugokonzert. First and foremost, in the case of Bled Jazz Festival, American officials stationed in Belgrade tried to get the State Department to tend to the old Yugoslav wound present and evident in the booking practice of Jugokonzert too. After listing all of the possible cultural attractions, jazz included, for Yugoslavia, in their the April 12, 1963 telegram American officials stationed in Belgrade noted the impossibility of bringing to Yugoslavia artists who appeared in Western Europe commercially as "their fees prohibitive locally, with small halls, low ticket prices, very little dollar currency". The same telegram continued emphasizing the utmost importance of the State Department to convince the "best artists to come" and that it compensates for the "dollar fees involved." The April 12, 1963 telegram further requested the State Department to "adopt [the] practice [of] picking up major artists [in] Western Europe and bringing [to] Yugoslavia four or more concerts with time for other appearances."¹¹⁷⁵ The task had been clear: in order to fulfil their vision for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, it was necessary to further promote Yugoslavia as a concert destination among American musicians and agents.

In their strategy of getting the State Department to reach, American officials stationed in Yugoslavia used the brand's target audience as their "bargaining chip". In their March 10, 1966 airgram, the Americans wrote how they considered "securing a good representation of American jazz" as "high priority". While true, continued the same airgram, that not a lot of tourists visited this festival, Bled Jazz Festival lured "the jazz faithful of Yugoslavia, both performers and jazz buffs. The latter element consisted in considerable measure of youth professional men and women and the importance of contact established with this element is obviously great."¹¹⁷⁶ Likewise, the Americans also had to be careful as who to send as their representative due to the high quality of the second Yugoslav brand ambassador – the audience. Referring to Willis Conover's articles published in *Down Beat* magazine in January of that year, the March 10, 1966 USIS Belgrade airgram noted how "the quality of jazz produced in this general area is high and can no longer be viewed patronizingly by American musicians." As the

¹¹⁷⁵ Kocher, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1042, April 12, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA.

¹¹⁷⁶ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Bled Jazz Festival," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-711, 10 March 1966, 1, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

same March 10, 1966 airgram further noted, performers from other countries, possibly Eastern Europe too, were present at Bled Jazz Festival.¹¹⁷⁷

The second strategy the Americans employed for Bled Jazz Festival was the same one they used for Jugokonzert: they attempted to boost the prestige of the event through the presence of prominent American jazz musicians. When on March 18, 1966 USIS Belgrade wrote how USIS Zagreb was approached by Mladen Mazur of Bled Jazz Festival with a list of possible American performers to come to Bled from Vienna Jazz Festival, they wrote how "[a] joint appearance of such an all-star combo might even establish the Bled Jazz Festival as a permanent Yugoslav institution as well as enhancing its international prestige. An increase of the event's prestige would hopefully make recruitment of American participants easier in the future."¹¹⁷⁸ Expressed differently, the rationale was: the higher the quality of the Festival, the more success it would have in attracting American jazz musicians and promoting Yugoslavia as a concert destination among American jazz musicians, a vision which aligned with Yugoslavia's cultural diplomatic objectives of manifesting a much stronger profile for the country on the international musical circuit and raising the awareness of the brand. Despite the recognition that sometimes even the Embassy's choice of jazz performers, such as the Embassy's booking of Buck Clayton and Big Joe Turner for the 1965 Bled Jazz Festival was not always successful, the March 10, 1966 airgram still emphasized that it was up to both the State Department and the American Embassy to compensate for the fact that the very best American performers are overpriced for the Yugoslav market. Bled and its Festival, so the March 10, 1966 continued, was "an excellent point of departure, where a relatively modest expenditure can yield significant returns."¹¹⁷⁹ From a branding perspective of keeping jazz diplomacy, the branding instrument, operational, investing in Bled Jazz Festival was thus a prudent thing to do.

Several factors impacted the American decision to invest into Bled Jazz Festival. Placing this festival into a much broader perspective, this American investment was not exception to the rule as the Americans similarly invested into local jazz festivals in Eastern Europe. As historian Rüdiger Ritter noted, when the Americans sent their jazz performers to these festivals,

¹¹⁷⁷ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Bled Jazz Festival," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-711, 10 March 1966, 1, Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library.

¹¹⁷⁸ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Yugoslav Jazz Festival, June 2-5, 1966," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to DOS, no. A-734, 18 March 1966, 2. Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

¹¹⁷⁹ Walter R. Roberts, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Seventh Bled Jazz Festival," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-711, 10 March 1966, 2. Willis Conover Collection, University of North Texas Music Library

their aim had been to establish an atmosphere amicable to the United States in these countries.¹¹⁸⁰ This thinking is in line with what scholarship had already demonstrated and that was that many of the cultural activities undertaken by the Americans in the post-World War II era had been directed towards selling their own brand on the global market.¹¹⁸¹ As suggested by Carla Konta's research, the United States had done the same in Yugoslavia.¹¹⁸² This is indeed visible in the Country Plans the Americans devised for Yugoslavia in the early 1960s when Bled Jazz Festival was established. For instance, one such American goal during the early 1960s had been to use Yugoslavia to show "the US Political, Economic and Cultural Dynamism and Freedom".¹¹⁸³ The idea had been, so the Americans wrote in a field message from August 31, 1962, to sell the story of the United States "as a friendly and peaceful country" as a precondition to add "credibility to U.S. policy positions, insofar as these are known to the Yugoslav public, and decreasing the credibility of regime distortions of U.S. policies." The same field message emphasized the Cultural Presentations Program as a salient component of the American program "not only for the cultural achievements portrayed, but also for the fact that the American people through their government think highly enough of their cultural achievements to send them abroad at considerable expense." As continued in the August 31, 1962 field message, given the infrequency of the arrival of American musicians to Yugoslavia through this specific program, USIS took it upon themselves to find additional musical activities to sponsor in Yugoslavia as well as to serve as a booking agent on special occasions "given the incompetence of the local concert agency".¹¹⁸⁴ Such a stated goal, in which they acknowledged their help to Jugokonzert in addition to selling specific aspects of the American story to the Yugoslav public, confirms how the Americans envisioned the Yugoslav market as a place to sell their own brand too. They were able to do so, to return to the field message from August 31, 1962, because "... we can talk about America in Yugoslavia; the regime recognizes this as a legitimate function of a foreign information program".¹¹⁸⁵

¹¹⁸⁰ Ritter, "Between Propaganda and Public Diplomacy: Jazz in the Cold War," 104.

¹¹⁸¹ See, for instance, Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*.

¹¹⁸² See her doctoral dissertation *Waging Public Diplomacy: The United States and the Yugoslav Experiment (1950-1972)*.

¹¹⁸³ See Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA; Walter R. Roberts, "COUNTRY PLAN: Annual Revision, FY 1961," RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, container 9, NARA; "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report USIS Yugoslavia, August 31, 1962," RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 40, box 82, NARA.

¹¹⁸⁴ Walter R. Roberts, "Country Plan: Annual Revision, FY 1963," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA, August 31, 1962, no. 16, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, NARA.

¹¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

However, even such an explanation or a "sell" of the American brand story was connected to the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. In a July 30, 1957 despatch, Americans stationed in Belgrade noted the value products such as educational exchanges had in connecting Yugoslavia to the West in line with the American vision of preserving Yugoslavia's independence in the context of Yugoslavia's "balancing" position. Such a program, continued the Americans in the said despatch, would counterbalance Soviet efforts and establish connections with many prominent Yugoslavs thus serving as an avenue to promote connections with the United States. Indeed, as the same document despatch continued to reveal, it was not just the Soviets that had such exchanges in place with the Yugoslavs, two other American competitors on the Yugoslav cultural market, the British and the French, had them too. The same despatch then noted how many prominent Yugoslavs approached American officials with the desire "to go to the U.S. for observation, study and increase of professional capacity" as they looked in the direction of the United States to gain "the superior knowledge and techniques they know that we possess". While the Americans had some programs that satisfied this particular Yugoslav thirst, they were yet to do the same, so the July 30, 1957 despatch revealed, for Yugoslav journalists, cultural and educational workers.¹¹⁸⁶ For the purpose of connecting their vision of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and the products they could offer to achieve this aim, the Americans were looking at the needs and desires of the customers which is, to remember the words of Catherine Slade-Brooking, what branding does. This was a necessity for the ultimate objective of American branding efforts in Yugoslavia. As the Americans stated in the July 30, 1957 document, programs outlined above were necessary because they "persuade others whose present ignorance or misunderstanding of the U.S. prevents their commitment to a genuine Yugoslav independence."¹¹⁸⁷ Put differently, the way that the Americans understood it was that a Yugoslav could not truly be loyal and devoted to the "independent Yugoslavia" brand if he or she did not understand the United States. In this sense, yet again, the Americans, emerged as "brand champions" who worked to strengthen the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. Indeed, as visible from the August 31, 1962 American revision report, the Americans also shared with the Yugoslavs one of the postulates of their cultural diplomacy which was to serve the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. When the Americans wrote about their customers in the said report, they noted how the people from the arts community they wished to target were not just cultural officials, artists, patrons, the audience who attended the opera, etc. but pretty much anyone

¹¹⁸⁶ Heath Bowman, "Educational Exchange: Prospectus Call for Fiscal Year 1959," FSD from American Embassy to DOS, no. 48, July 30, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

"who can be reached through cultural manifestations". These customers, so it was further written in the August 31, 1962 revision report, were salient as culture was "an area where, despite a high degree of 'official' organization, as befits a Communist State, experimentation is possible, and ideas may be aired which have implications going beyond the cultural realm." Simultaneously, culture was also an area where, continued the revision report, "international links are the rule rather than the exception. The creative artist must be in touch with what is going on in his own field in other centers."¹¹⁸⁸ Not only could contacts between the Yugoslav arts community and American culture and artists, wrote the August 31, 1962 revision report, help achieve American aims and goals for Yugoslavia¹¹⁸⁹, to remember from Chapter Two, this was the same strategy and vision employed by Yugoslav brand champions, the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries which meant that USIS officials still acted as brand champions for the Yugoslav independent brand.

Bled Jazz Festival, Muzički Biennale Zagreb, Dubrovnik Summer Festival or, later on, Newport Jazz Festival were also a branding stage through which another brand ambassador of the Yugoslav state, the Yugoslav audience, was given the opportunity to attract foreigners and play their assigned cultural diplomatic role for the purpose of preserving the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. Put differently, the stages of these festivals were not just the stages on which the artists performed but these festivals were also a stage for the Yugoslav audience. This was visible from complimentary words German composer Karlheinz Stockhausen used to describe the Yugoslav audience at the Muzički Biennale Zagreb. Stockhausen praised not just the organization and the program of the first Muzički Biennale Zagreb but also the "recruitment' of the audience". Stockhausen continued how he was amazed by the number of people in attendance and further stated how "[t]he audience was really outstanding, primarily with [its] special characteristic to listen first and then evaluate".¹¹⁹⁰ At the same festival, the Yugoslav audience was praised by the French composer André Jolivet and Argentinian composer and conductor Mauricio Kagel who stated that "... the Yugoslav audience has a good feeling. It does not accept all of what we have brought and what it receives [it] evaluates critically. This is excellent and extremely important for this music."¹¹⁹¹

¹¹⁸⁸ Walter R. Roberts, "Country Plan: Annual Revision, FY 1963," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA, August 31, 1962, no. 16, 7, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, NARA.

¹¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁰ AJ-559-121-258, Josip Stojanović Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, no. 2283, 12. VI. 1961, 8.

¹¹⁹¹ Ibid.

The Yugoslav audience managed to attract American jazz musicians too. Louis Armstrong arrived to Yugoslavia for the second time in 1965. As *Borba* informed its readers, he was welcomed by the sounds of "When The Saints Go Marching In" and "St. Louis Blues" played by "Lola", a dixieland band from Belgrade, on his arrival at the airport in Surčin. As *Borba* continued, Louis Armstrong then immediately stated: "I carry overwhelming impressions from my first performance in your country and your audience remained in my pleasant memory."¹¹⁹² The Yugoslav audience also earned complimentary reviews for their "performance" during the tour of "Blood, Sweat & Tears". Musician Casey Andersen, who performed before "Blood, Sweat & Tears", told a Yugoslav reporter how "[i]t is very nice in your country. Your audience listened to us most attentively".¹¹⁹³ When B.B King performed at Newport Jazz Festival in 1973 he noted how he "would be extremely happy if I had to play for such an audience until the end of my life. ... My colleagues told me, and now I am personally convinced of it, that your audience appreciates jazz very much."¹¹⁹⁴ In another interview, B.B. King informed Yugoslav reporters how fearful he and his accompanying musicians were at the prospect of having no audience in Yugoslavia. B.B. King, nonetheless, noted in the same interview that "what we saw, was really beyond our expectations. Your audience actually inspired my colleagues and myself", expressing hope for a return performance for the Yugoslavs.¹¹⁹⁵

Three years earlier, American jazz musician Duke Ellington also heaped similar praise on the Yugoslav audience. As Duke Ellington stated in July 1970: "In Dubrovnik I have experienced a sensation which I have not felt for a long time. I have felt the heart of this wonderful audience, and I would like to come again, even though my age will provide me much less opportunity..."¹¹⁹⁶ In another interview, Duke Ellington referred to those who listened to

¹¹⁹² "Luj Armstrong doputovao u Beograd," *Borba*, Year XIII, no. 87, March 30, 1965, 8.

¹¹⁹³ Mitja Meršol, "Good Music, Uncle Sam," *Tedenska Tribuna*, June 25, 1970, Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A-311, July 30, 1970, Group II Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2 Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 57, folder 4, CU Historical Collection

¹¹⁹⁴ "The Second Evening of the Newport Jazz Festival," *Večernje Novosti*, November 6, 1973, enclosed translation in Johnson, "Newport Jazz Festival in Belgrade," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. 715, December 28, 1973, Group II. Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2. Performing Arts, 1950-1980, folder 2, box 73, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas

¹¹⁹⁵ O.S., "Traditional Newport-Belgrade Jazz Festival '73 is Over," *Večernje Novine* (Sarajevo), November 10, 1973, enclosed translation in Johnson, "Newport Jazz Festival in Belgrade," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade to DOS, no. 715, December 28, 1973, Group II. Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Arts, 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

¹¹⁹⁶ "Dubrovnik Summer. Promises from the USSR and USA: The Summer Festival negotiates the engagement of Soviet and American artists.," *Oslobodjenje* (Sarajevo), July 17, 1970, enclosed translation in Belgrade A-332, RG 306 United States Information Agency Historical Collection, Entry A1 (1061), box 6, NARA

him perform in Belgrade as "a very sensitive audience".¹¹⁹⁷ As much as Duke Ellington was enticed by the Yugoslav audience, it was Duke himself that made history when he performed at the 1970 Dubrovnik Summer Festival. The story behind Duke Ellington's performance at this particular festival slightly differs in different accounts. According to one Yugoslav newspaper, it was Duke Ellington who requested a performance at Dubrovnik Summer Festival.¹¹⁹⁸ According to the official July 24, 1970 airgram from the American Embassy to the Department of State, Duke Ellington was initially to perform in Zagreb which fell through as the Concert Agency in Croatia withdrew the patronage for this specific performance. The Concert Agency and Dubrovnik Summer Festival organizers came up with an alternative solution, as further described in the July 24, 1970 airgram, which "broke tradition by including JAZZ for the first time in this traditionally classical program."¹¹⁹⁹ Indeed, Duke Ellington's performance at Dubrovnik Summer Festival generated a discussion in the Yugoslav media that centered on the issue of whether or not the inclusion of the performance of Duke Ellington into a manifestation such as Dubrovnik Summer Festival was appropriate.¹²⁰⁰ Regardless of such discussions, we find evidence that the organizers of the Dubrovnik Summer Festival and the American Embassy in Belgrade began another set of negotiations to include jazz into the program of the said festival three years later. As was noted in an American airgram from November 16, 1973, a discussion was held between an officer of the American Embassy in Belgrade and the Director of the Dubrovnik Summer Festival, Niko Napica, in which the latter was eager to have jazz musicians present at his festival, an information transmitted to the American officer by George Wein.¹²⁰¹ Jazz musicians such as Sarah Vaughan, Dave Brubeck, Modern Jazz Quartet and Oscar Peterson, so the American report continued, were the suggestions given by the officer of the Embassy as they were seen as performers who "could only help restore Dubrovnik's sagging prestige." An enthusiastic Napica, so the November 16, 1973 took in the information, alongside

¹¹⁹⁷ "The Ambassador of Jazz and Good Will," *Slobodna Dalmacija* (Split), July 17, 1970, enclosed translation in Belgrade A-332, RG 306 United States Information Agency Historical Collection, Entry A1 (1061), box 6, NARA

¹¹⁹⁸ D. Jelić, "Duke Ellington Orchestra in Belgrade on July 14, 1970. Royal Welcome for 'King of Jazz'", *Večernje novosti*, July 11, 1970, enclosed translation in Belgrade A-332, RG 306 United States Information Agency Historical Collection, Entry A1 (1061), box 6, NARA

¹¹⁹⁹ Leonhart, "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Visit and Performances of Duke Ellington Orchestra in Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State (CU), No. 307, 24 July 1970, Entry A1 (1061), RG 306 USIA Historical Collection, box 6, NARA.

¹²⁰⁰ See, "An evening of American Jazz," *Slobodna Dalmacija* (Split), July 23, 1970; "And, of course, blues," *Vjesnik*, July 17, 1970 enclosed translation in Belgrade A-332, RG 306 United States Information Agency Historical Collection, Entry A1 (1061), box 6, NARA

¹²⁰¹ George Wein was a famous American impresario and the leading face of the Newport Jazz Festival. See Peter Keepnews, "George Wein, Newport Jazz Festival Trailblazer, Is Dead at 95," *The New York Times*, September 13, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/13/arts/music/george-wein-dead.html> (last accessed on July 7, 2023)

additional information by the American Embassy officer who stated that Napica directly contact Aleksandar Živković "who now openly works for Wein and would be the logical person to organize a Dubrovnik schedule" while he would suggest to George Wein to establish contact with Napica.¹²⁰² The example of Dubrovnik Summer Festival and the second attempt at including jazz into its program demonstrates that well into the 1970s the Americans were still acting as brand champions of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand and still used the same method of boosting the prestige of a particular Yugoslav cultural manifestation in order to attract prominent American musicians.

In a sense, as the second brand ambassador, the Yugoslav audience was also a mirror or a reflection on the international stage of the cultural work done by Yugoslav brand champions and brand ambassadors who were given with the task of growing the Yugoslav audience for the purpose of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, as evident from Chapter Two. This is exemplified in the case of a performance in Yugoslavia of the band *Blood, Sweat & Tears*. Some Yugoslav publications described the performance of a State Department's sponsored attraction of a rock-jazz group *Blood, Sweat & Tears* at the end of July 1970 as "an exceptional event in our 'pop' musical life"¹²⁰³ and as "an event of the decade"¹²⁰⁴, Lorraine Alterman, who accompanied the band on tour at the invitation of the band's guitarist Steve Katz,¹²⁰⁵ provided a slightly different account on the audience reaction in her written record of the said tour. While, in their assessment of the performance of *Blood, Sweat & Tears* in Yugoslavia, the American Embassy wrote "that by presenting their audience with something new and rather advanced, BST assured a lasting impact on its listeners and on the Yugoslav musical world"¹²⁰⁶, Lorraine Alterman, by contrast, wrote how that the Yugoslav audience reacted well to the concerts but their "...

¹²⁰²"Dubrovnik Festival 1974 – Conversation with Niko Napica," Director of the Festival, during Lunch at CAO Home," November 7, 1973, enclosed in Toon, "Dubrovnik Festival 1974," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. 633, November 16, 1973, RG 59 General Records of Department of State, box 386, NARA.

¹²⁰³ Veljko Despot, "The Game Called 'Blood, Sweat and Tears,'" *Studio*, June 13, 1970 enclosed in Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/ Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A- 311, July 30, 1970, Group II Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2 Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 57, folder 4, CU Historical Collection

¹²⁰⁴ Dragan Jelić, "An encounter with the new music. Blood, Sweat and Tears – World Best Pop Ensemble of the Hour Touring Here," enclosed in Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A- 311, July 30, 1970, Group II Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2 Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 57, folder 4, CU Historical Collection

¹²⁰⁵ Loraine Alterman, "Behind the Iron Curtain with Blood, Sweat & Tears," (no page numbers visible), b 57, f 6, Group II, Series 2, Subseries I, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

¹²⁰⁶ Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/ Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A- 311, July 30, 1970, Group II Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2 Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 57, folder 4, CU Historical Collection

enthusiasm was tempered by the fact that they had heard this kind of music before." The Yugoslav youth, so Alterman further wrote, were quite knowledgeable about rock music with much of that knowledge gained from American and British sources, that is magazines and records, and domestic rock bands.¹²⁰⁷ As evident from Chapter Two, Yugoslavia becoming a part of the worldwide cultural scenes was one of the main postulates of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy.

In addition to all of these collaborative efforts between the Yugoslavs and the Americans to develop jazz diplomacy as a branding instrument in service of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, one tour of an American jazz musician and his orchestra is worth mentioning. In 1966, through the Cultural Presentations Program, the American state partnered up with Jugokonzert for a performance of the Woody Herman Orchestra in Belgrade and concert agencies of Croatia and Slovenia for the Orchestra's performances in Zagreb and Ljubljana.¹²⁰⁸ According to the official American report, the Woody Herman Orchestra was initially to perform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. When this planned tour fell through, so the official report continued, Africa was chosen as a substitute tour.¹²⁰⁹ Even though, as noted in USIS Zagreb's July 19, 1966 airgram, the campaign to promote the event was not really an intense one, USIS Zagreb was still satisfied with the organizational aspect of the concerts in the said cities.¹²¹⁰ Overall, the official report marked the tour a success, noting how the Phoenix Singers, which joined the Woody Herman Orchestra in Yugoslavia, Romania and United Arab Republic "were successful as or unified presentation reflecting high musical quality with a most diverse show of talent."¹²¹¹

The soft power attraction of the Woody Herman Orchestra, however, did not lie so much in the Orchestra's performance. An American airgram from July 19, 1966 wrote how the concerts

¹²⁰⁷ Loraine Alterman, "Behind the Iron Curtain with Blood, Sweat & Tears," box 57, folder 6, Group II, Series 2, Subseries I, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

¹²⁰⁸ Tobin, "Cultural and Educational Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Woody Herman Band/Phoenix Singers," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-38, July 19, 1966, 1, box 66, folder 10, MC 468, CU Historical Collection, Group II Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Arts, Subseries 1. Performers, Arkansas

¹²⁰⁹ "Woody Herman Orchestra AP-EUR-NEA. April 1- June 8, 1966," box 66, folder 10, MC 468, Group II CPP, Series 2. Performing Arts. Subseries 1. Performers, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

¹²¹⁰ "Report of USIS Zagreb on Woody Herman Orchestra and Phoenix Singers," Enclosure No. 1, Tobin, "Cultural and Educational Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Woody Herman Band/Phoenix Singers," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-38, July 19, 1966, box 66, folder 10, MC 468, CU Historical Collection, Group II Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Arts, Subseries 1. Performers, Arkansas

¹²¹¹ "Woody Herman Orchestra AP-EUR-NEA. April 1- June 8, 1966," box 66, folder 10, MC 468, Group II CPP, Series 2. Performing Arts. Subseries 1. Performers, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

of the Orchestra in Zagreb and Ljubljana were "excellent" and the Orchestra itself was "a fine musical organization". As the same airgram continued, despite this Orchestra being "a fine musical organization", it nonetheless presented itself "in the style of 'show biz 1940': Charming though it may be, this style seems out of place in the middle sixties." As a result, continued the July 19, 1966 airgram, "jazz enthusiasts of Slovenia and Croatia were delighted to hear the famous musical group, but one had the feeling that their expectations continued on even after the concert had ended."¹²¹² The Americans recognized that the attractive element of the Orchestra's performance was Yugoslav jazz musician Duško Gojković. The enthusiastic response of the Belgrade crowd, so the July 19, 1966 airgram continued, "was no doubt heightened by the fact that one of the trumpeters in the group, Duško Gojković, was a Belgrade boy returning to his home town after having 'made good' in the States."¹²¹³

Bill Byrne, a member of the Woody Herman Orchestra, noted how Duško Gojković joined the band in Europe and performed with the band on the African leg of their tour.¹²¹⁴ However, Duško Gojković himself was rather wary about his performance in Yugoslavia, as can be surmised from the recollection of Bill Byrne. According to Bill Byrne, Duško Gojković, whose father had been a resistance fighter during the Second World War¹²¹⁵, left Yugoslavia in order to avoid military conscription. For the duration of their State Department's tour, Duško Gojković, so Byrne continued, inquired around multiple Embassies to see if it was safe for him to return to his home country. Upon their reassurance, continued Byrne, Gojković landed with the band in Yugoslavia welcomed by "this huge roar as the door opened. The government didn't bother him."¹²¹⁶ In fact, at least according to the recollections of another band member, Nat Pierce, the Yugoslavs were not really interested in any other band members. As Pierce noted, while Woody Herman was ecstatic upon seeing such eager Yugoslav fans, the Yugoslav fans passed him by and stormed to welcome Duško Gojković in a manner, as recalled by Nat Pierce, "... like it was a homecoming for Clark Gable or something!" Pierce further recalled how the

¹²¹² "Report of USIS Zagreb on Woody Herman Orchestra and Phoenix Singers," Enclosure No. 1, Tobin, "Cultural and Educational Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Woody Herman Band/Phoenix Singers," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-38, July 19, 1966, box 66, folder 10, MC 468, CU Historical Collection, Group II Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Arts, Subseries 1. Performers, Arkansas

¹²¹³ Tobin, "Cultural and Educational Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Woody Herman Band/Phoenix Singers," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-38, July 19, 1966, 2, box 66, folder 10, MC 468, CU Historical Collection, Group II Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Arts, Subseries 1. Performers, Arkansas

¹²¹⁴ William D. Clancy with Audree Coke Kenton, *Woody Herman: chronicles of the Herds* (New York: Schirmer Books; London: Prentice Hall International, 1995), 261. (hereinafter, *Woody Herman*)

¹²¹⁵ Clancy, *Woody Herman*, 262. Comment by Nat Pierce.

¹²¹⁶ Clancy, *Woody Herman*, 262.

Woody Herman band received "a big banquet with all the homemade sausage and *sljivovica*" in Belgrade.¹²¹⁷ Woody Herman was apparently aware of the allure of Duško Gojković in Yugoslavia and, as the July 19, 1966 airgram noted, "Woody Herman very skillfully took account of the local feeling and gave the spotlight generously to Gojković, without slighting the other outstanding performers in his group."¹²¹⁸ Upon the request of his band leader, so Nat Pierce recalled, Duško Gojković went "down front every night to say goodnight to the people in their native language and its was touching."¹²¹⁹ One Yugoslav newspaper from Slovenia praised the soloists of the Orchestra noting how they could not overlook Duško Gojković "not perhaps on account of the fact that he is our countryman" but also because Gojković's performance of the ballad "I Remember Clifford" demonstrated that Gojković was "among the best trumpeters in the world."¹²²⁰ Even though, as could be grasped from the official American report outlined above, the Woody Herman Orchestra was not really an outstanding success in Yugoslavia, it can still be said that the band managed to achieve at least one goal stated by an American official in 1957 during a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Information. Responding to the question on whether the United States was using artistic performances for worldwide demonstration of them not being "the materialistic people that the Soviets have said we are, and that we are trying to prove to them that we have some of the finer and higher things of life, or are we using them primarily as an audience-builder", one member of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Information responded by stating an additional reason of for using these concerts and that was as a means to "entertain them [the foreign audiences] and make them feel good for a night at the expense of the United States, which is always a way of generating some good will."¹²²¹ It is in this aspect Woody Herman and his orchestra were indeed successful in Yugoslavia.

¹²¹⁷ Clancy, *Woody Herman*, 262.

¹²¹⁸ Tobin, "Cultural and Educational Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Woody Herman Band/Phoenix Singers," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-38, July 19, 1966, 2, box 66, folder 10, MC 468, CU Historical Collection, Group II Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Arts, Subseries 1. Performers, Arkansas.

¹²¹⁹ Clancy, *Woody Herman*, 262.

¹²²⁰ "Woody Herman Concert at the Tivoli Hall. The 'Big Band' must play in this way," *Ljubljanski dnevnik*, May 23, 1966, 1-2, enclosed translation in Tobin, "Cultural and Educational Exchange: Cultural Presentations Program: Woody Herman Band/Phoenix Singers," Airgram from AmEmbassy Belgrade to Department of State, no. A-38, July 19, 1966, box 66, folder 10, MC 468, CU Historical Collection, Group II Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Arts, Subseries 1. Performers, Arkansas

¹²²¹ "Stenographic Transcript. U.S. Information Agency. Advisory Committee on Cultural Information. Third Meeting, March 28, 1957, Walker Johnson Building, Washington DC," 112, RG 306 USIA, Entry P#8, box 5, NARA. Comment by Damon.

While the combined efforts of the Yugoslavs and the Americans in supporting specific elements of the Yugoslav independent brand through jazz diplomacy showed some success, how and through what means did the Yugoslavs aim to sell these same elements on the American market through jazz diplomacy is the subject of the next and last chapter of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 4

THE YUGOSLAVS TRY TO TAKE AMERICA

4.1 Presenting Yugoslavia's independence

In 1958, a critic for *The New Times* Howard Taubman wrote a review of Yugoslavia's performance at the Brussels World Fair. "The Yugoslavs," wrote Taubman, "have come to the Brussels World's Fair intent on showing their pride in their independence and integrity as a people." For two days, continued Taubman, the Yugoslavs displayed their culture through the performances of the Belgrade Philharmonic, the National Ballet and the National Opera, the Chorus of the People's Army, Soloisti di Zagreb and a group of soloists. Their repertoire mostly consisted of their own, Yugoslav, works, a move interpreted by Taubman as a "gesture of a proud spirit." The world, especially the Western one, did not know a lot about Yugoslav contemporary music so displaying their own music, according to Taubman, "does not offer a guarantee of sure-fire success". Nonetheless, as Taubman wrote, "... if a nation is displaying its accomplishments, how much braver to do so with the best of its own than to rely on the international repertory that everyone knows and does?" While Taubman further noted the absurdity of the claim that the Yugoslavs "disclosed any geniuses of masterpieces" as "the level of the works performed was not high", these works nonetheless, so Taubman stated, provided information regarding the cultural life of the country.¹²²² While the examined data does not contain official Yugoslav reactions to the review written by Taubman, considering elements that constituted the "independent Yugoslavia" brand, a reasonable supposition is that the Yugoslavs would have been satisfied with the said review as it, minus the comment on the not-so-excellent-quality of the performance of the Yugoslav troupes, contained all of the necessary ingredients the Yugoslavs wished to highlight to successfully present the Americans with the main message of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. For one, Taubman's review conveyed the main essence of the brand, the independence of the country, which was demonstrated through the performance of their own compositions and showcased the world the originality of their brand as the Yugoslavs were not copying anyone in their repertoire. In addition, Taubman's

¹²²² Howard Taubman, "Yugoslavs Heard at Brussels Fair. Nation's Variety of Musical Expression Underscores Its Spirit of Independence," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1958, 13. (hereinafter, "Yugoslavs Heard at Brussels Fair")

review indicated that the Yugoslavs were cultured, culture playing a large part in the cohesiveness of the country, that is in the sustenance of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand as recognized by the some Americans. The review written by Taubman was probably the review the Yugoslavs wished American critics wrote in line with their designated role of being potential advertising instruments for the desire image of the Yugoslav state. Unfortunately for the Yugoslavs, it appears that Taubman presented the minority among American critics who wrote such desired reviews.

The Yugoslav musical magazine *Zvuk*, just a year prior to Taubman writing the said review, provided an opportunity to its readers to read the perception of their Dubrovnik Festival by an American critic in the American magazine *Musical Courier*. The author of the said article, Gerson Nordlinger, so it was stated in *Zvuk*, started his review by stating how what he had witnessed at Dubrovnik Festival surpassed his expectations and the Festival was indeed "a truly delightful and rewarding experience". What differentiated the Dubrovnik Festival from other European festivals, highlighted Nordlinger, were Yugoslav artists who comprised the majority of the performers.¹²²³ Indeed, Yugoslav composer Vladimir Berdović saw the latter, meaning that Dubrovnik Festival had been "a reflection of our, Yugoslav forces" with a few foreign artists on its repertoire, as a "unique example in the international festival practice". It were Yugoslav performers on the repertoire that, according to Vladimir Berdović, "gave special meaning to Dubrovnik Summer Festival, it is its biggest value and as such presents a full reflection of our culture and our artistic achievements in the fields of drama and music."¹²²⁴ The Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries saw Dubrovnik Summer Festival in 1957 as a stage to display, both to the domestic audience and foreign tourists, the achievements of Yugoslav culture.¹²²⁵ The same document revealed how the festival was also seen as a means of Yugoslav soft power as the document noted that foreigners were attracted to the festival and several foreign artists performed at the festival that year.¹²²⁶ To Nordlinger, as further stated in *Zvuk*, Yugoslav performers at Dubrovnik Festival did provide "a clear picture of the significant artistic possibilities of this country but, at the same time, revealed gaps which are inevitable when the found talent is restricted to one national group".¹²²⁷ Still, as evident from the article in *Zvuk*, Nordlinger wrote rather warm concluding remarks in which he praised

¹²²³ "Kroz štampu i događaje," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija* 13-14 (1957), 184.

¹²²⁴ Vladimir Berdović, "Muzički bilans osmih dubrovačkih letnjih igara," *Savremeni akordi* 1 (January 1958), 16.

¹²²⁵ AJ-559-11-26, Krista Djordjević (handwritten signature), "Kulturne veze s inostranstvom po zemljama za 1957. godinu," 5.

¹²²⁶ Ibid.

¹²²⁷ "Kroz štampu i događaje," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija* 13-14 (1957), 184.

not just the Dubrovnik Summer Festival but other Yugoslav festivals "for their diversity and artistic value but also because of the opportunity they provide as an introduction to a beautiful country the majority of the Americans know and understand so little about".¹²²⁸ Despite these complimentary words, it appears that one segment of Nordlinger's writing drew the ire of the Yugoslavs. As *Zvuk* noted, Nordlinger's review also contained "the obligatory meditation on the topic: „How does the fact that Yugoslavia is a Communist country impact Yugoslavia's cultural life? That is a difficult question..." to which the unsigned author in *Zvuk* almost ironically wrote, "Of course, it [the question] is hard."¹²²⁹ In an earlier review of Dubrovnik Summer Festival by a different American critic political connotations, albeit in a slightly lesser manner, found their way into this review as well. As *Zvuk* noted of the review of Dubrovnik Summer Festival in *Musical Courier* by Trudy Goth, this American critic presented a rather "complimentary review of all the main artistic events of the festival".¹²³⁰ Still, even Goth could not do without the description of the festival as a state-sponsored festival held "under Tito's patronage" but stated how she did not come across "the slightest denials or interpositions for political reasons".¹²³¹ Attaching political connotations to Yugoslavia was not just a characteristic of musical critics such as Goth and Nordlinger. Jazz musicians disseminated similar messages. For instance, when Louis Armstrong addressed the upcoming visit of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to the United States in which he offered his suggestion to the Soviet leader to visit a jazz club to familiarize himself with "freedom", noted how "[t]he furthest I [have] been inside the Iron Curtain was Belgrade, Yugoslavia, and Pops you never seen a curtain jump like that in all your life."¹²³²

These examples reveal the main problem the "independent Yugoslavia" brand had in the United States. As the Americans reported in a memorandum from May 26, 1958, it was on May 23, 1958 that the then Press Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington DC, Josip Defranceski, "at his request" called on American official Joseph T. Kendrick in order to "discuss the cultural relations program between the United States and Yugoslavia" since the Yugoslav government, according to Defranceski, wanted to broaden "contacts between the two countries". As the American memorandum detailing the conversation between Defranceski and Kendrick continued, the Yugoslavs were especially interested in exchanging not only graduate students

¹²²⁸ "Kroz štampu i događaje," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija* 13-14 (1957), 184.

¹²²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²³⁰ "Kroz štampu i događaje," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija* 9-10 (1957), 459.

¹²³¹ *Ibid.*

¹²³² "Satchmo Wants Khrushchev To Visit U.S. Jazz Spot," *Jet*, Vol. 16, No. 22, September 24, 1959, 59.

but scholars as well, in addition to artists and literature and culturally oriented radio and TV materials. As was stated further in the said memorandum, the Yugoslavs were desirous of sending their exhibit to the United States. At the same time, so the May 1958 American memorandum further emphasized, the government of Yugoslavia was eager for American "newspaper companies to send correspondents to Yugoslavia to cover the cultural field" as a large number of reporters descend upon the country but get so engaged "in political topics and never take advantage of cultural events, such as Dubrovnik Festival."¹²³³ The observations made by the Yugoslav government and their meaning for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand was revealed in another American report two years later. As the Americans stressed in their despatch from September 1, 1960, "[t]he Yugoslavs are almost painfully eager to create a better picture of themselves abroad. Without adequate means or sufficient planning, they are attempting to change the image from an essentially political one ("Yugoslavia is a Communist country") to a more cultural one."¹²³⁴ Expressed differently, the issue at hand was that the Yugoslavs were unsuccessful in selling the cultural side of the story behind the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

Unlike the meticulously detailed almost step-by-step process the Americans went through in their cultural diplomatic ventures in Yugoslavia with the aim of selling their own brand to the Yugoslavs and simultaneously building the Yugoslav independent brand, the examined Yugoslav materials do not provide us with a coherent set of goals or marketing strategies through which we could gain a more detailed insight into the whole branding process the Yugoslavs had undertaken in an attempt to sell the cultural side of the story of their "independent Yugoslavia" brand. The examined materials reveal that the Yugoslavs characterized and identified cultural interaction with the Americans as simply being in the interest of Yugoslavia on several occasions during the 1960s. The United States was recognized as "occupying a special place" in Yugoslavia's cultural interaction with the world in the 1963 report of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.¹²³⁵ The already cited 1968 analysis of Yugoslavia's cultural interaction with the world recognized the high development of both science and culture of the United States as well as that it was in "the interest of our science and culture to develop more lively scientific, educational and cultural cooperative

¹²³³ Memorandum of Conversation between Josip Defranceski, Press Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy, and Joseph T. Kendrick, Jr – EE/P, "Yugoslav approach for extended cultural relations program with the United States," May 26, 1958, RG 306 USIA, Entry #P40, container 32, NARA.

¹²³⁴ Walter R. Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 20, September 1, 1960, 16, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹²³⁵ AJ-559-21-44, "Izveštaj komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1963. godinu," Beograd, decembar 1963, 4.

relations."¹²³⁶ Expressed differently, a possible gain was there for the Yugoslavs. By that time, as visible from a discussion generated by this analysis at one meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the perception of American culture went through a change at least in the minds of Yugoslavia's brand champions. As one member noted on the October 2, 1968 meeting of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the culture of the United States, compared to the culture of the Soviet Union, had been incorrectly characterized in the analysis as "seeking political concentration", a "fault" the culture of the Soviet Union did not have. In fact, as this Committee member continued, if it was the United States that was acting like a great power in their cultural politics, the Soviet Union was doing it too, even more so than the United States as "the etatist control of cultural politics in the Soviet Union is far greater than in the West."¹²³⁷ Simply put by the same Committee member, the Yugoslav analysis provided a biased view on the American cultural politics that could not have been farther from the truth as the United States developed a culture "that has its own values, that affirmed itself in the world, that is not just borrowing, that affirmed itself in the fine arts and in the literature, cultural trends are represented that are not part of the politics of the great force, but developments which are progressive and with which we can cooperate...".¹²³⁸ This changed view of the status of American culture played a role in the decision of the Yugoslavs to culturally interact with the Americans. The Yugoslavs honestly admitted this in another report of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1968. In the annual 1968 report, the Committee, writing about countries outside of Europe the Yugoslavs were enthusiastic on developing cultural relations with, noted the salience of the United States "keeping in mind, first of all, the concentration of scientists, educators, artists and creators of all profiles" in that country in the post-1945 period. The 1968 report continued how this view "changes those simplified assessments about this country without cultural tradition, because an authentic culture had been created and in all domains even on this continent and in these countries."¹²³⁹ Expressed differently, in line with the cultural diplomatic postulates of the country, as explained in Chapter One, the main brand champions of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand categorized the United States as one of those highly developed countries

¹²³⁶ AJ-559-34-75, "Analiza kulturnih odnosa Jugoslavije sa inostranstvom i naredni zadaci," 34.

¹²³⁷ AJ-559-35-76, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 2. oktobar 1968, 35. Comment by Dragoljub Vujica.

¹²³⁸ Ibid.,36. Comment by Dragoljub Vujica. For similar comments by Dragoljub Vujica on the culture of the United States see also, AJ-559-34-75, Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. "XIV Sednica Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom održana 4. juna 1968. godine," 45.

¹²³⁹ AJ-559-36-80, "Izveštaj Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1968. godinu," Beograd, Maja 1968, 74.

from which the Yugoslavs could learn and this could result in the improvement of the country's independent brand.

The Yugoslavs operated their cultural diplomacy, and their branding, in the United States in a much more modest manner than had the the United States in Yugoslavia. Unlike the United States, as can be surmised from the examined archive materials of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Yugoslavs did not have such a highly sophisticated set of bodies within a single institution that dealt with all of the segments of the American market through which they could grasp all of the vagaries of how the said market functioned in practice and what it needed. In fact, the closest thing to what could be characterized as Yugoslavia's research of the American market came in 1965 and focused on the "where to brand" question. It was in one 1965 Yugoslav document that the Yugoslavs noted how information about Yugoslavia was unequally distributed within the United States. Knowledge about the country, so the 1965 report from the Yugoslav Information Center to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs stated, was spread in areas of the United States which were frequented by the Yugoslavs and in places where universities were located which was namely the East and West coast. At the same time, the 1965 report of the Yugoslav Information Center emphasized that there was little knowledge about the country in the Midwestern region of the United States, an area that perceived Yugoslavia as yet another "Iron Curtain" country. The report then noted the salience of finding appropriate materials from the informational and propaganda spectrum to break into this area and to put on a "more offensive performance in areas where we acquired more tangible positions."¹²⁴⁰ On a much more general note on market research, it was only in a February 1967 document that the Section for Culture and Art of the Federal Committee of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia recognized the necessity of researching foreign markets so that Yugoslavia positions its cultural relations with foreign countries on a much more long-term basis.¹²⁴¹

The Yugoslav inability to manage the advertising process on a state-level from the beginning to its end should come as no surprise, especially if we take into account the country's experiences with advertising. As the Americans noted in their Country Assessment Report for 1961, they carried out a project which focused on the role of advertising in the economy of the United States as not only could this theme demonstrate "the lesson of attention to the consumer

¹²⁴⁰ AJ-559-54-119, Jugoslavenski informativni centar Državnom sekretarijatu za inostrane poslove- Upravi za informacije, January 20, 1966, no. 66, 2.

¹²⁴¹ AJ-559-24-51, "Mišljenje, stavovi i ocene o medjunarodnoj kulturnoj saradnji," 3.

-- a subtle reminder to a Communist country'' but also ''because Yugoslav enterprises are suddenly awakening to this medium themselves''.¹²⁴² Expressed differently, it was only at the beginning of the 1960s that the Yugoslavs began to develop a more intense interest in advertising. It was only with ''the introduction of market economy principles in Yugoslavia'', so the Americans commented in their 1965 report on ''Radio in Yugoslavia and its audience'', that advertising began to occupy a more prominent position in radio broadcasting to a mutual delight of both the listeners and the management of these radio stations. The former liked advertisements, continued the 1965 report, as they provided them with ''useful information on various products, and the radio station management is also pleased because it is a source of income.''¹²⁴³ What this meant was that, technically speaking, the Yugoslavs and the Americans began branding Yugoslavia before advertising became a widespread practice in Yugoslavia.

One of the first steps in the Yugoslav process involved choosing the appropriate advertising method and identifying their American partners. According to the examined materials of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and despatches sent by the Yugoslav Information Center, Yugoslav partners included American impresarios, musicians and record companies while the Yugoslav "how" entailed the preferred cultural diplomatic means of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the establishment of direct contact with these agents. As was stated in the January 17, 1956 Yugoslav Information Center's report, they unsuccessfully pursued a project with conductor Leopold Stokowski that would have seen the performance of Yugoslav works in the United States, noting that "[e]ven such actions, in the conditions of a strong American market, ask for much patient and diligent work." The same report noted how the Information Center collaborated with ANTA and that it was in music diplomacy that there was an evident "one-sidedness because a large number of American artists performed in Yugoslavia while, so far, no Yugoslav artist had arrived to the US." The January 17, 1956 report concluded that "[i]t takes a lot more work and dilligence for the situation to improve."¹²⁴⁴ Another method of the Yugoslavs to attempt to disseminate their cultural wares in the United States to secure the presence of their brand on that market included records. Records taped by the Chorus of the Yugoslav Army and the members of the Belgrade Opera,

¹²⁴² "Transmittal of Country Assessment Report, USIS Yugoslavia," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 87, March 13, 1961, 5, RG 306 USIA, Entry # P 328, box 12, NARA.

¹²⁴³ Research and Reference Service, "Radio in Yugoslavia and its audience," 10, R-13-65, February 1965, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 144, box 34, NARA.

¹²⁴⁴ AJ-559-17-36, "Iz izveštaja Informacionog centra u New Yorku pov. br. 211 od 20 decembra 1955 godine," attached to Ljubo Drndić Državnom Sekretarijatu za inostrane poslove, Odeljenje za štampu i informacije, "Dostavljaju se prijepisi iz izveštaja Centra za informacije (N.Y.) i Ambasade u Washingtonu o propagandi na kulturnom planu," no. 42/III, January 17, 1956, 1.

with Oskar Danon and Krešimir Baranović at the helm as conductors, for the company "Decca"¹²⁴⁵ were considered a great success that opened doors for Yugoslav singers to perform abroad.¹²⁴⁶ With the exception of records, these materials demonstrate how the Yugoslavs relied on establishing direct contacts with American individuals and organizations, that is, the Yugoslavs relied on the "word-of-mouth" marketing.¹²⁴⁷

This was where their strategy encountered one of its first major obstacles. This obstacle was indirectly revealed in an article jazz critic Marshall Stearns wrote for *The Saturday Review* that detailed the 1956 tour of Dizzy Gillespie. In this article, Stearns wrote how a member of Dizzy's band, Quincy Jones, spoke to a Yugoslav musician. Quincy Jones told his Yugoslav counterpart how "he hoped to see him someday in New York. The Yugoslav jazz musician then, according to Stearns, "burst into tears. 'It's my dearest wish,' he said, 'but I haven't [got] a chance.'"¹²⁴⁸ Even though Stearns wrote of the immense desire of jazz fans in Yugoslavia to move to the United States, attempts he described as "a dangerous move in their country"¹²⁴⁹, truth be told, it was not the Yugoslav side that was hampering attempts to establish cultural and educational interaction through direct visits of Yugoslav citizens to the United States. The initial obstacle that prevented the Yugoslavs from utilizing their desired marketing technique were political reasons which gave rise to a prevalent climate amongst American consumers that acted as market forces and impacted the dissemination of Yugoslav cultural wares. To reiterate from Chapter One, the word of mouth advertising method was not possible due to the two countries, based on the decision of the State Department from March 10, 1951, not having "an official exchange of persons program".¹²⁵⁰ While the American side was extremely cautious on who to allow to step on their market, the official cultural bodies of Yugoslavia advocated precisely the opposite. Reflecting on the visits and performances of American artists in Yugoslavia and subsequently Yugoslav artists in the United States during 1956 and 1957, the Yugoslavs identified as one of the first priorities in their discussion with the United States, so it was stated

¹²⁴⁵ AJ-559-11-25, Krista Djordjević, "Godišnji izveštaj Muzičko-pozorišnog sektora za 1956 g.," 2.

¹²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹²⁴⁷ Marketing expert George Silverman writes that "...the best way to make the decision easier is for a *trusted advisor to encourage the customer to use the product, i.e. word of mouth.*" George Silverman, *The Secrets of Word-of-Mouth Marketing: How to Trigger Exponential Sales through Runaway Word of Mouth* (New York: AMACOM, 2001), 21.

¹²⁴⁸ Marshall W. Stearns, "Is Jazz Good Propaganda? The Dizzy Gillespie Tour," *The Saturday Review* 39, July 14, 1956, 29.

¹²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹²⁵⁰ See Memorandum from OFX/D- William C. Johnstone, Jr. to P- Mr. Barrett, "Official Exchange of Persons Program Between the United States and Yugoslavia," May 23, 1951, Group XVI Post Reports, folder 32, box 320, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

in one document, to "insist that the authorities of the United States don't make entry visas harder [to obtain] for Yugoslav citizens. As long as our artists, students, scientific workers cannot obtain entry visas, any type of cultural cooperation or agreement is not possible."¹²⁵¹ The Americans considered the initiation of the "Leaders and Specialist" program in 1958 was a positive step in the direction of offering "opportunities for personal contact which, in turn, becomes the most important and perhaps the only effective means of promoting United States' objectives."¹²⁵²

The American market did not just have a say on the advertising method the Yugoslavs could use, it also, in a sense, impacted the product through which the Yugoslavs were to present the cultural story of their brand. To reiterate from previous chapters, it was folklore that was one of the earliest Yugoslav musical products that caught the attention of the Americans, according to the information obtained by the Yugoslav Information Center in New York in 1953.¹²⁵³ According to the Yugoslav interpretation, the Yugoslav usage of folklore as the primary Yugoslav cultural product to represent the state on the American market had actually been forced upon the Yugoslavs by the main force of the American market, that is, the basic attitude prevalent at that time at the market itself and its primary consumers, the Americans. When the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries reflected on Yugoslavia's cultural interaction with the United States in 1968, the Committee noted how the United States had "an extreme anti-Communist orientation that left a mark on everything that comes from socialist countries." Culture was, according to the same document, impacted by the Cold War and bloc division.¹²⁵⁴ Despite the Americans openly declaring "freedom of [artistic] creativity", so the document continued, Yugoslav cultural products had "for many years been subdued to general suspicion and an extremely severe censure of everything that came from our country."¹²⁵⁵ The only Yugoslav product that the Americans allowed for many years, as could be grasped from the Yugoslav interpretation of the basic postulates of the American market as stated in the 1968 Committee's report, was folklore. Put directly by the Committee,

¹²⁵¹ AJ-559-54-119, "Predmet: Kulturna saradnja SAD-Jugoslavija. Prorada "Promemorije" za diskusiju o kulturnoj saradnji između SAD i FNRJ," (no date), 1.

¹²⁵² "Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program with Yugoslavia for Fiscal Year 1961," FSD from Amembassy Belgrade to Department of State, No. 173, September 27, 1961, 2, Group XVI, Post Reports, folder 32, box 320, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Historical Collection, Arkansas.

¹²⁵³ AJ-559-8-19-20, "Mesečni izveštaj za decembar 1953 god," 219.

¹²⁵⁴ AJ-559-36-80, "Izveštaj Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1968. godinu," Beograd, Maja 1968, 74.

¹²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 74-75.

simultaneously with the censorship of Yugoslav products, the United States "... aimed to minimize our presence mainly on folklore that had, however, played a pioneer informative role and was very highly rated." Yugoslav presence in the United States, so the document continued, had improved in the last couple of years and Yugoslav films and music joined folklore, in addition to a large number of Yugoslav cultural and educational workers that went to post-graduate studies to the United States and "successfully shed the wrong image about the level of cultural development in our country."¹²⁵⁶

Be the reason anti-communism or any other, the truth of the matter was that there wasn't a lot of interest on the part of the segment of the American market, the consumers, on products coming from a country such as Yugoslavia, a matter of fact confirmed by the Americans. When Robert H. Thayer, the Assistant to the Secretary for Coordination of International Educational and Cultural Relations, wrote a letter to Thomas Messer, the director of the Institute of Contemporary Art in Boston, regarding a Yugoslav exhibition, to be discussed in more detail in the next subchapter, Thayer noted his awareness of the problems American institutions bore when taking in and funding Communist countries' art exhibits and how such exhibitions attracted scant attention in the United States as this was information he obtained from both the President of the American Federation of Arts and "a number of other prominent people from the art world".¹²⁵⁷

There were several criteria that both a Yugoslav musical product and the potential American supplier needed to meet for the Yugoslavs to dispatch their musical product on the American market. On the official cultural level, the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, as stated by one member at their Plenary Meeting in mid-January 1956, looked for and insisted on high quality managers who were to book Yugoslav attractions for performances in the United States. In this respect, the same member singled out the ensemble "Tanec" as the source of their headaches as this ensemble reached an agreement with a low-quality manager.¹²⁵⁸ The Macedonian folklore ensemble "Tanec" had been one of the first Yugoslav folklore ensembles to tour the United States. The ensemble was described in *Musical America* as "the first full company to come out of a former 'iron curtain' country" and was set to perform on American stages both indoors and outdoors following tradition that dictates that

¹²⁵⁶ Ibid., 75.

¹²⁵⁷ Letter from Robert H. Thayer to Thomas Messer, Reference Slip to Mr. Gert (USIA) from Cary T. Grayson, February 19, 1960, folder Yugo. Activities in U.S. 1961, container 17, RG 306 United States Information Agency, Entry UD-WW 395, NARA.

¹²⁵⁸ AJ-559-18-37, "Plenarni sastanak ... 16 i 17 januara 1956 g.," 103. Comment by Branko Drašković.

"the dances are held for the entire village, out of doors." The ensemble came to the United States, so the American musical magazine explained, under the sponsorship of the company „Consolidated Concerts" owned by Charles E. Green and Lee V. Eastman and the International Musical Institute while, from the Yugoslav side, the company was sent by the state of Macedonia and the Yugoslav Government.¹²⁵⁹ The success of "Tanec" was portrayed ambiguously in Yugoslav documents. According to an official Yugoslav report from January 1956, "Tanec" made their overseas journey under the blessing of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Committee and their January 1956 performance in Carnegie Hall was considered a great success.¹²⁶⁰ Overall, this ensemble performed 120 shows in America, achieving significant "[m]oral success" among the Macedonian minority in the United States but ending up a financial flop.¹²⁶¹ The Americans missed this detail, and, according to a review published in *Musical America* on February 1, 1956, the performance of "Tanec" "provided a major artistic experience" with the American critic pointing out how all of those in attendance for their New York performance could see "a fascinating cross-section of over 2,000 years of history and culture". The *Musical America's* reviewer continued providing compliments for the performances of both female and male dancers, writing who it were the dances performed by male members of "Tanec" "with their dazzling footwork, intricate steps, leaps, and sword play" that intrigued the audience. On the other hand, wrote the critic for *Musical America*, the female dancers of "Tanec" "were just as skilled, and their 'Cupurlika', a folk version of the old harem dance, was something that should make Hollywood feel ashamed for its tepid and vulgar imitations of the real thing."¹²⁶²

Regardless of such complimentary reviews by this American critic, another Yugoslav document interpreted the said tour of "Tanec" in a different manner that had the Yugoslav report outlined above. According to a 1956 report by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, "Tanec" caused problems for the tour of "Kolo", a Croatian folklore ensemble, scheduled to tour the United States in October 1956 under the patronage of Sol Hurok. The biggest sin of "Tanec", according to the said document, had been the signing of a contract with an inadequate manager "under very poor conditions", a process unbeknownst to

¹²⁵⁹ "Yugoslav Ballet To Tour America," *Musical America*, Vol LXXV, No. 15, December 1, 1955, pp. 6

¹²⁶⁰ AJ-559-11-25, "Muzički izveštaj za januar 1956. god," February 3, 1956, 1.

¹²⁶¹ AJ-559-10-24, Krista Djordjević, "Izveštaj – po zemljama za 1956 godinu – ... Sjedinjene Američke Države," 2; AJ – 559-11-25, Krista Djordjević, "Godišnji izveštaj Muzičko-pozorišnog sektora za 1956 g.," 112.

¹²⁶² R.S., "Yugoslav Folk Dancers in New York Debut," *Musical America*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 3, February 1, 1956, pp. 27.

the Committee.¹²⁶³ Furthermore, as was noted in another document from mid-January 1956, Yugoslav bodies, both at home and in the US, the latter's engagement deemed necessary, were unaware of the tour and the tour jeopardized "the achievement of a prior solidly concluded contract between Hurok and the folklore ansamble 'Kolo'."¹²⁶⁴

To reiterate, the issue and the discussion generated in Yugoslav cultural bodies, the brand champions of the Yugoslav independent brand, that surrounded the said tour of "Tanec" reveals how the quality of American managers engaged in the actual booking was one criteria for plastering Yugoslav musical products on the American market. The fight of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, so it was stated by one of its members during the Committee's Plenary meeting in 1956, which included using diplomacy and their representative bodies abroad, to prevent a conclusion of a contract that would not do justice to the country, its cultural politics and the level of its folklore art, lasted for two years. Steps were taken, continued the member, to gain access to a "top-notch manager". Through the system of elimination, that is ridding themselves of bad managers to get the best manager, so was further explained by the same Committee member, the Committee managed to prevent one Croatian ensamble and the folklore ensamble "Kolo" to sign a contract, only to have "Tanec" and their contract with a low quality manager send their two-year efforts down the drain.¹²⁶⁵

The Yugoslav brand champions did not just demand quality of the manager who would do the booking when selling the cultural story of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. They had the same demand of their musical brand ambassadors. The Yugoslavs may have pondered about the financial element that made it increasingly difficult to send their ballet or philharmonic to the United States but there was also the problem that "none of our philharmonics are on that level to be able to perform" in a country such as the United States.¹²⁶⁶ Quality was thus another key to the representation of the independent brand of Yugoslavia.

In the same manner as the Americans had done so on the Yugoslav cultural market, the Yugoslavs looked at their competition on the American market too. In this context, the Yugoslavs saw their performers as competition to one another on the American soil, as evident

¹²⁶³ AJ-559-10-24, "Plan rada po zemljama za 1956 ... Plan za 1956. SAD", 205.

¹²⁶⁴ AJ-559-16-35, Branko Drašković, "Zabeleška o problemima koordinacije u zemlji na polju kulturne propagande. Zabeleška izradjena na osnovu izveštaja naše Ambasade u Washingtonu Str. pov. br. 139 od 28. XII. 1955 godine," January 18, 1956, 1.

¹²⁶⁵ AJ-559-18-37, Comment by Branko Drašković, "Plenarni sastanak ... 16 i 17 januara 1956 g.," 103, Comment by Branko Drašković.

¹²⁶⁶ AJ-559-54-119, "Predmet: Kulturna saradnja SAD-Jugoslavija. Prorada "Promemorije" za diskusiju o kulturnoj saradnji između SAD i FNRJ," (no date), 3.

from an undated document in which the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries addressed problems that occurred during the negotiations period for performances in the United States by two Yugoslav folklore ensembles – "Kolo" and another, unnamed, ensemble from Croatia. As the document revealed, many Yugoslav attempts to break into the American market had endured failure as American managers were given too many options and had, due to the said issue, resorted to blackmail. On the other hand, so it was continued in the undated document, those that were considered "serious managers" gave up on booking Yugoslav musical products "because they got the sense of irresponsible dealings". It was salient, so it was further stated in the said document, that Yugoslav ensembles don't compete with each other in terms of "lowering prices" but, instead, "work in agreement". It was further noted in the same document how the United States, a large country, offered plenty of space for the visits of both of these ensembles but it was imperative that these two ensembles "don't appear at the same time in the same cities."¹²⁶⁷

In addition to ensuring that the Yugoslav ensembles don't compete with each other on the American market, the Yugoslavs, especially as the 1960s were coming to an end, also paid attention to their external competition on the American market too. In the same manner as the United States was in a competition with the British and the French for the attention of Yugoslav consumers on the Yugoslav cultural market, as we had seen in previous chapters, Yugoslavia was doing the same on the American market. Its competitors were other Eastern European countries. As was noted by the Yugoslav Embassy in the United States in mid-September 1969, the Yugoslavs needed to arrange musical events in the United States for the 1971 season as this had already been done by the Soviets, the Czechs and the Romanians.¹²⁶⁸ According to the view of the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington DC, so the mid-September 1969 report continued, Yugoslavia was lagging behind in music diplomacy with the United States if compared to Czechoslovakia and Romania, "not to mention the USSR which obviously pays much more attention to its presence in the cultural life of the US, which oscillates less than their mutual political relations".¹²⁶⁹ The Yugoslavs also focused on the way the Americans treated their cultural competition, compared to how the Americans were treating them (the Yugoslavs). When USIA's director Frank Shakespeare visited Yugoslavia in September 1969, the Yugoslav report from September 23 emphasized not just Shakespeare's satisfaction with the visit but how

¹²⁶⁷ AJ-559-10-23, "Razmena i gostovanja" (handwritten title), no date, 479.

¹²⁶⁸ AJ-559-68-151, Depeša iz Washingtona, no. 1028, 16. 9. 1969, 1.

¹²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

he "finally gets the difference between Yugoslavia and other EE [Eastern Europe] countries". Shakespeare, so continued the report, praised Yugoslavia's hospitality and the opportunity granted to him to converse with all of those Yugoslavs engaged in cultural interaction between the two countries.¹²⁷⁰ The rest of the September 23, 1969 report summarized the words of a man called Arnold who was Shakespeare's companion on the trip. This summary is salient as it shows how the Yugoslavs paid undivided attention to those they perceived as their competition on the American market. As the September 23, 1969 report noted, Arnold told them how USIA would have more funding available for Yugoslavia and, while the Americans would "expand activities in Romania, it [Romania] would still lag behind Yugoslavia." American educational exchanges with the Soviet Union, continued Arnold in the September 23, 1969 report, were progressing and, in the Eastern European fold with the exception of Yugoslavia, the majority of the educational exchanges were done with Poland and the numbers exceeded those of Yugoslavia.¹²⁷¹

In matters relating to the actual dissemination of the Yugoslav musical products on the American market, the 1956 tour of "Kolo" reveals how musical interaction from Yugoslavia to the United States actually functioned in practice. It was in June 1955, as revealed in one Yugoslav report, that impresario Sol Hurok put his signature on the sponsorship of the performances of the folklore ensemble "Kolo".¹²⁷² The context surrounding the negotiating process regarding the visit of this Yugoslav ensemble bears an uncanny resemblance to the negotiation process that occurred between the Yugoslavs and the Americans when Porgy and Bess was to visit Yugoslavia. As evident from the previous chapter, negotiations between the Yugoslavs and the Americans for the visit of Porgy and Bess lasted for some time as did the negotiation process for the performance of Kolo in the United States. The negotiation phase for the Kolo project, so the June 1955 document revealed, lasted for over a year.¹²⁷³ Even though the Yugoslav side was represented by "Turist-Express" from Belgrade in the negotiation process as this enterprise was covering the ensemble's transportation costs¹²⁷⁴, Yugoslav higher bodies and mediators had been on "stand-by" during the negotiation process, yet another similarity with the Porgy and Bess case. For this tour of Kolo, according to the June 1955 document, Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Jugokonzert and the Yugoslav

¹²⁷⁰ AJ-559-68-151, Depeša iz Washingtona, no. 1052, 23. 9. 1969, 1.

¹²⁷¹ Ibid.

¹²⁷² AJ-559-10-23, Radivoj Nikolajević, "Mesečni izveštaj za juni 1955," 6. jula 1955, 3.

¹²⁷³ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁴ Ibid.

Information Center all gave their "full support" during the negotiation process as did Gerald Severn¹²⁷⁵, who filled in the role of Ambassador Popović in the Porgy and Bess process by, so the June 1955 report continued, playing the role of the mediator as he had seen and attended several performances of Kolo.¹²⁷⁶ The Yugoslav Embassy in the United States and the Yugoslav Information Center also got engaged as visible from another Yugoslav document from early February 1956. This document revealed the plans for both the Yugoslav Information Center and the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington DC to get engaged after the performance of "Tanec" in the United States to get Hurok to accept the tour of "Kolo".¹²⁷⁷ Finally, there was also the Soviet element, so heavily present in American assessment reports for those early American music diplomats, Dizzy Gillespie included. Regarding "Kolo", be it a coincidence or not, the June 1955 report noted how, while the Americans were signing up "Kolo", the Soviet Union sent an invitation to the same ensemble for appearance in the Soviet Union in August 1955.¹²⁷⁸ The tour also included the "high dignitary" component, so present in the Porgy and Bess case. For the Washington debute of "Kolo", the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries forwarded "Hurok's request for our Ambassador to personally invite president Eisenhower for the first performance in Washington" to the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington DC.¹²⁷⁹ The final Yugoslav-American agreement on the performances of "Kolo" included a tour that was set to start in October 1956 and last for twelve weeks.¹²⁸⁰ A critic for *Musical America* wrote how, for their New York performance, concluded the critic "[a] full house greeted the company rapturously".¹²⁸¹

However, unlike the perfect timing for the launch of *Porgy and Bess* in Yugoslavia, as agreed on by both American and Yugoslav agents, various factors which preceeded and surrounded the launch of "Kolo" in the United States as the potential product which could change it all for Yugoslavia's artists, indicate the opposite to be the case. According to the information provided by Yugoslav officials stationed in New York from early February 1956, it was not easy to exercise "cultural propaganda" in the United States.¹²⁸² The document then

¹²⁷⁵ AJ-559-10-23, Radivoj Nikolajević, "Mesečni izveštaj za juni 1955," 6. jula 1955, 3.

¹²⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁷ AJ-559-54-19, Krista Djordjević, "Beleška. Razgovor sa pretstavnikom Odeljenje za štampu DSIP-a drugom Rusom dana 3.II. 1956 godine," 1.

¹²⁷⁸ AJ-559-10-23, Radivoj Nikolajević, "Mesečni izveštaj za juni 1955," 6. jula 1955, 3.

¹²⁷⁹ AJ-559-10-23, Radivoje Nikolajević, "Mesečni izveštaj za juli 1955. g.," 1.

¹²⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹²⁸¹ R.A.E., "Yugoslav Dancers In New York Debut," *Musical America*, LXXVI, No. 13, November 1, 1956, pp. 31.

¹²⁸² AJ-559-54-19, Krista Djordjević, "Beleška. Razgovor sa pretstavnikom Odeljenje za štampu DSIP- drugom Rusom dana 3.II. 1956," 1.

indicated potential problems which hampered the Yugoslav break into the American market. As the February 1956 document noted, the American market was full of "exhibitions and various manifestations, so it is not possible to implement something without large financial means."¹²⁸³ The same ills, cut-throat competition and no capital, that troubled Veljko Bijedić while he worked to gain support for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand through booking American artists who were to serve as advertising tools for the Yugoslav state, impacted Yugoslavia's presentation in the United States too.

The biggest difference between the tour of *Porgy and Bess* in Yugoslavia and *Kolo* in the United States lied in their achievement on the much bigger scale of opening the cultural hatch to each other's respective products. As evident from previous chapters, the Americans lamented on a lack of familiarity with American musical products in Yugoslavia when expressing the need for an appearance of *Porgy and Bess* in Yugoslavia to the State Department. Yugoslav sources cited the same reason for the performance of "*Kolo*" in the United States. In their December 1955 report, the Yugoslav Information Center characterized Yugoslavia's cultural promotional activities in the United States as being in the early stages of development before noting how the American public at large was relatively unfamiliar with Yugoslavia's cultural products. The Yugoslav Information Center continued the report by stating the need to "develop further and increase" such promotional ventures.¹²⁸⁴ Unfortunately for the Yugoslavs, it appears that *Kolo* was simply not that product. Unlike *Porgy and Bess* which stimulated considerable interest in American music in Yugoslavia, evident from American assessment reports cited earlier, this was not the case with *Kolo* in America, despite the Yugoslavs, as seen from the Yugoslav Information Center's January 17, 1956 report, nurturing hope for a different outcome.¹²⁸⁵ At least two official Yugoslav reports which listed opportunities for Yugoslav musical products to break into the American cultural market make it evident that *Kolo* ultimately failed in its ambassadorial role. One, which shall be discussed in more detail in subsequent subchapters, related to jazz while the other, a 1966 document drafted by the Yugoslav Information Center, noted stiff competition on the American musical scene and the reluctance of many American managers to book Yugoslav attractions out of fear for making a financial loss as Yugoslav artists were "still not affirmed enough on the American cultural

¹²⁸³ Ibid.

¹²⁸⁴ AJ-559-17-36, "Iz izveštaja Informacionog centra u New Yorku pov. br. 211 od 20 decembra 1955 godine," enclosed in Ljubo Drndić Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, "Dostavljaju se prepisi iz izveštaja Centra za informacije (N.Y.) i Ambasade u Washingtonu o propagandi na kulturnom planu," no. 42/III, 17.1.1956.

¹²⁸⁵ Ibid.

market." One such casualty, continued the 1966 Yugoslav Information Center report, was the folklore ensemble "Lado". This ensemble, as continued in the said report, missed out on the opportunity for an American performance due to uncertainty of American managers that the ensemble would make a profit, despite efforts of the Information Center to arouse their curiosity.¹²⁸⁶ The blame for the disappointing cultural performance in the United States did not just lie solely with the troupes or the ensembles sent to the United States. An official Yugoslav document also identified Yugoslavia's representative bodies in the United States, the Embassy and the Information Center, as bearing part of the blame. In addition to not having the necessary funds, stated a Yugoslav document from February 3, 1956, the Embassy and the Information Center lacked the promptness to disseminate Yugoslav cultural wares in the United States.¹²⁸⁷

The Yugoslavs, nonetheless, explored other promotional avenues to interest the American public for the cultural products of the Yugoslav "independent brand". According to an American document from November 14, 1960, the Yugoslav Information Center focused a lot of their attention on films, showing them in American "schools and to various groups". USIA's officer Turner B. Shelton, who drafted the November 14, 1960 document, further noted in the same document how the Yugoslavs asked for his help on several occasions to get him to intervene with the American film industry on their behalf. In particular, so Shelton continued, the Yugoslavs wanted "(1) to interest American producers in producing films in Yugoslavia, (2) to interest American film distributors in distributing Yugoslav films, and (3) to assist in the organization of certain 'joint productions.'"¹²⁸⁸ Another cultural diplomatic method included the Americans, that is USIA's IBS division, stimulating Jugoslovenska Radio Televizija (JRTV) to use the Broadcasting Foundation of American (BFA) to put some Yugoslav music programs and English language programs on American radio stations, as the Americans wrote in another November 14, 1960 report. As this report continued, according to the information forwarded to IBS by an official of BFA, a limited amount of Yugoslav radio programs had been placed on American stations. For instance, continued the same report, Dubrovnik Summer Festival's music tapes were taken in by 25 American stations for broadcast, folk music programs were

¹²⁸⁶ AJ-559-54-119, Dušan Vejnović, "Izveštaj o radu u 1965 godini," 20. januara 1966, 12.

¹²⁸⁷ AJ-559-54-19, Krista Djordjević, "Beleška. Razgovor sa pretstavnikom Odeljenje za štampu DPIS- drugom Rusom dana 3.II. 1956.," 2.

¹²⁸⁸ Memorandum from IMS-Turner B. Shelton to IAE- Mr. Phillips, "Yugoslav Information Activities in the United States," November 14, 1960, folder Yugo. Activities in the U.S. 1961, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 395, box 17, NARA.

broadcasted on BFA while 50 American stations took in Yugoslav English language programs.¹²⁸⁹

The Yugoslavs also remained rather adamant in using their preferred cultural diplomatic method of choice, that of establishing direct contacts, in their attempts to rebuff incorrect statements about Yugoslavia which were presented in the American media. The Yugoslav Information Center wrote to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs on January 20, 1966 how the American press followed, to varying degrees, happenings in Yugoslavia, both domestic and foreign. The Yugoslav Information Center further stated how such writings were not always "positive and objective which cannot even be expected given that Yugoslavia was a "communist country" for a large segment of American public opinion". Specific segments of Yugoslavia's relations with Western countries, so the Yugoslav Information Center continued in the January 20, 1966 report, were frequently ignored by the American press while the American press afforded much attention to Yugoslavia's relations with Eastern Europe. As further explained in the said document, the Yugoslav Information Center tried to remedy the situation by providing appropriate materials to editorial boards of American newspapers and magazines¹²⁹⁰ and talking directly to the people sitting on those boards with the aim of clarifying misunderstandings about Yugoslavia in specific writings and "interpreting our reality better". Even though, as the Yugoslav information Center continued, the American press treated the country slightly better in the second half of 1965, the association of Yugoslavia with Eastern Europe remained a common denominator in all of these writings which "reduced the international role of Yugoslavia, most notably its role in the nonaligned world."¹²⁹¹

Yugoslavia's musical interaction with the United States also adopted the direct method, that is, approaching key figures in America's cultural life who could help them disseminate their musical wares. In mid-1960s, American impresario Sol Hurok received an invitation from the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries to visit Yugoslavia which was a part of the Yugoslav strategy to ensure that not only do the tours of Yugoslav performers last longer but that they also cover a larger part of the American territory.¹²⁹² For the purpose of increasing

¹²⁸⁹ Memorandum from IBS- Henry Loomis to IAE- Mr. Phillips, "Yugoslav Information Activities in the United States," November 14, 1960, folder Yugo. Activities in the U.S., RG 306, Entry UD-WW 395, BOX 17, NARA.

¹²⁹⁰ AJ-559-54-119, Jugoslavenski informativni centar Državnom Sekretarijatu za inostrane poslove, Upravi za informacije, "Predmet: Izveštaj o radu u 1965 godini," 20. Januara 1966, no. 1/66, 3.

¹²⁹¹ Dušan Vejnović Državnom sekretarijatu za inostrane poslove - Upravi za informacije, "Izveštaj o radu u 1965 godini," no. 1/66, January 20, 1966, 4. AJ-559-54-119.

¹²⁹² AJ-559-32-68, "Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Izveštaj o radu u 1965. godini," Beograd, marta 1966, 60.

educational exchanges, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries directly contacted representatives of Rockefeller's, Eisenhower's and Ford's foundation.¹²⁹³ The vice-president of the Lincoln Center Schuyler Chapin visited Yugoslavia twice in an effort to position cultural collaboration between Yugoslavia and his institution on a much more long-term basis, the by-product of those efforts being "Atelje 212's" performance at the Lincoln Center.¹²⁹⁴

Albeit the preferred method, this direct method was not the only one employed by the Yugoslavs in their attempts to give the "independent Yugoslavia" brand a much more cultured face. Addressing the inability of Yugoslavia to establish reciprocity with the United States and recognizing the financial inequality between the two countries, in 1964 the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries turned their attention to Yugoslav immigrants in the United States to help them develop better relations with the United States.¹²⁹⁵ This too was a Yugoslav branding effort. Diaspora, so Keith Dinnie writes, is closely related to the idea of "brand ambassadors" as the diaspora may be seen "as a preexisting network of potential nation-brand ambassadors awaiting activation."¹²⁹⁶ In order to cater specifically to them, Yugoslav ensembles undertook several tours.¹²⁹⁷ Within the official Yugoslav-American jazz diplomacy, the Yugoslav immigrants had, at least on one documented instance, demonstrated their success in promoting Yugoslavia's music in the United States among those who had the potential to spread it further. Two members of the group "Blood, Sweat & Tears", guitarist Steve Katz and trombonist Jerry Hyman, stated *Vjesnik* on June 21, 1970, inquired about the possibility of buying "folk disc with good Yugoslav melodies" during their stay in Yugoslavia as they were eager to learn more about Yugoslav music. *Vjesnik* further noted how these two members frequented New York events organized by Yugoslav immigrants where they listened to Yugoslav folk music. The duo, so the June 21, 1970 *Vjesnik* further stated, "wanted to take

¹²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

¹²⁹⁴ AJ-559-34-75, "Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Izveštaj Savezne komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1967. god.," Beograd, maja 1968, 19.

¹²⁹⁵ AJ-559-31-66, "Izveštaj o radu Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom u 1964. godini," Beograd, 1965, 4.

¹²⁹⁶ Dinnie, *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*, 72.

¹²⁹⁷ See the suggestion for the tour of "Lado" in 1968 in AJ-559-34-75, Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Izveštaj Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1967. god., Beograd, maja 1968, 19. Tatjana Šarić also notes how the Yugoslav state sent musical ensembles to tour for the Yugoslav immigrant population. See Šarić, "Iseljenička služba Hrvatske u Jugoslaviji i kulturno djelovanje prema iseljeništvu..." 81.

some discs with them, who knows, perhaps one day this kind of music could give some new inspiration to 'Blood, Sweat and Tears'."¹²⁹⁸

As this subchapter has shown, Yugoslav attempts to break into the American market did not produce satisfying results. In order to remedy the said situation, as the next subchapter reveals, the Yugoslavs turned to the American state for help.

¹²⁹⁸ "The Best, the most expensive and (it seems) sincere," *Vjesnik*, June 21, 1970, enclosed translation in Leonhart, "Successful Visit of 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' to Yugoslavia," Airgram from Amembassy Belgrade/ Amconsul Zagreb to DOS, No. A- 311, July 30, 1970, Group II Cultural Presentations Program. Series 2 Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 57, folder 4, CU Historical Collection

4.2 Yugoslav Cultural Diplomacy Calls for American Aid

"With the Yugoslav disappointment over their lack of success in touring an exhibit in the US", wrote a despatch USIS Belgrade sent to USIA on January 13, 1960, "... we may very possibly be greatly curtailed in this and other activities."¹²⁹⁹ These few lines from the January 13, 1960 document reflect the Yugoslav response to all of the problems that had, during the 1950s, accumulated as a result of Yugoslav attempts to disseminate their cultural wares, one of Yugoslavia's branding instruments in the service of sustaining the independence of the country, on the American market. Starting from 1956, the Yugoslav Information Center in New York and the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries all submitted reports that noted the same thing: a huge discrepancy in the number of American artists arriving to perform in Yugoslavia as opposed to the same number of Yugoslav performers in the United States.¹³⁰⁰ The Yugoslavs made sure that American officials in Belgrade were informed of this fact, as evident from a despatch sent from the then American public affairs officer Walter Roberts to USIA in Washington. As Roberts wrote in a despatch from September 1, 1960, American officials frequently received two types of Yugoslav complaints. The first one related to the problems the Yugoslavs encountered when trying to disseminate their cultural products on the American market while the second, so Roberts continued to write, was concerned with the lack of attention received by Yugoslav cultural products that actually made it to the United States.¹³⁰¹

The two cited documents above reveal one of the marketing strategies the Yugoslavs devised to obtain their objective. The January 1960 document by USIS Belgrade to USIA revealed that, alongside films, American exhibits, a particularly useful instrument of the Americans to cover a large number of Yugoslav cities, faced possible imposed restrictions which would require the Americans to ask for permission to put on their exhibits in Yugoslav cities.¹³⁰² To rephrase the conclusion of Heath Bowman in the January 13, 1960 foreign service despatch cited in the

¹²⁹⁹ Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 53, January 13, 1960, 1-2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁰⁰ AJ-559-17-36, Ljubo Drndić, "Dostavljaju se prepisi iz izveštaja Centra za informacije (N.Y.) i Ambasade u Washingtonu o propagandi na kulturnom planu," Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, Odjelenje za štampu i informacije, Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, br. 42/III, 17.1.1956; AJ-559-10-24, "Plan za 1956-SAD"; AJ-559-10-24, "Izveštaj- po zemljama za 1956 godinu- Sjedinjene Američke Države".

¹³⁰¹ Walter Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 20, September 1, 1960, 16, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁰² Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 53, January 13, 1960, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

introductory lines of this subchapter, the reason behind such Yugoslav behavior had been hurt Yugoslav feelings over the lukewarm reception of one of their exhibits in the United States. Walter Roberts arrived at a similar conclusion in the September 1, 1960 despatch. In it, he stated, "[t]he disappointments the Yugoslavs have experienced, largely due to their own unprofessional approach, cause them to intimate that we should not expect to step up or even to maintain the present level of U.S. cultural manifestations here as long as Yugoslavia cannot get satisfaction on this score in the United States."¹³⁰³ These hurt Yugoslav feelings over the lukewarm reception of one of their their exhibit in the United States, underlined in the cited American despatches, translated into one of the strategies the Yugoslavs employed in hope of improving their penetration of the American market. This strategy was plain, old blackmail on the part of the Yugoslavs geared towards those they (the Yugoslavs) thought should help them plaster their cultural products for the sake of their independence on the American market: the American state and its representatives in Yugoslavia.

What had cause the Yugoslavs to behave in such a way? As evident from the previous chapter, *Porgy and Bess* may have charmed both the Yugoslav audience and the critics but it also created an expectation in the minds of those Yugoslavs at the head of Yugoslavia's official cultural diplomatic pyramid as to how music diplomacy should function between Yugoslavia and the United States. In one of their documents which detailed their cultural interaction with the United States, the Yugoslavs noted how unlikely it was for them to establish cultural connections with the Americans as long as they were at the disadvantage of not being able to get visas to enter the United States. In addition, as it was noted in the same document, up until that moment, it was only *Porgy and Bess* that "was given an official character and all of our state institutions got engaged."¹³⁰⁴ This observation reveals an element which presented a thorn in the Yugoslav eye concerning their music diplomacy with the United States. As the same document noted, the performances of *Tanec* and *Kolo* in the United States were "on a commercial basis under rather poor conditions and they were not at all helped by the official US side." By contrast, so the document continued, when the Americans staged one of their exhibits in Yugoslavia, the event had "an official character, opened by our officials."¹³⁰⁵ To rephrase, while the Yugoslavs officially got engaged in their musical and cultural diplomacy

¹³⁰³ Walter Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 20, September 1, 1960, 16, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁰⁴ AJ-559-54-119, "Predmet: Kulturna saradnja SAD-Jugoslavija. Prorada "Promemorije" za diskusiju o kulturnoj saradnji između SAD i FNRJ," 1.

¹³⁰⁵ Ibid.

with the United States, adding considerable weight to American cultural diplomacy in Yugoslavia, there was no such official American engagement concerning Yugoslav cultural products on the American market. The above cited document was not the only Yugoslav document that addressed this specific segment of Yugoslav-American music diplomacy. Yugoslav dissatisfaction with their cultural interaction with the United States was noted by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in a report from 1956 in which they revealed the existence of private initiative among the Americans, "but no call has ever been received for any kind of artistic manifestation or exchange from the official [side]".¹³⁰⁶ Expressed differently, the Yugoslav vision of music diplomacy and thus jazz diplomacy with the United States entailed the official engagement of the American state.

To reiterate, the main reason why the Yugoslavs fought for such a vision of music diplomacy was, as revealed by Yugoslav documents, because the numbers in the Yugoslav-American musical diplomatic equation did not add up.¹³⁰⁷ Why was this the case? The above cited 1956 report by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries revealed, the Americans were simply not interested in the cultural goods offered by the Yugoslavs.¹³⁰⁸ There were no demands for Yugoslav musical products by the American market even in the early 1960s, as visible from a report drafted by Veljko Bijedić for the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. As Bijedić noted in his report from early April 1963, while Jugokonzert was able to book a large number of American artists to perform in Yugoslavia and several Yugoslav artists performed in the United States in 1962, this was not the case for 1963 due to a lack of interest by either American agencies or Embassy representatives.¹³⁰⁹ Simultaneously, Yugoslav attempts to offer their cultural goods on the American market opened up an old Yugoslav wound visible in Yugoslavia's booking policy of foreign artists to Yugoslavia. When American officials Joseph Kolarek and Walter Wein informed Yugoslav official Krista Djordjević of a strong interest generated by Yugoslav folklore ensembles among the American public in April 1954, Djordjević replied how Yugoslavs attempted to promote this product on the American market on several occasions but such attempts failed due to the high transportation costs.¹³¹⁰

¹³⁰⁶ AJ-559-10-24, "Izveštaj – po zemljama za 1956 godinu- Sjedinjene Američke Države", 1.

¹³⁰⁷ See: AJ-559-11-26, Krista Djordjević, "Kulturne veze sa inostranstvom po zemljama za 1957 godinu, Opšti deo"; AJ-559-111-244, "Informacija u oblasti muzike i scenske umetnosti"; AJ-475-42, Veljko Bijedić, "Izveštaj o radu Jugoslovenske koncertne agencije u 1969. godini," 23. decembra 1969, 3.

¹³⁰⁸ AJ-559-10-24, "Izveštaj – po zemljama za 1956 godinu- Sjedinjene Američke Države", 1.

¹³⁰⁹ AJ-559-117-251, Veljko Bijedić Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, "Razmena umetnika između SAD i Jugoslavije," April 5, 1963.

¹³¹⁰ AJ-559-16-34, Krista Djordjević, "Beleška. Poseta Pretstavnikama Američke Ambasade g.g. Joseph Kolarek šef odeljenja za informacije i kulturna pitanja, Welter Wien ataše. 5/IV. 1954.," 1.

High transportation costs were not the only problem the Yugoslavs encountered when they attempted to arrange their cultural events in the United States. American managers and their requests for hefty fees were a problem too.¹³¹¹ Put differently, the Yugoslav penetration into the American market depended largely on money, a commodity, as seen from Yugoslavia's booking policy, the Yugoslavs had in limited quantity. So the first strategy the Yugoslavs resorted to in their attempts to force the American state to take action, as visible from their approach to their failed exhibit, was simple blackmail. This strategy was also employed in Yugoslavia's music diplomacy as seen in Veljko Bijedić's comportment towards American official Harold Engle that Bijedić summarized in his early April 1963 report. In this report, Bijedić wrote down how he raised the issue of a disproportionate number of American artists in Yugoslavia and Yugoslav artists in the United State with Engle by flatly laying out that his concert agency "is not in a position to continue booking American performers until such a disproportion is reduced."¹³¹² Veljko Bijedić was thus following the strategic cue of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in their cultural diplomatic dealings with the Americans.

So what were the Yugoslav demands that made them resort to blackmail as one of their strategies? In 1957, the Yugoslav Information Center in New York clearly stated that reciprocity was the aim in their cultural collaboration with the Americans and how this principle guided them in their approach to ANTA and American artists and their managers.¹³¹³ Veljko Bijedić had also informed the Americans about the Yugoslav quest for reciprocity. To reiterate from Chapter One, he told American officials in 1960 how Yugoslav artists disapproved of Jugokonzert's booking policy as these artists feared that foreign artists jeopardized their livelihood and Bijedić noting how it would be much easier if the Americans booked the same number of Yugoslav artists for performances in the US.¹³¹⁴ This in numbers would still be a Yugoslav malady in 1961. As was commented in one Yugoslav document, while the Yugoslavs were in no position "to ask for reciprocity the disproportion is obvious disproportion."¹³¹⁵ Put

¹³¹¹ AJ-559-10-23, "Godišnji izveštaj po zemljama- Sjedinjene Američke Države", 431.

¹³¹² AJ-559-117-251, Veljko Bijedić Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, "Razmena umetnika između SAD i Jugoslavije," April 5, 1963.

¹³¹³ AJ-559-133-284, Vinko Vinterhalter, "Gostovanje američkih umetnika," Yugoslav Information Center Komisiji za kulturne veze s inostranstvom, 1 marta 1957. godine.

¹³¹⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: J. William Henry (OCE) and Veljko Bijedić, "Exit interview: Mr. Veljko Bijedić, Director of 'Jugokonzert' (Concert Agency) Belgrade, Yugoslavia; FY 1961 P.L. 402 Leader Grantee," November 28, 1960, RG 59 General Records of DOS, Central Decimal File 1960-63, box 1074, NARA.

¹³¹⁵ AJ-559-111-244, "Informacija. Saradnja u oblasti muzike i scenske umetnosti," 1.

much more clearly, the first demand of the Yugoslavs in their music diplomacy with the United States, apparent from these documents, was reciprocity.

The second Yugoslav demand rested on the already adopted principle and lifestyle lived by the Yugoslavs on the international level which was connected to the first Yugoslav demand for reciprocity – balance. This demand is detected in a 1963 report of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. This 1963 document noted the difficult position of Yugoslavia in their cultural interaction with the Americans. The affluence of the United States, so continued the document, allowed them to offer their cultural wares to Yugoslavia and negotiate their presentation in Yugoslavia directly, that is, between American and Yugoslav institutions. By contrast, as was written in the 1963 document, the Americans turned down every single Yugoslav request for reciprocity. The question of the country's "more organized performance and better coordination of our organs and institutions" no longer presented the main challenge for the country, as identified by the said document. Instead, the importance lied in a demand for a "certain balance in the activities on the cultural plan". The aim was, so the 1963 report concluded, to work towards "a specific agreement that would guarantee this to us."¹³¹⁶ This issue was addressed in another Yugoslav document the same year. In contrast to the above cited report, this document identified Yugoslavia as having "an acute problem of securing our more organized performance in the United States as well as a better coordination of our organs and institutions in that direction." The Yugoslav side, so the document continued, also found it expedient to "determine a specific cultural exchange program" with the United States. The cultural interaction the Yugoslavs had in place with the United States, so the document further explained, did not allow the Yugoslavs the opportunity to pursue such an agreement while simultaneously it allowed the United States with opportunities to avoid it. Poland, as was noted in the same document, "which set the question of specific reciprocity as sine qua non to the United States, shows that this could be achieved." The document continued how they (the Yugoslavs) were not asking for "a formal program but an agreement of two sides which would ensure at least a minimum number of our activities in the US".¹³¹⁷ Expressed differently, as these documents illustrate, the Yugoslavs were primarily asking for reciprocity. To achieve reciprocity, so the rationale went, the Yugoslavs needed to push for balance and the way to get that balance was to force out a some sort of a cultural agreement with the Americans.

¹³¹⁶ AJ-559-21-44, "Izveštaj komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1963. godinu," Beograd, decembar 1963, 4.

¹³¹⁷ AJ-559-31-54, "Informacija o kulturno-prosvetnim vezama sa inostranstvom u 1963. godini," 2-3.

Such Yugoslav demands were, in a way, a quest to identify their own cultural diplomatic policies that would, in essence, reflect their independent behavior and position of the country on the international scene. They were thus looking for an "independent" model of cultural diplomacy. After all, this was the perception of culture by some Yugoslav cultural officials. As one member of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries put it on the meeting held on October 2, 1968, "... in order for culture to be able to help politics, it, first and foremost, needs to be independent..."¹³¹⁸ It was not just that the country was independent, that is citizens and cultural agents behaved independently but, as all things related to Yugoslavia were interpreted, culture was independent too.

Such thinking shaped Yugoslav understanding on how to use their cultural diplomacy, at least in theory. In 1956, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries noted how contemplated on making a plan on cultural engagement with each country separately. This plan would be based, so the 1956 document continued, on ideas generated both by Yugoslav representative bodies in foreign countries together with advice provided by foreign posts in Yugoslavia. This would encompass both the reception of foreign performers in Yugoslavia in addition to sending Yugoslav performers to foreign countries. It was for this reason, so the 1956 document continued, that there was a need to be up to date with "foreign artistic newspapers and to take into account cultural events abroad." These steps were "necessary so that we could carry out our cultural propaganda and collaboration plan in the way that we want to and not accept suggestions of foreign embassies or individuals."¹³¹⁹ Such statements and plans reflect the desire of the Yugoslavs to exhibit independent behavior in their cultural interaction with foreign countries. That the Yugoslavs should be more independent thinkers in their cultural approach was evident even in the 1960s during the discussions by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in the 1960s. As was noted by the President of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries during a meeting of the Committee held on October 2, 1968, it was evident that both the Soviet Union and the United States approached Yugoslavia from the perspective of their specific cultural politics that determined what is it that they would be doing. As the President continued, it was up to Yugoslavia to develop its own policies that would take into consideration Yugoslavia's desires in their cultural diplomacy with specific countries. This politics, according to the president of the Committee were to be based on "clear principles, and these principles have to be the result of mutual interests and agreement

¹³¹⁸ AJ-559-35-76, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 2. oktobra 1968, 48-49. Comment by Aleksandar Petrović.

¹³¹⁹ AJ-559-10-24, "Prorada plana za 1956 godinu," 155.

and we implement our politics. We are equal partners and nobody can put into our program something that we do not want."¹³²⁰ The president of the Committee, Dušan Vejnović, then stated the preferred technique the Yugoslavs would resort to in order to obtain their goals. As Vejnović stated, "If they will shorten our politics, we can shorten their politics on matters we are interested in them being present here. All of this can be nicely handled and done."¹³²¹ Put in other words, as the 1960s were coming to an end, blackmail was still one of the preferred tactics by the Yugoslavs in order to obtain their cultural diplomatic desires.

The second method the Yugoslavs adopted in order to obtain the desired level of cultural interaction with the Americans, with special emphasis on delivering their cultural goods on the American market, was to sit down with the Americans in hope of working out some sort of an agreement which would ensure that at least a portion of Yugoslav cultural wares make it to the American market. To get the Americans to budge, this Yugoslav strategy adopted two methods. The first one was to write to designated American bodies. As indicated in the Yugoslav "Aide Memoire" addressed to the State Department, the Yugoslav solution to their inability to navigate the vagaries of the American market was the inclusion of the American state into this process. The Yugoslav "Aide Memoire", received by the State Department in early July 1960, which included Yugoslav acknowledgement of the lack of success of the Yugoslav oil paintings¹³²² cited in the introductory lines of this subchapter, wrote about the positive impact of the cultural interaction between the two countries alongside Yugoslav content "that the mutual interest for cultural and other achievements in both countries has been constantly in progress, that the visits between our people increased in number, offering new possibilities to further cultivate our cooperation and strengthen the friendship between the peoples of our two countries."¹³²³ The "Aide Memoire" addressed the functioning of cultural diplomacy between the two countries and praised private initiatives¹³²⁴ but noted how the level of Yugoslav cultural presentation in the United States "lagged behind the level of existing relations and our cultural presentation in many other countries."¹³²⁵ The document then turned to what the Yugoslavs had seen to be the

¹³²⁰ AJ-559-35-76, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 2. oktobra 1968. godine, 97. Comment by Dušan Vejnović (Predsjednik).

¹³²¹ Ibid.

¹³²² See more on the exhibit and its description in Robert C. Haney, "Exhibition of Contemporary Yugoslav Art," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 8, July 17, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

¹³²³ "Copy of the Yugoslav Aide Memoire. Pro Memoria," 1, enclosed in Memorandum from IAE-Thomas J. Carolan to ICS- Mr. Harkness, IMS- Mr. Shelton, ITV- Mr. Wheeler, IBS- Mr. Loomis, "Approach from Yugoslav Embassy on cultural exchange," July 6, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³²⁴ Ibid., 1.

¹³²⁵ Ibid., 3.

solution to their cultural diplomatic ills. The "Aide Memoire" suggested "that the two governments exchange occasionally their views and remarks through their representatives, thus helping and stimulating the favourable continuation and broadening of the existing cooperation."¹³²⁶ In the case of music diplomacy, the document noted the warm reception the American audience afforded to Yugoslav artists who toured the United States alongside Yugoslav interest "in finding new possibilities in order to intensify this activity and make it even more various in future."¹³²⁷

It is in this document that we encounter a bit of contradiction on the part of the Yugoslavs. We have already mentioned how some members of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries cultivated the view of the independent status of culture. In the "Aide Memoire", the Yugoslavs noted a "positive fact" which was that cultural interaction between the two states was being done through direct communication between Yugoslav and American agents and institutions.¹³²⁸ Technically, the Yugoslavs and the Americans had already had an independent model of cultural diplomacy set in place as the power to conduct cultural interaction with the Americans rested in the hands of Yugoslav non-state agents, in compliance with the main postulates of Yugoslavia's cultural politics. Yet, through the "Aide Memoire" it appears that Yugoslav officials were asking for precisely the opposite model to take place, a model that rests on heavy engagement of the states. This statement can only partially be applied to the Yugoslav request. As the "Aide Memoire" further clarified, through the process proposed by the Yugoslavs, the idea was not to change the nature of the cultural interaction already in place but to overcome obstacles.¹³²⁹ Put differently, the American state was needed as a corrective force of the American market.

This Yugoslav request and the subsequent response of the Americans to this request is a rather interesting one to explore, especially for the sake of seeing American responses to cultural diplomatic requests of other countries. In general, the American indifference towards reciprocity in their public diplomacy was a frequent source of criticism directed towards the United States in the post-Second World War era¹³³⁰. This was also seen in the conduct of American music diplomacy. As observed by musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier, in the period of the Cold War there were a lot more American artists sent by the American state to foreign

¹³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹³³⁰ Scott-Smith, "Mapping the Undefinable," 176.

countries than had foreign artists been accepted for performances in the United States.¹³³¹ Indeed, writing about American cultural programs in the Middle East, scholar James R. Vaughan noted how some American officials emphasized the need for a two-way cultural exchange program that would afford foreigners partnership status. As Vaughan further noted, the program of cultural diplomacy the Americans were running in the Middle Eastern countries ultimately failed "to live up to the principles of mutual reciprocity and genuine cultural exchange."¹³³² Within such a context, knowing that the Americans were not really interested in reciprocal exchanges, it is interesting to explore the American response to the requests of the Yugoslavs. American documents reveal how the Americans did, in fact, react to the Yugoslav requests, albeit perhaps not always in the manner desired by the Yugoslavs. The American strategies may not have offered a true cultural exchange agreement to Yugoslavia but the Americans did employ various strategies in an attempt to help their Yugoslav partners gain access to the American cultural market.

The initial reaction of the Americans to the Yugoslav "Aide Memoire" was a purely diplomatic one. The State Department responded how the Yugoslav proposal "has been read with interest and attention" and regarding exchanges, the State Department greeted the Yugoslav proposal for periodic meetings of delegates from both sides "to share their views on these subjects and to explore in detail the extent to which it might be possible to facilitate such forms of mutually useful exchange." The Yugoslavs were also given assurance that the State Department will have officers ready for them to consult and help with their plans for cultural interaction between two countries.¹³³³ The first step of the Yugoslavs in order to obtain their desired model of music and cultural diplomacy with the Americans was thus writing of the "Aide Memoire". The second step involved presenting the Americans with yet another proposal. According to the Office of Assistant Director for Europe, Harold E. Engle, the Americans were on the receiving end of yet another Yugoslav cultural proposal sent by the Yugoslav Embassy in November of the same year. As Engle wrote to Walter Roberts, the PAO in Yugoslavia, the Americans contemplated that this request was not an attempt to obtain a cultural agreement with the United States but simply the result of Yugoslav opinion that they "should be

¹³³¹ Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 4.

¹³³² James R. Vaughan, "The United States and the Limits of Cultural Diplomacy in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957." in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 176.

¹³³³ "Copy of the reply by State Department," enclosed in Memorandum from IAE-Thomas J. Carolan to ICS- Mr. Harkness, IMS- Mr. Shelton, ITV- Mr. Wheeler, IBS- Mr. Loomis, "Approach from Yugoslav Embassy on cultural exchange," July 6, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

accomplishing more in the cultural field in this country than they have to date, and realize that they cannot get very far without some help from the US Government."¹³³⁴ Not in the slightest manner, so the documents reveal, were the Americans interested in signing a cultural exchange agreement with the Yugoslavs. It was even before Harold Engle wrote to Walter Roberts on November 23, 1960 that the latter wrote to the Assistant Director for Europe, Joseph B. Phillips, that, with regards to the United States making an arrangement with Romania, "when the U.S.-Rumanian exchange is finally announced publicly the release [should] avoid any language suggesting that this is a government – to –government 'cultural agreement.'"¹³³⁵ The reason had been fairly simple. As Roberts explained to Phillips, this was due to "the ardent desire of the Yugoslavs to conclude an over-all 'cultural agreement' with us -- and our equally ardent wish to avoid such an arrangement".¹³³⁶

The Americans may have been reluctant to sign a cultural agreement with Yugoslavia but they did not decline a sit-down with the Yugoslavs, a second method of the Yugoslav strategy and one of the more active strategies of the Americans in their cultural diplomacy with Yugoslavia. It was on December 14, 1960 that the Yugoslav Embassy and Information Center representatives met with their American counterparts. The Americans went into this meeting, so the Memorandum of Conversation revealed, with the concept that the two sides go over the points of the cultural exchange memorandum "and hear what plans the Yugoslavs had, what assistance they would like, and discuss what help the Department or USIA could give them."¹³³⁷ This idea had actually been, according to Harold Engle himself, his. According to the response he provided to Walter Roberts from January 13, 1961, the Yugoslavs were most definitely not pursuing a cultural exchange agreement with the Americans but they were seeking balance with American offers in Yugoslavia and "wanted to step up their presentation in this country". The reaction of the State Department, so Engle continued, "was to be 'constructively unhelpful' -- that is, to say we favored the idea of exchanges but would need more specific information on their proposals before we could discuss them."¹³³⁸ Engle had a different thought in mind. His

¹³³⁴ Harold E. Engle to Walter R. Roberts, November 23, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³³⁵ Walter Roberts to Joseph B. Phillips, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, November 11, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³³⁶ Ibid.

¹³³⁷ "Discussion of Yugoslav Memorandum on Cultural Exchange," Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: R. Clayton Mudd, M.J. Spear, Mautner, Engle, Siward, Bingham, Mirko Kalezić, Mirko Zarić, Marko Ristić, December 14, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³³⁸ Letter from Harold E. Engle (Office of Assistant Director (Europe)) to Walter R. Roberts, January 13, 1961, folder Chron-Yugoslavia (outgoing), box 17, Entry UD-WW 395, RG 306 United States Information Agency, NARA.

idea was, as he explained to Walter Roberts, that the two sides meet up, go over each point of the memorandum and have experts present at those meeting to give advice when the Yugoslavs have a clear idea on what they wanted to do and pose questions and provide advice when the Yugoslavs didn't have a plan.¹³³⁹ His idea met with approval from the State Department and the meet with the Yugoslavs was set up for December 6.¹³⁴⁰

As is evident from the above cited documents, the Americans opted against a cultural agreement with the Yugoslavs. In essence, such an American decision was not directed towards Yugoslavia per se. As Howard Engle stated, in general, the State Department was opposed to such agreements deeming them to be "restrictive in character, leading to less exchanges than more, and that in practice they operate to our disadvantage" and stating his personal belief that the United States had not sufficiently looked into the degree to which they "can make cultural exchange an instrument of policy working in our favour." However, Engle was eager for more reciprocity in their relations with the Yugoslavs.¹³⁴¹ With the cultural exchange agreement out of the picture, why were the Americans willing to at least act affirmatively to the strategies employed by the Yugoslavs in order to secure at least some presence on the American market?

There were several reasons for this. For one, this was a defensive stance as the Yugoslav blackmail strategy was threatening their own cultural program in Belgrade. Engle had stated it so himself. As he wrote to Walter Roberts, his idea to meet with the Yugoslavs was "to protect our position in Belgrade, lest the Yugoslav pressure for reciprocity lead to a cutting down of our program".¹³⁴² Indeed, to reiterate, when the Yugoslav exhibit on oil paintings failed in the United States, the Yugoslav Embassy lodged a complaint to the American State Department due to "a lack of good bookings for the art exhibit, together with a thinly veiled threat that, if we could not help, perhaps they might be compelled to curtail some of our exhibits here in Yugoslavia." USIS warned that if the Yugoslav go through with their threats "this whole unfortunate business may have really very limiting effects upon our whole USIS program."¹³⁴³

¹³³⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁴⁰ Ibid., An almost identical explanation of the plan for a meeting was provided in Engle to Roberts in Harold E. Engle to Walter R. Roberts, November 23, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁴¹ Letter from Harold E. Engle (Office of Assistant Director (Europe)) to Walter R. Roberts, January 13, 1961, folder Chron-Yugoslavia (outgoing), box 17, Entry UD-WW 395, RG 306 United States Information Agency, NARA.

¹³⁴² Letter from Harold E. Engle (Office of Assistant Director (Europe)) to Walter R. Roberts, January 13, 1961, folder Chron-Yugoslavia (outgoing), box 17, Entry UD-WW 395, RG 306 United States Information Agency, NARA.

¹³⁴³ Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 53, January 13, 1960, 1-2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

Indeed, as Henry Loomis wrote of the efforts of the IBS to get JRTV to place Yugoslav produced materials via the BFA, he explained that the Americans had done so under "USIS Belgrade's belief that placement of Yugoslav tapes on American radio would tend to make the reciprocity-minded Yugoslav radio officials more willing to accept VOA-produced package programs or programs for broadcast use".¹³⁴⁴ The American attempt to at least listen to Yugoslav complaints and, if nothing else, offer partial solutions, as we shall see further down in this chapter, had been thus primarily motivated by their own desire to prevent the doors of the Yugoslav cultural market from closing to American products. Indeed, as was noted in a despatch from Belgrade addressed to USIA on June 18, 1958, "[r]eciprocal appreciation is an important part of the Yugoslav acceptance of USIS within their borders."¹³⁴⁵ When the Yugoslav exhibit of oil paintings, under the sponsorship of the American Federation of Art, was about to hit the American soil, USIS reiterated again their earlier position by writing "that all possible interest and assistance be provided to make this initial Yugoslav exhibit a success, as it may well affect our program here."¹³⁴⁶ To summarize, the first American response to Yugoslav requests was inspired by purely defensive motives.

The second reason came out of the American awareness of the meaning reciprocity had for their Yugoslav partners and the weight it bore on the Yugoslav independence, the ultimate aim of the foreign policy of the United States for the country. Various American documents from 1958 to 1963 acknowledged Yugoslav demands for reciprocity.¹³⁴⁷ Looking at what culture could actually do to help sustain the independence of Yugoslavia, it is visible that the Americans held strikingly similar beliefs as the Yugoslavs, seeing culture to be a tool that could help obtain that goal. To reiterate from the previous chapter, one of the reasons why USIS in Belgrade was

¹³⁴⁴ Memorandum from IBS- Henry Loomis to IAE- Mr. Phillips, "Yugoslav Information Activities in the United States," November 14, 1960, folder Yugo. Activities in the U.S., box 17, Entry UD-WW 395, RG 306 United States Information Agency, NARA.

¹³⁴⁵ Heath Bowman, "Country Plan," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 152, June 18, 1958,6, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, box 8, NARA.

¹³⁴⁶ Robert C. Haney, "Exhibition of Contemporary Yugoslav Art," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 8, July 17, 1959, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 8, NARA.

¹³⁴⁷ Heath Bowman, "Country Plan," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 152, June 18, 1958, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, box 8, NARA; Lawrence S. Morris, "USIS Yugoslavia Inspection Report, November 20, 1959," no. 46, copy no. 4, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 11, NARA; Walter Roberts, "Restrictions on the Operation of USIS in Yugoslavia," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 20, September 1, 1960, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA; Operations Coordinating Board, "Report on Yugoslavia (NSC 5805/1)," December 21, 1960, RG 59 General Records of DOS, Executive Secretariat, Entry A1 1586B, box 33, NARA; Harold E. Engle to Walter R. Roberts, November 23, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA; Walter R. Roberts, "Exhibit of Yugoslav primitive art in New York," FM from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 65, February 29, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA; Kocher, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1042, April 12, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA;

pleading USIA to take action to make the Yugoslav exhibit of oil paintings a success was related to the awareness of those officials that recognition of Yugoslav cultural successes in the United States and American promotion of them in Yugoslavia built the pride of the Yugoslavs, a feeling that encouraged independence.¹³⁴⁸

The question of reciprocity became a salient one for the Americans for one more reason which could be summed up in the sentence of who was asking for such reciprocity to take place. Reciprocity was not just important to the Americans in order to run a successful program in Yugoslavia, as noted in a telegram American officials in Belgrade sent to the State Department on April 12, 1963. This telegram noted that it was not just Jugokonzert that was pressing the American Embassy for reciprocity, Yugoslav artists were doing it too. As the April 12, 1963 document wrote, Yugoslav artists were also eager to "be heard in US even under modest billing for travel and pocket money alone."¹³⁴⁹ This was not an astonishing revelation for the Americans as a report on the listenership of Voice of America in Yugoslavia from October 1952 revealed the desire of some Yugoslavs to familiarize the Americans more with Yugoslav music. As was written in the said report, those Yugoslavs who requested more information on Yugoslavia in Voice of America programs choose French and British programs over Voice of America because French and British programs afforded more space to Yugoslavia in their broadcasts.¹³⁵⁰ Furthermore, as the October 1952 report further revealed, the surveyed Yugoslavs expressed the desire to hear Yugoslav music on Voice of America.¹³⁵¹ Such Yugoslav requests for more information on Yugoslavia on Voice of America, described in the October 1952 report as meriting "particular consideration", came "from a universal human desire to be the subject as well as object." This resulted, at least partially, from a desire to provide a response when the one communicating got the attention of those listening. It was a request, so the October 1952 report further wrote, "that the communicator, by proxy, take the part of the listener and reply for him; that is, in the mutual conversation that can be given voice by only one member, that member must speak for both."¹³⁵² What these two documents reveal

¹³⁴⁸ Heath Bowman, "USIS/Yugoslavia Country Plan," FSD from USIS Belgrade to DOS, no. 123, June 26, 1959, 13, RG 0306 USIA, Entry #P: 328, container 9, NARA.

¹³⁴⁹ Kocher, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to Secretary of State, no. 1042, April 12, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA.

¹³⁵⁰ "Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952. Report no. A-107," Division of Radio Program Evaluation. International Broadcasting Service, IIA. Department of State, 58, RG 306 USIA, Entry A1 1015, box 121, NARA.

¹³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹³⁵² "Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952. Report no. A-107," Division of Radio Program Evaluation. International Broadcasting Service, IIA. Department of State, 62, RG 306 USIA, Entry A1 1015, box 121, NARA.

is that it were both the Yugoslav people in general and Yugoslav artists in particular, that is, the targets of the American cultural diplomatic program, that were asking for their products to be disseminated on the American market. This was salient from a nation branding perspective. To reiterate, brands rely on the loyalty of the customers.¹³⁵³ As we have seen from previous chapters, one of the American objectives relating to Yugoslavia's independence was to get both the authorities and the people of Yugoslavia "to stand firmly for the assertion of Yugoslavia's independence"¹³⁵⁴ Expressed differently, the Yugoslav independent brand, in which the Americans invested significantly, relied on Yugoslav customers, the same ones that were demanding reciprocity in their cultural interaction with the Americans. Given their investments into the Yugoslav independent brand, by default, it was not just the job of the Yugoslav structure to ensure loyalty of the Yugoslav customers. In essence, the Americans had to do it too as, seen from the above stated objectives, their idea of sustaining the Yugoslav independent brand was dependent on Yugoslav citizens.

The Americans thus had to react and, as American documents reveal, they did. While, to reiterate yet again, the Americans were determined to avoid a cultural agreement with the Yugoslavs, it is salient to mention that the fault did not entirely rest with the Americans. When the Americans, that is the PAO Walter Roberts and BPAO Robert C. Haney, were called to a meeting in late February 1961 by the Yugoslavs, namely Franc Primožić of the Foreign Secretariat with the presence of Press Counselor at the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, Mirko Kalezić, to discuss the desired cultural wares the Yugoslavs wanted to present in the United States and the desired help of the American government¹³⁵⁵, the Yugoslavs were given a direct statement as not to expect financial aid from the government of the United States in their cultural endeavours noting how even American cultural events, such as exhibits, were financed by the Americans themselves even if they occurred in co-sponsorship with the Yugoslavs.¹³⁵⁶ According to Franc Primožić, the Yugoslavs were fully aware of this, noting how the exchange of exhibits between the United States and the Soviet Union "were examples of 'pure reciprocity,' and, frankly, the Yugoslavs could not afford it -- they had to find some

¹³⁵³ Ham, "Place Branding: the State of the Art," 129.

¹³⁵⁴ See Joseph C. Kolarek, "USIS Annual Assessment Report," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Tousi 66, December 18, 1956, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA; Joseph C. Kolarek, "Country Plan for Yugoslavia," USIS Belgrade, USIA, Tousi 144, June 12, 1955, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹³⁵⁵ Walter R. Roberts, "Transmittal of Memo of Conversation: Proposed Yugoslav Cultural Activities in the U.S.," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 82, February 23, 1961, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 395, folder Yugo. Activities in U.S. 1961, container 17, NARA.

¹³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, " 2-3.

other way."¹³⁵⁷ Put differently, while the Americans evaded a cultural agreement with the Yugoslavs like a plague, the Yugoslavs could not engage in full reciprocity with the Americans either because they did not have the financial means to carry it out.

Still, the Americans responded to Yugoslav requests through different strategies. One "brainstormed" idea included helping the Yugoslavs with a modest amount of money to ensure that some of their cultural wares make it to the American market. As the early December 1957 despatch noted, providing support to Yugoslav efforts to stage their exhibits in the United States would not only please their Yugoslav partner, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the body that helped the Americans stage their exhibits in Yugoslavia, but would also showcase "the post's interest in encouraging Yugoslav aspirations for showing its art abroad".¹³⁵⁸ This was salient to the Americans for an important goal. As the early December 1957 despatch continued, Yugoslav exhibits won the admiration of Europe in the last few years while, within Yugoslavia, "[p]ainting, the graphic and plastic arts, are free and independent arts in this country. Knowledge of them in the U.S. can only produce new and valuable recognition of Yugoslavia's independence."¹³⁵⁹ While USIS Belgrade, so it was written in a December 2, 1957 despatch, was more than willing to provide financial help for this endeavour, their stance was that such help would be unnecessary. As the document continued, USIS firmly believed that American institutions would be interested in Yugoslav cultural products while the Yugoslav side "will surely respond favorably and generously". In the end, so the despatch concluded, USIS would benefit too as they would "have succeeded in gaining a new and important objective."¹³⁶⁰ While USIA in general gave USIS the green light to contact institutions in the United States, the Agency was against USIS using any financial means to stage the exhibits coming from Yugoslavia. USIA, nonetheless, stood available for "advice and good offices on an informal basis, hoping that any good will generated with Yugoslav officials here will make your work easier."¹³⁶¹ USIA's stance was the one Roberts showcased at the aforementioned meeting with Primožić and Kalezić. To summarize one strategy of the

¹³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹³⁵⁸ Heath Bowman, "Placement of Yugoslav Exhibitions in the U.S.," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 40, December 2, 1957, 1, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁰ Heath Bowman, "Placement of Yugoslav Exhibitions in the U.S.," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, No. 40, December 2, 1957, 2, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹³⁶¹ Allen, "Placement of Yugoslav Exhibitions in the U.S.," Outgoing Message to USIS Belgrade, No. 40, December 2, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 344, container 107.

Americans, the Americans were not to provide financial aid to the Yugoslavs but they were willing to provide advice and suggestions.

The adoption of this "suggestions" strategy by the Americans was exhibited during the December 1960 meeting between Yugoslav and American representatives. During this meeting, so it was written in the Memorandum of Conversation from December 14, 1960, the Americans suggested museums which the Yugoslavs could approach to stage their fresco exhibit and that Yugoslavia invites a group of curators, set to be in Europe the following summer, to visit the country "to see what was available."¹³⁶² Similarly, Harold Engle provided Veljko Bijedić with a partial solution to Yugoslavia's musical requests in early April 1963. Passing on the blame for the low number of visits of Yugoslav artists to the United States on Yugoslav representative bodies in the United States, Engle informed Bijedić of the possibility of putting outstanding Yugoslav performers "on the list of cultural-artistic workers, to pay for their travel expenses and, in that way, make performances of Yugoslav artists easier for the Yugoslav concert agency and organisers in the US."¹³⁶³

American suggestions did not just include where and whom to contact in the United States in order to enjoy more cultural success in the United States. The Americans also provided advertising suggestions to precede desired Yugoslav cultural attractions. For instance, during one social gathering, Walter Roberts suggested to Drago Vučinić from the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries with regards to a Yugoslav fresco exhibit in the United States "that a good, short, documentary-style color film on the frescoes would help Mr. Kalezić in finding the sponsorship he sought and could also be used to good advantage in publicizing the exhibit while it was being show", an advice the Yugoslavs also took note of at the February 23, 1961 meeting between them and American representatives.¹³⁶⁴ The entire idea behind this American strategy rested on, as Harold Engle wrote to Walter Roberts, in demonstrating to the Yugoslavs that the government of the United States, functioning in a

¹³⁶² "Discussion of Yugoslav Memorandum on Cultural Exchange," Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: R. Clayton Mudd, M.J. Spear, Mautner, Engle, Siward, Bingham, Mirko Kalezić, Mirko Zarić, Marko Ristić, December 14, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁶³ AJ-559-117-251, Veljko Bijedić Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, "Razmena umetnika između SAD i Jugoslavije," April 5, 1963.

¹³⁶⁴ Walter R. Roberts, "Transmittal of Memo of Conversation: Proposed Yugoslav Cultural Activities in the U.S.," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no. 82, February 23, 1961, 3, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 395, folder Yugo. Activities in U.S. 1961, container 17, NARA.

system that was a "voluntary" one, as opposed to the "managed" system of Yugoslavia, was more than willing to engage in reciprocal exchanges as permitted by the American system.¹³⁶⁵

There was another strategy that was employed by the Americans in their attempt to sustain the Yugoslav independent brand. Within Yugoslavia, the Americans also took efforts to promote Yugoslav attractions that were appearing in the United States as seen from a report dating from September 26, 1960 concerning two Yugoslav troupes that were scheduled to perform in the United States from the end of September to November (The Branko Krsmanović Choir) and from October to November 1960 (Soloisti di Zagreb). Appropriate sections of USIA, according to the September 26, 1960 report, were to cover performances of these two groups in the United States and send photographs and newspaper articles to USIS Belgrade to utilize them for presentational intent in Zagreb and Belgrade. If such moments appear, continued the document, reports should include exceptional events, such as "interviews with members of the groups and photo coverage of non-concert activities with Americana backgrounds" while TV broadcasts should only occur upon USIS Belgrade's behest. As the September 26, 1960 document expressed, the visits of these two Yugoslav groups to the United States were deemed salient to the American program conducted in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav side, so it was noted, was still not demanding "strict reciprocity in limiting the number of American attractions visiting Yugoslavia to the smaller number of Yugoslav attractions that can visit the United States." As the September 26, 1960 document revealed, it was salient to demonstrate to the Yugoslavs that their "groups receive extensive tours in this country and enjoy a good reception" since it was important to the Americans that the cultural window provided by the visits of American performers does not close in Yugoslavia given that "many normal USIS channels are closed to us in Yugoslavia."¹³⁶⁶ The Americans employed a similar strategy three years prior, during the visit and performance in the United States of Soloisti di Zagreb, led by Antonio Janigro as stated in an American telegram sent from Belgrade to Washington dating December 2, 1957. The visit of this specific group to the United States, so the December 2, 1957 telegram noted, coincided with the visit of Jose Limon to Yugoslavia. USIS Belgrade wrote back to USIA with a proposal to closely relate the tour of the American arts with Janigro's troupe's American tour "to show people's appreciation each others cultural achievements." In the same document, USIS also

¹³⁶⁵ Letter from Harold E. Engle (Office of Assistant Director (Europe)) to Walter R. Roberts, January 13, 1961, 2, folder Chron-Yugoslavia (outgoing), box 17, Entry UD-WW 395, RG 306 United States Information Agency, NARA.

¹³⁶⁶ Dalcher, Engle, "Draft NPN for Yugoslav cultural groups touring US, September 26, 1960," RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

suggested playing down the origin of Soloisti di Zagreb and to instead stress "they are Yugoslavs."¹³⁶⁷ The American strategy of popularizing Yugoslav performers in the United States in Yugoslavia was also noted in an American despatch from January 13, 1960, relating to the promotion of, for instance, the tapes of Yugoslav jazz musicians who had appeared on Voice of America, that is, on Conover's "MUSIC USA" program, and a trip of a Yugoslav conductor. These efforts, so the January 13, 1960 despatch wrote, all served one American objective which was "[t]o recognize Yugoslavia's independence by appreciation, where possible, of the country's individual and separate cultural contribution to the present world, and to foster its pride in its 'separate road.'"¹³⁶⁸ These documents reveal that culture was, in the same way as it had been for the Yugoslavs, an that was to be used in order to sustain the country's independence.

The cultural agreement request aside, it can be said that the Yugoslavs were at least partially successful in their strategy of getting the American state to engage in the cultural diplomatic process. First and foremost, some American officials, such as the already mentioned Harold E. Engle, credited Yugoslavia for starting a line of questions with regards to the way the Americans conducted their cultural exchanges. As Engle wrote to Walter Robers in November 1960, there appeared "[o]ne healthy result of the Yugoslav initiative" and that was that many in the State Department, in the East European and Cultural Affairs division, were becoming aware "of the need for some section of the US Government to be given clear action responsibility for facilitating the bringing of foreign cultural products and attractions to this country." Apart from Yugoslavia, so Engle continued, Romania was also pressing the Americans for a cultural agreement.¹³⁶⁹ But more than asking questions, the American state, that is, its officials went a step ahead and directly wrote to some who could aid Yugoslavia's cultural promotion in the United States. This is seen in a letter sent by Robert H. Thayer to Thomas Messer where the former had requested assistance from the latter, in a leadership cultural position in the United States, to help his country stage exhibits of foreign countries in the United States. The problem that the State Department encountered, continued Thayer, was that the United States was able to stage their exhibits in Communist countries with little difficulty while these countries, in turn, expected to be treated in the same way in the United States, an almost "mission impossible"

¹³⁶⁷ Bowman, Incoming Telegram from Belgrade to United States Information Agency, No. Tousi 161, December 2, 1957, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 343, container 93, NARA.

¹³⁶⁸ Heath Bowman, "Country Assessment Report for 1959, USIS/Belgrade," FSD from USIS Belgrade to USIA, Desp. no, 53, January 13, 1960, 8, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁶⁹ Harold E. Engle to Walter R. Roberts, November 23, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

for the Americans "given the very different nature of our own government and society", a reason, so Thayer contemplated, that was behind the inability of the American government to "ever be able to assure strict reciprocity in such matters."¹³⁷⁰ It were the problems that followed the Yugoslav exhibit "New Paintings from Yugoslavia" that Thayer quoted when writing to Messer. As Thayer explained, this particular exhibit was a high quality one but the staging in American museums was unsatisfactory. Thayer noted that the plan included the exhibit to be shown in the US for a year but it had no new engagements following the month of April. While the United States, continued Thayer, was presently presenting successful exhibits in Yugoslavia and in the planning stage for future ones, they were faced with a demand by the government of Yugoslavia to afford "the 'equal' treatment" to the much smaller number of their exhibits sent to the United States.¹³⁷¹ A much more interesting notion of Thayer's writing included the reason why the government of the United States was requesting assistance from a man in a position such as Messer. As Thayer wrote in the paragraph just before his final one in which he revealed that Messer was not the only person he was writing, Thayer stated "[g]iven the friendly relations which exist between the United States and Yugoslavia and the high respect which we hold for Yugoslavia's long-maintained position of independence I am hopeful that the difficulties encountered in placing the Yugoslav exhibit can be overcome."¹³⁷² The United States was thus motivated to act in the name of sustaining the Yugoslav independent brand. Yugoslavia and the problems its exhibits were having in the United States were again quoted by Edward Murrow, the then director of USIA¹³⁷³ when he wrote to the then Assistant Secretary of State, Philip M. Coombs of the need to change the governmental framework regarding "the placement, handling and financing of cultural exhibitions" of foreign countries in the United States. In the memorandum, Murrow explained how foreign countries avoided giving clear responses regarding American exhibitions until they secured staging of their exhibits in the United States. These governments, so Murrow further wrote, were unable to comprehend that the US government had no hold on museums and similar institutions and could not force these institutions host an exhibition. The same governments, continued Murrow, were pressing the State Department to plan a schedule for their exhibitions in the United States and move them from one museum to the next. Murrow further identified Yugoslavia and Poland as the countries

¹³⁷⁰ Letter from Robert H. Thayer to Thomas Messer, Reference Slip to Mr. Gert (USIA) from Cary T. Grayson, 1, February 19, 1960, folder Yugo. Activities in U.S. 1961, container 17, RG 306 United States Information Agency, Entry UD-WW 395, NARA.

¹³⁷¹ Ibid.

¹³⁷² Ibid.

¹³⁷³ For Murrow's time at the helm of USIA see Gregory M. Tomlin, *Murrow's Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the Kennedy Administration* (Lincoln: Potomac Books, an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 2016).

whose exhibitions were causing them such problems as their Embassies were pressing for "official action by the United States Government in developing itineraries and supplying financial support for U.S. tours of several important exhibitions."¹³⁷⁴ If anything, the issue of Yugoslavia's exhibits and the status of its cultural wares in the United States at least stirred up some spirits in the American circles to at least think and discuss about a potential change in American cultural diplomacy.

Unfortunately, the examined materials do not give us clear responses by the Yugoslavs for each of these American attempts but we do have some general remarks made by the Yugoslavs that pointed out that the Yugoslavs were, all in all, at least partially satisfied with how cultural collaboration went with the United States during the 1960s so we could say that their strategy of applying pressure on American official representatives bore some fruit. It was already in 1964 that a report of the Yugoslav Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries wrote about improved cultural and educational relations with the United States.¹³⁷⁵ In their annual report from 1965, the same Committee noted the success of two of their exhibits in the United States. Dean Rusk, so the 1965 annual report continued, graced the opening of one of those exhibits, alongside 2000 people.¹³⁷⁶ According to the 1966 annual report by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the American Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Charles Frankel arrived to Yugoslavia that year. During meetings, so the 1966 annual report continued, Frankel and his Yugoslav counterpart summarized the achievements of Yugoslav-American cultural and educational exchanges and both dignitaries agreed how these exchanges "achieved considerable progress" from 1964 to 1966. There was still space to improve these relations, so it was further written in the annual 1966 report, which identified finances as the biggest factor working against the expansion of these relations. The meeting put forward a suggestion to form two committees, so the 1966 Committee's report wrote on the conclusion of the meeting of the two men, that would establish cultural and educational collaboration between Yugoslavia and the United States on a more long-term basis.¹³⁷⁷ It was already in 1966 that this Committee submitted a report "which was

¹³⁷⁴ Edward R. Murrow, Memorandum for The Honorable Philip M. Coombs, Assistant Secretary of State, "The Need in Government Structure for Facilities to Handle U.S. Circulation and Financing of Cultural Exhibits from Foreign Governments," March 22, 1961, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 395, container 17, NARA.

¹³⁷⁵ AJ-559-31-66, "Izveštaj o radu Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom u 1964. godini," Beograd, 1965, 4.

¹³⁷⁶ AJ-559-32-47, "Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Izveštaj o radu u 1965. godini," Beograd, marta 1966, 3.

¹³⁷⁷ AJ-559-23-47, "Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Izveštaj o radu u 1966. godini," Beograd, marta 1967, 10.

to serve as a basis for future development of these relations in mutual interest" to their respective governments.¹³⁷⁸

We had seen in previous chapters that the Americans considered the Yugoslavs reliable and credible partners in musical and cultural diplomacy between the two countries. On a state level, the Yugoslavs in general afforded the Americans the same status. Looking at Yugoslav documents, it is evident that the Americans had also succeeded in convincing the Yugoslavs not to expect financial aid. The American State Department, according to one Yugoslav document, did not financially help Yugoslav cultural actions in the United States, given that this was not within their purview. However, the State Department did pull through in a different manner during the tour of the Zagreb Philharmonic.¹³⁷⁹ According to a Yugoslav despatch from New York, The Zagreb Philharmonic had been selected by the experts of the Temple University to perform at their summer games. During the selection process, the Yugoslavs were up against the Czechs and the Stuttgart Philharmonic. The Zagreb Philharmonic, so continued the despatch, was presented as an option by an American manager and ultimately selected when the American administration, with the engagement of the Yugoslav Embassy and the Ambassador, helped dispel prejudices held by the political authorities of Philadelphia that hampered this venture. Even though, according to the Yugoslav despatch, this visit was far from "ideal", it was, nonetheless, seen as an opening venture for seasonal performances in American concert halls. Zagreb Philharmonic, so continued the despatch, performed three independent concerts and four ballet shows and was joined on stage by, among others, Aaron Copland, Claudio Arrau and Benny Goodman. The reception of Yugoslav artists, as was further written in the report, by local authorities and the University, "exceeded expectations" while professional reviews varied but were "mostly positive, and in some way, all expressed sympathies." Congressmen Gerald R. Ford and Senator Mark Hatfield, continued the despatch, attended the final performance of the Zagreb Philharmonic. Also present, so the Yugoslav despatch stated, at least in the making, were "pro-Ustasha organizations" that had "planned anti-Yugosl. demonstrations" which was "prevented by [applying] intense pressure on the University and the festival with an intervention in the State Department" and the manifestation went on "in the spirit of Yugoslav-American friendship and cooperation." According to the view of the

¹³⁷⁸ AJ-559-34-75, "Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Izveštaj Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1967. god.," Beograd, maja 1968, 23.

¹³⁷⁹ AJ-559-68-151, Depeša iz Washingtona, 1028, 16.9.1969.

Yugoslav Information Center, what this event had demonstrated was "that in the US cultural exchange should not be mistaken for emigration."¹³⁸⁰

According to Yugoslav assessments, the American side was not the only one that was thoughtful in the process of musical and cultural diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States. The Yugoslav side was too. As was noted in one Yugoslav document from January 20, 1966 that gave full credit to the "tolerance of the American authorities", the Yugoslavs were also very "tactical" when conducting their program in the United States.¹³⁸¹ To remember from Chapter One, the Americans also credited themselves and their carefulness with what to disseminate within Yugoslavia as a factor that contributed to the Yugoslav government staying on the sidelines and not hampering their program. The Yugoslavs assessed their own comportment in the United States in the same manner. However, as evident from the January 20, 1966 report, a potential danger for the future of bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the United States appeared on the horizon. This entailed, so the January 20, 1966 report stated, a potentially much more careful approach to the presentation of Yugoslavia's foreign policies in the United States if the Vietnam War continues.¹³⁸² Despite occasional tensions in other segments of their relationship, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries noted in their 1967 report how Yugoslav-American cultural interaction had been on the rise and how both sides agreed that this interaction "achieve[d] an overall greater understanding". During the same year, the Yugoslavs had also attempted, according to the same document, to position their cultural interaction with the Americans on a more "reciprocal basis", both in terms of finances as well as "regarding the representation of national cultures". The 1967 report also noted how "very favourable conditions for further development of relations exactly on that line of equality and respect of mutual interests" had been established in 1967.¹³⁸³

With securing, at least declaratively and on a specific level, partners for their cultural diplomatic efforts in the United States, the Yugoslavs could not try and disseminate their musical diplomatic products on the American market. What follows in the next subchapter is the analysis of Yugoslavia's jazz diplomatic efforts to the United States.

¹³⁸⁰ AJ 559-68-151, Depeša iz New Yorka, 558, August 6, 1969; on the American State Department reaction to those protests see also, AJ-559-68-151, Depeša iz Washingtona, 1029, September 16, 1969, AJ-559-68-151.

¹³⁸¹ AJ-559-54-119, "Izvestaj o radu u 1965 godini," Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove- Upravi za informacije-, no. 1/66, 20. januara 1966, 2.

¹³⁸² Ibid.

¹³⁸³ AJ-559-34-75, "Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom. Izveštaj Savezne Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1967. God.," Beograd, maja 1968, 16.

4.3 Pushing Yugoslav Jazz into the United States

On a state level, documents surrounding the aforementioned December 1960 meet between Yugoslav and American representatives that aimed to discuss yet another Yugoslav cultural exchange memorandum, touched on the issue of presenting Yugoslavia musically in the United States with the Yugoslav side noting that there were no Yugoslav projects in a dire need of "immediate assistance" relating to their "efforts in the fields of musical presentations and publishing".¹³⁸⁴ The Yugoslav document that was attached to the official memorandum of conversation penned down by the Americans was in fact a list of suggestions prepared by the Yugoslav Embassy in the United States for the Americans to prepare before the meeting convened.¹³⁸⁵ Yugoslav musical suggestions proposed in the "Cultural Exchange" document included a possible visit of the Yugoslav radio and TV symphony orchestra and a notable mention of the talks already in motion for the American tour of the folklore ensemble 'Lado'.¹³⁸⁶ This particular document revealed yet another Yugoslav musical product the Yugoslavs wanted to promote in the United States. As the Yugoslavs wrote in the "Cultural exchange" document, interest was expressed and the Yugoslavs were desirous in talking more about sending a jazz orchestra led by Vojislav Simić.¹³⁸⁷ According to the examined materials, this effort constituted the first official attempt by the Yugoslav state, through its official representative bodies, to send Yugoslav jazz to the United States as part of the cultural package that was, according to the main principles and role afforded to culture in Yugoslav foreign policy, contribute to the sustenance of the Yugoslav independence.

By the time this Yugoslav jazz orchestra had been mentioned in the official Yugoslav-American cultural diplomatic structure, Yugoslav jazz orchestras had already amassed international experience as some of them had already toured Europe under either the patronage of the Yugoslav state or through other channels. Historians Dean Vuletic, Radina Vučetić and Zoran Janjetović all documented how the Yugoslav state already sent Simić's jazz orchestra

¹³⁸⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, December 14, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁸⁵ The document in question is: "Cultural Exchange," attached to Memorandum of Conversation, December 14, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁸⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, December 14, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁸⁷ "Memo. Cultural Exchange," attached to "Discussion of Yugoslav Memorandum on Cultural Exchange," Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: R. Clayton Mudd, M.J. Spear, Mautner, Engle, Siward, Bingham, Mirko Kalezić, Mirko Zarić, Marko Ristić, December 14, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

abroad in the second half of the 1950s.¹³⁸⁸ Prohaska's Dance Orchestra of RTV Zagreb, so the guitarist Aleksandar Bubanović recalled, went to Köln in 1955 to participate at a manifestation called "Music knows no boundaries" organized by the local radiostation. The invitation to perform at this manifestation was, as described by the guitarist in the said orchestra Aleksandar Bubanović, "equal to winning the lottery" as the musicians had not only been paid all travel and accommodation expenses but each member of the orchestra received a sum of 400 German marks for their two day performance. The aforementioned sum, as recalled by Bubanović, was "for our comprehension a sensation".¹³⁸⁹ Miljenko Prohaska composed his "Concerto No. 1" which contained Istrian folklore elements for this occasion.¹³⁹⁰ As Yugoslav jazz musicians began touring Europe, they also began notching up successes in the form of international prizes awarded to Yugoslav jazz. For instance, "Ad hoc", an ensemble from Ljubljana, received a gold medal at a jazz festival in Helsinki in 1962.¹³⁹¹ Notable successes in the international cultural arena were achieved by Jože Privšek's Dance Orchestra of Radio Ljubljana, Prohaska's Dance Orchestra of Radio-Zagreb, Zagreb Jazz Quartet, the Ljubljana Jazz Ensemble and jazz musician Predrag Ivanović and Bled/Ljubljana Jazz Festivals.¹³⁹² Indeed, as jazz musician Milivoj Koebler noted in 1968, it was Yugoslav jazz music that would achieve the biggest international prominence during the specific period in question. For instance, as Koebler continued, Vojislav Simić's Jazz Orchestra of Radio-Belgrade received the first prize at the European jazz festival in France.¹³⁹³ As *The New York Times* reported about this festival and performance of Simić's orchestra, it was precisely the latter that had attracted the highest attention at the Festival, alongside the jazz orchestra of Radio Budapest, despite the presence of jazz combos from thirteen countries. All eyes were, continued *The New York Times*, on the Yugoslav and Hungarian jazz orchestras as their performance on this festival was "their first contact with non-Communist jazz men on foreign soil."¹³⁹⁴ Indeed, a Parisian newspaper had also stated that the Yugoslav orchestra had been a true revelation at this festival. As the Parisian review continued, "[w]e already knew that jazz began to be in vogue in countries of Eastern Europe but everybody was surprised listening to this big ensemble that could play in the style

¹³⁸⁸ Janjetović, *Od internacionale do komercijale*, 46; Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 181, Vuletic, *Sounds like America*, 115-131.

¹³⁸⁹ Bubanović, *Sav taj jazz*, 113.

¹³⁹⁰ Prohaska, "Dobili smo »nogu« jer smo svirali jazz." 7.

¹³⁹¹ Koerberler, "Laka i popularna muzika u Jugoslaviji," 455.

¹³⁹² *Ibid.*

¹³⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹⁴ "French Jazz Fete Stars Yugoslavs. Belgrade Band Scores at First European Event – Festival Lasts 9 Days," *The New York Times*, July 15, 1960, 15.

of Count Basie with so much fervour, cohesion and discipline."¹³⁹⁵ It was this success that was officially quoted by the Yugoslavs in the "Cultural Exchange" document submitted to the Americans for the December 1960 meet.¹³⁹⁶

The inclusion of jazz by the Yugoslavs into the "working materials" for the Americans, can easily be interpreted as the first attempt by the Yugoslavs to officially circulate Yugoslav jazz into the United States with the help of the American government. The second Yugoslav attempt, that of securing the performance of Simić's Orchestra at the 1962 Seattle World Fair reveals yet another, more concrete, attempt by official Yugoslav bodies to launch this specific Yugoslav product on the American market. The analysis of this attempt additionally provides us with a much more clearer insight into all of the problems, weaknesses and strategies the Yugoslavs tried to employ in order to secure the presence of this product on the American market. The channels used for the launch were the familiar faces the Yugoslavs had already collaborated with in their earlier attempts at music diplomacy in the United States. Simić's jazz orchestra had been proposed by the official booking Agency of Yugoslavia, Jugokonzert, to the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries for the 1961 cultural exchange with the United States, the latter's proposals being Harry Belafonte and "ballet ensemble Balanchine".¹³⁹⁷ Shortly afterwards, Yugoslav representative bodies in the United States wrote back to the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries that they had engaged in a series of conversations with Harold Shaw from Huroc Inc.¹³⁹⁸ To reiterate from previous subchapters, Huroc and his firm had previously collaborated with the Yugoslavs to bring Yugoslav folklore ensembles to the United States.¹³⁹⁹ There existed yet another connection between Shaw and the desired Yugoslav goal of launching their jazz product on the American market. Shaw was the leading man of the performing arts division for the Seattle World Fair and he had already, beforehand, discussed with Jugokonzert the performance of the Belgrade Opera at the Seattle World's Fair.¹⁴⁰⁰ The discussed deal between the Yugoslav Information

¹³⁹⁵ AJ-559-112-245, "Umetničke turneje Jazz-orkestra RTB".

¹³⁹⁶ "Memo. Cultural Exchange," attached to "Discussion of Yugoslav Memorandum on Cultural Exchange," Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: R. Clayton Mudd, M.J. Spear, Mautner, Engle, Siward, Bingham, Mirko Kalezić, Mirko Zarić, Marko Ristić, December 14, 1960, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 291, container 10, NARA.

¹³⁹⁷ AJ-559-117-251, Veljko Bijedić Komisiji za kulturne veze s inostranstvom, no. 17/57, September 9, 1961.

¹³⁹⁸ AJ-559-66-148, Vujica, Telegram Sekretarijatu za inostrane poslove, Komisiji za kulturne poslove, October 19, 1961.

¹³⁹⁹ Scholar Ivan Hofman also notes the engagement of Sol Huroc in Yugoslav "'folklore diplomacy'" to the United States. See, Hofman, "'Folklore diplomacy' — the role of musical folklore in Yugoslavia's foreign policy," 210.

¹⁴⁰⁰ AJ-559-66-148, Vujica, Telegram Sekretarijatu za inostrane poslove, Komisiji za kulturne poslove, October 19, 1961.

Center and Shaw, according to the Yugoslav Information Center's report to the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries from October 19, 1961, would have included the World Fair covering transportation costs for opera members and their accompanying personnel from Edinburgh to Seattle and their stay in the city while the Yugoslavs would be the ones paying for return transportation costs. This deal would not include, so the October 19, 1961 Information Center's report further detailed, performances of this opera in other American cities due to the pre-existing schedules of American concert halls. "Zagrebački Solisti" and Simić's Orchestra, as revealed by the same report, emerged as two alternate possibilities the Yugoslavs could use to represent themselves in the United States.¹⁴⁰¹ The deal surrounding the possible tour of Simić's jazz orchestra would include, so the Information Center's October 19, 1961 report noted, organized TV and radio performances for several weeks, with the organizer picking up return expenses.¹⁴⁰² For this endeavour, namely the attempt to launch Yugoslav jazz into the United States, the Yugoslav Information Center had the backing of the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington as the latter considered that "these two groups [Simić's jazz orchestra and Zagrebački Solisti] would represent us well and that this would be a convenient solution."¹⁴⁰³ Put simply, the state had an interest in Yugoslav jazz being introduced on the American market. This was confirmed in yet another report in which the director of the Yugoslav Information Center in New York Dragoljub Vujica wrote of his "all in" engagement to make sure that Simić's tour materializes as "we [the Information Center] feel that the visit of our jazz would mean a lot for us in the US."¹⁴⁰⁴ Albeit no clear reason was stated as to why the Yugoslavs attempted to push their jazz into the United States, jazz was still seen as a part of the package to promote the cultural side of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

Two Yugoslav documents which detail the possible visit of Vojislav Simić's Jazz Orchestra of Radio Television Belgrade reveal all of the weaknesses of the Yugoslav attempt to officially conduct jazz diplomacy with the United States. First, there was the issue of communication between Yugoslav representative bodies in the United States and Yugoslav organizations in Yugoslavia, as evident from a March 5, 1962 letter sent by Dragoljub Vujica (Yugoslav Information Center) to Dušan Popović (director of Radio-Television Belgrade). As Vujica explained in this letter, officials of Radio Television Belgrade sent the Yugoslav Information

¹⁴⁰¹ AJ-559-66-148, Vujica, Telegram Sekretarijatu za inostrane poslove, Komisiji za kulturne poslove, October 19, 1961.

¹⁴⁰² Ibid.

¹⁴⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁴ AJ-559-117-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, no. 86, 7. marta 1962.

Center a letter with questions the Information Center had already answered.¹⁴⁰⁵ Such communication breakdowns between Yugoslav "brand champions" at home and abroad were, by no means, a new problem. For instance, it was already in mid-1950s that the Yugoslav Embassy wrote back home how Yugoslav representative bodies in the United States had still not developed satisfactory relations with some Yugoslav institutions. The Embassy identified such problem as a result of "insufficient efficiency of these organisations; b) the mismatch of the relations between respectable republican associations and their central organisations, and c) individualistic tendencies and attempts to achieve direct contacts with American organizations abroad by circumventing competent institutions in the country and [diplomatic] missions in the US."¹⁴⁰⁶ On the other hand, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries laid the blame at the door of Yugoslavia's representative bodies in the United States, the Embassy and the Yugoslav Information Center. According to the information obtained from the Yugoslav Information Center, in a 1955 report the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries wrote how Yugoslavia had the ability to culturally interact with the United States. Occasionally, so the same report continued, the Committee received the Yugoslav Information Center's suggestions and information on specific cultural events, yet was kept waiting for a long time for a response on some of their own proposals and inquiries. Yugoslav representative bodies in the United States, so it was further written in the 1955 report, "mostly do jobs outside of the Committee and very rarely ask for its cooperation."¹⁴⁰⁷ Expressed differently, the organizational cultural diplomatic structure of Yugoslavia was not fully functional.

This communicative structure was still not functional in the early 1960s as evident from the correspondence between institutions regarding the American tour of the Radio-TV Belgrade Jazz Orchestra. Dušan Popović, the director of Radio-Television Belgrade, received another letter from Dragoljub Vujica two days later, on March 7, 1962, in which Vujica addressed a telegram sent by Jugokonzert that detailed a performance offer for an American jazz orchestra in Yugoslavia. In this letter, Vujica referred to Jugokonzert's reaction as slightly jumpy behavior on the part of Jugoconcert, expressing fear that "if this continues, we will not get far". In the same letter Vujica noted the need "to get deeply involved with the whole issue and see that all

¹⁴⁰⁵ AJ-559-117-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, No. 148, March 5, 1962.

¹⁴⁰⁶ AJ-559-17-36, "Prepis iz izveštaja Ambasade FNRJ u Washingtonu str. pov. 133 od 19 decembra 1955 godine," enclosed in Ljubo Drndić Komisiji za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, "Dostavljaju se prepisi iz izveštaja Centra za informacije (N.Y.) i Ambasade u Washingtonu o propagandi na kulturnom planu," no. 42/III, 17.1.1956.

¹⁴⁰⁷ AJ-559-10-23, "Kulturne veze sa inostranstvom po zemljama za 1955 godinu. ... Godišnji izveštaj po zemljama-Sjedinjene Američke Države", 431.

can be done to get this thing [Simić's Jazz Orchestra's tour] happen." Vujica then noted his personal engagement in this project and the readiness of the Yugoslav Information Center to do all of the necessary bidding for the success of this project due to its meaning for Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁰⁸ This is where ineffective communication thwarted Yugoslavia's attempts to successfully conclude this project. Due to back and forth communication between Yugoslav bodies at home and in the United States, as stated by Dragoljub Vujica on March 5, 1962, the Yugoslavs "lost a lot of time to agree."¹⁴⁰⁹ As evident from these examples, the first set of issues that caused problems for Yugoslav jazz diplomacy in the United States related to communication between appropriate institutions.

The second set of problems related to the actual product itself. Similar to folkore or any other Yugoslav musical ware, as the director of the Yugoslav Information Center noted in the context of the possible performance of Simić's orchestra, Yugoslav jazz was unknown in the United States.¹⁴¹⁰ In order to change this specific situation, the Yugoslavs devised two strategies. The first one was noted in the already cited March 7, 1962 letter by the director of the Yugoslav Information Center and included a promotional campaign. As the director of the Yugoslav Information Center wrote in this letter, it was an absolute necessity that the Orchestra's record hits the American market. This task, so the Director further explained, would be carried out by an American agent who would ensure that the record was played on American radio-stations and reviewed in jazz related press.¹⁴¹¹ For this purpose, the Yugoslavs contacted the American record company "Monitor".¹⁴¹²

The attempt of the Yugoslav state to offer Yugoslav jazz on the American market through its representative bodies revealed an extra set of problems heavily present in Yugoslavia's booking policy and overall music diplomacy in the United States – the lack of financial resources. As Dragoljub Vujica wrote to Dušan Popović on March 7, 1962, the American tour of Simić's Orchestra was dependent on an exchange with Count Basie.¹⁴¹³ This is where the Yugoslavs ran into problems as there was a huge discrepancy in the sum of money offered by the Yugoslavs for Count Basie and the amount of money the Americans offered for Simić's orchestra. As Dragoljub Vujica wrote to Dušan Popović on March 7, 1962, for a weeks

¹⁴⁰⁸ AJ-559-17-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, no. 86, 7. marta 1962.

¹⁴⁰⁹ AJ-559-117-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, No. 148, March 5, 1962.

¹⁴¹⁰ AJ-559-117-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, no. 86, 7. marta 1962.

¹⁴¹¹ Ibid.

¹⁴¹² AJ-559-117-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, No. 148, March 5, 1962.

¹⁴¹³ AJ-559-17-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, no. 86, 7. marta 1962.

performance, the Americans offered \$ 10,000 for a completely unknown Yugoslav jazz orchestra while Jugokonzert offered only \$ 5,000 for Basie's troupe. As Vujica further wrote in the same letter: "We haven't even communicated this to the American agent."¹⁴¹⁴ Nonetheless, the Yugoslavs had in mind a potential partner who could resolve this problem. As Vujica wrote to Popović, the Yugoslavs should make an enquiry with USIS to see whether they could finance a portion of the visit of the American jazz orchestra to Yugoslavia.¹⁴¹⁵ Expressed differently, to resolve the issues surrounding their performance in the United States, the Yugoslavs had no problem asking American representative bodies in Yugoslavia to handle the American equation of the issue as that would secure Yugoslavia's cultural wares entering the American market. The Americans, thus, yet again emerged as "brand champions" of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

Another issue the Yugoslavs had to confront in their jazz diplomacy was connected to specificity of the American market. Before turning our analysis to this specific issue, we need to briefly address the characteristics of the product the Yugoslavs offered. The basic characteristics of what constituted the Yugoslav jazz brand was penned down by the famous German critic Joachim Berendt in the December 5, 1963 issue of *Down Beat* magazine. Berendt's account reveals how, in the minds of foreigners, Yugoslav jazz performed the same role on the international cultural scene as did Yugoslavia in international political affairs. Writing about the possibility of Yugoslav jazz musicians to establish contacts with other jazz musicians, regardless of where they came from, their availability to perform in places irrespective of political geography, the presence of performers of various nationalities at Bled jazz festival, wrote Berendt, made Yugoslavia "as far as jazz goes, what it is in politics: a sort of middle ground between East and West."¹⁴¹⁶ Expressed differently, Yugoslav jazz represented the essence of the desired image of the country as a connector between two geographical sides.

In 1957, American *Variety* magazine listed the second defining characteristic of Yugoslav jazz and its musicians. "The Yugoslavian musicians", wrote American *Variety* magazine in 1957 in an account featuring jazz musician Bojan Adamič, "have picked up a great deal of knowledge from their American masters."¹⁴¹⁷ These words demonstrate that foreigners detected

¹⁴¹⁴ AJ-559-17-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, no. 86, 7. marta 1962.

¹⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁶ Joachim E. Berendt, "Jazz in Yugoslavia," (translated by Ernest Borneman), *Down Beat*, Vol. 30, No. 31, December 5, 1963, 20. (hereinafter, "Jazz in Yugoslavia")

¹⁴¹⁷ Hans Hoehn, "Jazz, Once Branded 'Capitalistic,' Now Flipping Tooters in Titoland," *Variety*, August, 14, 1957, 48.

that much of the strength of Yugoslav jazz rested on the fact that Yugoslav jazz musicians had the ability to hone their craft with the Americans by their side. This was also indirectly confirmed by Vojislav Simić after his orchestra's performance at Juan-Les-Pins. As *The New York Times* noted, the arrangements by American jazz musicians such as Dizzy Gillespie, Lionel Hampton, Quincy Jones and Duke Ellington made it onto the repertoire of Simić's orchestra, in addition to "indigenous Yugoslav pieces." The leader of the band, Vojislav Simić, so continued *The New York Times*, mentioned "that Mr. Gillespie had worked in Belgrade for a month on a State Department- sponsored trip and Mr. Jones also had played with the Yugoslavs for a month."¹⁴¹⁸ The ability of American and Yugoslav jazz musicians to collaborate with one another had been made possible by the basic structure of the Yugoslav independent brand, as seen from Chapters One and Two.

This is not to say that Yugoslav jazz musicians and critics wholeheartedly agreed that Yugoslav jazz should duplicate the playing of American jazz musicians. Some Yugoslav jazz bands which nurtured the American style, such as Simić's orchestra, were subjected to criticism precisely for this fact. For instance, a Yugoslav critic described Vojislav Simić's jazz orchestra as "old-fashioned and sluggish" when reviewing the band's performance at Bled Jazz Festival in the early 1970s in the musical magazine *Zvuk*. Much of the critique, as evident from the same review, had to do with the band still performing in the idiom of Count Basie. On the other hand, in the same review, the same critic praised the performance of the B.P. Convention, led by Croatian jazz musician Boško Petrović, whose works contained elements from Yugoslavia's folkore music.¹⁴¹⁹

Criticisms such as the one aimed at the arrangements played by Simić's orchestra can also be interpreted within a wider discussion that was held in Yugoslavia about what it was that would make up the Yugoslav musical brand. In mid-1956, as could be seen from a meeting of the Union of Composers of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav musical circles began discussing two crucial questions which were summed up by composer Milo Cipra to be Yugoslavia's musical modernity, that is, how far away Yugoslavia was from general music trends, and its relation with folkore.¹⁴²⁰ This discussion revealed how Yugoslav agents were hard at work to find a musical expression that would serve as the country's musical brand abroad. For instance,

¹⁴¹⁸ "French Jazz Fete Stars Yugoslavs....," *The New York Times*, July 15, 1960, 15.

¹⁴¹⁹ Ognjen Tvrtković, "Petnaestogodišnjica organiziranog jazz u Jugoslaviji," *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija* 4 (winter 1974), 63.

¹⁴²⁰ "Smernice posleratnog jugoslovenskog muzičkog stvaralaštva....," 97. (hereinafter "Smernice posleratnog jugoslovenskog muzičkog stvaralaštva...") Comment by Milo Cipra.

composer Nikola Hercigonja claimed that there was substantial fear present amongst Yugoslav composers when they dealt with folkore. Many perceived the usage of folkore as a "step-back" even though, as claimed by Hercigonja, nineteenth century composers only "scratched the surface of the folkore substance". This substance had been explored in more detail in the twentieth century¹⁴²¹ and if the Yugoslavs began to look at folkore "as a substance extremely original" that represents "the most intimate connection between the experiences of this man", then, according to Hercigonja, "we can see that his musical expression is most intimately linked with his psychology, this is actually the photography of his life, his psychology and if we look at this at the deepest level, most interesting to folklorists, we shall see that it gives enormous possibilities to use this substance within the modern musical language."¹⁴²² Hercigonja put forward the argument that to obtain "contact with the environment and feel how that environment breathes and if we are talking to that environment with language, then we need to find the language that is there." As Hercigonja continued, "... through learning of that spirit and psychology of that music we can extract what will be new and ours and what we can then (now I am starting to speak in commercial language) market as goods, that is ours and is of quality."¹⁴²³ These remarks by the aforementioned Yugoslav composers, in a nutshell, represent the essence of "nation branding". Not only did Hercigonja explain the potential musical "product" of Yugoslavia in branding terms he also drew parallels with the context of his country and its people. What is specific about nation branding is the fact that a connection is made "between national characteristics (such as cuisine or music) and a nation's image abroad".¹⁴²⁴ Indeed, as Croatian composer Natko Devčić addressed the comment made by Milko Kelemen on electronic music during the aforementioned discussion, he stated how he had nothing against such music because of the specific time in which the Yugoslavs lived and "... our people also work in institutes for nuclear physics, they also work with electronic appliances, [they] work with the heritage and the process of industrialization and technical development...". Nonetheless, as Devčić continued, "[a]nd still these are the people of our land, the people that have their folkore background and a specific temperament of their own."¹⁴²⁵ This was further developed by composer Mihailo Vukdragović who addressed the performances of Yugoslav

¹⁴²¹ "Smernice posleratnog jugoslovenskog muzičkog stvaralaštva...", 86. Comment by Nikola Hercigonja.

¹⁴²² *Ibid.*, 86-87.

¹⁴²³ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁴²⁴ Viktorin, Carolin, Geinow-Hecht, Jessica C.E., Estner, Anika, Will, Marcel K., "Introduction: Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy: Exploring the Historical Origins of Nation Branding." in *Nation Branding in Modern History*, edited by Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, Anika Estner, Marcel K. Will (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018), 2.

¹⁴²⁵ "Smernice posleratnog jugoslovenskog muzičkog stvaralaštva...", 89. Comment by Natko Devčić.

music in Vienna four years prior where he noted how Vienna critics did not address the style in which a Yugoslav work was composed but whether or not "that music brought the breath and intonation of the land from which we came." What the critics focused on, continued Vukdragović, was "first and foremost the content and not the technical expression."¹⁴²⁶

That folklore, a product that had been the first the Yugoslavs sent to the United States as seen from the first subchapter of this chapter, could be that specific ingredient that made up Yugoslav jazz quickly became an object of discussion in Yugoslav musical circles. In their music making attempts, Yugoslav jazz musicians, as written by one critic from Croatia immediately after the end of the first jazz festival on Bled, attempted to "give a much stronger characteristics of our soil".¹⁴²⁷ Two years later, again within the context of a review of Bled Jazz Festival, one critic noted how it was precisely jazz, as opposed to the much more popular "zabavna muzika" that demonstrated the "connection with healthy sources of national folklore". It was this connection, continued the same critic, that attracted and delighted foreigners who noted that "a special role could be afforded to Yugoslav jazz within European jazz."¹⁴²⁸ Expressed differently, it was the folk component which was recognized by foreigners as an element that made Yugoslav jazz special. Indeed, to return back to Joachim Berendt's analysis of Yugoslav jazz in the December 5, 1963 issue of *Down Beat*, the use of folk was the second feature of Yugoslav jazz.¹⁴²⁹

On several occasions, Yugoslav jazz musicians also recognized folk as the element that made the jazz they played unique. As recently stated by jazz musician Davor Kajfeš: "So many young musicians, some even in ripe age, lived as parasites on the body of great jazz musicians! So many little Coltraines, little Parkers! Copying into eternity leads you into epigony, into a dead end street. We succeeded as soon as we started making our own repertoire with folk elements, especially rythm."¹⁴³⁰ When Miljenko Prohaska spoke about John Lewis, Gunther Schuller and "Third Stream Music", he noted how his contribution included the addition of the folk component and he thus referred to the whole project as "the fourth stream". As Prohaska continued: "It's very weird – terms such as ethno-jazz, ethno-this, ethno-that were invented and we had done it long before."¹⁴³¹ Not only had the folk element added a perceived touch of

¹⁴²⁶ "Smernice posleratnog jugoslovenskog muzičkog stvaralaštva ...," 94. Comment by Mihailo Vukdragović

¹⁴²⁷ Nenad Turkalj, "Jazz-Festival. Uspjeh I jugoslavenskog festivala jazza na Bledu - slaba strana: pjevači," *Večernji list*, God II, Septembar 19, 1960, no. 376, pp. 5.

¹⁴²⁸ N.T., "Kamo ide naš jazz?" *Večernji list*, God V, no. 1235, July 6, 1963, pp. 9

¹⁴²⁹ Berendt, "Jazz in Yugoslavia," 20.

¹⁴³⁰ Davor Hrvoj. "Davor Kajfeš – Kako sam oduševio Quincyja Jonesa."

¹⁴³¹ Hrvoj, "Razgovor s Miljenkom Prohaskom...," *Cantus*, no. 179, (March) 2013, pp. 7.

uniqueness to Yugoslav jazz, Joachim Berendt's writing confirmed that Prohaska's words were not just an overstatement by the musician. As Berendt explained, the folk melodies of Macedonia contained "incomparable rhythmic freedom and individuality in using such musical meters as 5/4, 7/4, 9/4, and combining such meters with each other, all devices that only in recent years have started to play a part in U.S. jazz."¹⁴³² This specificity became evident to American musicologist Everret Helm during his 1959 trip to Yugoslavia. As Helm wrote, during the Turkish rule the only art that grew in Macedonia was folk "much of which is based on 'irregular' meters (5,7,11, 13, etc.) that today are considered very 'modern' but that the Macedonians have 'in their blood'."¹⁴³³ On the November 23, 1961 meeting of the Committee for the Performing Arts and Music, one member of this Committee noted the Yugoslav awareness of their folklore treasure. This member stated that some in Macedonia felt their "festival was of special interest because Macedonia was the cradle of folklore".¹⁴³⁴

Yugoslav jazz only had the folk element that made it unique, it also had some strong individuals fronting these bands. This emerged as yet another point of agreement between Joachim Berendt and some Yugoslav cultural agents. In his *Down Beat* article on Yugoslav jazz, Joachim Berendt mentioned Vojislav Simić and Jože Privšek but singled out Miljenko as being "so original that he doesn't care about any kind of accepted theories."¹⁴³⁵ Yugoslav jazz impresario Aleksandar Živković was of the same opinion. In a 1966 article in *Borba*, Živković wrote how, when Prohaska, "a capable 'band leader', talented arranger and lucid composer", emerged at the helm of the Dance Orchestra of Radio's Zagreb, he put an end to an orchestra "that played jazz so badly". The changes Prohaska made, as Živković further wrote in the same article, "in all respects, represent the staple of Yugoslav jazz."¹⁴³⁶ Indeed, this "staple of Yugoslav jazz" would be given international recognition in mid-1960s. As was written in *Večernji list*, in 1965 Miljenko Prohaska had been given "immense recognition" by the leading jazz magazine in the United States, *Down Beat*, by being included "on the list of musicians whose talent »deserves world recognition«". As the same Croatian newspaper further explained, this was a result of an annual poll taken by leading experts of jazz and "was considered to be the most authoritative evaluation of figures and accomplishments in the field of jazz in a year."

¹⁴³² Berendt, "Jazz in Yugoslavia," 21.

¹⁴³³ Helm, "Visitor to Yugoslavia Finds Thriving Musical Activity," 7.

¹⁴³⁴ AJ-559-111- 244, Stenografske beleške. Sednica 23. XI. 1961, 54. Comment by Vučinić.

¹⁴³⁵ Berendt, "Jazz in Yugoslavia," 20.

¹⁴³⁶ A. Živković, "Džez na malom ekranu," *Borba*, Year XXXI, September 12, 1966, pp. 7

Prohaska's success was all the more impressive, continued *Večernji list*, as he had received the same number of points as did Gil Evans, Lionel Hampton and Woody Herman.¹⁴³⁷

Prohaska was at the helm of Dance Orchestra of Radio Zagreb, Simić led the jazz orchestra of RTV Belgrade while Privšek was the leading man of Radio Ljubljana's jazz orchestra. These three men and their orchestras constituted yet another part of the Yugoslav jazz brand, as far as Joachim Berendt was concerned. As Berendt wrote, unlike musicians in Western Europe who struggled to keep a big band together, Yugoslavia had seven top quality big bands. The three of them, continued Berendt, the orchestras led by Prohaska, Simić and Privšek, were the best in Europe. As Berendt concluded, not only did the Yugoslavs adore big bands, they also "possess the necessary discipline and team spirit to do it well."¹⁴³⁸ It was not just the Europeans who struggled to keep big bands together, the Americans did too. As American jazz critic Nat Hentoff wrote in 1961, there were a few big bands left, including Count Basie's and Duke Ellington's, that were working full-time.¹⁴³⁹ Yugoslav jazz musicians also noted the longevity of the Yugoslav big bands. As Miljenko Prohaska stated in an interview, compared to other orchestras in Europe and the United States, the Dance Orchestra of Radio Zagreb had been extremely active for a long period of time, touring Europe, disseminating their records worldwide and collaborating with foreign musicians.¹⁴⁴⁰ It is thus not surprising that in 1970, to honor the twenty-fifth anniversary of work of the three big bands of Radio Zagreb, Ljubljana and Belgrade, the Ljubljana Jazz Festival had one section dedicated to "Big Band Jazz".¹⁴⁴¹

As these examples demonstrated, the jazz product the Yugoslav state attempted to offer on the American market were its big bands. It was in this aspect, however, that the American market interfered and it is in this same context that the letter sent by the director of the Yugoslav Information Center to the director of the Radio-Television Belgrade is indicative. As Dragoljub Vujica wrote on March 7, 1962: "It is easier to bring here a symphonic than a jazz orchestra."¹⁴⁴² The attachment the Yugoslav Information Center sent to representative bodies in Yugoslavia points out that the Yugoslavs rightfully identified the problem that might interfere with the breakthrough of Yugoslav jazz onto the American market. In his letter to Dušan Popović,

¹⁴³⁷ 'Priznanje Prohaski,' *Večernji list*, God VII, no. 1905, 10. IX. 1965, pp. 18; On *Down Beat's* recognition of Miljenko Prohaska see also, Mirjana Greblo, "Jugoslavenski jazz festival na Bledu," *Matica*, rujan 1966, 349.

¹⁴³⁸ Berendt, "Jazz in Yugoslavia," 20.

¹⁴³⁹ Nat Hentoff, "Rx for the Big Bands. Diagnosis and proposed cure," *Hifi/Stereo review*, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1961, 34.

¹⁴⁴⁰ Hrvoj, "Kad je netko bio nepodoban..."

¹⁴⁴¹ Mladen Mazur, "XI međunarodni jazz festival »Ljubljana 70«, " *Zvuk: Jugoslovenska muzička revija*, broj 104-105, 1970., 209.

¹⁴⁴² AJ-559-17-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, no. 86, 7. marta 1962.

Dragoljub Vujica included an article written by Nat Hentoff for the American musical magazine *HiFi/Stereo Review* in which Hentoff discussed the problems big bands faced in the United States.¹⁴⁴³ To sum up Hentoff's thinking expressed in the aforementioned article, big bands fell out of favour with the audience in the United States due to "a shift in the nature of both jazz itself and the jazz audience." As Hentoff continued, big bands captivated the audience in the 1930s because the latter could find "so much musical interest" in them. While the job of the big bands was to pack dance and theatre halls, wrote Hentoff, the music they played was filled with jazz. The reason had been, according to Hentoff, the presence of jazz soloists. When, in mid and late 1940s, modern jazz arrived on the scene, so Hentoff further explained, jazz soloists started to move to smaller bands, the reason not being the unavailability of big bands but "more challenge and opportunity for self-expression" offered to jazz soloists by smaller bands. Jazz itself, that is, the attention of it, had also shifted, according to Hentoff, and "now it is music for listening only." While big bands attempted to combine a commercial program oriented towards dancing and a jazz one that targets clubs and concert avenues, Hentoff noted that the jazz audience developed a rather ambivalent attitude towards "this fence-straddling" and their focus turned "on the combos, which, theoretically, restrict the musicians' creative talents much less than the bands do."¹⁴⁴⁴ Hentoff's writing confirmed that the American market simply had no use for a Yugoslav out-of-date big band product. Given that the documents provide no information that indicates that the tour of the Jazz Orchestra of Radio-Television Belgrade materialized, it is evident that the Yugoslavs failed, at least officially, to resolve the aforementioned problem and mount a campaign that would ultimately lead to the successful launch of this musical product on the American market.

This is not to say that the Yugoslavs did not have another "ace up their sleeve" to offer to the American market. To go back to Joachim Berendt's analysis of the Yugoslav jazz scene, it was Yugoslavia's trumpeters that represented another strong side of Yugoslav jazz. As Berendt noted, it was really hard to find good trumpet players in Europe while the opposite was true for Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁴⁵ This statement had its roots and was connected to the essence or the beginning of the rise of the Yugoslav jazz scene. As identified by jazz musician Petar Vujić, who also played the trumpet¹⁴⁴⁶, it was the establishment of the trumpet department at the Music Academy in Belgrade in 1950 that represented a landmark for Yugoslav jazz as many Yugoslav

¹⁴⁴³ AJ-559-117-251, Dragoljub Vujica Dušanu Popoviću, no. 86, 7. marta 1962.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Hentoff, "Rx for the Big bands," 34.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Berendt, "Jazz in Yugoslavia," 20.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Luković, *Bolja prošlost*, 37.

trumpet players such as Predrag Ivanović and Duško Gojković graduated here.¹⁴⁴⁷ In the context of nation branding, trumpet players were yet another element of the Yugoslav jazz brand. As he noted in his December 5, 1963 *Down Beat* article, Joachim Berendt made this element of Yugoslav jazz all the more visible in his television program in Germany where nine Yugoslav musicians were featured in his all-star band. As he further explained to readers of *Down Beat*, Berendt was told by musicians from France and Germany that this would be "mission impossible" in their countries.¹⁴⁴⁸ One of those Yugoslav trumpet players in an American jazz band had been Duško Gojković.¹⁴⁴⁹ He was frequently referred to as "the first trumpet of Europe" and he became a member of the Maynard Ferguson's jazz orchestra considered to be, according to *Borba*, "one of the best ensembles of this kind all over Europe."¹⁴⁵⁰ That trumpet players were indeed Yugoslavia's strong side was confirmed by Bojan Adamič to *Variety* magazine in 1957 when he noted how he lent his trumpet player, Mojmir Sepe, to Max Greger's band in Germany.¹⁴⁵¹ *Variety* magazine further noted how two Yugoslav trumpet players, Milorad Pavlović and Duško Gojković, were selected by Kurt Edelhagen to play in his newly established big band.¹⁴⁵² These examples led *Variety* magazine to conclude that "Yugoslavia's forte is undoubtedly her jazz trumpeters. (After all, Ziggy Elman hails from this part of the world.)"¹⁴⁵³

It was not just the trumpeters that could safe face of Yugoslav jazz on the international cultural scene generally and jazz diplomacy with the United States particularly. First and foremost, the Yugoslavs had the festivals, products of the work of Yugoslav brand ambassadors, which were clearly, to reiterate from the previous chapters, designed and established in accordance to the central tenet of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy that stated that cultural interaction with foreign countries had the aim of connecting Yugoslavia with the world. This statement was true for Bled Jazz Festival and the Muzički Biennale Zagreb as evident from their formation documents, the statements made by the leading people of those manifestations and the interpretation of these events in the Yugoslav public discourse. This was also true for

¹⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., 40.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Berendt, "Jazz in Yugoslavia," 20.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Harold S. Engle, "Copies of notes on Yugoslav cultural manifestations in the United States in connection with our OM of Feb. 11, 1963 to USIS Zagreb," Transmittal Slip from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 11, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, box 1, NARA.

¹⁴⁵¹ Hans Hoehn, "Jazz, Once Branded 'Capitalist,' Now Flipping Tooters in Titoland," *Variety*, August 14, 1957, 49.

¹⁴⁵² Ibid., 48-49.

¹⁴⁵³ Ibid., 49.

Dubrovnik Summer Festival which was largely interpreted in the Yugoslav public discourse, as evident from the interpretation of Duke Ellington's performance in the previous chapter, as an event "out of jazz's league". As one of the documents noted, Dubrovnik Summer Festival was not only "one of the most significant cultural events in the world" but, as a cultural event for the country it was "a place in which conditions were established for the integration of the culture of our people and one of the most adequate means for presentation and the penetration of our culture and creators into the creativity of other peoples." For many Yugoslav cultural workers, so the same document continued, this festival represented "the first contact with a foreign audience and the opportunity for self-assessment in the international criteria."¹⁴⁵⁴ As evident from this document, Dubrovnik Summer Festival was established on the same premise as did Bled Jazz Festival and Muzički Biennale Zagreb as they offered Yugoslav cultural workers the gateways to connect and to advance. While Dubrovnik Summer Festival played little role in the development of the Yugoslav jazz brand, as evident from the performance of Duke Ellington at the Festival which was interpreted by one critic as a "deviation" in the musical program of the festival¹⁴⁵⁵, the contribution of Bled Jazz Festival was there.

To begin with, in 1971 one domestic critic credited Bled Jazz Festival as the festival that marked the beginning of creation of the Yugoslav jazz repertoire as it was precisely for this festival that specific arrangements, those based on folklore, began to be written.¹⁴⁵⁶ In addition, the festival demonstrated, as one critic put it in 1963, that "Yugoslavia was abundant with great jazz players," and that its people had the talent for jazz.¹⁴⁵⁷ Furthermore, Yugoslav jazz musicians credited Bled Jazz Festival with affording them with the opportunities they would otherwise not have been given had this particular festival not stepped on the Yugoslav cultural scene. After spending time with Willis Conover at Bled Jazz Festival, Miljenko Prohaska noted in 1966, that "[t]oday's recognition and reputation of our jazz in the world is high". This was, according to Prohaska, "the result of many years of patient work and many burnouts." As Prohaska continued in the same interview, Bled Jazz Festival was "an affirmed international musical institution" and the first two editions of the festival functioned on the model of Yugoslav jazz musicians observing foreign musicians. A reverse situation, continued Prohaska,

¹⁴⁵⁴ HR-HDA-1410- Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom Izvršnog vijeća Sabora Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske- Dubrovačke Ljetne Igre, box 83, "Informacija. Dubrovačke Ljetne Igre," u Lukatela Josip, "Dubrovačke ljetne igre. Za sastanak radne grupe u utorak, 24. III u 13 sati. Soba 233/II," 24. III. 1970, 1.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Vladimir Berdović, "XXI dubrovačke Ljetne igre," *Zvuk: jugoslovenska muzička revija*, no. 106-107, 1970, 278.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Nenad Hlača, "Od danas u Ljubljani: Četiri dana čudesnih nota. Je li nebo sklono jazzu?" *Večernji list*, God. XV, no. 3652, June 3, 1971, pp. 5

¹⁴⁵⁷ N.T., "Kamo ide naš jazz?" *Večernji list*, God V, no. 1235, July 6, 1963, pp. 9

began to take place as Yugoslavs began to create their own arrangements which made foreign musicians turn their attention to Yugoslav jazzers. As Prohaska concluded, "with certainty we can say that Bled established a name for us and widely opened the doors to the world."¹⁴⁵⁸ A 1962 review of this festival in the Yugoslav newspapers corroborates Prohaska's statement. As a result of the successes of the first Bled Jazz Festival, wrote a critic in *Večernji list* on February 2, 1962, Yugoslav jazz musicians Urban Koder, Mojmir Sepe, Zagrebački Jazz-kvartet, Belgrade's big band orchestra and a smaller Zagreb ensemble, were all to perform at a radio-television in Southern Germany. The man that made it all possible, so continued the same review, was Joachim Berendt¹⁴⁵⁹, who, if keeping in mind the basic tenets of Yugoslav cultural and music diplomacy, fulfilled the role of an advertising instrument for the Yugoslav state and one of its products. Berendt was not the only such agent as another review of Bled Jazz Festival in 1966 noted the presence of producers from the United States, East and West Germany, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia at the said festival.¹⁴⁶⁰

Finally, the Yugoslav state could also count on their brand ambassadors, Yugoslav jazz musicians, to further spread Yugoslav jazz into the United States and on the international cultural scene. The activities Yugoslav jazz musicians undertook that directly and indirectly worked in favour of building and promoting the Yugoslav independent brand could be divided into several categories. We have previously noted how the Yugoslav Information Center in New York devised a plan to launch a record of the Jazz Orchestra of Radio-Television on the American market. Yugoslav jazz musicians took advantage of the vicinity and ability to form direct ties with American jazz musicians, as permitted by the Yugoslav system, to promote Yugoslav jazz through this medium. Jazz musician Boško Petrović revealed how easy it was for Yugoslav jazz musicians to establish contact with American jazz musicians who visited Yugoslavia. Petrović wrote in his autobiography how, when the Modern Jazz Quartet visited Yugoslavia, he and Kajfeš managed to find the Belgrade hotel in which the musicians were staying¹⁴⁶¹ and then they literally walked up to their hotel room and served as tour guides for the band in Belgrade.¹⁴⁶² Other Yugoslav jazz musicians formed bonds with their American counterparts. As was noted by *Večernji list* in 1971, when Louis Armstrong died, all of the Croatian jazz musicians who played with Armstrong at Zagreb's Ritz bar in 1965 performed at

¹⁴⁵⁸ Greblo, "Jugoslavenski jazz festival na Bledu," 349.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Z. FR., "Iz naše zabavne muzike: »Bled 62«, " *Večernji list*, God. IV, no. 797, February 02, 1962, 6.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Nenad Turkalj, "I pored uspjeha – pod upitnikom," *Večernji list*, God. VIII, no. 2130, 6. lipnja 1966, pp. 5

¹⁴⁶¹ Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 87.

¹⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, 88.

an "in memoriam" concert for the American musician held in Zagorje. As the same article continued, on this occasion trumpet player Ladislav Fidri, "»the little Satchmo« evoked some details of his friendship with Louis Armstrong".¹⁴⁶³

Some of the records made this way included the one in which Boško Petrović's band performed with members of the band of jazz musician Quincy Jones during the latter's 1960 performance in Yugoslavia. As Boško Petrović continued writing in his autobiography, this record was "a big discographic ice breaker with the great American colleagues".¹⁴⁶⁴ Another such product was a record by Clark Terry and Petrović's B.P. Convention and John Lewis performing with "Zagrebački Solisti".¹⁴⁶⁵ Zagreb's jazz musicians also used the 1965 arrival of Buck Clayton and "Big" Joe Turner to Bled Jazz Festival¹⁴⁶⁶ to make a record for a foreign record label which was described as the record of the month by British magazine *Melody Maker*.¹⁴⁶⁷ Vojislav Simić had also used the vicinity of American jazz musicians during their stay in Yugoslavia to make records with them. As Simić told Yugoslav reporters on July 11, 1970, the arrival of Herbie Mann, Clark Boland, Duke Ellington had the role of to "attract[ing] old jazz fans and force those who were listening to classical music to listen [to] jazz." Simić continued in the same interview how he and his orchestra were using "the soloists of these orchestras" to make records "... in order to educate our people about what is newest and best in the music they are occupied with."¹⁴⁶⁸ Two months later, the Croatian newspaper *Večernji list*, noted how, in collaboration with the Press and Cultural Department of the American consulate in Zagreb, a whole group of American jazz musicians such as Stan Getz, Kenny Clarke, Gerry Mulligan, Art Farmer, Big Joe Turner, Jimmy Whitterspoon, Johnny Griffin and the likes were to play in Zagreb with their Yugoslav counterparts. As the same article continued, the promotional avenues planned for this event included recording interviews and making documentaries which would be organized into one show and then offered to foreign radio stations. Furthermore, according to the same article, these musicians were to be recorded for another Yugoslav show and plans were also made for Prohaska's Dance Orchestra of Radio Zagreb to make records with the aforementioned musicians.¹⁴⁶⁹

¹⁴⁶³ N. Hlača, "»Sjećanje na Louisa Satchma Armstronga« Koncert pod pokroviteljstvom »Večernjeg lista«. Uvijek živi Satchmo," *Večernji list*, God XV, no. 3701, 2.VIII. 1971, pp. 10.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 61.

¹⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶⁸ "Jazz in Our Concert Halls," *Feljton* (Belgrade), July 11, 1970, enclosed translation in Belgrade A-332, RG 306 USIA Historical Collection, Entry A1 (1061), box 6, NARA.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Z.F., "Asovi jaza u Zagrebu," *Večernji list*, God. XIV, no. 3431, 10.IX.1970, pp. 11

In return, through such efforts Yugoslav brand ambassadors also secured potential advertising instruments and suppliers for Yugoslav jazz on the European and world scene, in accordance to the main tenet of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy. In his autobiography, Boško Petrović noted how it was Buck Clayton who told Lionel Hampton about him and Hampton then suggested that the two perform on his Belgrade concert.¹⁴⁷⁰ As noted in the April 29, 1971 field message, Hampton performed commercially in Belgrade on March 25, 1971 and his Belgrade's performances were "outstandingly successful", even though the Yugoslav critics demonstrated a "somewhat blasé attitude". Hampton was still, so the same field message continued, "an unqualified success with his audience".¹⁴⁷¹ In the end, the performance of Boško Petrović with Lionel Hampton in Belgrade never materialized as it was stopped, according to Boško Petrović's autobiography, by the PR department of the American Embassy in Belgrade. As Petrović continued in his autobiography, Hampton told him that Petrović's performance with him on stage in Belgrade "seemed like an almost political problem, and my tour, as you know, is sponsored by the American government".¹⁴⁷²

The Yugoslav-American collaborative efforts at jazz diplomacy brought to Yugoslavia a musician who truly epitomized this type of diplomacy and who did much to develop and promote the Yugoslav jazz brand. This musician was John Lewis from Modern Jazz Quartet. Recollections of Croatian jazz musicians such as Boško Petrović, Miljenko Prohaska and Davor Kajfeš all reveal how John Lewis fulfilled the role of the teacher and an advertising instrument for Yugoslavia and its jazz, in accordance to the main tenets of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy and booking policies. In line with one of the principles of Yugoslavia's booking policy to invite to Yugoslavia only those artists from which the Yugoslav artists could learn¹⁴⁷³, the arrival and stay in Yugoslavia of John Lewis was a valuable educational experience for Yugoslav jazz musicians as evident from the recollection of Croatian jazz musicians. As stated by Davor Kajfeš, John Lewis "was an educator with whom we practiced at Boško [Petrović's place] until four or five [o'clock] in the morning, from A, from zero. He took us back to the initial steps. It's

¹⁴⁷⁰ Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 188.

¹⁴⁷¹ Wallace W. Littel, "Lionel Hampton in Belgrade," Field Message from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, no.35, April 29, 1971, Group II Cultural Presentations Program, Series 2. Performing Arts, 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 66, folder 6, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas. On Hampton's performance in Yugoslavia see also William P. Rogers, "Memorandum for the President. Subject: Lionel Hampton in Eastern Europe," enclosed in John Richardson, Jr. to the Secretary, April 7, 1971, "Private Cooperation and the Performing Arts: Lionel Hampton in Eastern Europe - Action Memonradum," Group II CPP, Series 2. Performing Arts 1950-1980, Subseries 1. Performers, box 66, folder 6, CU Historical Collection, Arkansas.

¹⁴⁷² Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 189.

¹⁴⁷³ AJ-559-11-26, "Kulturne veze sa inostranstvom po zemljama za 1957. godinu. Opšti deo", 1.

like when you teach kids to walk. We then realized some things that stayed cemented until today."¹⁴⁷⁴ As Kajfeš further noted in a recent interview, when he listens to the performances of contemporary European jazz musicians, he notices how these musicians don't grasp the basics which he sees as a result of not having a good teacher, that is, a person such as John Lewis who put in his time and effort "to get us on our feet".¹⁴⁷⁵ Another Croatian jazz musician, Miljenko Prohaska, recognized the teaching hours by John Lewis in the apartment of Boško Petrović as a landmark in his career.¹⁴⁷⁶ In accordance to Yugoslavia's cultural diplomatic tenets, the first contribution John Lewis made for the Yugoslav jazz brand was that of an educator.

The second contribution of John Lewis to the Yugoslav jazz brand was a promotional one, as noted by Boško Petrović to be the case with Miljenko Prohaska.¹⁴⁷⁷ On November 26, 1964 *Politika* wrote how Miljenko Prohaska was breaking into the United States thanks to John Lewis of the Modern Jazz Quartet. It was on Bled Jazz Festival, continued *Borba*, that John Lewis selected two Prohaska's works, "Intimacy" and "Concerto No.2" to perform at his New York concert.¹⁴⁷⁸ Indeed, as Prohaska further explained to the Croatian newspaper *Večernji list*, John Lewis also offered collaboration on arrangements.¹⁴⁷⁹ As Miljenko Prohaska told *Večernji list* in 1967, it was thanks to John Lewis that he got an intivation to perform on Monterey Jazz Festival in California. In the same article, Prohaska noted how it was precisely John Lewis who was pushing for more Europeans to perform on this festival. The first Croatian troupe, so continued Miljenko Prohaska, that received the offer of John Lewis to perform at Monterey Jazz Festival had been Boško Petrović's the Zagreb Jazz Quartet. Lewis made this offer, as Prohaska further clarified, two years prior and the tour never materialized. Prohaska's application, so he further stated in the same article, was accepted. In the same article for *Večernji list*, Prohaska noted that he aimed to present himself to the American public through his own arrangements which were to be performed by the orchestra of Don Ellis. As Prohaska continued in the same article, the majority of the selected arrangements for presentation had

¹⁴⁷⁴ Davor Hrvoj. "Davor Kajfeš – Kako sam oduševio Quincyja Jonesa."

¹⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Miljenko Prohaska "Dobili smo »nogu« jer smo svirali jazz," interview by Davor Hrvoj, *Cantus*, no. 179 (March) 2013, 7.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 198-199.

¹⁴⁷⁸ "Composition 'Intimacy' by Miljenko Prohaska in the USA," *Politika*, November 26, 1963 in Harold Engle, "Copies of notes on Yugoslav cultural manifestations in the United States," Transmittal Slip from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, December 4, 1963, RG 306 USIA, Entry UD-WW 205, container 1, NARA.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Z.F., "Miljenko Prohaska: Ponuda Johna Lewisa!" *Večernji list*, God V, no. 1337, 2. XI. 1963, pp.9

their premiere at Bled Jazz Festival.¹⁴⁸⁰ Later on, John Lewis would also secure the performance of Boško Petrović on the same festival.¹⁴⁸¹

John Lewis had also arrived on the Yugoslav jazz scene at a moment, to cite a Croatian critic who wrote about Bled Jazz Festival in *Večernji list* on June 8, 1961, when theoretical discussions were held to "determine the qualitative level, and, if possible, the physiognomy of what we would like to call, or at least affirm in the future, as »Yugoslav jazz«."1482 In this regard, John Lewis also had an indirect impact on the establishment of the Yugoslav jazz brand. Earlier in this subchapter, we identified the folk component as an added touch that contributed to the uniqueness to the Yugoslav jazz brand. According to the recollections of Boško Petrović and Davor Kajfeš, it was John Lewis that nudged them in the direction of experimenting with folk. Petrović never hesitated to admit that his Zagreb Jazz Quartet started as an imitation of The Modern Jazz Quartet¹⁴⁸³, a fact visible to Joachim Berendt who wrote about it in his 1963 *Down Beat* article on the Yugoslav jazz scene.¹⁴⁸⁴ As Boško Petrović wrote in his autobiography, when he presented John Lewis with a piece he arranged under the influence of the music he heard at the Muzički Biennale Zagreb¹⁴⁸⁵, the American jazzier was less than thrilled, claiming it to be similar to something already experimented by American jazzers in the 1940s. As Petrović wrote, John Lewis, a fan of Yugoslav folklore and *sevdah* from Bosnia, nudged him to look in that direction¹⁴⁸⁶, that is, to seek inspiration in their "folklore music, not American blues or bebop."¹⁴⁸⁷ Put differently by Davor Kajfeš:" ... He told us: „Look in your backyard!"¹⁴⁸⁸ This "backyard", according to Petrović and Kajfeš, entailed folklore.

Both John Lewis and Dizzy Gillespie served an additional cultural diplomatic role for the Yugoslav jazz and thus, indirectly, for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand as they served as advertising instruments for the jazz background of that same brand. As seen from previous chapters, one of Yugoslavia's booking policies entailed that foreign musicians perform Yugoslav works abroad. This occurred with Dizzy Gillespie and John Lewis. As Miljenko Prohaska recalled, Dizzy Gillespie performed two of his arrangements "Intima" and "Opsesija"

¹⁴⁸⁰ I.J., "Miljenko Prohaska na američkom jazz-festivalu. Ne jedino priznanje!", *Večernji list*, God. IX, no. 2521, 15.IX. 1967., pp. 7

¹⁴⁸¹ Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 110.

¹⁴⁸² N. Turkalj, "Danas počinje na Bledu drugi festival jazza," *Večernji list*, God. III, no. 595, June 8, 1961, pp. 10

¹⁴⁸³ Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 77-78.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Berendt, "Jazz in Yugoslavia," 21.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Petrović, *Život kao jam session*, 78.

¹⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Davor Hrvoj. "Davor Kajfeš – Kako sam oduševio Quincyja Jonesa."

at the Monterey Jazz Festival. Prohaska further recalled how he needed to make specific adjustments to his arrangements so that Dizzy could perform them as "... he read them in some weird way... He told me to count [measures] to him before so I counted eight measures ahead and gave him the signal and he played such solos that I fainted."¹⁴⁸⁹ Prohaska's arrangements were further performed by [Lewis' orchestra] USA Orchestra and Prohaska also arranged works for them to perform in Carnegie Hall and France with top notch performers.¹⁴⁹⁰ Prohaska was not the only jazz musician from Yugoslavia to have offered his own arrangements to American jazz musicians to perform. Vojislav Simić also offered his compositions to Count Basie when they met in Munich in 1965.¹⁴⁹¹

So what did these efforts that constituted Yugoslavia's jazz diplomacy bring to the Yugoslav jazz musicians and to the Yugoslav state? They brought an accomplishment of at least one goal of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy. To restate from previous chapters, in their annual report for 1960, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries defined the international cultural scene as an area in which they could compete with other countries.¹⁴⁹² To some Yugoslav musicians, to have their works performed by these prominent American jazz musicians brought a specific kind of recognition. Prohaska summarized his feelings on having his arrangements performed by these great musicians with the words: "This is the feeling of equality, knowledge that there are people in the world who consider this to be on such a level so that it can participate equally with the great international artists and that it was not a concession to some taste or an individual."¹⁴⁹³ Expressed differently, such performances by American jazz musicians of their own arrangements brought Yugoslav jazz musicians a sense that they were equal to these musicians.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Hrvoj, "Kad je netko bio nepodoban izbrisali bi ga sa slike,"; Davor Hrvoj, "Miljenko Prohaska: 'Dobili smo »nogu« jer smo svirali jazz," *Cantus*, no. 179 (March) 2013, 7.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Prohaska, "Dobili smo nogu," 7; Mirjana Greblo, "Jugoslavenski jazz festival na Bledu," 348-349.

¹⁴⁹¹ Simić, *Susreti i sećanja*, 134.

¹⁴⁹² See AJ-559-20-41, "Izveštaj Komisije za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom za 1960 godinu," Beograd, februar 1961, 7.

¹⁴⁹³ Hrvoj, "Kad je netko bio nepodoban...,"; See also Davor Hrvoj, "Miljenko Prohaska: Pedeset godina big banda HRT-a," <https://www.jazz.hr/index.php?opt=news?act=mlist&id=1056&lang=hr> (last accessed, September 9, 2023).

CONCLUSION

In 1996 Boško Petrović spoke to the Croatian edition of *Voice of America* about Willis Conover's death. Referring to Willis Conover as a "lighthouse of jazz", Petrović noted Conover's immense importance for all of those who listened to him in Zagreb during the 1950s. He then continued how the two became friends, meeting and greeting at various European festivals. The famous American jazz broadcaster, so Boško Petrović further recalled, even played Petrović's tapes on his show and interviewed him when Petrović visited the United States. As Boško continued, the famed broadcaster visited his hometown (Zagreb) twice "without pay ... to co-lead with me the TV-show *Welcome to the World of Jazz* for our television. A great expert and sincere lover of jazz, he left a lasting impact in the history of jazz ... Willis, I drink to you as we used to clink [glasses] many times in the Capital Hill Bar. Here's to you my dear. And God bless you!"¹⁴⁹⁴

Taking a cue and reiterating the already cited words of historian Jessica Gienow Hecht how music "... can introduce us to an entirely new dimension of what we deem an 'international relation'"¹⁴⁹⁵, these kind words Boško Petrović had for his friend Willis Conover can be interpreted within the context of the topic of this dissertation: "jazz diplomacy" and Yugoslav-American relations. In particular, the main research objective of this dissertation was to analyze the role of jazz between Boško Petrović's homeland, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (from 1963 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Willis Conover's homeland, the United States of America. This dissertation responded to several research gaps in current literature on cultural diplomacy. This literature admits that it still places excessive emphasis on the United States and its Cold War cultural diplomacy and notes the problems of defining cultural diplomacy. At the same time, this literature reveals a lack of studies on Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy on the global and European level. In order to address these gaps, this dissertation applied the "pericentric approach" proposed by scholar Tony Smith (2000), a definition of cultural diplomacy proposed by scholar Maurits Berger (2008) and took up the suggestion of Jessica Gienow-Hecht (2009) and applied the concept of "nation branding" in its analysis of jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States from 1956 to 1974.

¹⁴⁹⁴ "In memoriam: Boško Petrović (1935.-2011.)," January 13, 2011, <https://ba.voanews.com/a/in-memoriam-boško-petrović-1935--2011-113529439/1151272.html>, (last accessed on June 16, 2023)

¹⁴⁹⁵ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Introduction: Sonic History, or Why Music Matters in International History," 2.

This dissertation argues that jazz diplomacy emerged as a component of "brand strategies" used by both Yugoslavia and the United States to preserve the "independent Yugoslavia" brand in the international arena.

Within such a context, the friendship which developed between Willis Conover and Boško Petrović, in addition to the ability of Boško Petrović to visit the United States, had been a result of a specific set of circumstances whose origins can be found in the aftermath of the June 28, 1948 event when Yugoslavia was ousted from the Cominform. While this move by the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin initially left the Yugoslav Communists and the country confused, soon after and in a step-by-step process, this event also started a massive Yugoslav "rebranding" campaign that launched the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international global political market. The first branding steps included "internal" and "external" branding to secure domestic loyalty to the brand and to find external investors for the same brand. Willis Conover's homeland, the United States of America, became one of the biggest investors in this "independent Yugoslavia" brand, an act which secured the first condition for the friendship and collaboration between Willis Conover and Boško Petrović.

In its rebranding efforts, the homeland of Boško Petrović began using cultural diplomacy as one of its branding strategies to raise the awareness of this specific brand and ensure its survival on the global market. Within this strategy, music diplomacy, which included jazz diplomacy, became a branding instrument used by the country for the same purpose. Cultural diplomacy as a branding strategy and music diplomacy as a branding instrument gave Boško Petrović the status of the country's "brand ambassador" while his future friend Willis Conover became a potential advertising instrument for the Yugoslav state. As American officials became aware of the importance Yugoslavs attached to culture and the connection it had with Yugoslav independence, culture emerged as a component of the American "brand strategy" for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand too.

For the friendship between Boško Petrović and Willis Conover to develop, another necessary branding step had been a state-level manifestation of similar "brand visions", strategies and instruments to preserve the "independent Yugoslavia" brand. The brand vision and objective of both Yugoslavia and the United States had been the same: to sustain the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on the international scene. Both countries used the same strategies to pursue this vision and objective: culture and direct contacts between agents involved in the process of

music diplomacy. For the Americans to be able to do so on the Yugoslav soil, the Yugoslav government, when the Soviet Union began its return to Yugoslavia's cultural space in mid-1950s, employed two strategies that acted as the "market forces" on the Yugoslav market: "independence" and "politics of balance". Minus occasional governmental hamperings and interferences, these two forces secured communication and access of Boško Petrović and other Yugoslav jazz musicians to American jazz and American jazz musicians as they allowed the Americans to conduct their cultural and informational programs in Yugoslavia. In addition to granting new roles to Yugoslav and American jazz musicians, this new Yugoslav and American branding strategy assigned USIS (United States Information Service) the role of one of the "brand champions" of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand which USIS acted alongside Yugoslav cultural bodies such as Jugokonzert and the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

As the main objectives and visions of the strategies for the "independent Yugoslavia" brand now made them partners, Yugoslav and American agents accurately assessed the time and the product to be used as one of the branding instruments to sustain the "independent Yugoslavia" brand: jazz diplomacy. The first jazz musician, Dizzy Gillespie, arrived to Yugoslavia in 1956 and jazz diplomacy between Yugoslavia and the United States began. The first phase of this diplomacy was marked by the tours of American jazz musicians to Yugoslavia while in the second phase jazz diplomacy branched out and was marked by a much more active engagement of Yugoslav brand ambassadors who undertook several cultural activities and campaigns that worked in the service of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand on both the Yugoslav and American soil. It was in this second phase that the Yugoslavs tried to present to the Americans the cultural side of their "independent Yugoslavia" brand by, among other instruments, using jazz. With much more modest means and facing obstacles on the American market they could not entirely navigate on their own, the Yugoslavs resorted to a number of strategies in their attempts to secure at least a minimum of presence of Yugoslav cultural products on the American market. One such strategy was to ask the American government for assistance. While the American government provided some assistance to Yugoslav cultural and music diplomacy, jazz products which made it on the American and world market were the result of the work of Yugoslav "brand ambassadors", its jazz musicians and its impresarios and their American counterparts. To a degree, it were these agents that succeeded where the state had failed – they got Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy, and thus the state, the much desired reciprocity and cultural recognition.

In addition to its contributions, which were noted in the introductory section, this dissertation opens a lot of questions for future research to explore. While in its focus on American-Yugoslav jazz diplomacy, this dissertation provided a basic glimpse of how the Yugoslav cultural diplomatic apparatus functioned, a lot more studies are needed to clarify the basics of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy in terms of its objectives, motivations, agents and other elements. The clarification of these basics would allow us to provide a much more detailed response to the questions currently being asked by scholarship on cultural diplomacy and would allow us to bring the study of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy in line with European and world scholarship.

The clarification of the basic elements of Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy would allow for a much easier transition of studies on Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy into the comparative world which, according to scholar Eytan Gilboa, presents a largely unexplored segment of public diplomacy.¹⁴⁹⁶ Simultaneously, the clarification of the basics would allow us to respond in much more detail to the call of historians Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried for expansion in studies on cultural diplomacy to better grasp its basic concepts.¹⁴⁹⁷ Indeed, this dissertation provided other scholars with the first step in this direction as it demonstrated that, even though Yugoslavia and the United States had different social systems, they nonetheless created and established similar cultural diplomatic strategies that were to be used for the same goal: to sustain the independence of Yugoslavia. Additionally, keeping in mind the comparative perspective and following American scholarship which demonstrated the role competition played in the development of American cultural programs¹⁴⁹⁸, studies on Yugoslavia's cultural diplomacy would benefit much from an investigation of the role competition played in the development of Yugoslavia's branding vision, objectives, strategies and instruments. This would allow us to examine each element of the Yugoslav brand to see whether these elements made Yugoslavia unique or were these interpretations of Yugoslav agents presented in this dissertation just wishful thinking on the Yugoslav part to keep the brand going. To provide some examples, as already stated in the introductory section of dissertation, the works of scholars Yoshiomi Saito and Rüdiger Ritter¹⁴⁹⁹ demonstrated how musicians from other countries also considered their folk element an important component of their jazz. The use of

¹⁴⁹⁶ Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 71.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, "The Model of Cultural Diplomacy," 15-16.

¹⁴⁹⁸ See literature suggestion under reference number 76.

¹⁴⁹⁹ Yoshiomi Saito. *The Global Politics of Jazz in the Twentieth Century: Cultural Diplomacy and "American music"* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020); Ritter, "Broadcasting Jazz into the Eastern bloc," 128.

the comparative approach would allow us to investigate the degree to which the addition of the folk component made Yugoslav jazz and its musicians unique. Likewise, in the "brand image" department, scholar Lisa Jakelski¹⁵⁰⁰ demonstrated how Poland also aimed to project the same "connect the East and West" brand image as Yugoslavia. A tempting question to explore is the origin of this image in both states and compare their methods, aims, images and partners to better understand the branding process and to compare the similarities and differences in the branding efforts of these two countries.

Within Yugoslavia, we need to connect this outward manifestation of the "independent Yugoslavia brand" with its inward manifestation which was directed at Yugoslav citizens. This is in line with the writing of scholar Peter Van Ham who noted how politicians engage in both external and internal branding for specific aims.¹⁵⁰¹ In the case of Yugoslavia, we need to clarify in much more detail the role jazz diplomacy had in presenting the "independent Yugoslavia" brand to the domestic customers – the Yugoslav citizens. This means that we need to find more examples of using jazz as a branding instrument within the country's border to perform the same role as it had on the international scene. One such outward manifestation is found in 1968 when the jazz orchestra of Vojislav Simić performed at the World Festival of Jazz Music held in West Berlin from November 6 to November 9 when his soloists included Canadian trumpet player Maynard Ferguson and Simeon Shterev, a Bulgarian flutist.¹⁵⁰² This was a literal musical representation of one of the instances of the "independent Yugoslavia" brand.

¹⁵⁰⁰ Jakelski, Lisa. "Pushing Boundaries: Mobility at the Warsaw Autumn International Festival of Contemporary Music," *East European Politics and Societies* 29, No. 2 (2015), 189-211.

¹⁵⁰¹ Ham, "Branding Territory," 253.

¹⁵⁰² AJ-559-112-245, "Umetničke turneje Jazz-orkestra RTB," 6.

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RESUME

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