

The European Union and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

Vujnović, Luka

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UNIVERSITY OF ZAGREB
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

MASTER'S THESIS

The European Union and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

Luka Vujnović

Mentor: dr. sc. Martin Previšić

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Za moje djedove

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List of Abbreviations

ARBiH – Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/*Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*

CAP – Common Agricultural Programme

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CoE – Council of Europe

COMECON – Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

COMINFORM - Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties

CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation of Europe

EC – European Communities

ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community

EDC – European Defence Community

EEC – European Economic Community

EIB – European Investment Bank

EPC – European Political Community

EU – European Union

EUAM – European Union Administration of Mostar

EURATOM – European Atomic Energy Community

HV – Croatian Army/*Hrvatska Vojska*

HVO – Croatian Defence Council/*Hrvatsko vijeće obrane*

IGO – Intergovernmental Organization

IPTF - International Police Task Force

JNA – Yugoslav National Army/Jugoslavenska narodna armija

KPJ – Communist Party of Yugoslavia/*Komunistička partija Jugoslavije*

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SAM – Sanctions Assistance Missions

SAMCOMM – Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications

TO – Territorial Defence/*Teritorijalna Obrana*

UN – United Nations

UNPROFOR – United Nations Protections Force

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

UPFM – Unified Police Force Mostar

WEU – Western European Union

WU – Western Union

Introduction

Just another academic text analyzing the fall of Yugoslavia and the repercussions can at first glance seem as a boring add-on to a never-ending literature corpus surrounding this historical event. However, I chose a different, novel path. As time goes by, I am becoming more and more aware of how the fall of Yugoslavia shaped the future I now share with my contemporaries. There is not a tool capable of measuring how many individuals were changed, how many destinies were rerouted, and how many families affected. During schooling in Croatia, we are taught who were the actors, the perpetrators, the heroes, the villains, the marauders. Only during my studies of history did I understand how grand a role the dissolution of what was somewhere back in time called Yugoslavia, played in everybody's life. A year before enrolling into university, I witnessed my country enter the European Union, a foreign policy goal that took 10 years to complete. Knowing it had a history of its own, it made me wonder what was this organization doing while Yugoslavia was desolating? After 6 years of studying both history and international relations, I have dedicated a master's thesis to answer this question.

Countless pages from multiple points of view have been written about this episode of history, which is not to surprise, as it certainly is one of the most important events in Europe in the last 50 years. However, the 50 or so pages laying ahead of you are not going to say what happened all over again. As someone who truly admires the craft of the historian, I find rewriting history pointless. Therefore, I did my best to be as novel as possible. This master's thesis may have a generic name, but the content is far from generic. Also, the subject of this master's thesis is the European project, and how it advanced, and most importantly, how it reacted *vis-à-vis* the Yugoslavian crisis. In Part I, I argued that the Tito-Stalin split made Yugoslavia's geopolitical position unique, and that this paved the way for establishing relations with Europe. While simultaneously analyzing paths of European integrations in both aspects of security and economy, I argue that economic integration was not sufficient enough to help Yugoslavia, whereas integrations in security were far less developed and played a role in constructing the *European approach*. Part two investigates the evolution of the European narrative towards Yugoslavia through the lens of the Western European Union. In order to conduct this part of the research, I travelled to Villa Salviati in Florence, Italy,

where the Historical Archives of the European Union are located. I accessed the Western European Union General Assembly fond, in which I found documents that served as the primary sources for inspecting both the evolution of European security, and the response to the Yugoslav crisis. Part III is a case study focused on the European Union Administration of the City of Mostar, and how it was conducted, and why it is considered unsuccessful. Despite this being the first peacekeeping mission conducted by the EU, a surprisingly small amount of academic work has been dedicated to this mission. I approach the analysis with a combined methodology of discourse analysis and process tracing, while underpinning it with constructivist and institutionalist theories of explaining ethnic hostility. This gives the mission a fresh view from the academic perspective.

Speaking from a point of theory, this thesis does not have a general theoretical underpinning. For instance, in Part I both realism and liberalism could be understood as the theoretical underpinning, as multiple situations where sovereign states both cooperated and disagreed to cooperate due to national interests. Parts II & III are theoretically more of constructivist nature, as it is more than visible how Europe's actions and interests were prone to decision, rather than being a given, whereas Part III uses constructivist theory of ethnic hostility to further explain why the EUAM mission is deemed unsuccessful.

All in all, the following pages are my contribution to the debate among scholars focused on addressing the issue of foreign involvement, especially the European one, in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The goal is to add to this topic, and the interpretation of sources and literature accompanied with innovative methodology and theory are my gateway to entering this seemingly never-ending debate.

A Methodological Insight

As was hinted in the introduction, the *end goal* of this thesis is identifying, analyzing and making sense of the European response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Due to the overall broadness of the topic, one can think of addressing the issue through multiple *histories*, such as political history, social history, history of ideas etc.

The dominant outlook of this thesis falls within the scope of political history, or to be more precise, finds itself in the realms of diplomatic history. This branch of historical writing, sometimes known as international history, started its emergence as a discipline of history in the 19th century, primarily developed by historian Leopold von Ranke. As Ranke envisioned, the writing of history should be based primarily on archival documents, and should be non-judgemental.¹ Documents that are commonly used in the practice of writing diplomatic history include treaties between states, government documents, analysis of trade and war etc. Of course, at the beginnings of diplomatic history, concepts such as peace keeping and international interventions were unknown. Due to these concepts being a focal point of this thesis, it is important to give further explanation. The theoretical core of diplomatic history is the analysis of relations between at least two states, or in this case, a supra-state and a state. The analysis in the following chapters follows multiple aspects of the relations between the European Union and Yugoslavia, such as the economical, social, political and even military. The analysis is best embedded in diplomatic history – despite traces of other historical branches – such as economic and especially social history.

With the dominant frame being diplomatic history, a few words dedicated to the materials used in crafting this text seem to be necessary. As Ranke's *instruction* of the usage of documents in diplomatic history seems to be a postulate, this thesis generally obeys the cited. The aforementioned three chapters of the following analysis certainly differ in their structure, do not use the same methodology, however all follow the combining of primary (archival) and secondary (scholarly texts & other) sources for establishing a historical context and answering the main research question of each chapter.

¹ Matsuomoto, Saho. 1999. "Diplomatic History/International Relations" in *The Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, ed. Kelly Boyd. 1st edition. 314 – 316. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, p. 314

The first chapter is a general overview of how the relations between Europe and Yugoslavia were conducted – just as Ranke’s postulates envision, multiple treaties were used as primary sources to trace and understand the political developments within, and between the two actors. Secondary literature in the form of scholarly texts further helped establish this context and also provided an insight into the evolution of these relations. Thus, content analysis of the archival material is the dominant methodological driver of chapter I.

The second chapter heavily relies on archival material obtained at the Historical Archives of the European Union. Insight and analysis of these documents and their content helped in constructing a chapter focused on explaining the role of the Western European Union in the Yugoslav conflict. From a methodological standpoint, the second chapter heavily sticks to the Rankeian postulate of using archival material for analyzing diplomatic history.

The final chapter somewhat differs in the methodology, however uses primary sources, again archival material as its main base. The methodology used is a case study approach on the policing of Mostar during the imminent post-war period. However, while primary sources helped in establishing the context, they were used together with other sources such as speeches, historical narratives and similar to identify the existence of a discourse, which was later used in the methodological tool called *process-tracing* in order to answer the chapter’s research question.

To conclude, this thesis belongs to the textual corpus of diplomatic history, due to already stated reasons and the structure of the thesis itself. However, methodologically speaking, multiple tools are utilized in order to obtain the best possible answer from each chapter’s respective research question.

Part I – Castles Made of Sand

The complex relations between the European Community and Yugoslavia have been extensively analyzed from the geopolitical context of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, the relations between the two at first glance seem to have only been active after the fall of the Berlin wall and major geopolitical changes. Needless to say, the unique geopolitical context of Yugoslavia established after the split from Stalin and the COMINFROM era made the country different from other socialist, Eastern Bloc republics. Therefore, it is safe to argue that ties between Yugoslav foreign policy and the European Community indeed did exist and were active prior to the disintegration of the former, albeit being concentrated more on economic than security issues. Despite the latter being the focus of this thesis, giving a more thorough overview of the relations between the two is a necessary step in explaining the European Community's, and later European Union's actions in Yugoslavia. Therefore, this chapter is tasked with exploring and paving the way towards understanding the bilateral relation – starting with the very beginnings and going towards the end.

See My Way – Yugoslavia between the West and East in the Post-war Period

Following the end of World War II, the state known as Yugoslavia before 1941 was taken over by the Communist Party after 4 years of heavy battles and bloodshed. From a political point of view, the country was of socialist nature and its socio-economic principles would mark the country as an Eastern Bloc member. In the period between 1945 and 1948, the country, similar to other countries liberated by the Soviet Red Army, was subjected to the process of Stalinization. In other words, the everyday life of the populace would be saturated by cultural, political, economical elements from the Soviet Union, such as street re-naming, five-year plans, the cult of personality, centralization, dictatorship of the proletariat.²

The *harmony* lasted until 1948, when Stalin and the Soviet Union expelled Yugoslavia from the COMINFROM, publicly announcing the split. Many factors led to this – Yugoslav

² Banac, Ivo. 1988. "With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformists Splits in Yugoslav Communism" Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, p. 17

involvement in the Greek Civil War, the Bled Agreement of 1947 and the Albanian question were only some of the situations where rifts between the Yugoslavs and Soviets surfaced.³ Needless to say, the expulsion from the COMINFORM led to the isolation of Yugoslavia, whose economy was still deeply suffering from the consequences of World War II. Furthermore, just like other Eastern Bloc members, Yugoslavia had refused any financial aid envisioned by the United States' Marshall Plan, thus making it harder to invest and revamp infrastructure.⁴ Because of the unique situation, *keeping Tito afloat* became the main foreign policy objective of the West, primarily influenced by the United States and the United Kingdom.⁵ Aid from multiple Western countries (Primarily the US, UK, and France) was given to Yugoslavia, starting in 1949 and lasting up until 1955. Due to the three countries giving most of the aid, the project was named the *tripartite aid*. The policy of *keeping Tito afloat*, or in other words, the Western subsidizing of Yugoslavia's everyday life became a staple in the West-Yugoslavia relations and would last up until the death of Stalin and the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia's decision to juxtapose itself between East and West through the Non-Aligned Movement.

However, I find it extremely important to explain the importance of the economic situation, and furthermore argue that Yugoslavia's opening to Western capital forged firstly a relation of dependency towards the West and later proved to be the first step in a complex relationship between the West and Yugoslavia. I have already written that up to 1948, Yugoslavia was a Soviet satellite state and that the country was under a wave of Stalinization. As did most Marxist states throughout history, economic five-year plans were introduced in order to boost economies and catalyze industrialization. The 1947-1951 five-year plan was conducted to prioritize industrial development in a rather agricultural state that suffered grandiose losses in World War II. To illustrate, Tony Judt presented statistics for Yugoslav losses during the Second World War – 25% of vineyards, 50% of all livestock, 60% of roads, 75% of ploughs and railroad bridges, 20% of all housing, a third of its industrial wealth and

³ Ibid, p. 36 - 37

⁴ Holt, Stephen, Ken Stapleton. 1971. "Yugoslavia and the European Community 1958 – 70" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* (10/1): 47 – 57, p. 47

⁵ Zaccaria, Benedetto. 2016. *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe 1968 – 1980*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 27

10% of the country's populace had perished.⁶ Despite the five-year plan aiming to recover the country, the plan proved to be too ambitious – as scholar Ann Lane argues, modeling five-year plans on the Soviet-type platform proved to be an impossible task in the Yugoslav circumstances. First of all, prioritizing heavy industry in these circumstances was anything but possible, whereas the Soviet Union was able to conduct this due to itself being an enormous, mineral-rich country. Just by referring to Judt's statistics and the fact that Yugoslavia lost a third of its anyways limited industrial wealth during World War II helps envision the fact that the five-year plan was an overambitious maneuver. Furthermore, the young Marxist state of Yugoslavia had an enormous but inefficient bureaucracy, which undermined the efficiency of carrying out the five-year plan.⁷

The previous paragraphs were a build-up to explain firstly Yugoslavia's unique political situation, frequently characterized as the *middle path*, and how a combination of both external policy elements (the rift with Stalin) and failed domestic policies (five-year plan) forced Yugoslavia's policy creators to temporarily abandon the Titoist ideology as the foreign policy guide and embrace *realpolitik*. Despite the main foreign policy postulate of Titoism being that Yugoslavia remain independent as possible, the isolation after the split with Stalin prompted the Yugoslav government to approach the West for financial aid, with Edvard Kardelj himself travelling to Washington in order to bargain economic and military aid.⁸ Despite McCarthyism being a present current of thought within the United States Congress, the strategical importance of the West having a foothold in a communist country, along with the breakout of the Korean war helped pave the way for economic and military aid from the west.⁹ As Ann Lane notes, the pressure Tito faced from Stalin and the Eastern Bloc left him with either the choice to lose power or negotiate with the West. Yugoslavia chose the latter path, welcoming western aid. However, this would prove to be of crucial importance for the eventual economic collapse, as the flowing aid from the West averted

⁶ Judt, Tony. 2005. *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin Press, p. 17

⁷ Lane, Ann. 2004. *Yugoslavia – When Ideals Collide*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 112

⁸ Ibid, p. 109

⁹ Ibid.

Yugoslavia from the much-needed economic reforms of its system, later proving to play a crucial role in the country's collapse.¹⁰

First Contacts and Trade Agreements

After the immediate post-war period, European states had established regional economic blocks, namely the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), a free trade zone for the named materials between Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries, while the eastern countries had pooled into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, 1949). This section of the text is tasked with explaining Yugoslavia's stance towards the ECSC and later ECC.

To understand why the ECSC emerged, analyzing the political context is crucial. After becoming a sovereign state in 1949, West Germany was *de facto* isolated from the rest of the continent – its only link being itself in the frame of the Marshall Plan and under Allied occupation. After the division of Germany, United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson urged the French government to address the West German question in accordance to European integration.¹¹ Drawn up by French foreign minister Robert Schuman, the plan envisioned the creation of a single market for coal and steel, with a supranational institution overseeing all trade. At first glance a somewhat odd move by the French government, approaching Germany for a trade union can be explained as a possible method of control – the fear of Germany resurging after the expiration of the Marshall plan could be a possible explanation.¹² It was unprecedented for countries to abandon sovereign elements in Europe until then. Also, worth noting is that the liberalization of the market and the cooperation and willingness of states allowed the supranational ECSC High Authority not to communicate only with governments, but with all interested parties. Furthermore, as Tony Judt points out, the liberalization and the countries' willingness to abandon their economic sovereignty could be found in the fact that all members had seen their sovereignty recently ignored, and that there was none left to lose. Moreover, the Christian Democrat philosophy of social

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 114

¹¹ Judt, Tony. 2005. *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin Press, p. 155

¹² Vernon, Raymond. 1953. "The Schuman Plan: Sovereign Powers of the European Coal and Steel Community" *The American Journal of International Law* (47/2): 183 – 202, p. 185

cohesion was present in all states, thus imagining a supranational High Authority much easier.¹³

Branching out to other European countries was one of the ECSC main tasks as well. A 1953 general report indicates newly established contacts with a Swedish delegation, whereas the governments of Norway, Switzerland, and Denmark had also moved towards establishing permanent communication with the High Authority.¹⁴ As Branimir Radeljić points out, Yugoslavia could have been among the *target* countries, but is nowhere addressed directly.¹⁵

Despite initial success, the European integration processes had stalled by the mid-1950s. Due to opposition from certain member states, the proposed European Political Community (EPC), which would be assembled from the existing ECSC and the proposed European Defense Federation, never came to life (European defence integration will be discussed in further detail). Therefore, the integration processes were slowed down. However, under the leadership of Paul Henri Spaak, the ECSC framework was used to establish the European Economic Community (EEC) in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This understood the creation of a common market in manufactured goods accompanied by a Common Agricultural Policy, and the EURATOM – a common market for nuclear materials, namely uranium 233. The executive branch of the EEC was embodied in the EEC Commission, a nine-member body whose first president was Walter Hallerstein. Despite the EEC's organizational framework being similar to that of the ECSC High Authority, it had less power than the high authority and was financially dependent on the member states. Furthermore, the ECSC, EEC, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) shared the same assembly, whose name was changed to the European Parliament, whereas legal disputes were to be resolved in the Court of Justice.¹⁶

¹³ Judd, Tony. 2005. *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin Press, p. 158

¹⁴ The High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, *General Report of the High Authority on the Activities of the European Community* (August 1952 to April 1953), p. 25

¹⁵ Radeljić, Branimir. 2012. *Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy*. London: IB Tauris, p. 45 - 46

¹⁶ Dedman, Martin. 2009. *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945 – 2008*. London: Routledge, p. 83

As already noted, the tripartite aid of the United States, United Kingdom, and France had been *keeping Tito afloat*, financing the country's day to day needs, however the aid was not being invested in capital projects.¹⁷ Due to the death of Stalin and the somewhat normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, Yugoslavia had closed a series of agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia for a total loan's value of \$464 million. However, the political connotations of the loans were made clear at the 1957 conference of communist parties in Moscow, when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ – *Komunistička partija Jugoslavije*) made it clear that they would not rejoin the Eastern Bloc. The formation of regional trading blocks embodied in the EEC and the COMECON had become a problem for the ideological path of neutrality the Yugoslav government was striving towards. As Branislav Radeljić notes, the establishment of these regional trading blocs, particularly the EEC, slowed down the pro-European politics of Yugoslavia.¹⁸ Due to tariffs being cut down in the EEC, trade with Western Europe became more challenging to conduct. The creation of the blocs and how to deal with slumps in export became the main task of the Yugoslavian foreign policy. As one of the leading economists of Yugoslavia, Janez Stanovnik pointed out a potential solution to the mounting trade deficit – negotiating bilateral trade agreements with thirds countries.¹⁹ This would prove to be one of the pillars of Yugoslavia's foreign policy up to the disintegration – the Non-Aligned movement.

Despite shifting foreign policy towards the Non-Aligned Movement, Western Europe was still a large factor in Yugoslavian foreign policy. Already in 1962, the Yugoslav leadership had approached the EEC with tendencies to balance the negative trade surplus. Most EEC members, keen to help Yugoslavia in fostering its position *vis-à-vis* the Eastern Bloc, were open to establishing and nurturing a relationship with Yugoslavia, albeit not yet on an official basis.²⁰

¹⁷ Holt, Stephen, Ken Stapleton. 1971. "Yugoslavia and the European Community 1958 – 70" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* (10/1): 47 – 57, p. 47

¹⁸ Radeljić, Branimir. 2012. *Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy*. London: IB Tauris, p. 47

¹⁹ Holt, Stephen, Ken Stapleton. 1971. "Yugoslavia and the European Community 1958 – 70" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* (10/1): 47 – 57, p. 48

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 55

Furthermore, the decade of the 1960s saw the Yugoslavian trade deficit towards the EEC rapidly growing. In 1968, the EEC Council and Yugoslavia had embarked on negotiating a trade deal, with Yugoslavia being most interested in removing, or at least loosening levies on its agricultural exports. It was also in the EEC's interest to negotiate a deal with Yugoslavia due to newly emerged political constellations. The year of 1968 marked the enactment of the Brezhnev doctrine, with the Soviet Union invading Czechoslovakia. Due to this, EEC members were worried that the Soviet Union would continue to return *runaways* under its sphere of influence, namely Yugoslavia and Romania.²¹ Furthermore, the EEC was well aware that for Yugoslavia to retain its political stability, economic stability had to be present as well. All member states were also in favor to modify the Common Agricultural Programme, in order to help Yugoslavia economically with its agricultural exports, with the exception of France – which was not prepared to change CAP regulations and jeopardize its agricultural industry.²² Despite pressure from both Bonn and Rome, each conceding to certain changes in the CAP, the French government gave in only after a change of government. The election of Georges Pompidou gave the French foreign policy a different output, abandoning the Gaullist resentment towards the EEC.²³ The trade negotiations were concluded in 1970, making Yugoslavia the first socialist country to negotiate a deal with the EEC. Also, worth noting is that the deal foresaw both parties grant the other party status of the most favoured nation.²⁴

It is possible to argue that the 1970 trade agreement was indeed an embodiment of political nature, not only economic as it had been up until then. As Artisien and Holt argue, there are three potential political reasons to explain the active diplomatic dialogues between Brussels and Belgrade. Firstly, Yugoslavia's role in the Non-Aligned Movement was a driving force in its foreign policy, demanding for a creation of a new economic order that would aid poorer nations – this would greatly improve the EEC image within the Third World. Furthermore, the geographical position, being an intersection between market-oriented and state-based economies, along with being politically juxtaposed between two opposing blocs

²¹ Zaccaria, Benedetto. 2016. *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe 1968 – 1980*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 30

²² Ibid, p. 38

²³ Ibid, p. 46

²⁴ Artisien, Patrick, Stephen Holt. 1980. "Yugoslavia and the EEC in the 1970s" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 18/4: 355 – 369, p. 355

were reasons that made Yugoslavia an important element within the EEC.²⁵ Moreover, further explanations are potentially found in Zaccaria's text. Due to its juxtaposition and COMECON membership, the EEC saw Yugoslavia as a possible path towards establishing economic contact with Soviet satellite states. It is thus safe to argue that the EEC envisioned, that signing a trade deal with Yugoslavia would not only help the country economically, but by conceding to its trade demands, the EEC would shape a positive image in the Third World and potentially come closer with dialogue to the Eastern European countries, cementing the claim that the EEC *Yugoslavian policy* was much more than establishing trade relations with an *out-of-bloc* country.²⁶

Renewing and possibly expanding the trade deal eventually came to the daily agenda again in 1973. Due to the oncoming policy of the EEC to strengthen its ties with the Mediterranean countries, it was in the interest of Yugoslavia to negotiate a new trade deal, in order to prevent tariffs on its agricultural goods export. The new trade deal was agreed upon in 1973, being effective until 1978. The 1973 agreement can be viewed as a step forward in the relations between the two, and as a continuation of the *Yugoslav policy* whose foundation was struck in the 1970 agreement. The new agreement had an evolutive clause, meaning that the two parties would be able to develop economic cooperation as a complementary element to trade in areas of mutual interest. The clause was exercised by the parties in form of two subcommittees, one of agricultural and the second of industrial nature, which were tasked with exploring and dealing with the growing trade deficit Yugoslavia had developed with the EEC.²⁷ Also worth noting is that the EEC-Yugoslavia joint Committee (at a ministerial level) had its first meeting in 1975.²⁸

Despite being the focal point of the agreement, renegotiating trade was not the only benefit Yugoslavia had obtained. The nature of the 1973 agreement made it possible for Yugoslavia to seek loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB), in order to obtain capital for financing projects of *common European interest* on normal market terms. This marked

²⁵ Ibid, p. 357

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ UNSPECIFIED (1976) [Yugoslavia and the European Community. Information \[External Relations\] 138/76](#). [EU Commission - Brochure]

²⁸ Ibid

the first time a country with a centrally planned economy had obtained access to the EIB, with the first loan being 30 million EUR.^{29,30}

European Defence Projects

Up until this point, the thesis text was aimed towards providing an overview of relations between the EEC/EC and Yugoslavia, focusing on Yugoslavia's unique political situation, and mainly analyzing the relations *vis-à-vis* economics. However, the main topic of this thesis is of a security nature, therefore an overview of European defence projects up until the 1980s will be provided, in order for the reader to obtain a better understanding of security ideas in Europe. At first glance, the sharp turn from economical to security issues may seem somewhat inconsistent, however, providing an overview of joint security ventures between European states helps answer a grounded sub question of this chapter – How integrated was Europe before the Yugoslavian disintegration? The prior text explored the establishment of a well functioning economic association of sovereign states, however, as will be presented, endeavours towards a functional security union proved to be more challenging. Furthermore, since chapter 2 of this thesis is focused on the Western European Union (and its endeavours in Yugoslavia), presenting the reader with European security is certainly welcomed, if not a must.

The beginning of European security alliances can be traced to 1947 and the infamous Dunkirk agreement between France and the United Kingdom. Taken into fact that NATO was not yet in existence, the two parties agreed *to collaborate in measures of mutual assistance in the event of any renewal of German aggression, while considering most desirable the conclusion of a treaty between all the Powers having responsibility for action in relation to Germany with the object of preventing Germany from becoming again a menace to peace...*³¹.

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ 1 EUR = 50 Belgian Francs = 1.25 \$

³¹ *Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and France*. On 4 March 1947, in Dunkirk, France and the United Kingdom sign a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance against a possible German attack. Available at www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_of_alliance_and_mutual_assistance_between_the_united_kingdom_and_france_dunkirk_4_march_1947-en-1fb9f4b5-64e2-4337-bc78-db7e1978de09.html

Following the Prague coup in 1948, France and the United Kingdom decided to advance their alliance, this time signing an agreement with Benelux countries. The agreement, known as the Brussels Treaty was signed in March of 1948, obliging all signees to a mutual defence pact in case of external aggression. The pact was not, this time, aimed exclusively contra Germany, but towards any aggression. Furthermore, the Treaty foresaw the establishment of the *Western Union* (WU) an intergovernmental organization whose goal was to expand cooperation fields such as military, economic, social, and cultural spheres.³² However, soon after establishment, the pact lost most its authority and efficiency – and its economic tasks were *taken over* by the ECSC, whereas the military aspects were *taken over* by NATO. For instance, a document released by the ECSC, the intergovernmental organization (IGO) that managed to create a customs union before the WU, states that the WU and its cooperation with American and Canadian military personnel paved the way towards establishing NATO.³³

Further attempts in establishing a European security project were not fruitful. For instance, the proposed establishment of the European Political Community, which would be consisted of the ECSC and the proposed European Defence Community (EDC), failed, due to French opposition. The envisioned EPC was in fact of federalist, supranationalist nature, and this was visible in both the existing ECSC and the proposed nature of the EDC. This is visible in the second chapter of the proposed treaty, most obviously in Article II, whose goal was to establish the European Defence Forces. For instance, Article 9 envisioned that member states were not allowed to recruit or maintain national armed forces, except for situations such as operations out of state members territory, missions in Berlin and Vienna, etc.³⁴ Furthermore, the Commissariat was to be the main organ of the Community, and all decisions were to be binding, whereas when envisioning the constituting of the Council, Article 38 of the Treaty declared the Council as a body whose task was, among others, to make the EDC one of the elements of an ultimate European federal or confederal structure.³⁵

³² CVCE. 2016. *Western Union*, p. 2. Available at cvce.eu/obj/western_union-en-c253ffec-d8c4-4886-bd78-c1fd8e218902.html

³³ ECSC Secretariat. 1954. Aperçu historique sur l'établissement du Pacte de l'Union Occidentale

³⁴ *European Defence Community Treaty*. 1954. Title I - Fundamental Principles, Chapter II, Article 9 & 10

³⁵ *Ibid*, Title II – The Institutions of the Community, Chapter II, Article 38

The political environment in France proved to be too much of a barrier for the ratification of the Treaty, as the Gaullist movement interpreted the visions of federalism as a direct threat to French sovereignty. The French prime minister at the time, Pierre Mendés France, had hoped to propose changes to the agreement. The proposals included delaying supranational decision-making in the EDC for eight years by granting the Council of Ministers a power of veto; discarding Article 38 with its commitment to a European Political Community; limiting military integration to those troops stationed in Germany; allowing members to secede from the EDC if the Americans or British withdrew from NATO, or if Germany were reunited; lifting the existing EDC restrictions on the development and use of atomic energy for military purposes; eliminating clauses in the 1952 Treaty that would have curtailed sales of military equipment by French suppliers.³⁶ Other members were not willing to agree to France's proposals, and the vote ultimately failed in the French Parliament, effectively putting an end to one of the first attempts to federalize Europe.

Nevertheless, in 1954 the countries of the almost-defunct Western Union signed a revised version of the Brussels treaty, with the addition of new members – West Germany and Italy, renaming the organization to Western European Union (WEU). This organization, despite security being its main concern, was different than the envisioned EDC. Firstly, there are no signs of federalism in the document, no envisioned separate military body nor restriction of national military, along with an obvious link to NATO.³⁷ Due to the existence of other bodies, such as the Council of Europe (CoE), NATO etc., the revised Brussels Treaty did establish the WEU, however, the organization would not be an effective European integration until the late 1980s and 1990s, which is discussed in chapter II.

The aim of this sub-chapter was to show that Europe was not integrating equally in all envisioned aspects. As earlier paragraphs have shown, much less resistance was given to economic integration than to security/military integration. This attributes to Richard

³⁶ Ruane, Kevin. 2000. *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950–55*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 93

³⁷ For example, see Western European Union. 1954. *Brussels Treaty - As amended by the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954*, Article IV

Griffiths thought, that the EPC failure just underlines that there is no single logic towards European integration.³⁸

Nevertheless, with western European security issues being dealt with by NATO, the security integration process was far behind as opposed to the economic integration. This is evident, as seen by the analysis in the chapter. Not only was the economic integration in the EEC/EC *up and running*, the organization was signing bilateral treaties with other countries, whereas any security/military integration was not only at a stalemate, but hard if not impossible to undertake due to the prevailing defence philosophy of Euro-Atlanticism. Therefore, it is possible to argue that entering the decade of the 1980s, crucial in the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the European Communities integration (consisted of the ESCS, EURATOM & the EEC) was lacking security mechanisms to challenge the dissolution more effectively, and was not until the 1990s that non-economic plans were presented in attempt to avert the crisis. However before discussing the revival of European security and its handling of the Yugoslav crisis, it is important to present EC Yugoslavia relations in the crucial decade of the 1980s.

The 1980s – Integrating Europe and Disintegrating Yugoslavia

Up until now, it has been established that Europe was effectively economically integrating, while simultaneously developing a *Yugoslavian* policy embodied in balancing the trade deficit, and opening institutions such as the EIB for the Yugoslavs. At the same time, security integration was not as highly developed, as the East-West division of the Cold War had Washington and Moscow *de facto* coordinating all security and military policies.

In 1980, the EEC and Yugoslavia signed another trade agreement, hoping to facilitate Yugoslavian trade and further expand economic links. In the preamble, the EEC classified Yugoslavia as a *non aligned, European, Mediterranean State and a member of the group of 77 developing countries*.³⁹ As Branislav Radeljić notes, the second part of the Agreement was

³⁸ Griffiths, Richard. 1994. "Europe's First Constitution: The European Political Community, 1952 – 1954" in *The Construction of Europe – Essays in Honour of Emile Noël*, eds. Werner Abelhauser & Stephen Martins. 19 – 41. Dordrecht: Springer Science, p. 36

³⁹ *Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1980*, preamble

aimed towards political cooperation between the two; something that was envisioned in the 1968 trading talks, but never vitalized.⁴⁰ This time, the Agreement foresaw the cooperation between the European Parliament and the Yugoslav Federal Assembly:

*The Contracting Parties have agreed to contribute to the continuation of the cooperation and contacts established between the European Parliament and the representatives of the Assembly of the SFRY.*⁴¹

Furthermore, I have presented the existence of a *Yugoslavian policy* within the EEC. However, the policy was fundamentally economic, while other aspects were mostly covered bilaterally between member states and Yugoslavia. By adding this political element to a new cooperation agreement, along with the 1981 EEC enlargement (Greece), the EEC had prioritized political cooperation with Yugoslavia, stressing that economical cooperation will be achieved along with the latter.⁴² However, the 1980s turned out to be a decade of political turmoil in Yugoslavia, so is it possible to argue that the EEC's economic-oriented Yugoslav policy was not enough, and that developing political relations came too late.

Despite the proposed and called-on political cooperation, the early and mid-1980s were nevertheless characterized by economic cooperation, with the EIB again crediting Yugoslavia in infrastructure projects, such as the trans-Yugoslav highway.⁴³ Moreover, Yugoslavia benefited from the enlargement process of the EEC, as enlargement promised more funds from the EIB.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the 1980s marked a turbulent period in Yugoslavia. The year of 1980 marked the death of Josip Broz, the country's leader since its establishment, leaving open a power vacuum, which did not help in solving the failing economy. A commission led by economist Sergej Kraigher established that the economic situation was devastating, but did

⁴⁰ Radeljić, Branimir. 2012. *Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy*. London: IB Tauris, p. 74

⁴¹ *Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1980*, Joint declaration concerning cooperation and contacts between the European Parliament and the representatives of the Assembly of the SFRY

⁴² Radeljić, Branimir. 2012. *Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy*. London: IB Tauris, p. 74

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 78

⁴⁴ *Ibid*

not suggest complete measures due to the aforementioned power vacuum.⁴⁵ Furthermore, in 1981 violent demonstrations had started in the autonomous Yugoslav region of Kosovo, with the majority ethnic Albanians seeking full equality, culminating in 9 dead and hundreds of injured.⁴⁶ Moreover, Tito's death had visibly ruptured the countries paradigm of fraternity and unity among the nations (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*), and nationalist movements were growing stronger. In an attempt to salvage the economy, marked by a 2700% inflation rate, the federal prime minister Ante Marković imposed a *shock therapy* in accordance to IMF proposals – wages were frozen, subsidies stopped, along with strict monitoring of expenditures. With the Yugoslav system being unable to withhold conflicts among its republics, all political negotiations were at deadlock, making the economic transition into a free market unlikely, if not impossible.⁴⁷ During the crucial moments of late 1989 and 1990, the federal prime minister Marković was the only alternative to Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević willing to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. As Josip Glaurdić notes, with proper backing from the West, the federal government of Yugoslavia may have been able to neutralize Milošević, however, aid came to late and was only proposed in May of 1991, with the country already in a state of decay.⁴⁸

As Yugoslavia was disintegrating, Europe was, quite on the contrary, further integrating. As has been mentioned, the European security project had been foreshadowed by NATO, and the WEU was driven to minimal meaning, up until 1984. WEU members adopted the Rome Declaration in 1984, revitalizing the European security project. In the context of this work, the WEU would prove to be one of the mechanisms the EEC/EU would use in order to deal with the Yugoslavian crisis. The Rome Declaration, signed 30 years after the Modified Brussels Treaty, could be viewed as a fresh start for European security – as the foreign and defence ministers of the countries had agreed to cooperate in order to strengthen peace and security, encourage the progressive integration of Europe, and

⁴⁵ Glaurdić, Josip. 2011. *The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*. New Haven CT: Yale University Press, p. 14

⁴⁶ Calic, Marie Janine. 2019. *A History of Yugoslavia*. Translated by Dona Geyer. West Lafayette IN: Purdue University Press, p. 258

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 284

⁴⁸ Glaurdić, Josip. 2011. *The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*. New Haven CT: Yale University Press, p. 14

furthermore synchronize their views on matters such as arms controls, defence questions, and crucially, the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe.⁴⁹

To conclude this sub-chapter, it is important to stress several main points. Due to its uniqueness in a geopolitical and Cold War context, the state of Yugoslavia was neither in the Western nor Eastern Bloc, opting to undergo a third path out of mere necessity. Its split from the Soviet Bloc in 1948 reshaped its existing relations with the western countries, and keeping Tito afloat became a western foreign policy paradigm in the beginning of the relations. At the same time, the process of European integration had started, with the economic counterpart being the most successful, whereas the security/defence aspect was not as fruitful, due to questions of sovereign rights and the existence of NATO. Establishing contact with Yugoslavia was just a matter of time, due to reasons that were discussed in the chapter. The trade negotiations between the EEC and Yugoslavia which culminated in trade deals in 1970 and 1973 are clear indicators that there was interest from both parties to collaborate. However, and in accordance to the following chapters of this thesis, the Yugoslavia policy was of a mere economic nature. As was stressed, the agreements, on paper, did foresee the development of political and social contacts, but these remained on paper. The decade of the 1980s proved to be the turning point – in an environment where communist governments were collapsing, and the Soviet military threat fading, how important was it for Yugoslavia to survive as a balancing point between the east and west? I would argue that after the collapse of the Berlin wall, Yugoslavia's strategic value as a balancing factor between east and west faded.

Furthermore, as will be seen, the EEC's Yugoslav policy was not strong enough to prevent the country from disintegrating, and key financial assistance was provided too late. As effective mechanisms in the fields of politics and social questions were non-existent between the two, I would argue that this chapter made it clear that the Yugoslav policy conducted by the EEC was simply not *equipped* to deal with the 1980s inner Yugoslavian situation. As noted, sovereign member states of the EEC were bilaterally negotiating with Yugoslavia on issues of political and social nature, therefore, it could be possible to argue

⁴⁹ *Rome Declaration of 1984*, see articles 2 & 8

that Europe was not integrated enough to face the disintegration of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, despite Europe's defence identity becoming stronger in the 1980s, the situation in Yugoslavia would prove to be an extremely complex task to deal with security-wise, which will be analyzed in the next two chapters.

Part II – All Along the Watchtower

As was discussed in the previous part, the Yugoslav crisis, fueled by a deteriorating economic situation accompanied with rising nationalism in the Federation and deadlocks in any political decision-making. The EEC, on route towards further integration into the European Union, was keen to react and stop fighting in Yugoslavia. The WEU, serving as Europe's defence mechanism, was one of the key actors in the period of 1991. Furthermore, as the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 had envisioned, the WEU would become the sole actor of exercising security tasks framed within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Maastricht Treaty. In the newly established political context of the 1990s, Europe was keen to prove that it could deal with security issues on its soil independently of the United States, prompting Luxembourgish minister of foreign affairs to state:

*“This is the hour of Europe—not the hour of the Americans... If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.”*⁵⁰

The question to which this chapter seeks an answer to could be summed up in the following: *What was the European approach to the Yugoslav conflict?* Furthermore, the main question is accompanied with a necessary sub-question: *How did relations among European powers affect joint action?* The European approach will be analyzed primarily through the lens of the WEU, Europe's security mechanism. In order to do so, the bulk of this chapter will draw from the WEU General Assembly documents, which are physically located at the Historical Archives of the European Union at Villa Salviati in Florence, Italy. Examining these documents gives the reader a thorough view on how Europe was to solve the crisis, whereas existing scholarly literature, primarily the book *The Hour of Europe* by Josip Glaurdić proves to be useful in analyzing disagreements between European states on how to handle the crisis.

1990 – Reunification of Germany and First WEU Operations

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 symbolically announced the collapse of communist regimes over Europe, however, on the diplomatic stage, this meant that the path towards the reunification of Germany was left with no obstacles. Taking place in October of 1990, the

⁵⁰ Glaurdić, Josip. 2011. *The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*. New Haven CT: Yale University Press, p. 1

reunified German state was considered as the continuation of West Germany, therefore continuing its membership in all IGOs. With the reunification, Germany's interest towards superpower military protection vanished, which at the same time played a role in prioritizing regional stability through European integration mechanisms.⁵¹ Therefore, German security policy was focused on strengthening links between European member states through various organizations, including the WEU. For instance, both German prime minister Helmut Kohl and French president François Mitterand were, generally speaking, in favor of coordinating security through European instruments.⁵²

At the same time, the reunification of Germany had a deep effect on the diplomatic stage of Western Europe. This meant that the post 1949 state system of Western Europe had entered a new phase, and with a new state (re)emerging, the possibility of the rise of security dilemmas and unilateralism was a potential outcome.⁵³ However, further integration in security matters put a stop to this, as Germany's Europe-oriented foreign policy along with the pillarization of security in the Maastricht Agreement in theory nullified the chance of unilateral approaches to resolving security issues.

Needless to say, the role of reunified Germany and its leadership would prove to be of significant importance upon attempts to effectively coordinate joint action in accordance to the Yugoslav crisis.

However, before analyzing the WEU *European approach* in response to the Yugoslav crisis, it is important to point out another important historical event of 1990, the Gulf War, and Europe's involvement.

Upon the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Atlantic Alliance, spearheaded by the United States, undertook Operation Desert Storm, which resulted in the defeat of Iraqi forces and the subsequent liberation of Kuwait. Despite NATO being the leading force, for the first time, the WEU was participating. However, before covering the participation itself, the Gulf

⁵¹ Hussen, Mossa. 2012. "The Role of Germany in European Security After Reunification" *European Scientific Journal* (8/18): 142 – 163, p. 153

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Winn, Neil, Christopher Lord. 2001. *EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation State – Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 39 - 40

War and WEU preparations already give insight into how sovereign states and their foreign policy interests were still a barrier in planning efficient action. As Marc Ronald DeVore points out, during an August 1990 meeting, WEU members were in disagreement of where and how the WEU should carry out tasks in the operation: France, at the time at the head of the WEU presidency, was striving towards autonomous WEU operating, whereas countries such as Belgium and Germany opted for answering to the United Nations, while the UK and others saw subordination to a US led coalition as the right path.⁵⁴ The Naval aspects, which the WEU was coordinating, were actions such as minesweeping and enforcing the embargo on Iraq.

Despite all WEU members participation, along with non-WEU members Portugal, Greece and Denmark participating as well, the General Assembly of the WEU had discussed what steps could be taken from its experience in the Gulf. For instance, the WEU stressed that it was in need for more heavily equipped, mobile and flexible forces, that Europe does not possess sufficient land, sea or air forces to conduct such an operation, and most importantly asked the question, what should be the future role of WEU forces?⁵⁵ In the Gulf context, the WEU role remained of logistical nature along with minesweeping, however, worth noting is that the under article 23 of the document, the WEU Assembly was keen to establish *some sort of planning arrangements for present and future WEU action, the more prepared and capable we will be in "expecting the unexpected"*.⁵⁶

1990 proved to a complex year in terms of European integration. The reunification of Germany was an internal challenge for Europe as a new powerhouse was now in the organization. However, the pro-integration foreign policy of Germany and its willingness not to force multilateralism played an important role in the formation of the European Union. On the other hand, the Gulf Crisis, particularly the 1990 – 1991 marked the first coordinated WEU military action. It displayed weaknesses in coordination due to different foreign policy currents of member states, and also provided lessons to the General assembly who acknowledged that more effective planning of WEU action was necessary.

⁵⁴ DeVore, Marc Ronald. 2009. "A Convenient Framework: The Western European Union in the Persian Gulf, 1987 – 1988 and 1990-1991" *European Security* (18/2): 227 – 243, p. 237

⁵⁵ HAEU-WEU-1268

⁵⁶ Ibid

Due to these events taking place, crucial action of Europe was nowhere to be seen in the beginnings of the Yugoslav crisis. The Yugoslav League of Communists dissolved in 1990, making the organization incapable of enacting any kind of policy that would help secure some kind of salvation of Yugoslavian territorial integrity, whose market was defunct and cleavages among nations so deep that a civil war was more than a possibility.⁵⁷ In the same year, democratic elections took place in the country's republics, ultimately proving that the Communists had lost their grasp over power in Slovenia and Croatia, with national movements growing stronger and ultimately taking power.

With the European Community finally acknowledging that major change would take place in the Yugoslavian political constellation, changes were proposed, albeit still insisting on the unity of the country, if nothing, territory-wise.⁵⁸ One of the proposed plans was to transform Yugoslavia into a confederacy, however, a political deadlock between Croatia's president Franjo Tuđman on the one side, seeking almost full sovereignty within the confederation, as opposed to the view of Slobodan Milošević, ultimately failed.⁵⁹

Furthermore, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which was politically speaking an enormous factor in Yugoslavia, was more than aware about the disagreements and inefficiency of Europe, learning from the Gulf episode and the Soviet invasion of Lithuania in 1990. However, there were differences among these *cases* – the EEC and Yugoslavia had a history of economic cooperation, signed agreements and were trade partners. Despite this, Jacques Delors reported to the European Parliament that in the autumn of 1991, when the country was already in the process of disintegration, that Europe had 3 *weapons* at its disposal: public opinion, the threat of recognizing the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia, and economic sanctions.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Glaurdić, Josip. 2011. *The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*. New Haven CT: Yale University Press, p. 78

⁵⁸ Ibid, 123

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Salmon, Trevor. 1992. "Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990 – 1992." *International Affairs* (68/2): 233 – 253, p. 248

The European Approach of 1991

With the dissolution process turning violent in 1991, the WEU had expressed its fears over the development of the situation. The republics of Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed independence on June 25th 1991, however agreeing to a moratorium postponing the decision until October 7th the same year.⁶¹ A ceasefire signed in Brijuni on the 7th of July was subsequently broken by the JNA, whose task was to act as a buffer zone between Croat forces and rebelled Serbs in Croatia, with the JNA being dominated by the Serbian element. Other ceasefires were agreed upon, and one of the first *motions* of the *European approach* was the Hague Peace Conference chaired by foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, Lord Carrington. The task was restoring peace and paving the way towards a peaceful resolution. The WEU had already opted against any kind of military intervention, as the Permanent Council had decided not to send troops and to monitor further developments.⁶² Therefore, upon the opening of the Hague Peace Conference on September 1991, military action was still not seen as viable option.

However, German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher made it clear that if no deal was to be made among the participants, Germany would unilaterally recognize Croatia and Slovenia⁶³, deciding this time to go against a joint European approach. Simultaneously, the Netherlands presidency had proposed sending a WEU interposition force due to the situation sliding into decay and to protect European observers. The proposal had strong backing from France and Italy, however members such as the United Kingdom and Portugal opposed the WEU sending units to interposition; instead preferring to send a United Nations unit while also arguing that recognizing the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia would have no effect. Similar to the Gulf Crisis, the WEU members were once again opposed on how to react. With foreign policy ideals clashing, the ceasefire Lord Carrington managed to negotiate on the 17th of September was already broken the next day.⁶⁴

⁶¹ HAEU-WEU-1293

⁶² HAEU-WEU-1294

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid

With the interposition force being officially rejected on September 19th, the WEU iterated the following:

*"...the use of force is unacceptable, any change of frontier imposed by force is unacceptable, the rights of minorities must be respected, account must be taken of all interest and legitimate aspirations"*⁶⁵

The WEU again considered the option of the possible deployment of troops, however these actions were to be approved first by the Conference on Security and Cooperation of Europe (CSCE) and the UN. At the same time, the UN Security Council had adopted a resolution imposing a weapons embargo on the supply of arms to Yugoslavia, whereas the sending of emergency force was not accepted, due to possible interference of a member state.

According to document HAEU-WEU-1294, the WEU Ad Hoc Group developed 4 possible scenarios in accordance to the possible response of the WEU in the ongoing crisis:

1. Logistic underpinning of with the mission to support the work of EEC monitors, which would require the presence of 2000 to 3000 personnel
2. Escort and protection by armed military forces composed of 5000 to 6000 persons tasked with safeguarding the monitors
3. A peace-keeping force composed of 4500 to 5000 military personnel along with 3000 to 5000 added personnel to monitor the cease fire
4. A peace-keeping force of 20000 military personnel along with 10000 additional people to monitor the cease fire⁶⁶

The ad hoc scenarios were another indicator of different members of the WEU had different views on the organization's role. For instance, on October 10th, 8 days after the scenarios had been presented, France endorsed the fourth, while discarding the first and second as ineffective. On the other hand, the United Kingdom was in favor of the first, whereas the Netherlands preferred the third option and ruled out the fourth. Germany, due to its constitution preventing it from sending troops abroad, was in favor of either.

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ Ibid

Just as was proven in the Gulf, there was an ongoing rift among WEU members in regards to where they saw the organization in the post-Cold War era. As is indicated in the previous text, a common disagreement on the WEU's role is visible between London and Paris. Sonia Lucarelli provides possible explanations to this in the Yugoslavian context: Firstly, the United Kingdom was opposed to setting a precedent in which a European IGO could undertake a peacekeeping mission due to the deteriorating situation on its own soil, namely Northern Ireland. Furthermore, it is also possible to argue that London still preferred NATO interventions, due to the United Kingdom's pivotal role in Euro-Atlanticism, which foresaw a special relationship between the UK and the USA and the UK's superior status in the IGO as opposed to its status in the WEU.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the Berlin-Paris axis was keen to conduct security issues without the involvement of NATO, due to higher degrees of autonomy in decision making.

Due to the UN unanimously adopting resolution 713 on September 25th 1991, it was clear that European instruments had failed to deal with the crisis solely. The famous *Hour of Europe* had not lasted an hour, but merely a few minutes. Despite the UN involvement, the WEU was still present in resolving the tasks. Another matter which could be argued in matters to why the WEU did not manage to solve the crisis, could be that the Maastricht Treaty was not yet in power, and that legal matters played a role. Nevertheless, the next few paragraphs will be tasked with explaining the consequences of the Yugoslav failure, along with its effects *vis-à-vis* the Maastricht agreement for the WEU.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the WEU – Lessons learned?

Parallely with the ongoing conflict in Yugoslavia, the EC member states were in the final stages of moving from a community type organization to a political Union. In the midst of the Yugoslavian conflict, the members of the EC agreed upon the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), also known as the Maastricht Treaty. All EEC members had gathered in the town of Maastricht and agreed upon strengthening the ties among them. The newly adopted

⁶⁷ Lucarelli, Sonia. 2000. "Western Europe and the Break Up of Yugoslavia – A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation" (Ph.D. diss European University Institute) p. 169

Treaty had proposed creating a union based on 3 strands, or pillars – the first one being the economic one, the second pillar being of security and defence whereas the third pillar envisioned cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. The second pillar is of interest, as the WEU had been tasked as the organization responsible for conducting the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In other words, the WEU would be carrying out tasks as well as elaborating and implementing decisions of security nature and actions of the European Union (EU).⁶⁸

The growing role of the WEU can also be seen within its position vis-à-vis NATO, where the WEU countries had agreed upon further developing the *European identity* within the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, excerpts from the Maastricht Agreement hint that member states were not happy with the status of European security and defence matters: For instance, the Declaration on the Western European Union within the Treaty's text called for *a need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and greater European responsibility on defence matters*.⁶⁹ As was presented in the previous paragraphs, the Gulf War and Yugoslavia were the only coordinated WEU operations that took place since the organization's revival in the 1980s; with the Gulf showing cracks in the framework of decision making, whereas in the early stages of the Yugoslavian crisis member states were not able to agree on particular points of joint action, clearly indicating the absence of a coherent defence identity which eventually led to the UN getting involved and the *Hour of Europe* become a mere dream.

The Maastricht Treaty also hinted in how to synchronize the relationship between the EU and the WEU, especially in the operational aspect of the WEU. The Maastricht agreement foresaw changes in the operational role, with *strengthening by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means*.⁷⁰ What this meant was an overhaul of the existing structures of the WEU, as the treaty envisioned the formation of the WEU planning cell, closer cooperation military issues, along with the linking of military units to the WEU.⁷¹

⁶⁸ *Treaty on European Union of 1992*, Article J.4.2.

⁶⁹ *Treaty on European Union of 1992*, *Declaration on Western European Union*

⁷⁰ *Treaty on European Union of 1992*, *Declaration on Western European Union*

⁷¹ *Ibid*

At this point, and due to the Maastricht Treaty, which foresaw higher degrees of cooperation between the WEU, EU and NATO, the WEU headquarters was moved to Brussels, in order to start the implementation of Maastricht. Furthermore, the organization also started exploring possibilities to fulfill its new operational role. The member states declared themselves ready to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for WEU missions, whereas simultaneously exploring possible conditions for deployment, which, among other, involved humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks along with tasks of combat forces in crisis management, and finally, peace making.⁷² The envisioned planning cell of the WEU was to be established on October 1st 1992 with Major General Caltabiano of the Italian Air Force as its first director. The planning cell was given the following tasks:

- Preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under the WEU
- Preparing recommendations for the necessary command
- Keeping an update list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to the WEU for specific operations⁷³

With the Maastricht Treaty paving the way towards a new security order in Europe, the WEU, the WEU Council adopted the Petersberg Declaration, a document of extreme importance that framed the WEU in the new security order. The first part of the Declaration explained the role of the WEU, the newly risen judicial questions due to Denmark's refusal to ratify the Maastricht Treaty along with relations with NATO. However, the novelty of the Petersberg Declaration lay in the fact that the maintenance of peace in Europe was achieved through peace of other states as a condition, marking a clear disembarkation from the Cold War security philosophy characterized by opposing blocs, containment and similar strategies.⁷⁴ Another *innovation* was the legal framework for conducting missions under the scope of the WEU on the territories of non member states. These concepts were *put to test* in Yugoslavia and other countries, as the Petersberg Declaration served as the legal basis of six *out of area* operations – the demining mission in Croatia, Sharp Guard at the Adriatic Sea, the

⁷² HAEU-WEU-1322

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Madej, Małgorzata. 2013. "The Course and Meaning of the Petersberg Operations by the Western European Union" *Historia i Polityka* (9/16): 59 – 70, p. 62 - 63

Danube customs operation, the crisis management operation in Albania (MAPE), the surveillance and security missions in Kosovo, along with the policing mission in Mostar, whose failure is the topic of the final part of the thesis.⁷⁵

In addition to exercising the Maastricht goals, the tasks in the Petersberg Declaration, independently of the Maastricht ones, envisioned further conditions of deployment for WEU troops – such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of deploying combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.⁷⁶ With the new framework operable, the WEU Council organized the London Conference, taking place on August 26th and 27th 1992, the first concrete action taken since the Hague conference.⁷⁷ Furthermore, foreign and defence ministers of the WEU endorsed the contributions the WEU had made towards achieving peace in Yugoslavia, and talked about further tasks. For instance, for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, WEU members were willing to contribute in means of military, logistics, finance and others. In accordance to heavy weapon supervision, the WEU welcomed the decision that all heavy weaponry in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be subject to international supervision, and were willing to conduct supervision missions in co-coordination with CSCE and the UN. Finally, the WEU expressed its willingness to continue enforcing UNSC resolutions 713 and 757, along with providing assistance in operations on the Danube river.⁷⁸

It was at this point known that the European response to the situation in Yugoslavia had changed dramatically. With the war out of control, the European Union and its defence mechanism, the WEU had to concentrate on coordinating missions with other organizations, especially the UN and the CSCE. The co-coordinating of missions with the other organizations was certainly not the *brightest hour* of Europe, but nevertheless kept the WEU involved in the Yugoslav crisis. For instance, by late 1992, 3649 ships were monitored under WEU operations in the Adriatic, of which 71 suspected violations were reported.⁷⁹ However, according to document HAEU-WEU-1344, during the London Conference it was reported

⁷⁵ Ibid, 63.

⁷⁶ *The Petersberg Declaration 1992*, Part II Article 4

⁷⁷ HAEU-WEU-1327

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ HAEU-WEU-1345

that neither WEU or NATO vessels had to legal means to stop and search vessels in the Adriatic sea, thus making the embargo harder to conduct, despite the WEU and NATO vessels having access to air support.⁸⁰ The WEU Assembly thus concluded that arms smuggling was still active, due to the activity of multiple armed forces on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia in 1991.⁸¹ Furthermore, the WEU concluded that no control of arms was taking place on the land, therefore making it harder to supervise and exercise the UNSC embargo. Furthermore, at the end of the London Conference, the WEU Council had drawn up a list of possible forces ready to deploy by country:

- Belgium: 100 men and 24 tanks
- France: 1100 men from all services, including tanks and helicopters
- Germany: medical and logistic support (1000 tons of equipment)
- Italy: 1300 men from all services; helicopters and a medical unit
- Luxembourg: a financial contribution
- Netherlands: 60 trucks, 500 tons of equipment and 200 men
- Portugal: medical personnel and means of transport
- Spain: an armored unit of 300 to 400 men
- United Kingdom: 1800 men from all services, including an armored battalion

These units, in accordance with the Petersberg tasks, were only to intervene in means of humanitarian convoy protection, and only if these convoys were to be organized, and furthermore, without the possibility to occupy regions through which the convoys would pass (the document precises regions between the Dalmatian coast and Sarajevo), but only escort them.⁸²

With the Petersberg Declaration finally providing a legal basis for WEU operations, it is safe to argue that late 1992 marked a different, but more coherent approach to the Yugoslavian situation – albeit with a less ambitious, but more realistic approach than in 1991, in accordance to legal possibilities. With the Petersberg Declaration as the legal

⁸⁰ HAEU-WEU-1344

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² HAEU-WEU-1342

framework, the WEU did not conduct any military missions of grand proportions, but rather sticking to the Tasks, took part in solving the crisis in different ways.

In accordance with supervising and exercising the arms embargo bestowed upon Serbia and Montenegro, the WEU was coordinating missions in both the Adriatic and the Danube river. In 1993, the WEU signed a Memorandum of understanding with the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to help in policing the Danube. Furthermore, the WEU expressed willingness to examine possible military action coordinated with other organizations in order to prevent conflicts from *spilling over* to Albania and Kosovo.⁸³

The WEU was focused on policing the Danube river, concentrating on issues such as providing support to Romania. For instance, WEU representatives visited Romania in late 1992, concluding that despite Romania's best intentions on enforcing the embargo, the country lacked resources and equipment to fully conduct the embargo, with the foreign minister of Romania, Adrian Nastase, also pointing out that the embargo caused a considerable cost to his country.⁸⁴ Furthermore, possible breaches of the embargo were being reported on the behest of Greek ships, which were suspected of shipping oil to the Belgrade regime; however no connection with the Greek Government, whose membership in the WEU at the time was under parliamentary ratification, was established. The Greek port of Thessaloniki was clogged with 50000 tons of goods prohibited for export. Greece's willingness to support the embargo in spite of important trade routes crossing Yugoslavia was not compensated up until then. Ironically, Denmark, at that time the holder of the EC presidency and a vocal critic of Greece, recorded a rise in its trade of Serbia.⁸⁵

The Danube borderline between Romania and Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) was frequently being used as a transport route despite the blockade. For instance, ships navigating under the Yugoslav flag had violated the embargo on multiple occasions. In certain situations, false manifestos were provided to WEU authorities, refusal to submit to the controls of Romanian authorities, the use of flags of other states and the refusal to stop ships and present documents and cargo for control. Despite cases still being solved by

⁸³ HAEU-WEU-1367

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Ibid

Romania, ships under the Yugoslav flag were still breaching the embargo: For instance, on January 18th 1993, the boat *Bihać* turned around when navigating towards its port of origin, linking up with the tug boat *Kumanovo* and six barges loaded with oil products, which were not allowed to be transported under the embargo. On the 23rd of January, 3 convoys flying the Yugoslav flag were spotted transporting oil products, leaded by vessels *Orašac*, *Velebit* and *Kaimakalan*, departing from the port of Reni in the Ukraine. Despite warnings and orders from the Romanian authorities, the convoy refused to stop and continued towards the Yugoslav territory. Two days later, the *Kumanovo* tugboat was seen travelling with twelve loaded barges towards Yugoslav territory, without presenting documents.⁸⁶

In response to this, the WEU assisted in creating the so-called *Sanctions Assistance Missions* (SAM) in the neighbouring countries. The SAMs were coordinated by the *Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications* (SAMCOMM) headquartered in Brussels. The main goal of the SAMs was to overcome difficulties encountered in enforcing the embargo, in situations such as monitoring and inspecting traffic on the Danube, overseeing export from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia, and forged cargo manifests.⁸⁷ The WEU provided help to countries not able to enforce the embargo: at the request from Romania, the WEU provided navigation radio systems, naval radio telephones, electromegaphones, speed patrol boats, computers etc. Furthermore, the WEU council also sent police troops to aid Romania and Bulgaria enforce the embargo.⁸⁸ The police troops were to be consisted of some 250 – 300 police and customs officers, deployed on speed boats. France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain envisaged sending contingents, with Germany proposing 50 members of the German Frontier Force, France around 20 Gendarmes and Italy 80 from the customs police.

The WEU measures had indeed shown effect, as UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said while visiting the region: “*Now we have an empty river, before it would have been crowded. The operation seems to be working*”⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Ibid

Policing the Danube on the Hungarian side proved to be a larger task for the WEU – The Hungarian government called for the WEU contingents to be unarmed, not use force, subject to Hungarian command and operate under the Hungarian flag. At the same time, the Hungarian Government requested security guarantees from the WEU in case of a Serbian riposte.⁹⁰

The measures of the WEU/CSCE established SAMs had contributed to the fall of smuggling on the Danube, and establishing important relations with the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

Priorities and Results

The WEU had evolved into the main tool of European security, but one can surely ask: At what price? In document HAEU-WEU-1342, the explanatory memorandum give insight into the complex relations between the role of the WEU in Yugoslavia, the crisis itself and the Maastricht treaty:

“...The Yugoslav affair had a twofold effect since, during the summer of 1991 in particular, it brought to light serious disagreements among the Twelve about the nature of what they could do to keep peace in the region, but, at the same time, it led those countries to speed up their effort to consolidate political Europe and gave the testing ground for the implementation of a European policy in which WEU had a place alongside the joint external policy...”⁹¹

At the same time, the documents reveal how the Maastricht process was tightly linked with the Yugoslav crisis. For instance, in a report to the WEU assembly conducted by Luxembourgish rapporteur Charles Goerens, it is possible to see how important the Yugoslav crisis was vis-à-vis the Maastricht treatment, as the rapporteur states that it *should be underlined that any undertaking that did not have the consent of all member states of the Community would have significantly weakened Europe just when it was negotiating the Maastricht Treaty and the proceeding to ratify it.*⁹² He continues by stating that a military

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ HAEU-WEU-1342

⁹² Ibid

engagement that would have divided Europe would have had serious consequences, not only for Europe but for Yugoslavia as well. What Goerens also points to is the fact that the WEU was successfully conducting missions in cooperation with other organizations and their frameworks, and stressed the WEU's success in containing the crisis within Yugoslav borders, not letting it spread to other countries.⁹³

Goerens' report, when put into context with everything written in this part of the thesis, seems to give new perspectives, but at the same time make one think, was Yugoslavia sacrificed in order to remove any barriers from the further integration of Europe? I have already established that foreign policies of sovereign states were indeed unsynchronized in preventing the conflict. Furthermore, the hour of Europe was diminished from grand security plans to customs officers policing the Danube. Moreover, Yugoslavia was a common topic in the Maastricht negotiations – as Goerens notices, the states opposing the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty had used Yugoslavia as an example of a European failure, whereas those interested in further integrating Europe saw Yugoslavia as an opportunity to exercise new integration models.⁹⁴

All in all, this chapter was devoted towards answering *what was the European approach to the Yugoslav crisis* accompanied with the sub-question *How did relations among European powers affect joint action?* The WEU Assembly archive was the primary material consulted, and based upon it, it is possible to argue that the European approach changed during time. *The Hour of Europe*, in other words, the European Community taking over and solving the crisis effectively was already abandoned in 1991. Different foreign policy goals of Europe's power houses, namely France and the United Kingdom were a setback in coordinating joint action, due to different preferences in approaching the situation. After the September 1991 and the involvement of the UN, the EC was elevated to the EU, and the WEU was given authority and a legal underpinning in conducting security action. With the Petersberg Tasks adopted as the legal basis for WEU action, the European approach changed radically and no longer were talks about military intervention present like at the Brijuni meeting, but rather assisting and exercising the Petersberg tasks while cooperating with

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Ibid

other organizations. These missions would prove to be the main way the WEU participated in the crisis. With these missions in mind, the next part of this thesis will discuss the failure of the European Union Administration of Mostar and the WEU police contingent within it.

Part III – Crosstown Traffic

In accordance to what was written earlier, this chapter provides a case study approach to the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM). Despite this being the first peacekeeping operation conducted under the CFSP, not much has been written about it. The small corpus of existing scholarly literature provides surface explanations to why the mission failed, and focus more on the evolution of European foreign policy and organization. My goal is to focus on the police aspect of the mission, and investigate why it failed. What differentiates my view from others, is the fact that I present a brief history of Mostar from 1992 up until the 1994 Washington Agreement, whereas at the same time addressing documents from the WEU General Assembly found in order to further draw conclusions. As will be seen, I seek the answer to why the EU's intervention is deemed as an unsuccessful endeavour, by introducing theories of ethnic relations, presenting a chronological order of events, and by analyzing a proposed discourse of mistrust between the Bosniaks and Croats.

However, before analyzing and discussing, introducing the EUAM and its goals is of importance for the reader to understand the general context of the time. Therefore, I provide a brief overview of the Mostar during the war, accompanied with a general overview of the EUAM mission goals.

Mostar from 1992 to 1994

Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Mostar, a city in central Herzegovina, was known as a culturally diverse city with inhabitants of Croat, Muslim and Serbian heritage. Furthermore, the city was known for the Ottoman bridge over the Neretva river, the old town neighbourhood and the surrounding area. With Yugoslavia in dissolution and its people bound for war, Mostar would prove to be a harsh battleground in the upcoming years. Despite this thesis not being oriented towards military history, a brief overview will be given.

In 1992, the JNA had a strong presence in the Neretva valley, especially in Mostar and the neighbouring city of Čapljina, with strong support from Serbs from the area.⁹⁵ The Croats and some Bosniaks of Mostar (3443 under arms), were organized in 9 battalions within the Croatian Defence Council (*Hrvatsko vijeće obrane - HVO*) and an independent Bosniak

⁹⁵ Marijan, Davor. 2016. *Domovinski rat*. Zagreb: Despot Ininitus, p. 216

battalion.⁹⁶ Subsequently, the HVO took over the command of defending the city, with first skirmishes dating on April 3rd 1992, when a petrol truck near the military base Sjeverni Logor exploded.⁹⁷ With tremendous pressure from the Serbian side, the Croat forces had retreated from the left bank of the Neretva river. With the military base in Čapljina being overtaken by Croat forces on April 17th 1992, Croatian forces in the region were able to push back, and by mid-May were present near the left bank of the Neretva river in Mostar.⁹⁸

With the Croatian Army (HV – Hrvatska vojska) keen to stabilize its rear in accordance to the southern battlefield, operation Jackal (*Čagalj*) was planned and conducted in June of 1992 (sometimes also known as Operation Dawns of June – *Lipanjске zore*). With the goal of the operation being supporting Croatian troops in securing the left bank of the Neretva river, part of the operations also foresaw capturing parts of Mostar under occupation by Serb forces. The operation started in the morning of June 11th 1992, with artillery fire and further combat, the task being ensuring a corridor for crossing the Neretva river to the left bank.⁹⁹ Within 5 days, the city was liberated, and within one month, the new battleline was stabilized. By the end of the month, the Serb forces had been driven out of city, taking up battle positions on the hills surrounding Mostar.

Mostar was not spared from fighting during the Bosniak – Croat war in Bosnia & Herzegovina, quite the contrary – its strategic position in Neretva valley only made sure intense fighting took place in the summer of 1993. During 1992, many hostilities became visible in the relations between the two parties. For instance, before the formation of the ARBiH, the HVO requested an establishment of joint command with the Territorial Defense (TO – *Teritorijalna Obrana*), the ARBiH's predecessor, but due to hesitance from the Bosniak side the matter was never discussed. Further efforts for joint command would also fail due to Bosniak obstruction.¹⁰⁰ With fighting escalating after the fall of Jajce in late 1992, the fighting in Mostar would break out on April 19th 1993, with skirmishes between the ARBiH

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 216 - 217

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 223

¹⁰⁰ Shrader, Charles. 2003. *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia – A Military History*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, p. 66

and the HVO in the old city centre.¹⁰¹ With the fighting calming down after a cease fire agreement 4 days later, it continued on May 9th. By June 1993, the HVO took over the entire part of the city on the right bank of the Neretva river, with the exception of a few streets near the old bridge and the historical city centre. The Washington Agreement put a halt to the conflict, and laid the ground for establishing the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, which would later play a large role in the Dayton Peace Agreements.

EUAM

As was noted in the second chapter, the CFSP and the rehaul of European security done in the Maastricht Agreement paved the way for multiple operations to be conducted by the European Union. One of them was the EUAM, whose functioning and overview can be seen in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The task of the mission was, briefly, was creating conditions to unite the city of Mostar after consecutive years of war and bloodshed.¹⁰² The operation was conducted under the CFSP framework, thus the participants being both the EU and the WEU. Under article 10 section **d**, part of the operation was creating a unified police force, which at the moment of the EUAM inauguration was non-existent (the police force was disintegrated after the Bosniak-Croat war with each ethnicity having their own police).¹⁰³ This task was conducted by 181 policemen deployed by the WEU, known as the UPFM (United Police Force Mostar) whose task was to expunge the existence of two police forces (east and west, Bosniak and Croat) and to unite them. The EUAM mandate formally started after UNPROFOR demilitarized the city, upon both parties agreed to the Memorandum of Understanding, and officially started when EUAM administrator Hans Koschnik, former mayor of Bremen, arrived in Mostar on July 23rd 1994.¹⁰⁴ The envisioned timespan of the EUAM was set at 2 years, after which

Other tasks which were conducted in order to bring the city back to a functioning state were communal services, such as cleaning rubbish, connecting the city with low voltage

¹⁰¹ Marijan, Davor. 2016. *Domovinski rat*. Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, p. 280

¹⁰² Official Journal of the European Commission (39/1). 1996. p. C287/4, Article 9

¹⁰³ Ibid, Article 10

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, Article 48

and high voltage electrical cables, re-establishing water supply, urban reconstruction and similar services.¹⁰⁵

However, even the officials conducting the mission had acknowledged that the EUAM structure was of a complex nature, and *not entirely designed on functional lines*.¹⁰⁶ Despite this being explained through the lenses of the Refugee Advisor and Telecommunications Advisor of the EUAM, the complexity and the dysfunctionality projected itself to other parts of the operation as well, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

All in all, the EUAM mission was the first conducted under the CFSP policy of the Maastricht Agreement, with both the EU and WEU as participants. The mission can be viewed as an umbrella concept, with multiple tasks in different areas to be conducted. However, not all areas will be covered, as the policing aspect is the main focus.

Conclusions of the Academic Community

In general, scholars are in concurrence that the goals of the EUAM were overambitious. For instance, Annika Björkdahl claims that in the long term, the peacekeeping aspect of the EUAM failed, justifying this by underlining the existence of a complex legal situation.¹⁰⁷ She also notes that the EUAM was in clear opposition to the Dayton Agreement – the former envisioning multi-ethnic areas, whereas the Dayton Agreement was agreed upon clear ethnic division of the country.

On the other hand, Carsten Stahn, explains the failure of the EUAM in a different fashion – claiming complex European governance frameworks which were not suitable for this set of circumstances. Elements such as the principle of subsidiarity, mechanisms of consultation and accountability that gave the mission a more *European approach* are some of the cited reasons explaining the overall failure.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, Articles 18 - 20

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, Article 50

¹⁰⁷ Björkdahl, Annika. 2012. "The EU Administration of Mostar. Implications for the EU's Evolving Peacebuilding Approach" *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies* (4/1): 2 – 17, p.14

¹⁰⁸ Stahn, Carsten. 2008. *The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 301 – 302

Another interpretation of why the mission did not succeed in the long term is offered by scholar Jörg Monar. He emphasizes the lack of effective planning in the initial phase of the mission – sending an Advance party to the field did not turn out successful, alongside with the discontinuity issue in the CFSP Ad Hoc Group for Yugoslavia (Rotation of presidency of the group was every 6 months).¹⁰⁹ This is particularly interesting in accordance to the previous chapter, as one of the WEU conclusions from the failure of dealing with the Yugoslav war was the establishment of the WEU planning cell.

Despite not addressing the EUAM mission directly, other scholars' articles will also be briefly presented. Monika Palmberger's article *Practices of Border Crossing in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case of Mostar* gives the reader insight into more personal, individual views of the city in the imminent post war. By doing interviews, the author gave detailed insight into social concepts and interactions among Bosniaks and Croats in the post war period, helping the reader understand how the events *mirrored onto* the city's residents and their everyday lives.¹¹⁰ Also worth noting is the work done by Christia Fotini, whose text about alliances in civil wars analyzed the mutual perception of Bosniaks and Croats through newspaper articles. This article proved useful in establishing a discourse of mistrust; however, the discourse I will establish will not use newspapers or any literature of similar nature for its *construction*.

Therefore, it is safe to argue that the academic community has multiple explanations to why the mission can be considered not successful, however, all their explanations vary on the question: *why?* What I argue is different from what was presented in the paragraphs above. My argument is quite simple as compared to the other scholars – I argue that a long brewing discourse of mistrust existed between the Bosniaks and Croats, and that the EUAM mission framework was not at all synchronized with this. Moreover, I argue that the failure is embodied in the fact that the EUAM never took hostilities in the field as a crucial element for attempting to reunite the city, and that this is the main reason why the UPFM temporarily disbanded in February of 1997, after a notorious shootout. Concrete evidence of the joint

¹⁰⁹ Monar, Jörg. 1997 "Mostar: Three Lessons for the European Union" *European Foreign Affairs Review* (2/1): 1 -5, p. 1

¹¹⁰ Palmberger, Monika. 2013. "Practices of border crossing in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina: the case of Mostar. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* (20/5): 544 – 560., p. 551

police force temporarily disbanding is located in document HAEU-WEU-1609¹¹¹, whereas a UN document from 1997 shows the police force established again, albeit not within the EUAM, but under UN organization.¹¹² Therefore the Liska Park incident has the role both of a causal mechanism of mistrust among Bosniaks and Croats, and is empirical evidence the police force disbandment.

Master Cleavages

In order to give this part of the research a theoretical platform, diving into theories of ethnic conflict gives a rather fruitful framework for making sense of why history went down the path it did in Mostar. While analyzing multiple theories of ethnic conflict, I found that the master cleavages theory proposed by Ashutosh Varshney best suit the following research. Briefly, Varshney's text provides a sociological inquiry into why ethnicities go to conflict. Within his analysis, the term *master cleavage* is presented through a constructivist lens, arguing that every society has a conflict that is historically constructed, hence a master cleavage.¹¹³ This constructivist theory is used as a theoretical background for this case study, as the master cleavage between Bosniaks and Croats is the starting point for the construction of the discourse of mistrust. Furthermore, as will be seen, institutionalist views of ethnic conflict were also introduced to engage with social concepts, as will be seen. Briefly, counterparts of the institutionalist theory in ethnic conflict suggest that designs of representative political institutions can explain why some multiethnic societies have violence, and others, peace.¹¹⁴

The historical narrative shaping the antagonisms in modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina can be traced since the Ottoman Empire's arrival in the region, whereas the context established during World War II and Communist Yugoslavia eras also added to the narrative, which will be evident in the speech analysis. Despite the master cleavage between

¹¹¹ HAEU-WEU-1609

¹¹² UNSC/1997/6369

¹¹³ Varshney, Ashutosh. 2007. "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict" In Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 287

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 289

Croats and Bosniaks being the theoretical framework, this paper is not focused on the history surrounding the two, and therefore will only provide a brief overview.

Varshney also introduces a critique of the *master cleavage* by claiming that it only appears on the national, not sub-national levels (such as cities with different racial groups). Despite Croats and Muslims inhabiting the same country, they are two distinct nations with a complex history of their own, so the master cleavage theory as proposed by Varshney can grasp the situation. Thus, I would argue that using constructivism is the most logical choice as a theoretical framework for this project.¹¹⁵

The methodology I will be utilising to prove my claims is of a twofold nature: My first step is finding empirical evidence of the discourse of mistrust I proposed. After finding this evidence, I proceed to analyze it and construct *layers* of my discourse, of which 3 are presented in the following paragraphs. After these layers are presented and the discourse of mistrust strengthened, I proceed to explain the mistrust as the key causal mechanism that sparked problems for, and ultimately failed the EU on this peacekeeping test.

As noted, the methodological practice is conducted in two steps. The first step is an analysis of speech given by Arif Pašalić on the War Radio of Bosnia & Herzegovina on June 30th 1993, a few days after heavy fighting broke out between Bosniak Army (ARBiH) and Croatian Defence Council (HVO) troops in the city. By focusing primarily on the vocabulary of the speech, I want to analyze the meanings of these words, define their position within the cleavage, and most importantly, point out to the fact that the ongoing discourse was one of mistrust and hostility. Furthermore, an analysis of the article *Practices of Border Crossing in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina: the case of Mostar* gives a different insight into this discourse, as the article relies on the neighbourliness (*komšiluk*) discourse, which will be problematized. Despite being hard to categorize between material and non-material, empirical evidence gives the discourse further meaning, as I argue that events can be reflections or even full manifestations of discourses. Therefore, relying on documents, the shooting of 1997 will be analyzed in order to contribute, strengthen and prove that a discourse of mistrust (which can be viewed as *Longue durée* structure) was in fact,

¹¹⁵ Ibid

overlooked by the WEU. The historical insight, speech of Arif Pašalić, critical analysis of the *komšiluk* through the lens of institutionalism and the shooting of 1997 are observable manifestations of the proposed mistrust, and can simultaneously be viewed as layers of the discourse. Layering a discourse is a key step in proving its existence and in its further utilization.¹¹⁶

The Speech

On the 30th of June 1993, ARBiH commander Arif Pašalić gave an interview on the War Radio of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The interview, transcribed and translated to English, can be found in the 2nd book published by Croatian Defence Council general Slobodan Praljak¹¹⁷, and is the only interview reflecting the discourse I have managed to find. The speech was made during tense fighting in the city, and reflects one of the operations conducted by the ARBiH, as well as a call for other citizens of the city to join the ARBiH. The speech is not long, as its transcription is less than a page and a half.

The words of choice within the speech are my main focus in the analysis. I tend to locate words that reflect mistrust, hatred, violence and see if they could be associated with the master cleavage. The master cleavage plays a great role here, as it functions as a framework which one can use to identify the origin of this discourse.

The speech starts with a call to all Muslims, *honest Croats* and *loyal Serbs*. The choice of adjectives is for Croats and Serbs is to an extent synchronized with a practice of mistrust, as the call is forwarded only to the *honest* and *loyal* ones, implying that the leading Bosniak officials have little or no trust to the non-Bosniak populace.

Pašalić continues his speech with addressing military operations conducted earlier that morning by the HVO units. Pašalić's vocabular selection is one that heavily implies of mistrust, hatred and clearly addresses the master cleavage. All this is embodied in the word *Ustaše*, which is a term for the Croatian fascist movement sponsored primarily by Mussolini's

¹¹⁶ Neumann, Iver. 2008. "Discourse Analysis" In *Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A Pluralist Guide*, eds. Audie Klotz & Deepa Prakash. 61 – 78. London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 73

¹¹⁷ Praljak, Slobodan. 2014. *Development of political and military preparations regarding the attacks of ABiH on HVO in Central Bosnia and the Valley of the Neretva River in the period from 1992 to 1994/Mostar/AbiH offensive against HVO "Neretva 93"/Volunteers from Croatia (HV) in ABiH and HVO & Other Truths*. Zagreb: Oktavijan, p. 531 (REFERENCED LATER AS: D-116/1)

fascist Italy, which took power and proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 (A puppet state of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy). In a rhetorical context, one can think of it as a synonym, or even homonym, for Nazi. This particular word embodies a fragment of the master cleavage between Bosniaks and Croats which started in 1941, during World War II. After the disbandment of the Independent State of Croatia in 1945 and the establishment of Yugoslavia, the cleavage was modified by a Serbian dominated state – any articulation of Croatism was equalised with the Ustaše movement, whereas the Bosniaks (then Muslims) were stripped of their national category and forced either to identify (nationally) as Croats or Serbs. The Muslims would identify as would the Muslim communist leader, which was always Serbian. Because of this, Muslim participation in the Ustaše movement was overlooked by communist authorities and the Ustaše connotation was attributed to Croats exclusively.¹¹⁸ By utilising the ongoing discourse, one can dive into the cleavage and identify layers, and also explain why certain discourses emerged at a certain time.

The Ustaša term is indeed critical within the speech. As I have explained, this term is a synonym to Nazism, and carries a hateful connotation. Furthermore, the Ustaša term is also attributed to Mate Boban, the political leader of Croats in Bosnia & Herzegovina at the time. He also urges citizens of the city to beat the *Ustaša* on every corner¹¹⁹, and concludes his speech by calling for everyone who can carry a rifle or throw a rock, to kill the Ustaše because life in the city will not be possible with them, but only with Muslims, honest Croats and loyal Serbs.

Another layer of this discourse can be found when Pašalić mourns one of the fallen ARBiH soldiers, using the word *Šehid*, which in the Islamic world is used to describe victims or marauders. Its meaning in Islam is of grand value, and has been utilised in the political sphere numerous times. For instance, assassinated Irani general Qassem Soleimani was declared a *šehid*, or marauder after his death. The *šehid* terminology was brought into the cleavage during the Ottoman Empire's presence, and its use in 1993 surely suggests that the Bosniak Croat war is indeed located within the framework of the cleavage.

¹¹⁸ Lučić, Ivica. 2013. *Uzroci Rata*. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, p. 18

¹¹⁹ D-116/1

Despite only one speech, we can proceed to layer this discourse. I would argue that the vocabulary is the most important part, as the chosen words reflect the master cleavage theory. First of all, the speaker chose not to frame the entire populace into the Ustaše category, but instead resorted to addressing the *honest Croats*, clearly implying that there is a general mistrust for the populace. Invoking the Ustaše word is perhaps the best element possible to use to truly illustrate the mistrust, as the word carries heavy connotations produced in earlier phases of the cleavage. At last, the *šehid* vocabulary choice leads the reader to interpret the speaker's opinion of his own as glorious heroes who could not be possibly responsible for any wrongdoing. From this point of view, it is more than certain that a discourse of mistrust, powered by a long going master cleavage, had surfaced. Also important to point out is, that scholars did not address this issue, or merely brushed upon it.

Discussing *Komšilik*

As was noted earlier, an analysis of Monika Palmberger's article *Practices of Border Crossing in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case of Mostar*, provides detailed field work with both Bosniaks and Croats as the subject. By doing interviews the researcher managed to establish that post-war, members of neither ethnicity felt *at home on the other side*, preferring to stay in their own part – Croats in the western part and Bosniaks in East Mostar.¹²⁰ However, what I wish to problematize here is the concept of *komšilik*. As noted in the theoretical outlook, the master cleavage theory relies on the national level and is visible through the country's history.¹²¹ I propose to discuss the *komšilik* through the lens of institutionalism, in order to explain why I think that *komšilik* was on the surface, rather than being deeply-rooted within the society.

The practice of institutionalism in explaining ethnic conflicts lay in the simple premise that where a mechanical transfer of institutions forms, regardless of whether the society is multi ethnic or not, can lead to ethnic conflict. This is obvious in the transfer from Yugoslavian, socialist institutions to national institutions. Furthermore, Varshney stresses

¹²⁰ Palmberger, Monika. 2013. "Palmberger, M. (2013). Practices of border crossing in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina: the case of Mostar. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* (20/5): 544 – 560., p. 551

¹²¹ Varshney, Ashutosh. 2007. „Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict“ In *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 287

that only under the tutelage of a more politically advanced ethnic group can order be maintained and ethnic violence avoided.¹²² First of all I wish to argue that this *komšiluk*, which Palmberger defines as *a way to express what was and what no longer is and to emphasise today's tense relations between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs*,¹²³ was not a discontinuation of the master cleavage, but rather a result of the KPJ taking over institutions and acting as the *more politically advanced group* (ethnically speaking, the KPJ was of a mixed composure). What seemed to be an end in the cleavage was rather a *breather* imposed by the KPJ under the paradigm of fraternity and unity.

However so, it is possible to argue that, symbolically, the seeds of the cleavage were sown in 1463, more than 500 years before the WEU Mostar missions. With the fall of the medieval Bosnian Kingdom, the Bosnian Church vanished alongside it, with Bosniak scholars claiming that around 60% of the followers converted to Islam, marking the symbolic start to the Bosniak nation, whereas Croatian and Serbian scholars claiming that the converts were indeed of the former, or latter origin.¹²⁴ With the establishment of Ottoman rule, swift Islamization was imposed upon Bosnian and Herzegovinian territories, with those opposing to convert, in the best scenario, being socially marginalized. Furthermore, the peasants were subject to contribute to their Ottoman Sipahi lords. The peasants, known as *raja*, had no political rights.¹²⁵ Islam was the state religion, and followers of other religions, such as Orthodox and especially Catholics were marginalized and discriminated upon, which resulted in the partial emigration of these people. Furthermore, it was under Ottoman rule that ethnicity shaping took place, along with changes in cultural templates. With the Ottoman rule leaving the territories, the Muslim community remained, which was the seed of the modern Bosniak nation. The discrimination and marginalization play an evident role in master cleavage – widening the gap between the religious groups which were the modern nations in the process of formation. Also, mistrust is represented in the folk saying *Kadija te*

¹²² Ibid, 289.

¹²³ Palmberger, Monika. 2013. "Palmberger, M. (2013). Practices of border crossing in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina: the case of Mostar. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* (20/5): 544 – 560., p. 556

¹²⁴ Iličić, Gordana. 2008. "Hrvati u BiH 1991.-1995. godine: nacionalni sukobi i uloga međunarodne zajednice u mirovnim procesima" *National Security and the Future* (9/3): 73 – 113, p. 78 -79

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 79

tuži, kadija te sudi, implying that the judicial system of the Ottoman Empire was corrupt, with the kadijas being Ottoman judges whose existence is often compared with unequal treatment – the same person is suing and judging you, which ultimately points to the fact that justice was non-existent.¹²⁶ The fact that this saying remains in use in modern times implies not only remembrance of a corrupt judicial system, but also mistrust towards another ethnicity, later nation.

Furthermore, a history of skirmishes between Christian Slavs and Slavic Muslims had also taken place. As Milenko Petrović points out, the Slavic Muslims would often take sides with the regular Ottoman Forces.¹²⁷ The last, and most important one of these skirmishes, the 1875 – 1877 Hercegovina uprising took place in Southern Hercegovina, with the Catholics (Croats) starting the uprising in the village of Gabela, whereas the Orthodox (Serbs) parallelly starting an uprising in Nevesinje. The fact that the Slavic Muslims sided with the Ottoman regulars not only in this instance, but in other uprisings as well, adds to a discourse of mistrust.

With the stated examples used as a cleavage explanation, it is also possible to establish that the mistrust was being forged on different level through an extensive timespan. The *komšiluk* harmony, described by many subjects in Palmberger's article would suggest that these events never took place, or were not anymore present in public memory. However, this is where I argue that the institutionalist view of ethnic conflict comes into place. As noted, I argue that it was the KPJ, their institution building that played the role of the more politically advanced group, that managed to halt the mistrust, but only at a surface level. This can be argued taken into fact the epistemological paradigm of the Yugoslavian state – *brotherhood and unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo)* – which emphasized the importance of one identifying primarily with antifascist values, rather than national identity.¹²⁸ Therefore, I argue that the discourse of mistrust could have been *supressed* during communist Yugoslavia, and that the *komšiluk* is just a term used during an era of diminishing tensions.

¹²⁶ proleksis.lzmk.hr/29580/

¹²⁷ Petrović, Milenko. *The Democratic Transition of Post-Communist Europe*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 68 - 69

¹²⁸ Stier, Davor Ivo. 2015. *Nova hrvatska paradigma: Ogled o društvenoj integraciji i razvoju*. Zagreb: Tim Press p. 14 – 15.

However, as will be seen, the mistrust surfaced almost instantly after the fall of Yugoslavia and played a key role in undermining the rather ambitious policing mission of the WEU.

Liska Park

The final layer of the mistrust discourse is the 1997 shooting in Liska Park. During the aforementioned 1992 aggression on Mostar, the park on Liska street in today's West Mostar was converted into a cemetery, in which both Bosniaks and Croats buried their dead. The unusual set of circumstances paved the way towards a multi ethnic graveyard – something that was not practiced in Bosnia & Herzegovina, even during the Yugoslavia period.¹²⁹ After the 1993 Bosniak-Croat clash in the city, the Liska cemetery area was under the control of the HVO, subsequently making the Liska area part of West Mostar.

A notorious shooting in 1997 plays the role of the final layer of the discourse of mistrust. Despite the shooting taking place after the EUAM mandate, it only tends to prove that the framework of the EUAM mission was too ambitious, and failed to passivize the mistrust. In other words, the Liska shooting not only marked failure of the mission, but also serves as a historic occurrence that proves how deep the material counterpart of this discourse really was. As was noted before, the Liska cemetery was a mixed cemetery for both Bosniak and Croat casualties, which happened due to a special set of circumstances. Also, after the city was *carved* into blocks, with 3 under control by the Croat side, 3 by the Bosniak side and the central zone under mutual control, the Liska graveyard was in the zone controlled by the Croatian side.¹³⁰

On February 10th, during the Muslim holiday of Bajram, a procession of several hundred Bosniaks headed to the graveyard, as is customary for the holiday.¹³¹ The group was accompanied by the IPTF (International Police Task Force), the successor of the UPFM, and the deputy mayor of Mostar. The procession crossed the *Bulevar*, which during war time was the demarcation point between the Bosniak and Croat controlled side, and was *en route*

¹²⁹ Makaš Gunzberger, Emily. 2011. "Mostar's Central Zone: Battles over Shared Space in a Divided City" Conference presentation from Urban Conflicts: Ethno-Nationalist Divisions, States and Cities, Queen's University, Belfast, United Kingdom, May 19th to 21st, 2011.

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ UNSC/1997/204

to the cemetery. At the same time, a few blocks away, a group of Croats were celebrating carnival, near the *Rondo*, a West Mostar roundabout. Upon entering Liska street, the procession was stopped by West Mostar police, advising them not to continue, which the procession ignored and continued. The West Mostar police then deployed a vehicle in an attempt to make a roadblock, which proved to be unsuccessful. Furthermore, more West Mostar Police officers joined, some in uniform and some in plain clothes. With the procession still refusing to turn around, the West Mostar Police drew their batons and started to beat individuals in the crowd, causing the crowd to retreat.¹³² At this point, certain officers drew their pistols and started to fire into the crowd, fatally injuring an individual, while the procession was fleeing back to Eastern Mostar. The situation sparked further violence within the city, with Bosniaks targeting Croats and vice versa. A report dated from February 12th 1997 by Robert Wasserman, the acting IPTF commissioner, stated that: *The failure of the police, both East Mostar and West Mostar, to provide protection to potential and actual victims of the series of cross-entity attacks within the city and on the travel routes leading from the city in the days following the confrontation on 10 February, illustrates the serious absence of professional police leadership throughout the area.*¹³³

This brief analysis of the incident of 1997 was not to establish who was right or who was wrong, but rather to prove that a discourse of mistrust was far from passivized – it rather culminated in a violent skirmish that resulted in a person losing his life. Therefore, this concludes the analysis of the third layer of the discourse. By analyzing a speech from 1993, interpreting the *komšilik* concept as a rather short fragment of the timespan in the master cleavage, and finally presenting in a rather materialistic way of how the discourse culminated into violence, I wished to prove that this discourse was in fact very real, and that the European goal to reunite the city was not synchronized to the situation in the field, but rather ignored the most vital barrier which was, and remains crucial to reuniting the city. The following paragraphs will *operationalize* the discourse through which I tend to prove that it was the main barrier for achieving the EUAM final goal.

¹³² Ibid

¹³³ Special Investigation Group Mission Headquarters. February 12th 1997. Report in Pursuance of the Decisions on Mostar of 12 February 1997 (available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr_archive/fed-forum-report-mostar-24-february-1997-3/)

Process Tracing

The method of process tracing is frequently used in social studies and humanities to explain why a certain outcome took place. In the context of this case study, the main goal is explaining why the UPFM failed. Since this was part of the EUAM mission, explaining this outcome is also important to explain the failure of the mission in general. Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen differentiate theory-testing (deductive) and theory-building (inductive) process tracing methodologies.¹³⁴ As noted in the opening of this part of the thesis, the conclusions from academic work concentrated on this case can be used as causal mechanisms to explain the outcome in which the UPFM failed. Therefore, all the scholarly literature presented in the opening paragraphs can be *inserted* into this mechanism. The theories created in these works have already identified causal mechanisms which are different from mine – ambitious framework, incohesive response etc. My approach was inductive, as I built my causal mechanisms from scratch – by using documents and other auxiliary literature, I was able to identify the existence of a discourse that plays an essential role in the process tracing mechanism. The documents I used led me to establish at least 3 causal mechanisms in the form of speech, social concepts and events. What distinguishes my approach from other author's explanations is that I introduced both non-materialistic and materialistic elements into the discourse – non-materialistic being speech and social concepts, whereas the Liska episode was a materialistic embodiment of the discourse.

In their vision of process tracing, the aforementioned authors suggest that a sufficient explanation must be provided within research in order to explain the link between **X** and **Y**. In this case, **Y** is the outcome, whereas **X** can be viewed as the beginning of the process.¹³⁵ In this particular case, the beginning of the process is the inadequate grasp over the peacekeeping mission by the EU. However, brining empirical evidence *to the table* is important in order to explain why this particular set of circumstances is **X**, and not another one. As I noted in the beginning of the Mostar case studies, academics that produced work on this topic were only in agreement on one thing – that the EUAM had proposed and

¹³⁴ Beach, Derek, Rasmus Pedersen. 2013. *Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, p. 19

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 20 - 21

attempting in setting up a framework that proved to be extremely ambitious. Therefore, by analyzing their work, I find it appropriate to argue that the framework, which was generally too ambitious, complex, and borderline functional is the **X** variable. It is possible to identify two empirical manifestations of this – firstly, as was noted, the mission was dependent on goodwill. This is found in the HAEU-WEU-1526 document.¹³⁶ Other empirical manifestations are presented by the scholars whose work was discussed in the opening of this chapter, such as the *ad hoc* groups dysfunctionality or lack of effective planning. The outcome has also been established, and that is the disbandment of the joint Mostar Police. The empirical evidence supporting this is in document HAEU-WEU-1609, which stresses that the shooting virtually annihilated all attempts for pursuing a joint police force.¹³⁷

However, establishing a cohesive link between the two variables was the task of this chapter. Building from the bottom up, my theory was that a mistrust whose origins were present for a long time is the main causal mechanism linking **X** and **Y**. I proved this firstly by building the discourse itself, by using both material and non-material evidence. My proposed layers embodied in a speech, social concepts and a violent event proved the existence of this discourse, which I then used to explain the main element of why the European Union failed in achieving its goals in Mostar.

The aim of this chapter was not to narrate the history of Mostar in the 1990s, but rather to investigate and answer the main research question of why the UPFM disbanded. I investigated this by reviewing what other scholars concluded in their work, by analyzing documents and secondary literature and embedding all empirical evidence into a process tracing mechanism, while simultaneously using a combination of constructivist and institutionalist theories of ethnic conflict. What I still find interesting is the lack of work conducted on this topic. Precisely because of that, I went to prove what at first seemed the most obvious reason why – mistrust. However, sometimes explaining what one deems as obvious and logical can indeed prove to be a complex task, like here, but with adequate methodology, hard-turned simple tasks prove to be projects worth conducting.

¹³⁶ HAEU-WEU-1529

¹³⁷ HAEU-WEU-1609

Concluding Remarks

This thesis was never envisioned to reproduce already known facts, try to answer the unanswerable, but to add to the literary corpus focused on explaining the links between organizations of European integration and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the first chapter I parallelly analyzed the evolution of European economic and security integration, whereas simultaneously drawing links between the aforementioned processes and Yugoslavia. I argued that there was indeed a *Yugoslavian policy* in Europe. I also hinted that in the security spectrum, Europe was far from integrated, and member states national interests often prevailed. When violence in Yugoslavia started, the economic integration among EC member states proved to be insufficient to deal with the crisis, whereas the security sector was not integrated enough to enact mutual action to effectively stop the violence at the beginning. In the second chapter, I pointed to the fact that even before Yugoslavia, European defence organizations were not well coordinated, and that member states interests often produced quarrels among them, rather than further uniting them. A discourse which can symbolically be traced to the infamous *Hour of Europe* speech, I analyzed it from its ambitious initial goals of dealing with the Yugoslav crisis without external help, to its actual embodiment in various CFSP missions, such as policing the Danube. From the WEU perspective, the organization had once again admitted it had not reacted properly in the Yugoslav crisis. The documents point to the days of Maastricht, where any unilateral move by any signee state in accordance to the Yugoslav crisis could have endangered Europe's path to integration. In the third chapter I argued that a discourse of mistrust is the best suitable way to explain why the European Union did not succeed in reuniting Mostar. After conducting a twofold methodological process and pinning onto a theoretical platform, I proved that my explanation is valid and explains why the mission failed.

Writing this thesis proved to both challenging and entertaining at the same time. I started the writing process with the wish not to reproduce, but to genuinely bring something new *to the table*. One of the postulates of being a historian is constantly going back to the sources, which played a pivotal role in this thesis. Furthermore, I am also keen to writing history as interdisciplinary as possible. For instance, methodological processes more characteristic to the studies of international relations were used in Part III, and give a

different insight and path on answering a research question. As time goes on, I am in belief that historians must adapt to changes in the academic community, and resort to writing as interdisciplinary as possible – only that way can we keep the craft interesting and novel. Analyzing primary and secondary sources from different perspectives and with a concise and coherently developed critical apparatus in the mind of the historian keeps history relevant. I also wanted to point out how a seemingly over-analyzed subject such as the collapse of Yugoslavia could be analyzed from overwhelmingly different perspective, and be novel at the same time. Therefore, not only do I hope the readers of this thesis, especially the younger generations, find it interesting, but also hope to further encourage them in their own endeavours to consume and produce history in their unique way.

Summary

The dissolution of Yugoslavia has been analyzed from many perspectives and in many disciplines of humanities and social sciences. The international community and its presence, endeavours and involvement in Yugoslavia remain of interest to scholars. The European Union played a significant role in the dissolution process as well, which was the main analytical interest of this thesis.

This thesis answers questions on the simultaneously evolving processes of European integration, and how European organizations that were products of this integration constructed and developed relations with a country that did not belong to either Cold War block, Yugoslavia. The thesis explores the relations between the numerous organisations of European integrations and Yugoslavia from the days of the COMINFORM period up to the violent disintegration, further explores the European approach during the Yugoslav crisis, and concludes with conducting a case study of the city of Mostar, and why the first European Union peacekeeping mission is deemed a failure.

Sažetak

Raspad Jugoslavije analiziran je iz mnogih perspektiva te iz točke gledište mnogobrojnih društvenih znanosti i disciplina humanistike. Međunarodna zajednica i njena prisutnost, pothvati i umiješanost u raspadu Jugoslavije i dalje je znanstvenicima zanimljiva tema. Europska unija je također odigrala bitnu ulogu u procesu raspada, što je glavna tema ovog diplomskog rada.

Rad odgovara na pitanja o istovremenim razvojnim procesima europske integracije te kako su europske organizacije koje su bile plod razvoja istih integracija stvorile i razvijale političke odnose s državom koja nije pripadala niti jednom bloku hladnog rata, Jugoslavijom. Rad istražuje odnose između mnogobrojnih organizacija europske integracije i Jugoslavije od doba INFORMBIROa do njenog nasilnog raspada, nastavlja istraživanjem *europskog pristupa* jugoslavenskoj krizi, te završava *studijom slučaja* o gradu Mostaru i zašto se prva mirovna misija Europske unije smatra neuspjehom.

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